JUDGMENT - SALVE V.P., J.:­- An interesting point has arisen in this criminal application before me in which Mr. Vilas Dhordepatil, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, challenges the order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Aurangabad in Criminal Case No. 141 of 1982 passed under section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short, the 'Cri.P.C.') in which respondents 1 to 3 through respondent No. 1 claimed enhancement of maintenance amount granted to them by the J.M.F.C., Shrirampur in the year 1977. 2. It is contended by Mr. Vilas Dhordepatil, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the matter was compromised and the respondent No. 1 was granted Rs. 40/- and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 Rs. 30/- each, in all Rs. 100/- for their monthly maintenance. As per the compromise, this amount was being paid by the petitioner to the respondents every month uptodate. An application came to be filed by the present respondents (respondents 1 to 3) through respondent No. 1, the wife of the petitioner claimed enhanced maintenance at the rate of Rs. 125/- p.m. for herself and Rs. 100/- each for the two children i.e. respondents 2 and 3. The J.M.F.C., Aurangabad after notice to the husband and after giving him opportunity of being heard, granted enhanced maintenance at the rate of Rs. 325/- jointly to all the respondents from the date of petition i.e. from 21-12-1983. It is this order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Aurangabad dated 21-12-1983 which has been challenged before me. 3. The main ground of attack by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the order is without jurisdiction. That the J.M.F.C., Aurangabad had no jurisdiction to pass the said order. That the jurisdiction lay with the original Court i.e. the J.M.F.C., Shrirampur and that the Shrirampur Court had exercised the territorial jurisdiction where an application was filed when the petitioner was residing at Shrirampur when the original order came to be passed. In 1981, he had shifted to Bombay to join service in the Indian Air Lines as Wireless Operator. His salary, according to the learned Counsel is Rs. 1100/-. It is, therefore, apparent that the quantum of maintenance of Rs. 325/- granted to the three respondents cannot be challenged on any ground since the petitioner is now well placed and is being paid well. In these days of inflation and rising prices, an amount of Rs. His salary, according to the learned Counsel is Rs. 1100/-. It is, therefore, apparent that the quantum of maintenance of Rs. 325/- granted to the three respondents cannot be challenged on any ground since the petitioner is now well placed and is being paid well. In these days of inflation and rising prices, an amount of Rs. 25/- p.m. towards maintenance of the wife and two children cannot be regarded as high. The quantum of maintenance is challenged by the learned Counsel, but it must fail for the reasons stated by me earlier. 4. Mr. Vilas Dhordepatil, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has relied upon the decision of this Court reported in 1979 Bom.C.R. 249 (Vithalrao Marotrao Awadhut v. Ratnaprabha Awadhut and others)1, decided by M.D. Kambil, J. According to the learned Counsel, the application under section 127 Criminal Procedure Code for enhancement in terms is a sequel to the application under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code and as such, the forum chosen must be the same as can be chosen by the person who wants the benefit of section 127 in the same Court where the original application under section 125 was filed. Relying heavily on the decision of this Court in Vithalrao's case, Mr. Vilas Dhordepatil argued that the principles of res judicata would apply to the present application under section 127 and the Aurangabad Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain that application. 5. Mr. Jadhav, the learned A.P.P., appearing for the State, has rightly pointed out that the facts of Vithalrao's case are absolutely different and the principles of res judicata would not apply to the instant case. According to him, the present application was filed under section 127 Criminal Procedure Code for the enhancement of the maintenance amount and not for grant of maintenance once again under section 125 as was in the case of Vithalrao v. Ratnaphabha. To my mind, Mr. Jadhav's contention is right. Mr. S.A. Deshmukh appearing for the respondents has also made similar submissions. 6. The principles of res judicata are generally not applicable to criminal cases. To my mind, Mr. Jadhav's contention is right. Mr. S.A. Deshmukh appearing for the respondents has also made similar submissions. 6. The principles of res judicata are generally not applicable to criminal cases. As has been held by Kambli, J., a second application under section 125 (Old Code section 488) was not maintainable as there was a danger looming in the reported case that the 'Nagpur Court' may set aside the earlier order passed by the J.M.F.C. at 'Wardha' or reduce the amount of maintenance and thus would be sitting on appeal over the previous decision granting maintenance and hence rejected the revision. He has, however, held that section 403 Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, has no application to the proceedings under section 488 - now section 125 Criminal Procedure Code. On this short ground alone, that the acts of Vithalrao's case differ with that of the present case, I could have dismissed the application of the petitioner. However, since the matter is of some importance. I would like to deal with the question of jurisdiction of a Magistrate so far as the entire Chapter IX of Criminal Procedure Code is concerned. 7. It is no more 'res integra' that the proceedings under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code are of a quasi civil nature i.e. they are not of a criminal nature in which there is conviction or acquittal of the non-applicant nor is it of a civil nature where there have to be specific pleadings, issues raised and issues decided. But it is a speedy remedy available to women and children, who are likely to be rendered destitutes and lead a vagrant life, to enable them to maintain themselves by claiming maintenance from their husbands and fathers. With the change of law, we see that section 125 has brought in many more beneficiaries under it. The beneficiaries now also can receive maintenance allowance are - the wife, who is unable to maintain herself; the legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself; legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reasons of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself; and father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself. This list, brought in by an independent legislation showing more beneficiaries include for protection under section 125 clearly shows that the Legislature intended to extend the protection of section 125 liberty to more persons than one. The object of this section formerly used to be to prevent the vagrancy of deserted women who out of destitution, may take to vagrancy. Whether or not legitimate or illegitimate, minor children, without any maintenance to them, would turn out to be vagrant is left to one's own imagination. In these difficult days, maintenance of children and their education and development as useful citizens is a social problem which perhaps may not be solved by enacting a beneficial legislation under Section 125. The social ethos and the present day struggle for existence is so acute that the children, finding themselves at bay in spite of the fact that they re provided maintenance which is negligible, say at the rate of Rs. 40/- or Rs. 50/- p.m. may take to vagrancy, though the laudable object of the section is to prevent vagrancy of women and also the children. So far as the father and mother are concerned, the possibility that they will lead to a vagrant life cannot be visualised because they have reached an age and stage where vagrancy cannot come so easily. Therefore, the original objective of preventing destitute women from vagrancy appears also to have undergone a change when this list of beneficiaries under section 125 was increased and included also the father and mother. But the fact remains that this help whatever small it may mean, will always help the wives, the children, the father and the mother from persons who are required to maintain them as a moral responsibility of the society. In the absence of any such moral, social and legal binding, the rigour of the section like 125 may suffer badly. It is under these aspects of the practical life that I wish to interpret the question of jurisdiction of deciding the application under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code, other by way of second application or by way of an application for enhancement of the maintenance already granted. It is under these aspects of the practical life that I wish to interpret the question of jurisdiction of deciding the application under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code, other by way of second application or by way of an application for enhancement of the maintenance already granted. No doubt, the case decided by Kambli, J., is a case decided on the general principles of res judicata but is not a good law, since I find that the judgment has been arrived at perhaps per incurium since the two judgments of the Supreme Court decided earlier have not been brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The two cases are (Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v. Dev Raj Vijh)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1101 and (Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal)3, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1589. The Supreme Court in Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh's case were concerned with the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court and held that there are two type of jurisdiction of a Criminal Court viz. (1) the jurisdiction with respect to the power of the Court to try particular kinds of offences, and (2) its territorial jurisdiction. While the former goes to the root of the matter and any transgression of it makes the entire trial void, the latter is not of a peremptory character and is curable under section 531 of the Code. Territorial jurisdiction is provided “just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the administrative point of view with respect to work of a particular Court, the convenience of the accused who will have to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the Court.” Sub-section (8) of section 488 in fact provides that proceedings under the section “may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife or, as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child.” This, therefore, is ordinarily the requirement as to the filing of an application under section 488 (now 125) within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned. Where a Magistrate has the “power” to try a particular application under section 488, and the controversy relates solely to his territorial jurisdiction, there should, ordinarily, be no reason why section 531 of the Code should not be applicable to the order. Where a Magistrate has the “power” to try a particular application under section 488, and the controversy relates solely to his territorial jurisdiction, there should, ordinarily, be no reason why section 531 of the Code should not be applicable to the order. I am inclined to hold that the decision of Kambli, J., was per incurium for the obvious reason that these two judgments of the Supreme Court which throw light on the two types of jurisdiction of a Criminal Court do not find place in the said judgment. If these two judgments had been brought to the notice of Kambli, J., I am confident that he would have decided otherwise. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, any decision of the Supreme Court is the law of the land and it is not permissible for any Court to circumvent the effect of such a decision provide such decision is brought to their notice. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the decision reported in 1978 Mh.L.J. 393 (Vithalrao v. Ratnaprabha) cannot be regarded as a good law in view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court. 8. There is one more aspect which I must deal with. In the matter, I am ably assisted by Mr. Jadhav, the learned A.P.P. That relates to the power of the Magistrate contemplated under section 125. The language used in section 125 is to the following effect: “125.(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuse to maintain- (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate, or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the First Class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife etc. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX” To whom does this refer to, when the section says a Magistrate of the First Class? Does it mean a Magistrate in whose jurisdiction the beneficiary resides, or does it mean a Magistrate in whose jurisdiction the person against whom such order is claimed, resides? XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX” To whom does this refer to, when the section says a Magistrate of the First Class? Does it mean a Magistrate in whose jurisdiction the beneficiary resides, or does it mean a Magistrate in whose jurisdiction the person against whom such order is claimed, resides? A clue is provided to this question in section 126 Criminal Procedure Code. It says: “126(1). Proceedings under section 125 may be taken against any person in any district - (a) where he is, or (b) where he or his wife reside, or (c) where he last resided with wife, or as the case may be, with the mother of the illegitimate child. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Prima facie, what should be the forum for a father or a mother is not at all mentioned. Therefore, which is the Magistrate of First Class before whom a father or mother claiming against their children must file their application? In fact, the language of section 125 is such that no formal application is contemplated, but only proof of neglect or refusal has be given before the Magistrate. Two things, therefore, arise - (1) that he must be a Magistrate of the First Class and (2) that he must be a Magistrate where any of the beneficiaries should conveniently file an application. Now, let us take an example that the father and mother are residing in Aurangabad and the son from whom they want to claim maintenance resides in remote part of Punjab. Will the father and mother who do not have money for their own maintenance be required to travel to Punjab and file the case before a Magistrate of First Class in Punjab? The answer must, obviously, be in the negative. Therefore, just as the law has made a change by bringing in sub-clause (b), the forum where his wife resides as a convenient forum for the wife, we may have to read in it at the same breath, “where his father and mother reside.” It is obvious that the Magistrate intended is one to give relief to the beneficiaries mentioned in section 125 and harassment is not intended. If the beneficiaries mentioned in section 125 are required to hunt the person from whom they have to claim maintenance, who may himself be shifting from place to place for service or any other count, it would mean more harassment than a relief to them. In A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521 (M/s. Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh)4, this aspect was considered and Subha Rao, J., in para 5 has clear told us: XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX” “This is our view, has been designedly done by the Legislature to enable a discarded wife or a helpless child to get the much needed and urgent relief in one or other of the three forums convenient to them. The proceedings under this section are in the nature of civil proceedings, the remedy is a summary one and the person seeking that remedy, as we have pointed out, is ordinarily a helpless person. So the words should be liberally construed without doing any violence to the language.” On this touchstone, I would not be far from right if I were to hold that the convenient place for filing an application under section 125, whether it is first, or second or third application, or whether it is an application for enhancement under section 127, should be regarded as the proper forum and a Magistrate referred to in section 125 as also the Magistrate referred to in section 127(1) and (2) must refer to that Magistrate before whom all, or any of the beneficiaries can conveniently file the application. The territorial jurisdiction of Magistrate so far as section 125 is concerned, cannot be restricted to the convenience of the person against whom an order is claimed, but it must be given a liberal interpretation, of course not causing any violence to the language and must mean any convenient forum approachable by any of the beneficiaries mentioned in section 125. 9. One of the arguments of Shri Jadhav, the learned A.P.P., was that the word “the” in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 127 can be read as “a” as told to us from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Volume 5, Fourth Edition, by John B. James at page 2753. 9. One of the arguments of Shri Jadhav, the learned A.P.P., was that the word “the” in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 127 can be read as “a” as told to us from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Volume 5, Fourth Edition, by John B. James at page 2753. He has specially referred me to the meaning of the phrase “The jury” at sub-clause (7) under the title “the” which says that “the jury” might have been read as “a” jury when the person and pleaded guilty to the offence charged. 10. It is a common method of interpreting words in which 'a' can be used as 'the' and 'the' can be used as 'a'. Therefore, the Magistrate referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 127 Criminal Procedure Code will not mean the Magistrate who passed the order, but any Magistrate having First Class powers. This interpretation of mine will also be in consonance with the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1589 and A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1101. In this view of the matter, the revision is dismissed. The rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.