Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was elected to the Board of Directors of a Co-operative Bank. The election was in June, 1984. Admittedly, he was a defaulter to a Society as on that date. (The fact that he was only a surety or that the default related to a comparatively small sum would not detract from his being a defaulter). The liability was discharged ultimately on 25-7-1985. Under Ext.P1 dated 16-11-1985, the 2nd respondent directed the petitioner to show cause against the disqualification on various grounds including his being a defaulter at the time of election. The fact that at the time of election he was a defaulter and consequently disabled to continue as a member bad been clearly indicated in that communication. The reply of the petitioner on that aspect was that his default was a past one and that R.44(1)(c) of the Co-operative Societies Act would not get attracted to such a case. The discharge of liability on 25-7-1985 was relied on to show that he did not continue to be a defaulter at the time when proceedings for election bad been initiated. This contention of the petitioner did not appeal either to the Joint Registrar or to the Government which dismissed his revision petition challenging the adverse order passed by joint Registrar. Both these orders are now in challenge in this writ petition. 2. In the light of the facts stated above, there could not be any doubt that at the time of the election the petitioner was a defaulter. He was, therefore, ineligible for being elected to the Committee (or Board of Directors as it is sometimes termed) in view of the positive prohibition contained in R.44(1) (c). If he is initially ineligible to be a member of the Committee, his election would be ab initio void. And if his membership itself is a still-born child, post natal care cannot breathe life into it. The case is to be distinguished from a situation governed by R.44(2). That situation, to carry the earlier analogy further, relates to a well-born child suffering from fatal 'default attack' subsequent to the election. Curative devices may sometimes be available in such a situation. The situation is totally and fundamentally different to the extent it is governed by R.44(1). 3. The case is to be distinguished from a situation governed by R.44(2). That situation, to carry the earlier analogy further, relates to a well-born child suffering from fatal 'default attack' subsequent to the election. Curative devices may sometimes be available in such a situation. The situation is totally and fundamentally different to the extent it is governed by R.44(1). 3. Counsel naturally, and to some extent justifiably, sought to rely on the observations of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Thommen Itticheriyanthu v. State of Kerala, 1978 KLT 887. In particular, reliance was placed on the sentence reading: "The mere fact that at some time in the past a member might have been in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan e;c. will not afford a valid ground or taking action under R.44 unless it is further shown that the state of such default actually continued to exist as on the date when the proceedings under the rule are initiated." This sentence cannot be read in isolation or divorced from the factual situation. As noted in Thankappan v, Dy. Registrar, 1983 KLT 88, the observation was obiter. The narration of facts in 1978 KLT 887 supra would indicate that that case dealt with only a supervening disqualification. The judgment is, therefore, not an authority of the interpretation of R.44(1) (c). Equally futile is the attempt to rely on the decision in Mathew v. Dy. Registrar of Co-op. Societies, 1979 KLT 818. That too was a case of supervening disability. This is clear from the facts stated in Para.2 of the judgment. The election in that case was in September, 1976. The petitioner became a defaulter only on 1-11-1976. Ha continued as a defaulter till 26-3-1977. The expiry of the term of the Committee made it unnecessary for the Court to treat the case as one having a live issue, nevertheless, view was expressed about the scope of the Rule. The observations contained therein would, however, tend to fortify the conclusion reached by me earlier. The Court held that sub-rule (2) covered cases of supervening disqualification, and that clause (1) covered primarily "a case of pre-existing disqualification vis-a-vis the time of the election " (emphasis supplied). The observations contained therein would, however, tend to fortify the conclusion reached by me earlier. The Court held that sub-rule (2) covered cases of supervening disqualification, and that clause (1) covered primarily "a case of pre-existing disqualification vis-a-vis the time of the election " (emphasis supplied). The relevance of a continuing default on the part of a member while adjudging his initial eligibility itself to be elected as a member of the Committee is thus clearly evident. When, concededly, the petitioner was a defaulter on the date of the election, and consequently ineligible to be a member of the Committee in terms of R.44(1) (c), the declaration of disqualification to be a member of the Committee by the authorities is perfectly legal and correct. In that view of the matter, no interference is called for with those orders. The writ petition is dismissed.