ORDER V.D. Gyani, J.- 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal, arising out of the Judgment and decree dated 9-8-75 passed by the Additional District Judge, Rajgarh in Civil First Appeal No. 13-A/75, thereby affirming the trial Court judgment and decree dated 31-1-75 passed by Civil Judge Class II Biora in C.O.S No. 123-A/72. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and possession of a home and agricultural lands situated in Village Gindorehat as described in the Schedule 'A' and 'B' appended to the plaint. Plaintiff's father Daula had two sons. Ramlal and Girdhari, who inherited Daula's property on his death, As Girdhari died, and his daughter Kasubai, was married, it was Ramlal who came to be in possession, as sole owner. On the death of his wife Ramlal contracted Natra marriage with one Sonibai, as such marriage was permissible by custom, prevalent amongst the 'Ahir' community to which the parties belong. Ramlal also died in 1956, and Sonibai became the owner in possession. Her name was also mutated and recorded in the Revenue Records. Kasubai, the daughter of Girdhari, and niece of Ramlal was not recognised as heir to Ramlal. Sonibai sold a part of the agricultural land to Chhitar - Defendant No.2, as mentioned in para 4 of the plaint, the remaining is in plaintiff's possession as owner thereof It was also the plaintiff' case that Sonibai - Defendant No.1 also contracted Natra with one Laxman and was living with him as his wife since 'Abhay' Tratiya' of 1969 and on 4-7-71 admitted such relationship in presence of witnesses. Her contention is that as a result of the 'Natra' Sonibai was divested of her rights in the property left by Ramlal, even otherwise she (Sonibai) had only a limited right in the said property. She has, therefore, challenged Sonibai's right to alienate property (the agricultural land as well as the suit house). It my be noted that during pendency of the suit defendant No. 2 Chhitar died and his LRs. were brought on record who are respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in this appeal. 2 Soni-defendant No 1 denied her Natra with laxman and contested the suit. She claimed to be absolute owner of the properly. She also disputed the plaintiff's right to maintain the suit, which did not disclose any cause of action accruing to the plaintiff. were brought on record who are respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in this appeal. 2 Soni-defendant No 1 denied her Natra with laxman and contested the suit. She claimed to be absolute owner of the properly. She also disputed the plaintiff's right to maintain the suit, which did not disclose any cause of action accruing to the plaintiff. The other defendants also filed their separate written statements. 4. The trial Court framed as many as eight issues and tried the 8th issue "whether the suit does not disclose any cause of action accruing to the plaintiff'? as a preliminary issue and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the lower Appellate Court confirmed the trial Court's judgment and decree. Now, the plaintiff bas come in second appeal. There being no evidence nor was it necessary for decision on the preliminary issue, the appeal has to be decided on the sole question of law governing the rights of a Hindu widow, keeping in mind the pleadings of the parties. As stated above, 'Natra' marriage as a recognised and prevalent form of marriage having customary sanction amongst Ahirs has not been disputed by the defendants. Thus, the validity of marriage between Ramlal and Soni, after the death of Bhulibai Ramlal's wife can safely be assumed which is further aided and commented by Sec. 7 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. 5. Shri Upadhyava, learned Counsel for the appellate has assailed the judgment, while Shri Sanghi, learned Counsel for the respondents has supported the same, and it must be observed that the argument has been extremely academic and instructive with the minimum affect of adversorial approach to a problem which is essentially academic though posed by two contesting ladies Devbai and Sonibai representing two rival Schools of thoughts 'Limited inherent' 'absolute rights' of a Hindu widow Arguments covering the whole gamut of Hindu Widows Rights to property commencing with the Hindu widow Re-Marriage Act. 1856 and culminating with the Hindu Succession Act 1956, have been advanced. 6. Shri Uyadhyaya's main contention is on the true scope of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and section 2 of the Hindu widow Re-Marriage Act, 1856. His emphasis and argument revolves round this pivotal question, which according to the learned Counsel needs to be resolved. Before taking up the scope of section 2 of the Hindu Widow Re-Marriage Act, 1856. His emphasis and argument revolves round this pivotal question, which according to the learned Counsel needs to be resolved. Before taking up the scope of section 2 of the Hindu Widow Re-Marriage Act, 1856. It may be noted that the Act itself has now been repealed by Act No. 24 of 1983 published on 31st August, 1983, but the learned Counsel contends that on the day when the Act was in force the Courts below should not have overlooked section 2 of the Hindu widows Re-marriage Act, 1856. Section 2 of the Act reads as follows ;- "Rights of widow in deceased husband's property to cease on her re-marriage. All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her re-marriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall there' upon succeed to the same." It was on this provision of law, that the appellant has based her claim by divesting the respondent of her rights. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, on the other hand, provided for property of a female Hindu to be a absolute property. The Sec. reads as follows :- "Property of a female Hindu to be absolute property-(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation-In this sub-section "property" includes both movable and in movable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." The contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1856 was not repealed by Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and Sec. 31 thereof specifically mentioned Hindu law of Inheritance (Amendment Act 1929) and the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937 as repealed It was urged that the legislative intent is clearly expressed in section 31 by not including the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act of 1856 in Sec. 31 of the Hindu Succession Act. Shri Sanghi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has on the other hand, contended that section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act should be given its widest meaning and be so interpreted as to sub-serve the purpose, which by now has been well-settled by numerous judicial pronouncements. to better the rights of a hindu widow, which is also explicit in the provision itself. According to him, any narrow interpretation would be defeating the purpose of the Hindu Succession Act itself, The learned Counsel has also referred to section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The marginal heading of this section is itself a pointer to its scope and object and it was, therefore, contended by Shri Sanghi, that to 'over-ride' means to 'Supersede' to 'disregard'. By virtue of section 4 thus, the Hindu Succession Act gets superseding affect to the extent provided for, in this section and in the Act. Clause (a) and (b) of sub section l of section 4 indicate the over-riding effect in respect of text rule or interpretation of Hindu Law and any ether Law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act. It may be noted here that Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force on 17th of June 1956. 7. Thus, the whole controversy raised, revolves round there provisions of law. It may be noted here that Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force on 17th of June 1956. 7. Thus, the whole controversy raised, revolves round there provisions of law. Learned Counsel Shri Upadhyaya placing reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court as reported in Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi AIR 1976 SC 2198 and Daya Singh a Dhan Kaur AIR 1974 SC 655 submitted that the respondent could only have a limited interest in the property left by her husband. The two Courts below have erred in recognising her as the full owner by mis-interpretation of law of succession. So far as the case of Daya Singh is a concerned. it my be noted that it was a case of a Hindu Widow governed by the customary law of Punjab who had succeeded to her husband in 1933 and died after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act but was not found in possession of the estate. The succession to the estate, the Supreme Court held would be governed by section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act and not by the customary law of Punjab. This case as a matter of fact, does not support the appellant. Similarly, the case of Naraini Devi is based on an award and the claim of Naraini Devi was based thereon. It was in this context, that the Supreme Court held "a reading of this document as a whole, leaves little doubt that the only interest in the house created in favour of the widow was that she would be entitled to its rent-and no more-for her life time. Thus, the award confers on her only a restricted estate in the house within the meaning of Sub-see 2 of section 14...........". In short the Supreme Court held that she had no pre-existing right or interest in the house in question. It was the award dt. Jan. 4th 1946 that created a restricted estate for her in the house in question, and it was in this factual background and context, that the Court interpreted section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act and vis-a-vis Hindu Women Right to Property Act of 1937 keeping in mind the fact that Naraini Devi's husband died in 1925. in may be noted that the S C in its subsequent decision of V. Tulasama v. Sesha Reddi AIR 1977 SC 1944 has over-ruled this decision. 8. in may be noted that the S C in its subsequent decision of V. Tulasama v. Sesha Reddi AIR 1977 SC 1944 has over-ruled this decision. 8. Shri Upadhyaya learned has Counsel has laid much emphasis no See. 2 of the Hindu Widows Re marriage Act, 1856 which was not specifically in terms repealed by section 31 of the Hindu Succession Act, but it may be remembered that apart from an expressed repeal the legislature can also exercise the power of implied repeal A later statute may repeal an earlier one either expressly or by implication Although it is a different matter that repeal by implication is not favoured by the Courts (See max-well on interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition page 191). Shri Upadhyaya has contended that there is a presumption against an implied repeal. Upon the assumption that legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject. The failure to add a repealing clause as in the instant case in section 31 of the Hindu Succession Act indicates that the legislative intent was not to repeal the existing legislation. Shri Sanghi, learned Counsel for the respondent on the other band, pointed-out that this presumption stands amply rebutted by the provisions of the new Act which are so inconsistent With the old one that the two cannot stand together. 9. The Supreme Court in Munnalal v. Rajkumar AIR 1962 SC 1493 had occasion to consider the legislative intent of section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act and held" by section 14 (1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under the Shastric Hindu Law would have been regarded as limited interest of an absolute interest and by the explanation gave to the expression 'property' the widest connotation: "By section 14 (1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu Law would have been regarded as a limited interest to an absolute interest and by the Explanation gave to the expression 'property' the widest connotation. The expression included property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise or at a partition or In lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not before at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By section 14 (1) manifestly, it is intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratap Mull's case 63 Ind. App. 63 undoubtedly laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree for partition of the Hindu joint family estate a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognised as owner but that rule cannot in our judgment apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act". This view has further been reiterated by the Supreme Court in V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi AIR 1977 SC 1944 . The legislative intent of bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu Society is writ large in section 14 and the Supreme Court again in Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi AIR 1970 SC 1963 held that the provision must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in Sub-section 1 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court further observed: It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section 1 of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by Sub-section (1). 10. Followed by many more decisions of the Supreme Court, giving effect to this intent and refusing to put any narrow construction on the rights of a Hindu widow in Sukhram v. Gaurishankar AIR 1968 SC 365 the Court held that widow acquiring an interest in the property by virtue of Hindu Succession Act is not subject to any restrictions, which the Bararas School of Hindu law imposes on power of alienation as imposing such limitation would mean importing limitations which the Parliament has not chosen to impose. 11. 11. As the subject-matter (property) of the suit involved is agricultural land as well, it was urged that the rights of Sonibai, in respect of the agricultural land, should be determined in view of the prevailant revenue laws. 12. According to Shri Upadhyaya, Sonibai, on her re-marriage (Natra) would loose her rights in the property of her husband. In this connection her position on 2-10-1959, the date when the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force and prior to that under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, requires to be considered. 13. Section 82 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy' Act prescribes the mode of devolution of right on the death of a male Pakka tenant. Shri Sanghi, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that' section 83 of the M.B.L.R.T. Act related to succession in the case of a woman holding an interest inherited as a widow, mother, daughter, etc. 14. Shri Upadhyaya's contention is that Deobai would succeed as reversioner in view of section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act. 15. Section 82, in order to determine the position of Sonibai on the death of her husband should be read alongwith section 70 which empowers a Pakka tenant with the previous sanction of the Collector to transfer his rights in the whole or part of the holding by sale except for this power, section 82, of the M.B.L.R.T Act does not curtail the rights of a Pakka tenant under the Act. This Court in Civil Second Appeal No 6/55 decided on 31-12-58 has held "section 82 and 83 do indicate the difference in the order of succession among the male and female pakka tenants but there is nothing in these sections or anywhere else in the Act to suggest that a female Pakka tenant is put in any inferior position than a male Pakka tenant". Similarly, in Civil Second Appeal No. 103/56 decided on 20-2-59 it was held that a female Pakka tenant could sell her rights in the land in accordance with the provisions of the Act even in the absence of any legal necessity or other cause so as to convey Pakka tenants right to the transferee. 16. Similarly, in Civil Second Appeal No. 103/56 decided on 20-2-59 it was held that a female Pakka tenant could sell her rights in the land in accordance with the provisions of the Act even in the absence of any legal necessity or other cause so as to convey Pakka tenants right to the transferee. 16. A similar view has been expressed in a Division Bench judgment of this Court as reported in Chanaram v. Pvari Bahu 1963 JLJ 355 where a female Pakka tenant named u/s 83 of the M.B.L.R.T. Act was held to be under no disability in respect of her right to transfer her holding which she could do subject to the restrictions contained u/s 70 of the Act. 17. It is an admitted fact, that re marriage of respondent Sonibai, had taken place in 1969 i.e. after commencement of the M.P. land Revenue Code. Her rights u/s 164, remains to be considered. This question was posed before a Full Bench of this Court in Nahar Singh v. Dukalhin 1974 JLJ 250 = AIR 1974 MP 141 . It was held by majority that where a female had inherited as a widow before the coming into force of the land Revenue Code, and became a bhumiswami by virtue of Sec. 158 of the Code, remarriage would be of no consequence. To the same effect, is yet another judgment of this Court, as reported in Revenue Nirnaya 1982 page 14, which also takes into account the applicability of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. It was held that the widow who held land as a Pakka tenant under the M.B. Act and after enforcement of the M.P.L.R. Code as a Bhumiswami she became the absolute and full owner having full right to dispose of the land. 18. Shri Upadhyaya, learned Counsel for the appellant has erred that section 164 as it stood prior to its amendment in 1961 laid down the order of succession of devolution of interest for a Bhumiswami upon his death. Section 164 ( ) (c) provided that in case of re-marriage of a widow, her interest would devolve upon the nearest surviving heir. As stated above, even according to the plaintiff appellant re-marriage had taken place in 1969 and Shri Sanghi, learned counsel rightly pointed out that the suit had been dismissed on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action. As stated above, even according to the plaintiff appellant re-marriage had taken place in 1969 and Shri Sanghi, learned counsel rightly pointed out that the suit had been dismissed on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action. 19. The Hindu Succession Act has brought about radical changes in the law of succession and this Act was intended to supersede all rules of succession contained in any previous enactment or elsewhere which were inconsistent with any provision contained in the Hindu Succession Act. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Jagdish Mahta v. Mohd. Illahs & others AIR 1973 Pat. 170 held that section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re marriage Act is inconsistent with section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and, therefore, invalid to the extent of inconsistency by virtue of Sec. 4(1) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act A similar view has been expressed by the Gauhati High Court in Anpurna v. Kalpana Devi AIR 1972 gauh 107 holding tHat in view of section 4 and 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, re-marriage by widow long after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act would divest her of the property which became absolutely vested in her. 20. In view of the discussion aforesaid, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.