Judgment :- 1. A Party in M.C. No. 19 of 1985 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Perinthalmanna, are the petitioners in this petition filed under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in short the Code. M. C. No. 19 of 1985 is a proceeding initiated under S.145 (1) of the Code on the allegation that there exists a dispute between the A party and the B party concerning possession of properties measuring about 7 acres and 33 cents comprised in Sy. No. 1/A6 in Purathoor Village. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate by his order dated 29-7-1985, passed under S.146 (1) of the Code, attached the property and handed it over to the Village Officer, Purathoor, to be in management of the property. This petition is filed to quash the above proceedings. 2. The property measuring 7 acres and 33 cents comprised in Sy. No./lA6 of Purathoor Village was purchased in the name of Francis Manjooran as per sale deed No. 18/59. He had entrusted the property with the 1st respondent Pappu Manjooran for managing the same. Francis Manjooran bad executed a power of attorney in favour of the 1st respondent in 1967. It is alleged that the said power of attorney was cancelled in the year 1977. It appears that on 26-12-1979, ignoring the cancellation of the power of attorney, Pappu Manjooran sold the property to one Joe Thomas. Joe Thomas, it is said, is Pappu Manjooran's mother-in-law's brother's son. After the said sale, Pappu Manjooran got a power of attorney from Joe Thomas for managing the property. While so, the 1st respondent as plaintiff filed O.S. No. 126 of 1982 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Tirur, for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining Francis Manjooran and his men from entering into the property. Francis Manjooran is the second defendant and the second petitioner herein is the first defendant in that suit. Along with the suit the 1st respondent filed I.A. No. 1597 of 1982 for an order of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, restraining the defendants from entering into the plaint schedule property, 7 acres and 33 cents. After considering the evidence let in by the parties, the trial court dismissed that application by its order dated 19-1-1983. After considering the evidence let in by the parties, the trial court dismissed that application by its order dated 19-1-1983. The 1st respondent took up the matter in appeal in C.M. Appeal No. 3 of 1983 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tirur. The learned Subordinate Judge, after considering the entire evidence in the case, by his judgment dated 14-6-1983 dismissed the appeal. The 1st respondent has preferred C R.P. No. 2572 of 1983 against the said decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and the C.R P. is pending in this Court. While so, the 1st respondent moved the Police and the Police sent up a report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Perinthalmanna, stating that there is a likelihood of serious breach of peace concerning the possession of the property in Sy. No. 1/A6 measuring about 7 acres and 33 cents in Purathoor Village. On the basis of this report, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate has passed the impugned order under S.146 (1) of the Code. It is for quashing this order this Criminal M.C. has been filed. 3. The main argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the civil court is seized of the matter concerning 7 acres and 33 cents of property in Sy. No. 1/A6 of Purathoor Village and that learned Sub Divisional Magistrate was clearly in error in initiating proceedings under S.145 of the Code. I find much force in this contention. The 1st respondent filed O.S. No. 126 of 1982 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Tirur, for a declaration of his possession and consequential prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with his possession over the property. The second petitioner in this petition and Francis Manjooran, the person in whose name the property was purchased in 1959, are defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. Along with the suit he moved I.A. No. 1597 of 1982 for an order of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the lines prayed for in the plaint. The learned Munsiff, after appreciating the evidence let in by the parties, dismissed that application. Aggrieved by that order the 1st respondent preferred C.M. Appeal No. 3 of 1983 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tirur. A copy of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the C.M. Appeal is marked in this petition as Annexure-3. The learned Munsiff, after appreciating the evidence let in by the parties, dismissed that application. Aggrieved by that order the 1st respondent preferred C.M. Appeal No. 3 of 1983 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tirur. A copy of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the C.M. Appeal is marked in this petition as Annexure-3. In Para.22 of that judgment the learned Subordinate judge observed: "At any rate, the plaintiff has miserably failed to show that he is in possession of the properties. The documents produced by him do not show that he has any right or possession over the plaint schedule properties". In the light of this categorical finding arrived at by the civil court, in a proceeding inter parties, it is not now open for the 1st respondent to contend that his possession is being threatened by the petitioners herein. The 1st respondent has challenged the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge before this Court by filing C.R.P. No. 2572 of 1983. That petition is still pending. He has not approached this court for any interim order to protect the property on the allegation that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge is incorrect. Without approaching this Court to get relief, he moved the Police to have the proceedings initiated under S.145 of the Code. This is nothing but an abuse of process of Court. In Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. (AIR. 1985 S C 472) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated the law in the following terms: "There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court in a muter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the Criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed." 4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that the above statement of law cannot apply to the facts of this case, because there is no final adjudication of the respective rights of the parties by a Civil Court in the instant case. According to counsel, the observations made by the learned Munsiff and the learned Subordinate Judge while disposing of I. A. No. 1597 of 1982 and C. M. Appeal No. 3 of 1983 are only observations made in passing interlocutory orders. Those interlocutory orders are not to govern the field. I find it difficult to accept this contention. The conclusion arrived at by the Civil Court, whether in disposing of the suit finally or in disposing of interlocutory applications, will have to be honoured and respected by Criminal Court, because Civil Court alone is competent to adjudicate upon the claims of possession in respect of properties. (Reference may be made to the following decisions - Sankara Pillai v. State (1972 K. L. T. 154) and Balakrishna Pillai v. Raghavan Pillai (1971 K. L. T. 843). 5. Relying on the decision reported in Yohannan v. Abraham Kathanar (1975 K. L. T. 32) learned counsel appearing for the respondents urges that even after the civil court has pronounced on the question of possession while disposing of the interlocutory application, the Sub Divisional Magistrate has got jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under S.145 of the Code. This argument, I am afraid, is not supported by the said decision. According to me there is nothing in that decision which is contrary to that laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above. Further, what this Court has stated in Yohannan v. Abraham Kathanar (1975 K. L. T. 32) is: "When a civil suit in respect of land or water between the same parties is pending and an interlocutory order declining the possession of one of the parties therein is made, a Magistrate who has been approached by one of the parties to take action under S.145 of the Crl. P.C. in respect of the identical subject matter, must proceed with care and caution, and consider whether the apprehension of breach of peace cannot be averted by] proceeding under S.107 or S.144 of the Code." This statement of the law applies on all fours to the facts on hand. Here, competent civil court, in a proceeding between the parties, has categorically found that the 1st respondent is not in possession of the property and that he has no manner of right to be in possession. So long as that finding governs the field, the Criminal Court is duty bound to honour that finding and take legal action accordingly. In the instant case, the Sub Divisional Magistrate has ignored the finding of the Civil Court and proceeded to take action under S.145 of the Code. This is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction. In view of what has been stated above, I quash the proceedings in M. C. No. 19 of 1985 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Perinthalmanna. Crl. M. C. No. 841 of 1985 is allowed in the above terms. Issue carbon copy of the order on usual terms.