S.K. MAL LODHA, J.— The learned single Judge by his order dated February 6, 1986 allowed the writ petition filed by Thaker Mal (deceased). His legal representative is respondent no. 1 and quashed the order Annx. 2 dated October 15, 1981 of the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar passed in revision under s. 17 of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, (1957 Act No. XXVTII of 1957) (the Act" herein) by which he reversed the order of the Debt Relief Court, Sri Ganganagar (Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar) holding that the appellants who were applicants are not agriculturists within the meaning of s. 2 (b) of the Act. The Debt Relief Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence and the definitions of "agriculturist" in s. 2(b) and that of "debtor" in s. 2 (cc) held that the appellants Banshidhar and Rameshwardas are not agriculturist. The appellants went in revision under s. 17 of the Act. The learned District Judge. Sri Ganganagar while exercising revisional powers under s. 17 of the Act reappreciated the evidence and came to a contrary conclusion from the one arrived at by the Debt Relief Court (Civil Judge) Sri Gangananar. Aggrieved a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was filed by the Creditor Thaker Mal who was non-applicant before the Debt Relief Court. The learned single Judge was of the opinion that the learned District Judge should not have interfered with the finding of the Debt Relief Court holding that the appellants are not agriculturist as he has a limited jurisdiction under s. 17 of the Act while hearing revision. In view of this, he quashed the order dated October 1 5, 1981 of the District Judge and restored that of the Debt Relief Court, (Civil Judge) Sri Ganganagar. The appellants have filed this special appeal under s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. We have heard Mr. H. N. Calla, learned counsel for the appellants. In view of this, he quashed the order dated October 1 5, 1981 of the District Judge and restored that of the Debt Relief Court, (Civil Judge) Sri Ganganagar. The appellants have filed this special appeal under s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. We have heard Mr. H. N. Calla, learned counsel for the appellants. He urged that the learned single judge has committed an error in interfering with the order of the learned District Judge passed in revision while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for, according to him the scope of revision under s. 17 of the Act is wide and the learned District Judge was competent to interfere with the order of the Debt Relief Court as it was covered by clause (a) of s.17 of the Act. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on Deepchand V. Surta (1). 2. We have duly considered the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. S. 17 of the Act is as follows:- "Section 17, Revision of order of Debt Relief Court-Any person aggrieved by an order of a Debt Relief Court may, within ninety days of such order, apply to the District Court for revision of the order on any of the following grounds:- (a) that the order is contrary to law; (b) that the court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law: (c) that the instalments fixed under sub-section (3) of section 11 are inequitable; (d) subject to the orders of the District Court on such application and further subject to the provision of section 18, the order of the Debt Relief Court shall be final. Explanation - For the purposes of the section (and section 18, 18A and 19) the District Court shall be deemed to be the Court of the District Judge within whose civil jurisdiction the Debt Relief Court is situate." 3. Admittedly clauses (b) and (c) of s. 17 are not attracted in the present case. 4. Mr. H.N. Calla, learned counsel for the appellants, pressed that since the order of the Debt Relief Court holding that the appellants were not agriculturist was contrary to law, the learned District Judge was right in setting aside the formers order. 5. Admittedly clauses (b) and (c) of s. 17 are not attracted in the present case. 4. Mr. H.N. Calla, learned counsel for the appellants, pressed that since the order of the Debt Relief Court holding that the appellants were not agriculturist was contrary to law, the learned District Judge was right in setting aside the formers order. 5. This has necessitated us to carefully scrutinise the order of the Debt Relief Court as well as the order of the District Judge passed in revision. The Debt Relief Court in the light of the definitions of agriculturist" and "debtor" contained in the Act examined the averments made in the application and appreciated the statements of the applicants It minutely examined the statements of the applicants Banshidhar and Rameshwardas He took into consideration the documentary evidence that was placed on record. On appreciation thereof, it cams to the conclusion that both the applicants, namely, Banshidhar and Rameshwardas are not agriculturist. To quote from the order of the Debt Relief Court, with respect to Rameshwardas, on the Debt Relief Court has stated as under:- ^^Jh jkesoj ds c;ku ls ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd mldh vkthfodk lEiw.kZr ;k eq[;r% —f"k ij vk/kkfjr gSA For Banshidhar the Debt Relief Court observed:- ^^i{kdkjksa ds leLr lk{; dk v/;;u djus ij Jhcakh/kj dh vkthfodk dk eq[; lk/ku —f"k dh vis{kk O;kikj gksuk gh izekf.kr gksrk gSA** After examining the cases of the applicants-appellants Banshidhar and Rameshwardas separately, the Debt Relief Court summed up its conclusion as follows:- ^^bl rjg nksuksa gh vkosnd —"kd ugha gS vkSj Qly _.kh dh Js.kh esa ugha vkrs gS vkSj bl dkj.k ;g vkosnu i= fujLr gksus ;ksX; gS** It is thus clear that the Debt Relief Court on consideration of the facts pleaded in the application and the evidence led. held that both the applicants appellants are not agriculturist. It appears from the order of the learned District Judge in revision that he re-appreciated the evidence and thereafter held as follows:- ^^gekjs fopkj ls bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa izkFkhZx.k dh thfodk dkr ij fuHkZj gksuk iw.kZ :i esa izekf.kr gS blfy;s os vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr _.kh gSA fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us mUgsa _.kh ugha ekuus esa Hkwy dh gSA** A close scrutiny of the order of the District Judge in revision shows that it has been passed on the basis of the re-appreciation of the evidence relating to facts. S. 17 of the Act came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this court in Nanda vs. District Judge, Jaipur (2), it was held that there is no doubt that the power of revision under s. 17 of the Act is wider than the power exercised by the High Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but this revisional power is all the same limited by the expression that the findings of the original court are open to review only if the judgment is contrary to law. The expression "contrary to law" was also considered by the learned Judge. It will be pertinent to quote para 11 of the report which is as under:- "The expression, "contrary to law" covers an order passed in disregard of the provisions of law applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case or when a relevant law applicable to the case has been misinterpreted or applied by the subordinate court. Every erroneous judgment cannot, therefore, fall within the expression "order contrary to law" A court commits an error of law if it acts contrary to or fails to apply any law or any legal principle. The expression used is "contrary to law" in cl. (a) of s. 17 of the Act and not "legality, regularity or propriety of the order" which is wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact. Applying these tests we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the order of the Debt Relief Court was contrary to law so as to warrant interference in revision under s. 17 of the Act by the learned District Judge. It was not open to the learned District Judge to interfere with the finding of fact merely because on the evidence, he took a different view. In such a situation the order of the Debt Relief Court cannot be called an order contrary to law" and in such circumstances, the revisional court had no power under s. 17 of the Act to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken in Nandas case (2). Deep-chands case (1) which was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants is beside the point. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken in Nandas case (2). Deep-chands case (1) which was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants is beside the point. What was held therein was that the so-called revisional powers given to a District Court under s. 17 of the Act are not merely revisional powers but they also include powers given to the appellate court to a limited extent. After referring to Nagendra Nath v. Suresh (3) and Standard Type Foundry v. Venkatarammaiah (4) it was held that the revision would be covered by s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. In that case it was contended that the learned District Judge had wrongly refused to exercise his jurisdiction is not deciding a revision application on merits and that he had also committed an error which is apparent on the fact of the record in dismissing the revision application as time barred. While considering the question of limitation, s. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act was considered and for that limited purpose it was held that it will have the similarity to a limited extent as that of appeal. 6. We are not satisfied that the order of the Debt Relief Court which was challenged in revision and which, as stated above, was passed on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence was contrary to law so as to warrant interference in revision under s. 17 of the Act by the learned District Judge. The learned single Judge was right in quashing the order Annx. 2 dated October 15, 1981 of the learned District Judge which he passed in exercise of his revisional powers under s. 17 of the Act. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard is devoid of force and it is consequently repelled. 7. There is no merit in this appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed summarily.