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1986 DIGILAW 181 (GUJ)

PRAFULCHANDRA SOMALAL VASANI v. STATE

1986-10-01

B.S.KAPADIA, D.C.GHEEWALA

body1986
B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) CRIMINAL Appeal No. 236 of 1983 is filed by Prafulchandra Somalal Vasani original accused No. 1 against the order of conviction for the offence punishable under sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and further for the conviction for the offence punishable under sec. 5 (1) (d) read with sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months and a fine of Rs. 500. 00 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 2 months passed by the learned Special Judge Bhavnagar District on 9/02/1983 in Special Case No. 1 of 1982. The State has filed Criminal Appeal No. 343 of 1983 against appellant Prafulchandra Somalal Vasani under sec. 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code for enhancement of the sentence on the ground that on Special reason is made out by the learned Special Judge for awarding lesser sentence. In Special Case No. 1 of 1982 original accused No. 2 was one Purshottam Sukha. He was also charged for the offence punishable under sec. 5 (2) read with sec. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and also for the offence punishable under secs. 161 and 165a of the Indian Penal Code. However the learned Special Judge has found him not guilty and therefore acquitted him of the said charges levelled against him. The State has filed Criminal Appeal No 344 of 1983 against the acquittal or original accused No. 2 Purshottam Sukha. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) MR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) MR. N. N. Gandhi the learned advocate appearing for the appellant - (accused No. 1) submits that the evidence led by the prosecution in the case for the purpose of proving the technique of the anthracene powder alleged to have been applied on the currency notes and thereafter alleged to have been found from the person of the accused and the complainant cannot be accepted in view of the decisions of this Court. Mr. Gandhi further submits that the Panch witnesses are not independent and therefore their evidence cannot be relied upon. Mr. Gandhi submits that the evidence of the complainant also cannot be relied upon particularly when it is not corroborated by other substantive evidence. Mr. Gandhi also submits that the evidence of P. I. Chauhan is the evidence of an interested witness and therefore that evidence also cannot be relied upon without corroboration. According to Mr. Gandhi the material witnesses are not examined and they are dropped by purshis exh. 24 are according to him witnesses Mohan and Dharamshi were material witnesses and as the material witnesses are not examined according to him an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. For the purpose of the aforesaid submission Mr. Gandhi has relied upon certain authorities. ( 3 ) IT may be stated at the outset that Mr. Gandhi the learned advocate for the appellant (original accused No. 1) has first submitted on the point of the appreciation of evidence particularly that of the complainant bribe giver that his evidence is that of an accomplice and in support of his submission he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Panalal Damodar Rathi V. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court page 1191. In the said case in paragraph 8 it has been observed as under:there could be no doubt that the evidence of the complainant should be corroborated in material particulars. after introduction of sec. In the said case in paragraph 8 it has been observed as under:there could be no doubt that the evidence of the complainant should be corroborated in material particulars. after introduction of sec. 165-A of the I. P. C. making the person who other bribe guilty of abetment of bribery the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon. When the aforesaid observations are to be considered they are to be considered in the light of the facts of that case. The complainant of the said case was being tried for an offence under Bombay Prohibition Act. The appellant before the Supreme Court worked as Police Prosecutor whereas the second accused was on duty as Court orderly. According to the prosecution the appellant advised the compliant to plead guilty 60 that he would be let on on nominal sentence and on his part promised not to bring to the notice of the Court the previous conviction. He demanded Rs. 50. 00 as gratification Again after some days the appellant contacted the complainant and repeated his demand. The complainant promised to make payment on 21/11/1969 In the meanwhile on 19/11/1969 the complainant wrote to the Police Sub- Inspector attached to the Anti-Corruption Branch complaining of the illegal demand and requesting the officer to meet him at his village on the evening of 28/11/1969 as the case was posted for the next day and thereafter trap was arranged and the complainants version was that at about 1 P. M. he and the Panchas stood near the eastern side of the varandah of the Court building the appellant came near him and inquired if he had come. The complainant told him to relieve him from the case and to see he was given a lesser sentence. The appellant asked him if he had brought the money and the complainant told him that be had. The second accused Dalvi was standing there. Complainant was told to pay tine money to constable Dalvi. Appellant asked Dalvi to receive the money from him and then went inside the Court. When this conversation took place between him and the appellant the panchas were standing at a distance of 2 to 3 feet from him. The second accused Dalvi was standing there. Complainant was told to pay tine money to constable Dalvi. Appellant asked Dalvi to receive the money from him and then went inside the Court. When this conversation took place between him and the appellant the panchas were standing at a distance of 2 to 3 feet from him. However in the said case there was no hesitation or non-inclination of the complainant to give bribe. He wanted to take undue advantage from the Public Prosecutor. Under the circumstances he was willing to give bribe and when a man offers the bribe willingly naturally he would be guilty for the offence punishable under sec. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code and therefore he would be an abettor and therefore his evidence can be treated as that of an accomplice. In the said case there was inconsistency between his version and prosecution witness No. 3 with regard to conversation and therefore the benefit of doubt was given to them. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid observations are made in respect of the complainant who had willingly offered the bribe. ( 4 ) AS against the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court the learned Public Prosecutor brought to our notice the observations made in the decision in the case of Ambalal Motibhai Patel v. State report in AIR 1961 Gujarat page 1. In paragraph 4 it is observed as under:as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court a person who is not a willing party to giving of bribe and who is only actuated by the motive of trapping another cannot be regarded as an accomplice but the evidence of such a witness is that of a partisan witness who was out to entrap another. Although their Lordships observed that such a person was a partisan witness they did not lay down the principle that as he was a partisan witness his evidence requires to be corroborated by independent evidence. A partisan witness merely means a person who is interested in the prosecution and in bribery cases in the successful laying of a trap and in the successful prosecution of the alleged bribe taker. In other cases also there may be interested witness. A partisan witness merely means a person who is interested in the prosecution and in bribery cases in the successful laying of a trap and in the successful prosecution of the alleged bribe taker. In other cases also there may be interested witness. If a person is murdered the relatives of the deceased person may be regarded as interested witnesses but there Is no rule that in the case of an interested witness there must always be independent corroboration. In the case of an interested witness the Courts must always weigh the evidence with particular caution and if after scrutinizing the evidence of an interested witness it is found to be unsatisfactory in some respects. In such cases independent corroboration would be necessary before the prosecution case can be accepted. This is the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322 . ( 5 ) ANOTHER decision which has been brought to our notice is the decision in the case of State of U. P. v. Dr. G. K. Ghosh reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court page 1453. In the said case in paragraph 10 Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :10 By and large a citizen is somewhat reluctant rather than anxious to complain to the Vigilance Department and to have a trap arranged even if illegal gratification is demanded by a Government servant. There are numerous reasons for reluctance. In the first place he has to make a number of visits to the office of Vigilance Department and to wait on a number of officers. He has to provided his own currency notes for arranging a trap He has to comply with several formalities and sign several statements He has to accompany the officers and participants of the raiding party and play the main role. All the while he has to remain away from his job work or avocation. He has to sacrifice his time and effort whilst doing so. Therefore he has to attend the Court at the time of the trial from day-to-day. He has to withstand the searching cross-examination by the defence counsel as if he himself is guilty of some fault. In the result a citizen who has been harassed by a Government officer has to face all these hazards. Therefore he has to attend the Court at the time of the trial from day-to-day. He has to withstand the searching cross-examination by the defence counsel as if he himself is guilty of some fault. In the result a citizen who has been harassed by a Government officer has to face all these hazards. And if the explanation offered by the accused is accepted by the Court he has to face the humiliation of being considered as person who tried to falsely implicate a Government servant not to speak of facing the wrath of the Government servants of the department concerned in his future dealings with the department. No one would therefore be too keen or too anxious to face such an ordeal. Ordinarily it is only when a citizen feels oppressed by a feeling of being wronged and finds the situation to be beyond endurance that he adopts the course of approaching the Vigilance Department for laying a trap. His evidence cannot therefore be easily or lightly brushed aside. Of course it cannot be gainsaid that it does Dot mean that the Court should be oblivious of the need for caution and circumspection bearing in mind that one can conceive of cases where an honest or strict Government official may be falsely implicated by a vindictive person to whose demands for showing favours or for according a special treatment by giving a go-by to the rules the official refuses to yield. After making the aforesaid observations the Supreme Court observed that the Court might therefore depending on the circumstances of a case feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis of public officers even if the trap witnesses turned hostile or were found not to be independent. When therefore besides such evidence there was circumstantial evidence which was consistent with the guilt of the accused and not consistent with his innocence there should be no difficulty in upholding the prosecution case. ( 6 ) THUS from the aforesaid decisions it is clear that it all depends on the circumstances of each case as to whether the bribe-giver that is the complainant was willing to give bribe or that he was compelled and reluctantly he agreed to give bribe. ( 6 ) THUS from the aforesaid decisions it is clear that it all depends on the circumstances of each case as to whether the bribe-giver that is the complainant was willing to give bribe or that he was compelled and reluctantly he agreed to give bribe. If he was not willing to give bribe but under the circumstances was compelled to agree to give bribe then he cannot be treated as an abettor and his evidence cannot be treated as evidence of an accomplice and if the Court feels it safe to rely on the evidence of that witness after due caution the order of conviction can be based on the evidence of that witness and there is no need of independent corroboration of his evidence like that of an accomplice. However if the Court feels it not safe to implicitly rely on the evidence of that witness the Court may seek corroboration from other evidence. In a case where the panch witnesses turned hostile and/or are found to be not independent in such a case looking to the facts and circumstances each case the Court may rely on the evidence of the complainant and also that of the Police Officer for the purpose of convicting the accused when the attending circumstances are consistent with the guilt and not consistent with the innocence of the accused. ( 7 ) THE second submission made by Mr. Gandhi learned advocate is that when the panch witnesses are Government servants they are not independent witnesses and in support of the submission he has relied on a decision in a case of Raghbir Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court page 91. In the said case His Lordship Bhagwati 1 (as he then was) has observed as under:we must take opportunity of impressing on the officers functioning in the anticorruption department to insist on observing this safeguard as zealously and scrupulously as possible for the protection of public servants against whom a trap may have to be laid. They must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and the Court is not left in any doubt as to whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe. They must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and the Court is not left in any doubt as to whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe. In the said case there was evidence of one Jagdish Raj and Arjun Das for the purpose of holding that a sum of Rs. 50. 00 was paid by Jagdish Raj to the appellant by way of bribe. It was held that the prosecution case also suffered from another serious infirmity and it was that it rested entirely on the evidence of the witnesses who were either interested witnesses or police witnesses Jagdish Raj was clearly an interested witness because he was concerned in laying the trap for the appellant. Arjun Das was also an interested witness as he was a relative of Jagdish Raj. Jagdish Raj admitted in his evidence that Arjun Das was his relative and so did Arjun Das. In that case Arjun Das was not secured as a witness to the raid by Inspector Hardas Singh. He was picked up by Jagdish Raj when he was going to meet his sister in Putligar and taken to the Special Enquiry Agency. His defence was that he tad taken leave from his work as he wanted to meet his sister even though the raid was over and it was therefore held that it was extremely Improbable that Arjun Das was really going to meet his sister when he was diverted by Jagdish Raj and taken as a member of the raiding party. Arjun Das therefore could not be regarded as an independent person. Inspector Hardas knew this fact still he did not care to secure an independent person to act as a witness of the raid. In fact one Mohanlal bad acted as a witness when Jagdish Raj gave information to Inspector Hardas Singh in regard to the demand or bribe made by the appellant and though he was independent person he was not taken as a witness when they went for raid. Instead Makhan who was a sweeper in the whole time employment of police was taken as a witness. Even he was not sent along with Jagdish to witness the passing of the bribe. Instead Makhan who was a sweeper in the whole time employment of police was taken as a witness. Even he was not sent along with Jagdish to witness the passing of the bribe. Makhan was dropped as a witness on the ground that he was not a man of status. Thus it is clear that the above observations are made in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 8 ) IT may be noted that as against the aforesaid Supreme Court decision the learned Public Prosecutor has pointed out a judgment in the case of State of Gujarat v. Raghunath Vamanrao Baxi reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court page 1092. The Supreme Court in para 5 of the said judgment has observed as under :5 The most important circumstance which seems to have weighed heavily with the High Court almost to the point of obsession was that Parikh and Panchal were not independent witnesses as they were both Government servants and as they bad some previous acquaintance with Inspector Sharma who was assisting Jadeja in the investigation. The High Court was of the view that some other respectable residents of Bhavnagar should have been called as Panch witnesses to be associated with the raid. We are afraid the High Court has entirely misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence In their approach to the evidence the High Court has done injustice to the witnesses and this has resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice. In appreciating oral evidence the question in each case is whether the witness is a truthful witness and whether there is anything to doubt his veracity in any particular matter about which he deposes. Where the witness is found to be untruthful on material facts that is an end of the matter. Where the witness is found to be partly truthful or to spring from tainted sources the Court may take the precaution of seeking some corroboration adequate and reasonable to meet the demands of the situation but a Court is not entitled to reject the evidence of the witnesses merely because they are Government servants who in the course of their duties or even otherwise might have come into contact with investigating officers and who might have been requested to assist the investigating agencies. If the association with the investigating agencies is unusual frequent or designed there may be occasion to view their evidence with suspicion. But merely because they are called in to associate themselves with the investigation as they happened to be available or it is convenient to call them it is no ground to view their evidence with suspicion. Even in cases where officers who in the course of their duties generally assist the investigating agencies there is on need to view their evidence with suspicion as an invariable rule. For example in rural areas investigating officers would ordinarily think of calling in the village officers such as the Head man the Patel or Patwari to act as panch witness as they are expected to be respectable persons of the locality. It does not mean that their evidence should be viewed with suspicion because they are Government servants or because they are generally associated with investigating agencies whenever there is a crime in the village. For that matter it would be wrong to reject the evidence of police officers either of the mere ground that they are interested in the success of the prosecution The Court may be justified in looking with suspicion upon the evidence of officers who have been demonstrated to have displayed excess of zeal in the conduct and success of the prosecution. But to reject the evidence of all official witnesses as the High Court was done in the present case is going too far. We think that it is extremely unfair to a witness to reject his evidence by merely giving him a label. ( 9 ) THUS from the above authorities on this point it is very clear that the evidence of each witness is to be examined without keeping any prejudice as to whether he is a Government servant or not. It may be stated that the panch witness should be an independent witness as required under sec. 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But merely because the panch witness is Government servant his evidence cannot be viewed as that of an interested person unless it is found that he has shown excessive real in the conduct and success of the prosecution. Thus on this count it is not possible to agree with the general submissions made by Mr. But merely because the panch witness is Government servant his evidence cannot be viewed as that of an interested person unless it is found that he has shown excessive real in the conduct and success of the prosecution. Thus on this count it is not possible to agree with the general submissions made by Mr. Gandhi that in all cases of bribe the evidence of the complainant is that of an accomplice and it requires corroboration Further that merely because the panch witnesses are Government servants their evidence cannot be accepted as it that is of an interested person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 10 ) MR. Gandhi has also submitted that the prosecution has failed to examine material witness in this case. It may be stated that in this case the prosecution was satisfied by examining the complainant panch No 1 and Police Officer though the other witnesses are examined on other points. They have dropped amongst others witnesses as per the purshis namely Mohan Bhima at whose house the raid was carried out and Dharamsinh Bhagwan. It is true that according to the complainant they were not receiving the regularly the electric power supply and therefore the complainant Mohan Bhima Dharamsinh Bhagwan and Amba Hira had made the complaint to accused No. 1. Even thereafter when he demanded the bribe of Rs. 500. 00 under the circumstances and reluctancy they were required to agree to pay the bribe amount and accused No. I had agreed to come to the house of Mohan Bhima to get the amount on the next day evening and thereafter they all had discussed and deliberated on the point and they decided not to give any bribe and further decided to file complaint at the time of raid also according to the complainant both the accused came. It is also in evidence that at the time of raid accused No. 2 sat just opposite the complainant and accused No. 2 sat just opposite to Mohan Bhima. However it is not mentioned as to whether Dharamsinh Bhagwan was present at that time or not. Though it was suggested in the cross-examination that Dharamsinh went to call the accused the said suggestion has been denied by the compliant in cross-examination. However it is not mentioned as to whether Dharamsinh Bhagwan was present at that time or not. Though it was suggested in the cross-examination that Dharamsinh went to call the accused the said suggestion has been denied by the compliant in cross-examination. Thus it is clear that the material and important witnesses have been examined and in the purshis it is stated that under the circumstances the witnesses are dropped and that the purshis was recorded. It may be mentioned that in the old case of Stephen Senivartne v. The King reported in AIR 1936 Privy Council page 289 it is observed that their Lordships did not desire to lay down any rules to feter discretion on a matter such as that which was so dependent on the particular circumstances of each case. It is further observed in the case that at the same time they could not speaking generally approve of an idea that prosecution must call witnesses irrespective of consideration of number and of reliability or that a prosecution ought to discharge the functions both of prosecution and defence. If it did so confusion is very apt to result and never was it more likely to result than if the prosecution called witnesses and they proceeded almost automatically to discredit them by cross-examination. It was further observed that the witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution was based must of course be called by the prosecution whether in the result the effect of their testimony is for or against the case for the prosecution. Even subsequently the above view of the Privy Council was affirmed on the proposition that it was the duty of the prosecution to examine all material witnesses who could give account of the narrative of the events on which the prosecution is essentially based and that the question depended on the circumstances of each case. ( 11 ) NOW herein in the present case the material witnesses are the complainant panch and the Police Officer who knew about the demand of bribe by the accused. Mohan Bhima was a person at whose place the raid was carried out but he cannot give all details as to how the trap was arranged. Similarly it is not the suggestion that Dharamsinh was present at the time when the raid was carried out. Mohan Bhima was a person at whose place the raid was carried out but he cannot give all details as to how the trap was arranged. Similarly it is not the suggestion that Dharamsinh was present at the time when the raid was carried out. It is therefore clear in the facts and circumstances of the case that these two witnesses were not able to give all detailed account of the events and therefore the learned Public Prosecutor had exercised discretion in dropping them and therefore there is no question of drawing an inference against the prosecution for not examining them. It may be stated that it was suggested that Dharamsinh went to call the accused which fact has been denied by the witness. When that is so it was open for the defence to examine Dharamsinh as defence witness but the defence has chosen not to examine him. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 12 ) IN the result all the appeals being Criminal Appeal No. 236 of 1983 Criminal Appeal No. 343 of 1983 and Criminal Appeal No. 344 of 1983 fail and deserve to be dismissed and are dismissed. (The rest of the Judgment is not material for the reports.) appeals dismissed .