Judgment :- 1. Revision petitioners challenge the order of the executing court in refusing to amend the decree. Their contention is that they are liable to pay interest only at the rate of 6 per cent per annum subsequent to the decree and the court erred in granting interest at 20.5 per cent per annum. Another contention is that the decrees passed in the suits are not in compliance with 0.34 of the CPC. It is pointed out that preliminary decree and final decree were not passed in these suits for enforcing the mortgages and hence decrees are in-executable. Counsel for the respondent-decree holder contended that having agreed to a consent decree, it is not open to the revision pensioners to raise the aforesaid objections before the executing court. 2. The dominant question to be considered is as to whether the revision petitioners can challenge the decrees having consented to it. The foundation of a compromise lies in two aspects of public policy: the need for determining the dispute and the desirability of parties coming to an agreement out of their bargains. When a compromise is embodied in a judgment, both the aspects are present. After having entered into a compromise which is embodied in the judgment it is often an exercise in futility to retract from the same on insufficient grounds. A compromise may be impeached on the ground of incapacity of the parties to enter into the agreement. It may be bad if a minor not represented by a guardian, enters into a compromise. The compromise may also be vitiated by mistake either due to misrepresentation, fraud, coercion or undue influence. There may be a compromise which is ab-initio illegal or a compromise of a dispute which gives rise to questions of illegality. The compromise reached between the parties in the cases in hand does not come under any of the above category. Petitioners (Judgment debtors) were represented by their advocates and so it cannot be said that they were not aware of the import of S.34 CPC. So it is not possible to hold that the compromise can be wholly ignored by the court of law. The Rules concerning the effect of judgments obtained adversely apply with equal force to those obtained by consent. A party against whom a judgment has been passed after contest can only challenge the same by filing appeal. So it is not possible to hold that the compromise can be wholly ignored by the court of law. The Rules concerning the effect of judgments obtained adversely apply with equal force to those obtained by consent. A party against whom a judgment has been passed after contest can only challenge the same by filing appeal. This is equally so in the case of a judgment as a result of compromise. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioners having entered into the compromise can assail it in the execution proceedings. 3. Petitioners did not raise a contention that the claim of interest in the plaint cannot be allowed and that the plaintiff can be awarded interest after the decree only at 6 per cent per annum. In the counter they have no case that they took loans for agricultural purposes and therefore interest after the decrees cannot exceed 6 per cent, On the other hand, petitioners fully agreed to the entire claim of the plaintiff when they filed compromise. To attract the first proviso to S.34 CPC., petitioners ought to have raised the contention that they obtained the loan from the respondent-Bank for a noncommercial purpose. As there is no such plea the same point cannot be raised in execution. 4. It cannot be said that the decree is not in conformity with the judgment. A decree can be amended as provided under S.152 of the CPC. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of the parties. As the judgments in the above cases were passed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties there is hardly any scope to say that there are arithmetical mistakes or errors which could be corrected invoking S.152 CPC. This Section is based on two salutary principles: first the act of court should not prejudice any party and second, the courts have a duty to see that their records are true and that they represent correct state of affairs. 0.20 R.6 postulates that the decree shall agree with the judgment. When the decree is not in conformity with the judgment the court has no alternative but to rectify it. 0.20 R.6 postulates that the decree shall agree with the judgment. When the decree is not in conformity with the judgment the court has no alternative but to rectify it. When there is no inconsistency between the judgment and decree, the court cannot amend the decree to the whims and fancies of the parties. In this context, it is useful to refer to the decision in AIR 1979 Patna 88 (Rukmini Devi v. Pawan Kumar) wherein it is held as follows: "The decree cannot be amended if it is prepared on the basis of the judgment. If there is variance with the judgment and decree then only, the decree can be amended otherwise not." As there is no inconsistency between the judgments and decrees in all these cases, the petitions to amend the decrees were rightly rejected by the court below. 5. Another contention of the petitioners is that the decrees are in-executable as the court failed to pass preliminary decree and final decree as envisaged under 0.34 CPC. It is contended that the suits are essentially one for the enforcement of mortgages and hence the decrees ought to have been drafted as contemplated in 0.34 CPC. It is urged that initially the court ought to have passed a preliminary decree and it the amount was not deposited within the time fixed by the court for payment the court should have passed a final decree. In 1973, 0.34 CPC. as amended by the Kerala High Court permitted a single decree for sale without the court passing a preliminary decree and then a final decree. Under S.122 of the CPC. the High Court is empowered to do it. Counsel for the petitioners relying on AIR. 1986 SC. 589 (Jenpath Giri v. Second Addl. District Judge Balia) contended that any local amendment of the Code which is inconsistent with the Code as amended by the Amending Act would cease to be operative on the commencement of the Amending Act ie. on 1-2-1977 and so the Kerala Amendment doing away with the preliminary and final decree is invalid and the decrees passed not in conformity with 0.34 CPC. are not executable. There is no force in the above argument as the failure of the court to pass a preliminary decree and a final decree does not make the decree passed a nullity. are not executable. There is no force in the above argument as the failure of the court to pass a preliminary decree and a final decree does not make the decree passed a nullity. It cannot be said that the court lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass the decrees. If the petitioners were aggrieved they could have filed appeals against the decrees. Without doing so, they are precluded from contending in the executing court that the decree is a nullity (See the decision in 1982 KLT. 591 Mathew v. Bank of Cochin sl others). As petitioners have not chosen to file appeals to substantiate their contentions that the court went wrong in not passing the preliminary decree and final decree, they cannot raise it before the executing court on the ground that the decree is a nullity. As already pointed out the decrees are in conformity with the judgments and so the petitions for amending the decrees were clearly ill conceived. There is no merit in the Civil Revision Petitions and hence they are dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Dismissed.