JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - This is defendant's appeal. 2. The Panchayat Dhara Bada Miyanan Kankhal (hereinafter referred to for the sake of convenience as `the Panchayat DBM') is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society is an amalgamation of a Chitthis that is thoks such as thok Miyanan, Goswamis, Chandaman, Kakiras, Chaklan. The general body comprises of one adult member of the families in each of the eight thoks. The Executive Committee consists of 23 members of whom there is one representing each of the thoks. The objects for the formation thereof are enumerated as under : (i) For effort being made for all-round development of the Tirth Purohits. (ii) Appropriate management and increase in the income of the movable and immovable properties of the Panchayat obtained in the past and accruing in the future; (iii) Providing education to the sons and daughters of the Tirath Purohits and making effort for their character development; (iv) According help to the helpless widows and daughters of Tirath Purohits; (v) Maintenance and development of the sacredness of Hardwar and Kankhal Tirath. 3. The Executive Committee has for its office bearers the President, two Vice- Presidents, Secretary, two Joint Secretaries, Cashier and Accountant. The Panchayat DBM was registered under the order of the Registrar of Societies, U. P. dated October 24, 1962, for which the Memorandum accompanied with Rules formulated under the signature of seven persons associated for the purpose was submitted to the Registrar on August 27, 1962. In the Memorandum among the properties enumerated as belonging to the Society, is included the house in dispute situate at the Vishnu Ghat in Hardwar and described by boundaries as item No. 3 in cl. 16. Prior to the registration of the Panchayat DBM, there was, according to the plaintiffs, the Panchayat Brahminan (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat B) or called sometimes the Panchayat Dhara 400- the figure signifying the number of families attached thereto. This was admittedly unregistered. 4. The suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted on September 28, 1964, in the Court of Civil Judge, Roorkee, by the Panchayat DBM through the President (Vishnu Dutt Miyanan) and the then Secretary Dwarika Prasad Misra, whereafter Pran Nath Kaushik has been brought in his place. This was admittedly unregistered. 4. The suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted on September 28, 1964, in the Court of Civil Judge, Roorkee, by the Panchayat DBM through the President (Vishnu Dutt Miyanan) and the then Secretary Dwarika Prasad Misra, whereafter Pran Nath Kaushik has been brought in his place. The contention is that Chandi Dutt Goswami the defendant was also a member of the Panchayat B. He managed the affairs of the properties, including the property in dispute as Muntazim/Secretary. The defendant was also the Secretary/Muntazim when the Panchayat DBM was registered in 1962. He was in occupation of the house described at the foot of the plaint in his capacity as the manager. It was his duty as such to keep and maintain accounts relating to the properties placed under his charge. Since the defendant did not submit accounts for long despite opportunity being accorded and being required to come up and explain, he was removed with effect from June 8, 1983, from the office. The house, however, has not been vacated by him and his possession over the same is unauthorised ever since the removal from the office. The relief claimed accordingly is possession of the house, rendition of account by the defendant and also injunction. 5. In defence it was pleaded that the defendant is a member of Panchayat DBM. The plaintiffs' right to sue was refuted and it is maintained that the property in question does not belong to them. It has been asserted that this has devolved upon the defendant from his ancestors.There was permission accorded by the defendant's grandfather Jai Ram Goswami to the Panchayat for carrying on its Panchayat therein. But the defendant, it is asserted revoked this permission thirty to forty years prior to the institution of the suit. There is no liability on the defendants part to render any accounts. The bar of limitation is pleaded also besides setting up a claim of adverse possession. 6. Upon considering the evidence placed on the record, the learned Civil Judge found that the Panchayat DBM is duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and is entitled to sue. The house in question is its property; the possession of the defendant was in capacity as the manager/secretary. He has been removed from the office on June 8, 1963. There is no foundation for the claim of adverse possession. The house in question is its property; the possession of the defendant was in capacity as the manager/secretary. He has been removed from the office on June 8, 1963. There is no foundation for the claim of adverse possession. Accordingly the suit has been decreed on August 2, 1971, for possession over the house and permanent governing body file with the Registrar of Join injunction besides directing.the defendant to render accounts in respect of the properties during his tenure as manager/secretary up to June 8, 1963 and with respect to the property in dispute from June 8, 1963, till the date of handing over possession. Aggrieved the defendant has preferred this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that there has been no transfer of the property from the Panchayat B to the Panchayat DBM in accordance with law and the latter is not competent to sue since this may not be treated as a successor to the Panchayat B. Admittedly Panchayat B was unregistered. It is argued that the Panchayat DBM is not registered in accordance with Ss. 17, 18 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and, therefore, this may not be claimed to have succeeded to the Panchayat B nor may it be asserted that the property vesting in the Panchayat B belongs to the Panchayat DBM. Sections 17 and 18 read as follows : 17. Registration of Societies formed before Act "Any company or society established for a literary, scientific or charitable purpose, and registered under Act 43 of 1850, or any such society established and constituted previously to the passing of this Act but not registered as a society under this Act; subject to the proviso that no such company or society shall be registered under this Act unless an assent to its being so registered has been given by three-fifths of the members present personally, or by proxy, at some general meeting convened for that purpose by the governing body. In the case of a company or society registered under Act 43 of 1850, the directors shall be deemed to be such governing body. In the case of a society not so registered, if no such body shall have been constituted on the establishment of the society, it shall be competent for the members thereof, upon due notice, to create for itself a governing body to act for the society thenceforth." 18. In the case of a society not so registered, if no such body shall have been constituted on the establishment of the society, it shall be competent for the members thereof, upon due notice, to create for itself a governing body to act for the society thenceforth." 18. Such societies to file memorandum, etc. with Registrar of Joint Stock Companies :- "In order to any such society as is mentioned in the last preceding section obtaining registry under this Act, it shall be sufficient that the the name of the society, the objects of the society, and the names, addresses and occupations of the governing body, together with a copy of the rules and regulations of the society certified as provided in S. 2, and a copy of the report of the proceedings of the general meeting at which the registration was resolved on." 8. In view of Section 17 aforementioned a society, which was not registered under the Act 43 of 1850, as in the present case, may not be registered under the Act, 1860, unless assent to it being so registered has been given by three-fifths of the members present personally, or by proxy, at some general meeting convened for that purpose by the governing body. Section 18 lays down the documents which are to be filed by the governing body before the Registrar for the purpose of getting such a Society registered under these provisions and it says that the same shall be accompanied with a copy of the report of the proceedings of the general meeting at which the registration was resolved on P. W. Chandra Prakash, Advocate, testified on personal knowledge, as submitted for the respondents, that on August 15, 1962, there was a meeting of the general body comprising of all the members wherein he read out the 1951 rules (which had not been registered) and the draft of 1962 memorandum/rules was approved. A period of ten days was allowed for objection, if any, from any of the members. No objection came and on August 27, 1962, the memorandum/ rules were submitted to the Registrar for the purpose of registration. The memorandum and the rules are placed on the record. A period of ten days was allowed for objection, if any, from any of the members. No objection came and on August 27, 1962, the memorandum/ rules were submitted to the Registrar for the purpose of registration. The memorandum and the rules are placed on the record. From his statement, however, it is not clearly made out that the assent to the Panchayat DBM being registered was given by three-fifths of the members present personally or by proxy at the general meeting convened for the purpose of the governing body. The proceedings of the general meeting were, it is stated, filed before the trial Court, but these were lost. The factum of the loss is not in dispute before me. It was argued, however, for the appellant that since in view of S. 18, a copy of the report of the proceedings of the general meeting at which the registration was resolved had also to be submitted to the Registrar, it could be possible to obtain certified copy thereof and file the same as secondary evidence. No such copy has been placed before us. This only means that the Panchayat DBM may not, strictly speaking, be treated as the successor under the law to the Panchayat B. In order that such a succession may be claimed to be brought about, the registration had to be in compliance to the reformation of S. 17/18. But it is not right to contend, in my view, that there is a bar under the Act to a new society being established or constituted and the same being registered in terms of Ss. 1 and 2. Section 1 lays down that any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in S. 20 may by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with the Registrar form this into a society under this Act. In view of S. 2 the Memorandum of Association shall contain the name of the society, objects of the society, the names, addresses, and occupations of the governors or other governing body to whom, by the rules of the society, the management of its affairs is entrusted. There was full compliance made to these requirements whereafter there was the certificate of registration issued with effect from October 24, 1962 by the Registrar. There was full compliance made to these requirements whereafter there was the certificate of registration issued with effect from October 24, 1962 by the Registrar. It is not in dispute that the purpose is charitable and is covered under S. 20 of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents referred not without force to the admission made by the defendant in categorical terms in paragraph 1 of the affidavit filed by him on August 18, 1965, and again on April 29, 1966 (vide papers 24C/33C) in the Court below accompanied with objections to the appointment of receiver. Therein the defendant-appellant stated that the plaintiff is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. For the appellant there was reference made in the course of arguments to an order passed by the trial Court in Original Suit No. 202 of 1971 dated May 7, 1973, containing a compromise entered into between the appellant's son Virendra Kumar on the one hand and the Registrar of the Societies on the other in which it is urged, the Registrar stated that the registration of the society was made under S. 1/2 and not under S. 17/18 of the Act. This order, however, came to be set aside by that Court on November 26, 1973 (vide CA-3) on objection taken by the respondents in this behalf. No advantage can be taken by the appellant consequently of the order dated May 7, 1973. But this apart and even if the admission of the defendant-appellant in the two affidavits, mentioned above were to be overlooked, the fact remains that there is no bar under the law to the new society being formed and registered as such under S. 1/2 of the Act. The change made was, it may, be said, not barely in the name, but in substance also as a result of the new constitution adopted on August 15, 1962, leading to the registration with effect from October 24, 1962. In view of S. 6 of the Act, every society registered hereunder as the Panchayat DBM in this case, may sue in the name of the President or the Secretary. The right of the respondents-plaintiffs to sue may not, therefore, be disputed. 10. In view of S. 6 of the Act, every society registered hereunder as the Panchayat DBM in this case, may sue in the name of the President or the Secretary. The right of the respondents-plaintiffs to sue may not, therefore, be disputed. 10. In so far as the contention of the appellant's counsel that the Panchayat DBM may not claim any right, title or interest in the house in dispute since there is no formal transfer thereof in its favour by the Panchayat B is concerned, it is devoid of merit. Section 5 of the Act provides that the property, movable and immovable belonging to a society registered under this Act, if any, vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal may be described as the property of the governing body of such society by their proper title. It is nobody's case in the present that the property in question vested in the trustees at any stage. The memorandum of registration on October 24, 1962, makes mention of the property vesting in the governing body of the Panchayat DBM. In Harinarayan Shaw v. Gobardhandas Shroff, AIR 1953 Cal 140 cited by the learned counsel for the respondent the Division Bench held that the disputed property, which was vested in the trustees before registration of the society became as and from after the registration of the society, a property belonging to the society and be deemed to be the property of the society. As a matter of fact, and, strictly speaking, there is no transfer of ownership. That which belonged to unregistered society continues after the change in status of that society on being registered as being belonging to the registered society. I am in respectful agreement with this view. 11. The other contention of the appellant's learned counsel then is that the house in dispute belongs to the appellant from the time of his ancestors and the Panchayat DBM or Panchayat B for that matter has had no right, title or interest in the same. The trial Court has repelled this contention. On scrutiny into the evidence placed on the record, the conclusion, to my mind, is irresistible that the title to the property vests in the Panchayat DBM and that this does not belong to the appellant-defendant. The trial Court has repelled this contention. On scrutiny into the evidence placed on the record, the conclusion, to my mind, is irresistible that the title to the property vests in the Panchayat DBM and that this does not belong to the appellant-defendant. This is borne out both from documentary evidence of unimpeachable character and oral testimony, including the admissions of the appellant-defendant. In the settlement of 1897 AD, the khasra records plot No. 567 as being under the proprietorship of Dhara Panchayat Brahaminan and there is also the name of one Ram Prasad resident of Jwalapur appearing under it (Exhibit 2). From the khasra 1343 fasli (corresponding to 1935-36) (Exhibit 3) it will appear that the new plot 1327 corresponds to the old plot 567 referred to above. Against plot No. 1327 the entry in this khasra is Panchayat Brahminan Kankhal zair-e-intezam Chanddi Dutt son of Lakhmi Ram that is belonging to Panchayat Brahminan Kankhal under the management of the appellant. This entry is in the column meant for recording the proprietor. The map of the relevant period has also been filed (vide 4). In the khasra for the period of 1928-29 to 1934-35 the proprietor's column records Har Prasad Misra (the father of Dwarka Prasad Misra-Secretary, Panchayat DBM) and in the column 6 the occupant recorded is the father of the defendant-appellant. In the assessment list (Exhibit 5) drawn by the Municipal Board, Hardwar, for the period of 1934 to 40 (Exhibit 6) the entry is in the name of Har Prasad Misra. In the proprietor's column relating to the house situate at the Vishnu Ghat and in the occupant's column it is shown as makan Panchayati lodging. The significant fact then also is that in the assessment list, Municipal Board for the period of 1940-45 (Exhibit 7) the entry in the proprietor's column is Chandi Dutt, Manager Panchayat house Brahminan Kankhal'. This specifically records the appellant, but in his capacity as the manager. The bill relating to taxes (Exhibit 8) for April, September 1944, is in the name of Secretary Panchayati Makan Brahminan. This specifically records the appellant, but in his capacity as the manager. The bill relating to taxes (Exhibit 8) for April, September 1944, is in the name of Secretary Panchayati Makan Brahminan. The identity of the house is borne out when these documents are considered in the context of the entire evidence including the oral testimony and the fact that the defendant- appellant was not in residential occupation of any other house except this in capacity as the Manager of the Panchayat B. In cross examination the defendant-appellant admits the entry made during the settlement in 1935-36 and also that he raised no objection against the same. He is unable to assign any reason for the same. On August 10, 1922, it further appears, one Sitaram executed rent note (vide Exhibit 14) in respect of the house in dispute described by boundaries (which tally with those given in the plaint and oral testimony) stating that the same was taken on rent being under the proprietorship of Panchayat B/ Panchayat Dhara 400 through Datti Ram, Jai Ram Goswami. Datti Ram, it should be noted, was the father of Vishnu Dutt and he was at the relevant time the President, Panchayat B while Jai Ram Goswami was the grandfather of the defendant-appellant P. W. Ram Chandra was a marginal witness to this rent note and he has testified to the transaction on personal knowledge. This is a pointer also in the direction that the house was treated as belonging to the Panchayat B and the appellant's grandfather was also a party to the document wherein it was so described while admitting Sitaram as tenant thereto. One Mangal Dutt son of Atma Ram having his house in the vicinity sought permission of the Municipal Board to raise construction as appearing from the Izazatnama dated February 1940 and the plan submitted for the purpose (Exhibits 27/28). Therein too the house in question is described as belonging to the Panchayati Brahminan Kankhal. These admissible in view of S. 13 of the Evidence Act reflecting as they do certain circumstances of significance and relevant for consideration. 12. For the respondents reference is made also to certified copy of the plaint in Original Suit No. 648 of 1929 showing that Parmanand et cetera filed a suit for injunction against Bishan son of Datti Ram aforementioned (vide Exhibit 9). 12. For the respondents reference is made also to certified copy of the plaint in Original Suit No. 648 of 1929 showing that Parmanand et cetera filed a suit for injunction against Bishan son of Datti Ram aforementioned (vide Exhibit 9). In para 1 thereof it was mentioned that to the east of the plaintiffs' house was situate the single storeyed house belonging to the Panchayat B and that on account of the attempt made to raise the second storey on that house, the easementary right of the plaintiffs was being adversly affected. The description appears also in the boundaries given at the foot of the plaint. In that suit Bishan son of Dtti Ram filed written-statement (vide Exhibit 10). As is clear from Paragraphs 2 and 5 thereof he admitted that the title to that house was of the Panchayat B and there was no dispute raised on this score. He contended, however, that the wall pertaining to that house was separate from the eastern wall of the house of the plaintiffs therein. The suit came to be decreed ultimately on March 21, 1930 (vide Exhibit 11) on the basis of a compromise. It does not appear that in the normal course of events there will not have been objection raised by Bishan concerning the title to the house if that were wrongly described as belonging to the Panchayat B. It is also submitted for the respondent that Chandi Dutt, the appellant, himself filed Original Suit No. 66 of 1926 for partition against his collaterals namely, Shrinath and others in the Civil Court. The pedigree is to be found given in the plaint thereof (vide Exhibit 31). There was no relief sought, however, in respect of the house in dispute in the partition suit, which was decreed upon compromise dated 28th August, 1926 (vide Exhibit 32). Smt. Surja Kunwar wife of Gauri Prasad (first cousin of the appellant) also brought Original Suit No. 900 of 1926 for partition and gave the pedigree in the plaint (vide Exhibit 29) to which the appellant filed written-statement dated 5-2-1927 (vide Exhibit 30) but there was nothing said so far as the house now in dispute is concerned. These are relevant in the sense that in case this house were ancestral property of the appellant as he now asserts, it will not have been left out ordinarily from the partition suits aforementioned. These are relevant in the sense that in case this house were ancestral property of the appellant as he now asserts, it will not have been left out ordinarily from the partition suits aforementioned. These are also admissible in view of S. 13 and the certified copies may be taken on the record keeping in view S. 90A(1) of the Evidence Act (as amended in U. P.). The defendant-appellant has had no explanation to offer despite being questioned specifically in this respect in cross-examination. 13. In so far as the oral testimony is concerned, the respondents-plaintiffs examined PWs Ram Chandra Sharma, Advocate, Dwarika Prasad Misra and Ram Ratan Kaushik. PW Ram Chandra Sharma testified to the transaction whereby this house was taken on rent by Sitaram in the year 1922 as has been discussed above. PW Dwarika Prasad Misra was the Munshi during the period of June 1963 to January, 1967. He has testified to the proceedings on personal knowledge and also referred to the notes prepared by K. L. Mittal, Advocate, from the proceedings book, which were subsequently lost after having been filed in the Court below. According to S. 63(5), Evidence Act secondary evidence includes oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it. PW Dwarika Prasad has narrated on oath that he had perused the original himself and the notes were drawn in his immediate presence on the basis of what he pointed out on reading the proceedings book. These are suggestive of the appellant's active assent to the meeting convened for the 13th and thereafter 15th August, 1962, PW Chandra Prakash also deposed on personal knowledge regarding the meeting being convened on August 13, 1962 in which the appellant was, however, not present. Thereafter, according to him, the meeting took place on 15th August, 1962. In that meeting this witness read out the Rules 1951, which had been drawn by the Panchayat B, but not registered and the draft of the memorandum/rules 1962 was also prepared. A period of ten days allowed for objections, if any. No objections were raised and on 27th August, 1962, these were submitted to the Registrar for registration. This witness had been a member of the Panchayat B since 1949. PW Ram Ratan Kaushik has also been a member for life and is a dependable witness. A period of ten days allowed for objections, if any. No objections were raised and on 27th August, 1962, these were submitted to the Registrar for registration. This witness had been a member of the Panchayat B since 1949. PW Ram Ratan Kaushik has also been a member for life and is a dependable witness. He attended the meeting of the Panchayat B even in 1935 when the defendant-appellant was elected as the Secretary in view of Har Prasad Misra having left. The defendant-appellant, according to him, was elected Secretary in 1947 also. Rules were framed by the Panchayat B in 1951, which, however, remained unregistered. He has deposed then to the meeting convened on April 9, May 24, June 1, June 8, 1963, all of which he attended and has referred to the resolution adopted on June 8, 1963, removing the appellant since he failed to submit the accounts. In support of his deposition there is reliance also placed on the purcha dated 12th August, 1962, which the defendant-appellant wrote in his own hand to this witness (vide Exhibit 18) saying that Ram Ratan (then Joint Secretary) shall work in his place. The defendant-appellant admits his signature on this purcha. On 23rd January, 1963, the defendant-appellant again wrote to this witness (vide Exhibit 19) saying that he had returned back and, therefore, the papers be sent to him so that he may continue to look after the affairs. All these speak of the capacity in which the defendant-appellant was associated. 14. As regards the testimony of the defendant-appellant himself, an analysis leaves no room to doubt that this stands self- condemned both in view of the shifting stands taken by him at various stages and in face of the admissions made by him. The written statement filed originally on May 25, 1965, itself speaks of shifting stands. In paragraph 7 thereof there is admission that he is a member of the Society. Para 8 narrates that as one of the members and office bearers he is the owner of the house. Para 11 points out that the property belonged to his grandfather Jai Ram and thereafter to his father and himself. Para 22 narrates that he being one of the eight thoks his family is the co-owner in respect of the house. Para 8 narrates that as one of the members and office bearers he is the owner of the house. Para 11 points out that the property belonged to his grandfather Jai Ram and thereafter to his father and himself. Para 22 narrates that he being one of the eight thoks his family is the co-owner in respect of the house. On 16th November, 1970 there was amendment sought by him in the written statement whereby he inserted paras 11(a)(b) and 14(a)(b). It was then given out by him that his grandfather Jairam had given permission to the Panchayat for using the house for its purpose, but there was no transfer made and that the permission revoked by him more than 12 years prior to June 8, 1963. Adverse possession was set up in 14(a)(b). There is no dispute as the appellant's learned counsel states that even inconsistent pleas may be taken in the pleadings. But this remains at the risk of the party taking those pleas and when it comes to evidence there has to be a definite and clear-cut stand taken. This is not to be found in the testimony recorded of the defendant. He stated that he was never appointed Secretary in the Panchayat, but later he said that in 1951 there were rules framed and that he was also the Secretary at that time. According to hin Panchayat B comprised of 400 families and eight thoks including the Goswami thok to which he belongs and further that this was known also as Panchayat Dhara 400. On being questioned in regard to the meeting held in August 1962, the appellant clearly and repeatedly evaded the answer saying that he could not recollect. This was his version including in examination-in -chief. He added that meeting may have taken place on August 13/15, 1962. He did not find it possible to swear that he did not attend any of those crucial meetings. In regarding to the title of the house he disclaimed all knowledge as to how was the same cleared or as to who raised the same. There is no personal knowledge on his part as to any permission being granted by his grandfather for use of this house to the Panchayat. It does not appear that occasion ever arose on his part to revoke any such permission. There is no personal knowledge on his part as to any permission being granted by his grandfather for use of this house to the Panchayat. It does not appear that occasion ever arose on his part to revoke any such permission. He admits that he never given notice to the Panchayat revoking any permission. No objection was filed by him during the settlement of 1935 although he was aware thereof as he himself points out nor does he assign any reason for not laying claim to partition of the house in the proceedings referred to above. Learned counsel cited authorities in support of the contention that the admissions must be clear in their meaning and though what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so. But the admissions are not ordinarily conclusive. Admission constitutes only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which depends on the circumstances under which it were made and it can be shown to be erroneous or untrue (vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 , Chikkam K. Rao v. Chikkam Subbarao, AIR 1971 SC 1542 , Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 . No exception can be taken to these propositions. The application whereof is dependent however, on the facts and circumstances of the case. Both in the pleadings and in his statement on oath as also in the suggestions made during cross-examination to the witnesses on the other side, the stand taken by the defendant-appellant has been varying and the same moreover does not fit in with the documentary evidence of sufficient evidentiary value nor is there corroboration forthcoming from other reliable independent source to what he claims. Evidently the contest to the suit reflects attempt on his part to disentitle the Panchayat DBM originally entitled to the house vesting in it taking advantage merely of the fact that he had been in residential occupation of the house in capacity as the Manager/ Secretary till he was removed from the office on June 8, 1973. Thereafter his occupation of the house is unauthorised rendering him thereby liable to damages for use and occupation thereof besides eviction. 15. Thereafter his occupation of the house is unauthorised rendering him thereby liable to damages for use and occupation thereof besides eviction. 15. There is no denying that in a suit based upon title the plaintiff can succeed on the strength of his case (vide Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos, AIR 1959 SC 31 ) but this does not suggest that where evidence has been led on both sides as in this case, the material which the defendant brings in (including the admissions if any) be not taken into account. Perfection in the matter of proof is rarely achieved, if ever. The Court has to proceed on the preponderance of probabilities. A fact is said to be proved after all not only when after considering the matter before it, the Court believes it to exist, but also where it considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that it exists (S. 3, Evidence Act). 16. For the discussion foregoing I find that the house in dispute belongs to the Panchayat DBM and the plaintiffs-respondents are entitled to possession of the same. since the defendant-appellant's occupation of the house subsequent to June 8, 1963, is without authority, he is rendered liable for demages for use and occupation thereof. In so far as the liability of the defendant-appellant for accounting is concerned, that can be only for the period of October 24, 1962 (the date when the Panchayat DBM came to be registered) and became entitled to sue as such) to June 8, 1963, when the defendant-appellant was removed from the office. For the period preceding October 24, 1962, the Panchayat DBM may not lay claim to accounting for the reason that during that period the properties belonged to the persons constituting the Panchayat B to which the Panchayat DBM cannot be said to be the successor for reasons explained already. 17. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs except for the modification that in respect of the house in dispute the liability of the defendant-appellant is for payment of mesne profits ever since June 8, 1963. 17. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs except for the modification that in respect of the house in dispute the liability of the defendant-appellant is for payment of mesne profits ever since June 8, 1963. pendente lite and future at such rate as on receipt of the Commissioner's report the Court below determines and upon the court-fee required being paid and further that the accounting to be rendered by the defendant-appelllant in respect of properties other than the house in dispute under his charge as Manager shall be for the period of October 24, 1962, to June 8, 1963, only. For the rest the decree passed by the Court below shall stand confirmed. The amount deposited in terms of the interim orders of this Court shall be adjusted towards the decree.