JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal by the defendant-tenant is directed against the decree of affirmance passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Alipore in a suit for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff-landlords for their own occupation. 2. THE case of the plaintiffs, in a nutshell, was as under. Premises Nos. 98a, 98b and 98c, Bakul Bagan Road which are contiguous buildings, belonged to their predecessor Late Sukumar Mitra who inducted the defendant-appellant Trilok Chandra jain as a monthly tenant in respect of the third floor of premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road consisting of four rooms, kitchen, bath room etc. at a rental of Rs. 350/- per month, payable according to the English Calendar. One Revan Das Patel was also inducted as a tenant in respect of the second floor of the said premises. Premises No. 98b which stands in between premises Nos. 98a and 98c, Bakul Bagan Road was gifted by late Sukumar Mitra to two of his sons, namely, Soumen Mitra and Debasish Mitra (Plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6 respectively) and the remaining plaintiffs have, therefore, no interest in the said premises. Sukumar Mitra having died intestate, Premises Nos. 98a and 98c, Bakul Bagan Road devolved upon his eight sons Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 8), seven daughters (Plaintiff Nos. 9 to 15)and his widow (Plaintiff No. 16 (1. They instituted two ejectment suits, being Title Suit Nos. 44 of 1977 and 45 of 1977 in the 4th Court of the Munsif at Alipore against the present appellant Trilok Chandra Jain and Revan Das Patel respectively on the ground that both the second and third floors of Premises no. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road are reasonably required by them for their own occupation and that they are not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation in the city of Calcutta. In the plaint they gave a detailed account of their requirement and alleged that their present accommodation is wholly insufficient for their joint family consisting of forty members. During pendency of the suits plaintiff No. 3 died and was substituted by his heirs (Plaintiff Nos. 3 (a) to 3 (c. 3. BOTH the tenant contested the suits brought against them. In the plaint they gave a detailed account of their requirement and alleged that their present accommodation is wholly insufficient for their joint family consisting of forty members. During pendency of the suits plaintiff No. 3 died and was substituted by his heirs (Plaintiff Nos. 3 (a) to 3 (c. 3. BOTH the tenant contested the suits brought against them. The defence of defendant Trilok Chandra Jain in Title suit No. 44 of 1977 with which we are concerned in this appeal was that the present accommodation available to the plaintiffs is quite sufficient, to meet their requirement. 4. THE two suits were tried analogously by the learned munsif who while dismissing Title suit No. 44 of 1977 against the defendant appellant Trilok Chandra Jain, decreed Title suit No. 45. of 1977 against Revan Das Patel. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the decree of dismissal passed in Title Suit No. 44 of 1 977 which was registered as Title appeal No. 611 of 1979. Revan Das Patel also preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned munsif in Title Suit No. 45 of 1977 which was registered as title Appeal No. 686 of 1979. Both the appeals were heard together by the learned Additional District Judge who dismissed title Appeal No. 686 of 1 979 but allowed Title Appeal No. 611 of 1979 and, reversing the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Munsif, decreed the suit. Being unsuccessful both Revan das Patel and Trilok Chandra Jain preferred second appeals to this court but after the admission of the appeals Revan Das Patel vacated the second floor of Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road comprising four rooms, kitchen and bath room and delivered possession thereof to the plaintiffs. Thereafter he did not prosecute the appeal which was dismissed for non-prosecution. 5. IN dismissing Title Suit No. . 44 of 1 977 brought against the present appellant two things weighed with the learned munsif. First, he found that at the time of the gift of Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan Road in favour of plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6, it consisted of a single storied house with tile roof which was reconstructed and converted into a four storied building in the year 1964. According to the learned Munsif the cost of construction. was borne by all the plaintiffs out of. their common fund. 5 and 6, it consisted of a single storied house with tile roof which was reconstructed and converted into a four storied building in the year 1964. According to the learned Munsif the cost of construction. was borne by all the plaintiffs out of. their common fund. Hence notwithstanding the gift which, according to the learned Munsif, was not acted upon all the plaintiffs have the right of enjoyment and possession of the said premises. Secondly since Tittle Suit no. 45 of 1977 was decreed, the second floor of Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan road comprising four rooms, bath room, privy etc. was to be available to the plaintiffs and in view of the additional accommodation that would be thus available to them, their requirement. would be fully satisfied. 6. THE learned additional District Judge differed from the learned Munsif on both the points. He held that premises no. 98d,bakul Baqan Road belonged absolutely to plaintiff nos. 5 and 6 by virtue of the gift and though some other plaintiffs were occupying portions of the said premises they were mere licensees under plaintiff Nos. 5and 6. He further held that the licence in favour of the plaintiffs who were in permissive possession of the premises having revoked, they had no right to occupy the same In the next place the learned additional District Judge was of the opinion that plaintiffs' requirement would not be satisfied even if the second floor of Premises No. 98a bakul Bagan Road which was the subject-matter of Title Suit no. 45 of 1977 was available to them for their occupation. 7. ON 18. 4. 83 the appellant Trilok Chandra Jain filed an application under Order 41, Rule. 27, Civil Procedure Code with the prayer to take into consideration the following subsequent events namely : - (i) Revan Das Patel, defendant of Title Suit No. 45 of 1972 delivered possession of the second floor of Premises No. 98a. Bakul Bagan Raod in favour of the plaintiff-respondents during the pendency of the second appeal and (ii the original landlord Late Sukumar Mitra, during his lifetime, sought to inform the appellant by a letter that he had let out entire Premises no. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road to plaintiff No. 1 who, since then, was collecting rents on his own account as the sole landlord. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road to plaintiff No. 1 who, since then, was collecting rents on his own account as the sole landlord. The letter addressed to the appellant was, however, misdelivered to Reran Das Patel whose son Navin Bhai Patel came across the same only on 16. 4. 83 while searching for some old files and handed it over to the appellant on the same day. 8. AN affidavit to the above effect by Navin Bhai patel and the letter purported to have been written by Late Sukumar mitra were made annexures to the application and. a prayer was made to admit as additional evidence the original letter and the rent receipts granted by plaintiff No. 1 as the sole landlord of Premises Mo. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road. On 4. 7. 8 3 when the application came up for hearing, jyotirmoyee Nag, J. (as she then was) before whom the second appeal was pending, directed that the application would be heard along with the appeal and further directed that objection to the application, if any was to be put in at the time of hearing of the appeal. Therefore, this judgment will dispose of both the appeal and the application. Before the hearing of the appeal, the respondents filed an affidavit- in- opposition admitting delivery of possession of the second floor of Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road by Revan Das Patel in their favour during the pendency of the second appeal preferred by him which was ultimately dismissed for non-prosecution. It was, however stated that inspite of the second floor being available to them their requirement would not be fulfilled and as a matter of fact, the lower appellate court, while allowing their appeal, arrived at the finding that their requirement would not be satisfied even if they obtained possession of the second floor of Premises no. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road. 9. AS regards the letter purported to have been written to the appellant by late Sukumar Mitra, it was stated that the application under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code did not contain any explanation for the delay in filing the letter in court. It was further alleged that Navin Bhai Patel, after having delivered possession of the second floor, manufactured the letter at the behest of the appellant. 10. ON 7. 3. It was further alleged that Navin Bhai Patel, after having delivered possession of the second floor, manufactured the letter at the behest of the appellant. 10. ON 7. 3. 86 the appellant filed an affidavit- in- reply denying the allegation the the respondents' requirement would not be satisfied even after obtaining possession of the second floor of Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road. With regard to the letter alleged to have been written by late Sukumar Mitra, the appellant denied that in his application under Order 41, rule 27, Civil Procedure Code he had not given any explanation for the delay in filing the letter in court and further denied that the letter was manufactured by Navin Bhai Patel at his request. Photostat copies of the rent receipts granted by the late Sukumar Mitra and thereafter by the plaintiff No. I were made annexures to the affidavit- in- reply. The respondents too,. filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil "procedure Code for taking into consideration certain events which took place during the pendency of the second appeal, namely., birth, marriage etc. in their family necessitating further accommodation for the family. As usual, an affidavit in opposition was filed by the appellant denying all the material averments of the respondents. The application, however, was not ultimately pressed by Mr. Chatterjee, learned advocate for the respondents. Therefore, only the application filed by the appellant is required to be disposed of and I proceed to dispose of the application before entering into the merits of the appeal. 11. HAVING heard the learned Advocates for the parties, i am unable to enteratin the application for the reasons stated hereunder :- 12. IN paragraph 9 of the application it has been stated that as far back as on January 22, 1973 the original landlord late Sukumar Mitra by a letter sought to inform the appellant that he had let out the entire premises. No. 98a, Bakul Bagan road to plaintiff No. 1 (Respondent. No. 1) and thereafter, rents were realised by him at all material points of time. The allegation in paragraph 10 of the application is that the letter was misdelivered to Revan Das Patel whose son Navin Bhai Patel gave it to the appellant only on April. 16, 1983 informing him that he came across the letter while searching for some old files. The allegation in paragraph 10 of the application is that the letter was misdelivered to Revan Das Patel whose son Navin Bhai Patel gave it to the appellant only on April. 16, 1983 informing him that he came across the letter while searching for some old files. Navin Bhai, in paragraph 2 of his affidavit has stated that by a notice dated January 22, 1973 Late Sukumar Mitra informed his father Revan Das Patel that he had let out Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road to respondent No. 1 and since January, 1973 respondent No. 1 started realising rent on his own account as sole landlord of the said premises. During search of some old files on April 16, 1983 he found a similar notice in the file addressed to the appellant Trilok Chandra Jain and handed it over to him. 13. IT has been mentioned already that Revan Das Patel was the tenant in respect of the second floor, while the appellant trilok Chandra Jain was the tenant in respect of the third floor of Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road. Late Sukumar mitra, with the members of his family, used to occupy Premises nos. 98b and 98c, Bakul Bagan boad and also a portion of Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road. In such circumstance, the possibility of the alleged letter addressed to the appellant having been misdelivered to" Revan Das Patel must be ruled out. Also, it is difficult to imagine why' Revan Das would keep the letter in his personal file instead of making over the same to the appellant. 14. IT appears from the judgments of the courts below that revan Das, in his written statement, simply denied the allegation of the plaintiffs that they reasonably required the second floor of Premises No. 96ia, Bakul Bagan Road for their own occupation. He did not challenge the maintainability of the suit on the ground that he was a tenant only under Plaintiff No. 1 who again, was a tenant under Late Sukumar Mitra. Such a defence, if established, would have non-suited the plaintiffs but no such plea was taken in the written statement although, it was speficially alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint that under instructions from late Sukumar Mitra, respondent No. 1 used to realise rents from both the tenants. Such a defence, if established, would have non-suited the plaintiffs but no such plea was taken in the written statement although, it was speficially alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint that under instructions from late Sukumar Mitra, respondent No. 1 used to realise rents from both the tenants. Revan Das, to whom the letter is alleged to have been misdelivered, has not filed any affidavit affirming receipt of any such letter by him and tile reason is not far to seek. If he had filed any such affidavit he would have had to explain why during the period of long ten years from 1973 to 1983 he did not deliver the letter to the appellant who was living in the same premises or even disclose to him the contents of the said letter. 15. THE photostat copies of the rent receipts annexed by the appellant to his affidavit in reply go to show that rents were realised by late Sukumar Mitra upto December,' 1972 and respondent No. 1 started realising rents from January, 1973 onward. Realisation of rents from January, 1973 by respondent no. 1 might be due to two reasons. Either late Sukumar Mitra instructed him to realise rents from the tenants as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint ox he had given notice to the tenants to pay rents to respondent No. 1 as he had let out the entire premises to the latter. The appellant, therefore, knew the reasons why he started paying rents from January, 1973 onward to respondent No. 1 instead of late Sukumar Mitro who inducted him to the suit premises as a tenant. 16. IF the case made out in paragraph 7 of the plaint be untrue then, irrespective of non-receipt of the alleged letter of Sukumar Mitra misdelivered to Revan Das, he must have had the knowledge that the entire premises had been let out to respondent No. 1 and, that is why, the latter was realising rents from him. Inspite of such knowledge he did not rais the plea in his written statement that respondent No. 1 was the sole landlord as, subsequent to the creation of the tenancy, the entire premises had keen let out by late Sukumar mitra to respondent no. 1. Since no such plea was taken by the appellant in his written statement inspite of his knowledge that respondent no. 1. Since no such plea was taken by the appellant in his written statement inspite of his knowledge that respondent no. 1 became his sole landlord being a tenant of the first degree of the premises under late Sukumar Mitra, additional evidence on the above point cannot be allowed to be produced at this stage under Clause (a) of Order 41, Rule 27, Civil procedure Code even if the alleged letter of late Sukumar mitra came into the hands of the appellant only on 16. 4. 83 as claimed by him. The application under Order 41, Rule 27, civil Procedure Code must, therefore, be dismissed. Having disposed of the application as above, I now proceed to deal with the merits of the appeal. 17. IN assailing the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellant, has urged before me the following points :- (i) the lower appellate court failed to appreciate that the gift of Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan road by late Sukumar Mitra in favour of plaintiff nos. 5 and 6 was never acted upon and all the respondents had interests in the said property. The lower appellate court was, therefore, wrong in excluding from consideration the accommodation available at Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan while considering the requirement of the remaining plaintiffs; (ii) the lower appellate court took into account the requirement of plaintiff No. 9, a married daughter of late Sukumar Mitra, ignoring the provisions of Section 23, Hindu Succession Act which does not give right of residence to a married daughter in the dwelling house of her father or mother who had died intestate; (iii) the lower appellate court failed to take note of the variations between the plaintiffs' pleading and evidence with respect to the plaintiffs' requirement for additional accommodation (iv) instead of applying the test of a single household, the lower appellate court treated each of the plaintiffs and the members of his family as a separate unit by allotting them separate drawing room, dining room, kitchen etc. though their own case is that they constitute a joint family; and lastly (v) the judgments and the decrees of the courts below should be set aside. though their own case is that they constitute a joint family; and lastly (v) the judgments and the decrees of the courts below should be set aside. and the suit should be remanded to the trial court for thresh trial as no issue was framed as to whether the plaintiffs are in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. 18. WITH regard to the first point. Mr. Banerjee has invited my attention to paragraph 12 of the plaint where it has been stated that "the plaintiffs, barring the unmarried daughters, are living in joint mess in the family dwelling house all located at Bakul Bagan Road in Premises Nos. 98a, 98b, and 98c, Bakul Bagan Road". From this, Mr. Banerjee wants me to drew the inference that premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan Road belongs to all the plaintiffs. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate for the respondents has, however, referred to paragraph 3 of the plaint where the specific averment is that late Sukumar Mitra made a gift of Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagn Road to plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6 who constructed Pacca buildings on the said land and have been living in a portion thereof. Paragraph 12 therefore, cannot be read in isolation and the two paragraphs, read to gather do not support the contention of Mr. Banerjee. 19. THE allegation in paragraph 3 of the plaint mentioned above were nowhere denied by the defendant in his written statement. No case was made out by him that the gift was not acted upon, that the construction was made by all the plaintiffs jointly out of their common funds and, as such, allot them had interests in the building so constructed. Also no evidence was led challenging the gift. That being so, the lower appellate court rightly held, disagreeing with the learned Munsif, that Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan Road was the property of plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6 by virtue of the deed of gift which was duly proved and that the remaining plaintiffs had no interests in the said property. In such circumstance the accommodation available at Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan road cannot be taken into account while considering the reasonable requirement of the remaining plaintiffs. The first point urged by Mr. Banerjee cannot, therefore, be accepted as sound. 20. THE second point canvassed by Mr. Banerjee also appears to be without merit. Plaintiff Nos. In such circumstance the accommodation available at Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan road cannot be taken into account while considering the reasonable requirement of the remaining plaintiffs. The first point urged by Mr. Banerjee cannot, therefore, be accepted as sound. 20. THE second point canvassed by Mr. Banerjee also appears to be without merit. Plaintiff Nos. 8 to 15 are daughters of. late Sukumar Mitra. All of then are married and all of them are co-owners of Premises Nos. 98a and 98c, Bakul Bagn Road. Of them, plaintiff Nos. 9 and 11 live in Delhi and the rest live in Calcutta. But they pay occasional visits to their ancestral house to stay with their mother and brothers for a few days with their children. Both the courts below have held and, in my opinion, rightly that since they are living with their husbands the question of reasonable requirement of Premises Nos. 98a and 98c, bakul Bagan Road for their permanent occupation cannot arise. The courts below were, 'however, of the opinion that two guest rooms are required by the plaintiffs for accommodation of the married daughters during their periodic visits to their ancestral houses with their children. The lower appellate court was also of the opinion that two more rooms are required by the plaintiffs for the permanent residence of plaintiff No. 9 who is at present living in Delhi with her husband who is to retire shortly from service. She desires to permanently settle down in Calcutta where she has no house except her ancestral house at Premises Nos. 98a and 98c, Bakul bagan Road. 21. MR. Banerjee assails both the findings on the 'ground that under Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act where a hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in class I of the Schedule and such female heir is a daughter she can have no right of residence in the dwelling house left by the Hindu intestate unless she has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. 22. SO far as the requirement of two guest rooms for temporary accommodation of the married daughter is concerned, the contention of Mr. Banerjee cannot be. 22. SO far as the requirement of two guest rooms for temporary accommodation of the married daughter is concerned, the contention of Mr. Banerjee cannot be. entertained in view of the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Parimal Bala vs. Santosh Kumar reported in AIR 1984 Calcutta 205 where it has been held that the requirement of a room for accommodating the married daughter of the landlord who was his only 'child and who came and stayed with her father for two days in a week must be held to be a reasonable requirement of the landlord 'and his family. That now bring us to the second part of Mr. Banerjee's contention namely, whether accommodation required for the permanent residence of a married daughter who is not only a co-owner of the premises. but also a co-share-landlord may be regarded as reasonable requirement of the landlords "as contemplated by Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956. 23. SECTION 23 of the Hindu Succession Act relied' upon by mr. Banerjee is extracted below for. convenience of discussion :-23. Special provision respecting dwelling houses where a Hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in class I of the schedule and his or her property includes a dwelling house wholly occupied by. members of his or her family, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling house shall not arise until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein but the female heir shall be Entitled to a right of residence therein : provided that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. " 24. A plain reading of Section 2. 3 of the Hindu Succession act and the proviso thereto extracted above undoubtedly goes to show that a married daughter, not answering any of the descriptions contained in the proviso, cannot claim a right of residence in the dwelling house of the Hindu intestate which is wholly occupied by members of his of her family. 3 of the Hindu Succession act and the proviso thereto extracted above undoubtedly goes to show that a married daughter, not answering any of the descriptions contained in the proviso, cannot claim a right of residence in the dwelling house of the Hindu intestate which is wholly occupied by members of his of her family. Therefore, if a suit is brought by such married daughter to enforce her right of residence in the dwelling house left by the Hindu intestate, the members of the family of the Hindu intestate who are in occupation of the dwelling house may successfully resist the claim by using Section 2 3 as a shield. This however, is c matter concerning the married daughter and other members of the family of the Hindu intestate and not the tenant of the dwelling house. Where, therefore, the members of the family of the Hindu intestate do not object to provide permanent accommodation to a married daughter in the family dwelling house, as in this case, the tenant cannot contest the plaintiffs' claim of reasonable requirement of the family dwelling house for her occupation by using Section 2 3 as a shield and contend that a married daughter has no right of residence there in. Of course it is needless to mention that the landlord must show a genuine present need for accommodation of the married daughter. Secondly, Section 23 clearly indicates that it can have no application unless the dwelling house is wholly occupied by members of the family of the; Hindu intestate. Thus, if the dwelling house in question is not actually occupied wholly by the members of the deceased's family, Section 2 3 will not apply. In the instant case the dwelling houses, namely, Premises Nos. 9 8a and 9 8c, Bakul Bagan Road were not wholly occupied by members of the family of late Sukumar Mitra because, there were two tenants in Premises No. 98a, Bakul Bagan Road. That being so Section 2 3 Hindu Succession Act has no application to the facts of the present case. For the reasons stated above, i find myself unable to accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee. 25. WITH respect to the third point Mr. Banerjee contends that although in the plaint accommodation for drivers, cook, servants, maid-servants etc. That being so Section 2 3 Hindu Succession Act has no application to the facts of the present case. For the reasons stated above, i find myself unable to accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee. 25. WITH respect to the third point Mr. Banerjee contends that although in the plaint accommodation for drivers, cook, servants, maid-servants etc. was not asked for, the plaintiffs were allowed to lead evidence in this regard and the lower appellate court found upon such vidence that three rooms are required for them. As there was a complete departure from the pleading during trial the lower appellate court, according to Mr. Banerjee, should have ignore) the evidence on the above point. 26. IN paragraph 11 of the plaint the plaintiffs claimed that there are 40 members in their family who are required to be provided with suitable accommodation in the two houses, namely, Premises Nos. 98a and 98c, Bakul Bagan Road. This number, it appears, is more than the total number of plaintiffs, their dependants and married daughters as mentioned in the plaint. Although, therefore, the plaint did not contain the express averment that accommodation was also required for the cook, servants, maid-servants, drivers etc., the lower appellate court, in my opinion, did not commit any error in taking into account the plaintiffs' requirement in this regard because there are bound to be driver, cook, servants, maid-servants etc. in such a big family having considerable social status. In such circumstance it is difficult to hold that during trial the plaintiffs made a complete departure from their pleading and introduced a new case which took the defendant by surprise and caused prejudice to him in his defence. I, therefore, find no substance in the point urged by Mr. Banerjee. Mr. Banerjee has vehemently argued that since plaintiff nos. 1 to 8 and 16 are members of a joint family, the test of a single household should have been applied by the lower appellate court in considering their requirement and separate drawing room, kitchen etc., should not have been provided for them. 27. THOUGH plaintiff Nos. 1 to 8 and 16 constitute a joint family, both the courts below regarded each male plaintiff and the requirement of each unit, having regard to the social status avocation etc. of the members constituting such unit. 27. THOUGH plaintiff Nos. 1 to 8 and 16 constitute a joint family, both the courts below regarded each male plaintiff and the requirement of each unit, having regard to the social status avocation etc. of the members constituting such unit. The lower appellate court has found from the evidence that there are 22 members in the joint family besides cook, servants, maid-servants, drivers etc. and has further found that at least 27 rooms are absolutely necessary for the entire family besides 3 rooms for servants, maid-servants, 'drivers etc. Even according to the trial court 21 living rooms, 2 guest rooms, dining space and 1 kitchen are reasonably required by the plaintiffs, besides 2 rooms for servants, cook, drivers etc. The trial court, however, dismissed the suit in view of its finding that Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan Road is a joint family property and the accommodation in the said premises is available to the plaintiffs. 28. THE finding of the lower appellate court as to the reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs in the circumstances of the case is a finding of fact and cannot, be disturbed in second appeal unless it is shown to be perverse. On a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court I find that its approach in arriving at the above finding is pragmatic, just and reasonable. To cite an instance, plaintiff No. 1 has his wife and three sons. He himself is a Solicitor and also a practicing Advocate of this court. His wife is a lecturer in the Gokhale Memorial High School. His eldest son also is a Solicitor and an Advocate. The second son is a Government employee and the youngest son is a college student. The lower appellate court found that plaintiff No. 1 and his two sons each require a separate bed room plaintiff no. 1 and his eldest son require one office room for carrying on profession and the wife of plaintiff No. 1 requires one room for holding tutorial classes. The approach of the lower appellate court cannot, therefore, be said to be perverse. Rather the lower appellate court in my opinion, should have found that two separate office rooms are required for plaintiff no. The approach of the lower appellate court cannot, therefore, be said to be perverse. Rather the lower appellate court in my opinion, should have found that two separate office rooms are required for plaintiff no. 1 and his eldest son both of whom are solicitors and practicing Advocates of this court as they cannot conceivably use the same room at the time as their chamber or office room. 29. THE contention of Mr. Banerjee is that the lower appellate court was wrong in allotting a separate drawing room to each of plaintiff Nos. 1, 5 and 6 and two more bath rooms and privies. for the entire family. Plaintiff no. 1, as pointed out already, is a solicitor and a practicing Advocate of this court. Plaintiff No. 5 is a Chartered Accountant and plaintiff no. 6 is a Civil Engineer attached to the Calcutta Improvement trust where he holds a high position. In the above circumstance it would be preposterous to hold that they reasonably, require only one drawing room. Also, for a family consisting of 22 members the finding of the lower appellate court that two more bath rooms and privies are required by the plaintiffs cannot be said to be perverse. If he family consists of Advocates, Chartered Accountant, Civil Engineer, Government employee, Bank employee, Teacher etc. Naturally therefore, they will have to entertain different types of friends and visitors and will require separate drawing rooms. In the above context the finding of the lower, appellate court as to the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff cannot be interfered with in second appeal. 30. - THE lower appellate court found that at present the plaintiffs are in occupation of 13 rooms, including 6 rooms at Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan Road which belongs to plaintiff nos. 5 and 6 absolutely. According to Mr. Banerjee the lower appellate court through inadvertence left - out of consideration 3 bed rooms in the ground floor of Premises No. 98c, Bakul bagan Road arid if these 3 rooms are taken into account then the plaintiffs will be found to be in occupation of 16 rooms, including 6 rooms at Premises No. 98b, Bakul Bagan Road. THEse 16 rooms, together with the 4 rooms of which possession has been delivered to the plaintiff by the other tenant Revan das Patel will bring the number to 20. THEse 16 rooms, together with the 4 rooms of which possession has been delivered to the plaintiff by the other tenant Revan das Patel will bring the number to 20. Since the married daughters are not entitled to accommodation in the family dwelling house of the deceased the 4 rooms found by the lower appellate court to be reasonably required by the plaintiffs for accommodation of the married, daughters should be excluded and so also the 3 rooms allotted for the cook, servants, maid-servants, drivers etc. According to Mr. Banerjee if these 7 rooms are eluded from consideration the plaintiff will require 20 rooms in all of which they are already in possession. It is difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Banerjee. In the first place the map appended to the Commissioner's report goes to show that there is no bed room in the ground floor of Premises No. 98c, Bakul Bagan Road. In the second place, I have already held that requirement of accommodation, both for temporary and permanent residence of the married daughters must be regarded as the reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs. In the third place, the requirement of accommodation for servants, cook, drivers, maid-servants etc., cannot be left out of consideration simply because the plaint does not contain the specific averment: "that accommodation is required for them in my opinion, the lower appellate court was fully justified in holding that the suit premises consisting of 4 rooms, kitchen, bath room etc. is reasonably required by the plaintiffs for their own occupation. 31. THE last point by Mr. Banerjee is that since no issue was framed by the trial court as to whether the plaintiffs are in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, the judgments and the decrees of the courts below should be set aside' and the suit remanded for fresh trial after framing of the above issue. To me, this seems to be an argument of despair without having any merit in it. 32. IN paragraph 13 of the. plaint the specific allegation is that the plaintiffs have no other reasonably suitable accommodation in the city of Calcutta. The allegation was denied by the defendant in paragraph 13 of the written statement where it was contended that the plaintiffs had suppressed material facts. During trial the question whether the plaintiffs were in possession of two other premises, being Premises no. The allegation was denied by the defendant in paragraph 13 of the written statement where it was contended that the plaintiffs had suppressed material facts. During trial the question whether the plaintiffs were in possession of two other premises, being Premises no. 52, Sakharipara Road and 48, Beninandan Street came up for consideration. It was found by the trial court on the evidence on record that premises No. 52, Sakharipara Road was owned by M/s. Bhawanipur Estates Pvt. Ltd., of which Plaintiff No. 2, and the sons of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 3 and some outsider were the partners. It was further found that the entire premises was in occupation of tenants. With regard to Premises No. 48, Beninandan Street it was found by the trial court that though plaintiff No. 4, 5, 6 and 7 were the purchasers thereof, the entire premises was in the occupation of tenants and no part of it was available to the plaintiffs for their own occupation. Although, therefore, there is no finding by the courts below that the plaintiffs are not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation, the above finding is sufficient to indicate that actually they are not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation in the city of Calcutta. This finding, it appears, was not challenged before the lower appellate court. Therefore, the question is whether in the above circumstance the absence of any issue as to whether the plaintiffs are in occupation of any reasonably suitable accommodation can be fatal to the suit. 33. FROM the above it would appear that not only the plaintiff expressly averred in the plaint that they are not in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation in the city of Calcutta but also adduced evidence in support of their case. On a consideration of the evidence so adduced, the trial court found that the case of the plaintiffs was true and the suit proceeded on that footing, the defendant having full knowledge of the plaintiffs contention. In such a situation, the absence of any issue as to whether the plaintiffs are in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation can never be fatal to the suit. 34. IN this context reference may be made to two single Bench decisions of this Court. In such a situation, the absence of any issue as to whether the plaintiffs are in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation can never be fatal to the suit. 34. IN this context reference may be made to two single Bench decisions of this Court. In the case of Banka Behari Dutt vs. Gour Mohan Dutt reported in AIR 1981, Calcutta 185 a learned single Judge of this Court held that where the landlord in a suit for eviction made it clear that he had no other alternative accommodation and the parties proceeded to trial with full knowledge of the rival contentions, led evidence in support of their respective cases and the court considered such evidence in coming to its decision, it could not be said that the trial was vitiated in the absence of any issue as to whether the landlord was in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. 51. In the later decision in the case of S. N. Rudra vs. A. K. Bhattacharjee reported in 86 CWN 819 the same view was reiterated by another learned Judge of this Court. Agreeing respectfully with the two decisions cited above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold that the absence of any issue as to whether the plaintiffs are in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation has not caused any prejudice to the defendant-appellant or any miscarriage of justice and has not, therefore, vitiated the trial. 52. All the points urged by Mr. Banerjee in support of the appeal having failed, the appeal must be dismissed as being without any merit. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and the decree of the lower appellate courts are affirmed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.