K. P. MOHAPATRA, J, J. ( 1 ) THESE two criminal revisions arise out of toe order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, altering the conviction of the petitioners from section 395 to section 392 of the Indian Penal Code (I. P. C. for short) and maintaining the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four years on each of them. The revisions were heard analogously and this judgment will govern both. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution case, in the night of 15. 2. 1977 at about 10 clock a dacoity took place in the house of the informant Upendra Senapati (P. W. 1 ). He was sleeping inside a room of his house with his wife, Padmabati (P. W. 2 ). The other members of his family were sleeping in other rooms. He heard sound of explosion of bombs and got up from sleep. He focused his torch light through the cracks of the door and saw seven dacoits outside who forcibly removed the door leaves and four of them entered inside the nom where a lantern was burning. Two of them had crow-bars and one had a torch light. The dacoits who had crow-bars in their hands guarded P. W. 1 and the others focusing the torch light removed utensils, clothing, a transistor, a wrist-watch and a brass Hunda. Petitioner Ratnakar by force snatched away two gold plated bronze bangles from the wrist of P. W. 2 After committing dacoity, the dacoits left the house. The next morning the F. I. R. (Ext. 1) was lodged at the police station. After investigation charge sheet was submitted against the petitioners and flour other accused persons for an offence under section 395 I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE defence of the petitioners has a complete denial of their participation in the dacoity. ( 4 ) THE learned Assistant Sessions Judge who tried the case convicted the petitioners for the offence under section 395 I. P. C. and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years. He acquitted the other four accused persons of the said charge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, on appeal, altered the conviction to one under section 392 I. P. C. , but maintained the sentence as already referred to above. He acquitted the other four accused persons of the said charge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, on appeal, altered the conviction to one under section 392 I. P. C. , but maintained the sentence as already referred to above. ( 5 ) THE salient factures of the case are that according to the concurrent findings of facts, a dacoity had taken place in the house of P. W. 1 in the night of 15. 2. 1977. In the light of the burning lantern P. W. 1 identified petitioner Indramani Ojha, whereas, P. W. 2 could identify all the petitioners. In a test identification parade held on 29. 3. 1977 by Shri G N. Misra, Judicial Magistrate (P. W. 11), P. W. 1 identified petitioner Indramani Ojha and P. W. 2 identified all the petitioners. These two witnesses repeated the performance of identification while giving evidence in court. The articles stolen in the dacoity were not recovered from the possession of the petitioners. Thus the conviction was passed on the identification evidence alone. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that according to the prosecution case, it was possible for P. Ws. 1 and 2 to identify the petitioners by the focus of the torch light, as well as, by the burning lantern. But in the F. I. R. (Ext. 1) there was no mention of these significant facts. On account of the omission the veracity of P. Ws. 1 and 2 is open to doubt and, accordingly, the prosecution case should be viewed with suspicion. In order to counter the above contention the learned Additional Standing Counsel urged that the informant (P. W. 1) was an uneducated simple villager and bad no legal knowledge so as to make his written report a compendium of all relevant facts keeping in view the ultimate result of the prosecution case. In his simplicity, he reported the incident of dacoity in simple language and wrote the F. I. R himself. This would show the truth of the occurrence and further the fact that he was not tutored by any outside agency to submit his report in a particular manner. So, for omission of the aforesaid facts, neither the veracity of P. Ws. 1 and 2 would suffer, nor the prosecution case. This would show the truth of the occurrence and further the fact that he was not tutored by any outside agency to submit his report in a particular manner. So, for omission of the aforesaid facts, neither the veracity of P. Ws. 1 and 2 would suffer, nor the prosecution case. ( 7 ) IN Dharma Ram Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra, it was ruled that the first information report is never treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used for corroborating or contradicting its maker when he appears in court as a witness. Its value must always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. In Ram Kumar Panda v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, it was held that the first information report is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it. The omission of important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, it is necessary to consider if omission of important facts such as focussing of torch light and burning of a lantern in the F. I. R. will affect not only the veracity of P. Ws. 1 and 2, but also the prosecution case itself shall be viewed with suspicion. 8. As already referred to above, the report (Ext. 1) was written by P. W. 1 himself which shows that he was not coached by anyone to draft it in such a manner that ultimately all relevant materials to be used as evidence on behalf of the prosecution shall be included in the report itself. He stated the bare facts of the dacoity and the articles stolen by the dacoits. Manifestly he was not educated and so knowledge of legal drafting could not be expected from him Had the Investigating officer written the F. I. R. on oral report by P. W. 1, he would have ascertained facts regarding the manner of identification of the culprits and in that process it would have come out from the month of P. W. 1 that identification was possible on account of the focus of torch light and burning of a lantern. P. W. 1 in his simplicity did not make endeavour while giving evidence in court to conceal that he omitted to mention these relevant facts. It is clear from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2, both eye-witnesses to the occurrence of dacoity, that there was focus of torch light inside the room and a lantern was burning at least at some point of time during which period identification of the petitioners was possible. In the light of the above facts and circumstances and in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the evidentiary value of the first information report, I am of the opinion that omission of the lantern in the F. I. R, (Ext. 1) will not affect the veracity of P. W. 1 nor on that account, the prosecution case be looked upon with suspicion. The contention is, therefore, untenable. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that there was neither any focusing of the torch light nor was there a burning lantern inside the room which made the identification of the petitioners possible by P. Ws. I and 2. In this respect the concurrent findings of facts by the learned courts below are that there was focusing of torch light and a lantern was burning inside the room. In the light emanating from both, it was possible to identify the petitioners. The learned courts below accepted the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 not only on their merit, but also on the probability that if P. W. 1 was speaking falsehood, he would not have stated in his evidence that he identified only one of the dacoits namely, Indramani Ojha. He could have stated that he identified all the three petitioners. But he did not do so and thus there is a ring of truth in his evidence. I have gone through the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 very carefully. Both of them have stated about the focusing of torch, light, as well as, of the burning lantern. In a household it is not at all improbable that a lantern might be burning during night. It was not at all improbable that P. W. 1 had also a torch light and the dacoits had also one. Both of them have stated about the focusing of torch, light, as well as, of the burning lantern. In a household it is not at all improbable that a lantern might be burning during night. It was not at all improbable that P. W. 1 had also a torch light and the dacoits had also one. For the reason that neither the torch light of P. W. 1 nor the burning lantern was seized by the investigating officer, their evidence cannot be thrown out. In this connection, I would make a reference to the evidence of the investigating officer (P. W. 12 ). Very curiously be stated that no lantern or torch light was produced before him in course of investigation. I fail to understand why an investigating police officer in a case of dacoity should expect that all evidence should be produced before him by the witnesses and he will not himself investigate to find out how identification of the culprits was possible during the night. The evidence of P. W. 12 in this respect is highly objectionable. But that will not affect the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 who appear to be truthful witnesses. In the light of the facts, evidence and probability, I do not find any illegality or material, irregularity in accepting the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the learned courts below to the effect that identification of the petitioners was possible on account of focus of torch light and as a lantern was burning inside the room from which dacoity of valuable articles was committed. The contention on this score is also untenable. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was possibility of P. Ws. 1 and 2 seeing the petitioners when they were produced in the court for remand. At the time of production, the petitioners were not kept in Parda so as to prevent the identifying witnesses seeing them before the test identification parade. Therefore, no importance should be attached to the evidence of the test identification parade. In making this contention two points have been raised. At the time of production, the petitioners were not kept in Parda so as to prevent the identifying witnesses seeing them before the test identification parade. Therefore, no importance should be attached to the evidence of the test identification parade. In making this contention two points have been raised. First, the evidentiary value of the test identification parade in case the identifying witnesses actually saw the suspects before the test identification parade and, second, before the test identification parade was conducted, the suspects should be produced in the court in Parda so as to prevent the identifying witnesses seeing them. So far as the first point is concerned, the principle has been made clear in Yeshwant and others v. The State of Maharashtra, where it was held that if a suspect is seen by the identifying witnesses before the test identification parade, it becomes a farce and no reliance can be placed on such test identification evidence to base a conviction. Relying upon the decision of the Rabi Das v State of Orissa4, it was held in Radha Bhakta and others v. State, that when the unknown persons said to be the culprits had been seen by the identifying witness prior to the identification proceeding, such identification loses its value. In Md. Rosen and others v. The State, it was held relying upon a decision Mohalal Gangaram Gahani v. State of Maharashtra, that in a case where the culprits were shown to the identifying witness prior to the identification in a test identification parade, such identification has no value. With regard to the second point of producing the suspects in court in Parda, two cases are relevant. They are State of Rajasthan v. Ranjit Ladhuram, and Ramanathan v. The State of Tamil Nadu. A Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (supra) ruled that it will be going too far to suggest that when the accused is sent to the jail custody, he is to be kept Be-parda till the identification parade takes place, nor is it necessary to specify the precautions that the jail authorities are to take for keeping the accused Be-parda. The above decision of the Rajasthan High Court came up for consideration in the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 1204 (supra ). The above decision of the Rajasthan High Court came up for consideration in the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 1204 (supra ). The views of the Rajasthan High Court were not disturbed and it was not specifically laid down that the suspect should be kept Be-parda in judicial custody till the test identification parade takes place. The specific evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 is that they did not see the petitioners when they were produced in court for remand to judicial custody. The investigating officer (P. W. 12) stated that there was no possibility of P. Ws. 1 and 2 seeing the petitioners. There is no material on record to show that between the occurrence and the test identification parade P. Ws. 1 and 2 had any occasion to see the petitioners. It was also not necessary that while producing the petitioners for remand to jail custody, they should have been either brought or kept in Parda. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel is based on no evidence and so cannot be accepted. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel submitted that the evidence of identification for the first time in court is of a weak nature and cannot be accepted. It is the settled principle of law that evidence of identification of an accused for the first time in court is of a weak character. Identification in court must be preceded by identification in the test identification parade. For the above proposition the references are Budhsen and another v. State of U. P. , State of Orissa v. Susanta Kumar Dey and others. The State of Orissa v. Ramesh Sahu and three Ors. , and Radha Bhakta and others v. State (supra ). In this case, however, there are three stages of identification, first, at the time of the occurrence, second, in the test identification parade and third, in the court. Therefore, the evidence of identification is stronger in this case rather than weak. The contention is thoroughly untenable. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel urged that the suspects, namely, the petitioners were not mixed up with persons of the same age group, wearing the same dress and being of the same status in life. Therefore, no value should be attached to the test identification parade. The contention is thoroughly untenable. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel urged that the suspects, namely, the petitioners were not mixed up with persons of the same age group, wearing the same dress and being of the same status in life. Therefore, no value should be attached to the test identification parade. In this connection the evidence of P. W. 11, the Judicial Magistrate who conducted the test identification parade is material. On going through his evidence, it is not possible to find any irregularity in conducting the test identification parade. He categorically stated that the suspects were mixed up with 36 other persons of similar are and dress, Nothing was ascertained in cross-examination so as to discredit the above statement. So the contention is not based on evidence. 13. It was next contended that the test identification parade was conducted after long delay. Law is fairly well settled that test identification parade in a case should take place as early as possible, because, the more the delay, the memory of the witnesses of the physical features of the suspects will fade. Courts in India do not view with favour and do not generally accept evidence of test Identification parade conducted after long delay. In Son v. State of Uttar Pradesh, test identification parade conducted after lapse of 42 days ended in acquittal of the appellant. In Madhu Allauddin Mian v. State, occurrence took place on 7. 11. 1977 and the test identification was conducted on 23 12. 1977. In view of this fact and for some other evidence, the evidence of test identification parade was not accepted by the court. In this case, although the occurrence took place on 15. 2. 1977, petitioner Ratnakar Palai was arrested on 27. 2. 1977, Indramani Ojha was arrested on 1. 3. 1977 and petitioner Minja Naik was arrested on 27. 3. 1977. The test identification parade was conducted on 29. 3. 1977. In view of the delay in arrest of the petitioners, it cannot be said that there was abnormal delay in conducting the test identification parade. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel that there was abdominal delay in conducting the test identification parade and so the evidence thereof should be discarded. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel that there was abdominal delay in conducting the test identification parade and so the evidence thereof should be discarded. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel also urged by making reference to the evidence of P. W. 1 that the photographs of the petitioners were taken by the investigating officer (P. W. 12) and was shown to the identifying witnesses. Except examining D. W. 1, there is no other material on record to prove that the investigating officer P. W. 12 had previously taken photographs of the petitioners. D. W. 1 did not produce the negatives of such photographs nor any material evidence to substantiate his evidence. A witness like D. W. 1 can be secured from the street. His evidence is unreliable and cannot be accepted. There is no material in this case to conclude that the investigating officer P. W. 12 had taken photographs of the petitioner through D. W. 1 for being shown to P. Ws. 1 and 2. In the absence of any such evidence the contention is without any legs to stand upon. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel pointed out that the investigating officer (P. W. 12) stated that the house of the petitioner Minja Naik was at a distance of 30 to 40 cubits from the house of P. W. 1. Curiously enough, the investigating officer had stated so. But the address of the petitioner Minja Naik as would appear from his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that he belongs to Salijanga within the police station of Sukinda, which is obviously not a neighbouring village of Baghanata to which P. W. 1 belongs. Apparently, the investigating officer (P. W. 12) was careless in making such misleading statement in court in a serious case of this nature. Therefore, the misleading statement of the investigating officer (P. W. 12) shall have no effect on the merits of the case. ( 14 ) IN State of Uttar Pradesh v. Boota Singh and others it was held that identification evidence is not a very weak type of evidence. Therefore, the misleading statement of the investigating officer (P. W. 12) shall have no effect on the merits of the case. ( 14 ) IN State of Uttar Pradesh v. Boota Singh and others it was held that identification evidence is not a very weak type of evidence. Where the witness correctly identifies the accused at a test identification parade held by a Magistrate after observing all the essential formalities and taking the necessary precautions and then identifies the accused also in court, the evidence of identification can be believed, unless the evidence of witness suffers from some other infirmity. Applying this test to the facts of the case, it would appear that P. Ws. 1 and 2, two truthful witnesses who saw the crime of dacoity being committed in their presence, not only identified the petitioners at the time of commission of the dacoity in the focus of torch light and in the light of a burning lantern, they also identified them in a test identification parade and also while giving evidence in court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is difficult to disbelieve their evidence of identification, concurrently accepted by the learned courts below. Moreover, in a case of this nature, normally the revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be exercised, because, there is neither any glaring defect in the procedure nor is there any manifest error on a point of law which has resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in the criminal revisions and accordingly they are dismissed. .