ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh. J.-1. The short question of interpretation of clause (b) of Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act which merited a short and instant answer, unfortunately, required long investigation of the law. Because, it was necessary to be definitive as is contended by the applicant's counsel, Shri N.K. Jain, on the question of interpretation on which little guidance from reported decision of this Court being available. I extract, therefore, not only clause (b) but also clause (a) which has a material bearing on the interpretation of the sister clause:- "57.-The provisions of this Part which are set out in Schedule III shall, subject to the restrictions and modifications specified therein, apply :- (a) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jai., on or after the first day of September, 1870, within the territories which at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and (b) to all such wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immovable property situate within those territories of limits. (Emphasis added) 2. In the instant petition validity is challenged of the impugned order by which substitution of a legal representative (who claimed his right in virtue of a will executed in his favour) was allowed giving rise to the legal contention of statutory interpretation aforesaid. Shri Jain has contended that until the concerned legal representative (who has been ordered to be impleaded by the Court below) has probated the will, he is not entitled to be so impleaded. Unfortunately, for him, toe law has a dear answer to the objection which is to be found in c1ause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 213 by which wills of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57 are exempted from the requirement of being probated in order to establish, inter alia the legatee's right claimed under such will. 3. It is not disputed that in this case the will concerns immovable property which is not situate in any of the territories mentioned in clause (a) of Section 57. It is also not disputed that the will in question was also not made in those territories. 3. It is not disputed that in this case the will concerns immovable property which is not situate in any of the territories mentioned in clause (a) of Section 57. It is also not disputed that the will in question was also not made in those territories. What Shri Jain submits is that words "within those territories and limits" which finds place in clause (b) do net refer to the territories mentioned in clause (a). His contention is that if the will is executed at a place different from the place where the property is situate, the case is covered by clause (b). A con joint reading of the two clauses, however, according to me, is sufficient to refute the counsel's contention. I never had any doubt that the emphasized word "those" definitely, and indeed patently and conclusively, refer to and indicate to the territories earlier referred, in clause (a), it makes no other sense then that, if the rules of grammar are rigorously followed. 4. Indeed, the key expression is "outside", (emphasized in the extract) which, according to me, qualifies the territories (those) contemplated under clause (b). The word "those" in both parts of clause (b) evidently refers only to the territories named in clause (a). Indeed, the use of semicolon at the end of clause (a) with the conjunction "and" is vocally suggestive of the legislature intent in that regard. Thus, clause (b) contemplates clearly, in my opinion, cases of wills made outside Calcutta (Political Bengal in 1870) Madras and Bombay and also of wills made in respect of immovable properties situate outside Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. For this view I find ample support, which Shri Jain concedes, in a large number of decisions of different High Courts (See Mr. Jadav v. Ram Swarup AIR 1868 Raj. 40, Behari Lal v. Karam Chand AIR 1968 Pun. 108, Rangaswami v. Ramgammal, AIR 1969 Mad. 271 and Balaram v. Lokanath, AIR 1973 Orissa 112. In all these cases the Courts have taken the view that clause (b) concerns wills of such classes in which both the person (testator) and the property are situate outside the territories referred to in clause (a) of Section 57. Few decisions of this Court are also cited, and these are-Lachhman singh v. Smt. Brisbhan Dulari, 1966 MPLJ SN 8, Ramcharanlal v, Madhavlal, 1978 II MPWN 86 and Vidhyaram v. Devlal, 1981 MPLJ 448 . Few decisions of this Court are also cited, and these are-Lachhman singh v. Smt. Brisbhan Dulari, 1966 MPLJ SN 8, Ramcharanlal v, Madhavlal, 1978 II MPWN 86 and Vidhyaram v. Devlal, 1981 MPLJ 448 . Unfortunately, the decisions of this Court do not deal with the question expressly and affirmatively. There are some observations, however, only in the Ramcharanlal's case (supra) which may still be said to support the view taken by me though the facts of that case, as well as of the other cited cases of this Court, as Shri Jain rightly submits, were different. 4. Although, according to me, the language of clause (b) is dear and needs no external aid for its interpretation, it may still be pointed out that the legislative history also supports the view taken by me. The Hindu Wills Act, 1870, which the Succession Act 1925 fully repealed, had a provision (in Section 2 thereof) parallel to aforequoted clauses (a) and (b). Accordingly, 1870 Act being fully repealed to make room for a complete Code for all communities, the old provision dealing with the rights of the particular communities, was re-enacted in new Code It may be mentioned that 1870 Act applied only to wills made by any Hindu, Jain, Sikh or Buddhist within the territories subject during that period to the control of lieutenant Governor of Bengal and in the towns of Madras and Bombay. As to the purpose of the enactment of 1870 it was observed in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal, 22 I.T. 107 that its effect inter aha was to place a Hindu executor on the Same footing as the executor of an Anglo-Indian testator in so far as it concerned the taking out of probate. 5. For all the foregoing reasons I have no hesitation to hold at once that the instant petition bas no merit and it is accordingly dismissed.