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1986 DIGILAW 185 (ORI)

RAM NARAYAN BADAPANDA v. STATE OF ORISSA

1986-05-16

B.K.BEHERA, G.B.PATNAIK

body1986
JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - This writ petition calls for an interpretation of the proviso to Rule 78 of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti (Conduct of Election) Rules 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'). Rule 78 prescribes the procedure for filling up a casual vacancy occurring on account of removal, resignation, death or otherwise or an elected member, Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a Samiti. 2. The undisputed facts are that the Petitioner was elected as the Chairman of Binika Panchayat Samiti in the district of Bolangir in the year 1984 and he was also a Ward Member from Ward No. 2 in Babupali village under Babupali Grama Panchayat of Binika Panchayat Samiti. A vote of no-confidence motion was moved against the Petitioner, but on the date fixed for taking votes on the said motion, the meeting could not be held. The Petitioner, however, tendered his resignation from the office of the Chairman of the Samiti with effect from 7-10-1985. The Block Development Officer accepted the resignation by his letter dated 8-10-1985 with effect from the date of the resignation i.e., 7-10-1985 as per Annexure-I. The resignation, therefore, must be taken to have been effective from 7-10-1985, the date on which the same was received by the Block Development Officer as per the provisions contained in Section 46 of the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Consequently, a casual vacancy occurred in the office of Chairman of the Samiti and the same was to be filled up in accordance with law. Section 47(2) of the Act provides that if the Chairman of the Samiti ceases to be such Chairman by reason of his resignation or otherwise, the vacancy so caused shall be filled up, so far as may be, in the manner provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 16 and the person filling up such vacancy shall hold office for the unexpired term of the Chairman in whose place he has been elected. Thereafter, the Collector, Bolangir, in exercise of his powers conferred under Rule 78 read with Rule 2(f) of the Rules authorised the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sonepur, to exercise all powers and perform all duties of Election Officer in respect of the bye-election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Binika Panchayat Samiti by his order dated 14-10-1985 fixing the programme for conducting the bye-election. As per the said programme the, polling was fixed to be held on 15-11-1985, as would appear from Annexure-A to the counter affidavit of the opposite parties. This order was superseded by another order of the Collector dated 18-10-1985 which has been annexed as Annexure-B to the counter affidavit whereunder the polling was fixed to 19-11-1985. On 14-11-1985, the present writ petition was filed by the Petitioner challenging the validity of the notices issued by the Collector. When the matter was listed for admission on 15-11-1985, this Court directed that a counter be filed by 25-11-1985 and the matter be put up for admission on 26-11-1985. But on the application for interim direction it was ordered that the result of the election shall not be declared. Subsequently, by order dated 30-11-1985, notice of admission and hearing was issued and ultimately, the matter was heard on 1-5-1986. Because of the interim order passed by this Court, though the election has been held on 19-11-1985, yet the result has not been declared. 3. Mr. Palit appearing for the Petitioner contends that the casual vacancy in question having been caused on 7-10-1985 and the election having been held on 19-11-1985, there has been an infraction of the provisions contained in Rule 78 of the Rules and consequently the election must be held to be void. In the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties on 25-11-1985, it was generally contended that there is no illegality in holding the election on 19-11-1985. Subsequently, an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1 wherein a stand has been taken that after the election was over, the State Government has issued an order on 24-3-1986 condoning the delay for holding the election and the said order has been annexed as Annexure-C. The learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the opposite parties contends that since there has been a condonation in accordance with the proviso to Rule 78 of the Rules, the election held on 19-11-1985 cannot be said to be invalid. Thus, we are called upon to interpret the proviso to Rule 78 of the Rules. Rule 78 is quoted hereinbelow in extenso: Casual Vacancy - In the case of a casual vacancy occurring on account of removal, resignation, death or otherwise of an elected member, Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a Samiti, the Block Development. Thus, we are called upon to interpret the proviso to Rule 78 of the Rules. Rule 78 is quoted hereinbelow in extenso: Casual Vacancy - In the case of a casual vacancy occurring on account of removal, resignation, death or otherwise of an elected member, Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a Samiti, the Block Development. Officer shall forthwith report the fact to the District Collector, who shall fix a date as soon as conveniently for holding a bye-election to fill up the vacancy. The vacancy shall be filled up within a period of thirty days from the date of occurrence. The rules prescribed in Parts I, II and III shall apply mutatis mutandis to such bye-election. Provided that where the election cannot be held within the period specified above, the Government or such other officer, as may be empowered by Government, on this behalf, may condone the delay. In the main part of the Rules, the Block Development Officer is required to forthwith report the fact of a casual vacancy having occurred to the District Collector who shall fix a date as soon as convenient for holding a bye-election to fill up the vacancy and the vacancy shall be filled up within a period of thirty days from the date of occurrence. The language of the Rule is explicit and unambiguous and makes it mandatory for the Collector to hold the bye-election within thirty days from the date of the vacancy which has occurred. In the present case, therefore, the vacancy having occurred on 7-10-1985 and the election having been held on 19-11-1985, there has been an infraction of the mandatory requirements of the Rules and accordingly such an election cannot be held to be valid. 4. The next important question is whether the proviso to Rule 78 can be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. No doubt, the proviso confers power on the State Government or officer empowered by the State Government to condone the delay where election cannot be held within the, period specified in the main Rules. But the most question that requires to be answered is whether such condonation is necessary prior to the holding of election of delay can be condoned even after the election is held. According to Mr. But the most question that requires to be answered is whether such condonation is necessary prior to the holding of election of delay can be condoned even after the election is held. According to Mr. Palit, the plain meaning of the proviso is that if the election cannot be held within the specified period, then Government or the Authorised Officer can condone the delay to hold the election. Mr. R.K. Patra, the learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, contends that since the power has been conferred on the State Government or the Authorised Officer under the proviso to condone the delay, there cannot be any fetter on such power by restricting that such condonation can be made only prior to the election being held and it is open for the authorities to condone the delay even long after the election is held. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission made by the learned Additional Government Advocate. It is the cardinal principle of construction of statutes that the words, phrases and sentences of a statute are ordinarily to be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular and grammatical meanings and the construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words used in the Act. The only way to be adopted in interpreting a statute is to take the words as the Legislature has given and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply unless where the construction of those words is either by the Preamble or by the context of the words in question controlled or altered. If the main part of Rule 78 is construed applying the aforesaid principles of construction, then in our opinion it is not susceptible of any other construction than that the Collector must fill up the casual vacancy within a period of thirty days from the date of occurrence. Thus the Legislature has fixed up a period for filling up the vacancy obviously with the object that the vacancy should be filled up with utmost expedition and but for the proviso any infraction of the said minimum period would constitute the election invalid. Thus the Legislature has fixed up a period for filling up the vacancy obviously with the object that the vacancy should be filled up with utmost expedition and but for the proviso any infraction of the said minimum period would constitute the election invalid. Coming to the proviso, it is equally well settled that a proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended and the proviso here empowers the Government or the Authorised Officer to condone the delay if the election cannot be held within the specified period. A plain reading of the proviso, in our view, indicates that the State Government or the Authorised Officer in a case where the election could not be held within the specified period may condone the delay but such condonation must obviously come prior to the holding of election itself. The condonation contemplated under the proviso is not in the nature of a post facto ratification. In other words, if the election in question could not be held within a period of thirty days from the date of the vacancy then the Collector must obtain the prior condonation from the Government or the Officer authorised by the Government and then hold the election within that extended period. This, in our view, is the plain meaning of the proviso and the only construction that can be put on the proviso if the proviso is read along with the main part of the Rule. To interpret the proviso otherwise, as contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate, would amount to legalise an election held contrary to the substantive provisions of the Rules even after a year of holding the election, which could never have been the legislative intent particulary when the anxiety of the Legislature to hold the election within thirty days of the date when casual vacancy occurred is kept in mind. We would accordingly hold that condonation contemplated under the proviso must precede the election to be held beyond the period of thirty days provided in the main part of the Rules. Admittedly here in the present case, the election was held on 19-11-1985 beyond the period of thirty days of the occurring of the casual vacancy on 7-10-1985. We would accordingly hold that condonation contemplated under the proviso must precede the election to be held beyond the period of thirty days provided in the main part of the Rules. Admittedly here in the present case, the election was held on 19-11-1985 beyond the period of thirty days of the occurring of the casual vacancy on 7-10-1985. The order of condonation as per Annexure-C by the State Government was passed on 24th of March, 1985, which in our view is not in consonance with the proviso to Rule 78 of the Rules. In this view of the matter, the conclusion is irresistible that the election which was held on 19-11-1985 is invalid and inoperative in the eye of law. We would accordingly quash the election that was held on 19-11-1985. We would however, make it clear that it is open for the opposite parties to hold an election after obtaining prior condonation from the Government in accordance with our observations made in this judgment and in accordance with law. The writ application is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. B.K. Behera, J. 5. I agree. Final Result : Allowed