Judgment :- 1. Landlord filed eviction petition under S.11 (2) and 11 (8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Controller allowed the petition under S.11 (2) and rejected the claim under S.11 (8) of the Act. Tenant filed R.C.A. 52/77 challenging the findings against him and the landlord filed R.C.A. 66/77 challenging the finding under S.11 (8). Appellate authority dismissed R.C.A. 52/77 and allowed R.C.A. 66/77. Tenant filed R.C.R.P 41/77 against the order in R.C.A. 66/77. Pending the revision, tenant and landlord died and their respective legal representatives have been impleaded. 2. The contention of the revision petitioners is that the claim under S.11 (8) cannot be allowed as the building in their possession is separate from the building in the possession of the respondents. There is no force in the above contention as the tenant did not have such a case in his counter statement. In Ext. A2 notice it is stated that the tenant is in possession of the lean-to portion of the main building. In the reply notice Ext. A4 there is no denial of the above assertion. Revision petitioners and their predecessor did not produce any documentary evidence or oral evidence to show that the building in their possession is entirely separate from the building in the possession of the landlord. In para 1 of the petition, it is clearly stated that the building in the possession of the tenant is a portion of the main building. The description of the building in the schedule to the petition also makes the position sufficiently clear that the premises in the possession of the tenant is only a lean-to of the main building. In para 3 of the counter there is implied admission that the premises in the possession of the tenant is a lean-to. There is crystal clear evidence to hold that the building in the possession of the tenant is only a portion of the main building. In view of the above position the petition is perfectly maintainable under S.11 (8) of the Act. 3. There is clear and unassailable evidence in the case to show that the respondents (landlords) require the building for additional accommodation. P.W. 1's evidence would show that he has his wife and five children and they are residing with him in the building. 3. There is clear and unassailable evidence in the case to show that the respondents (landlords) require the building for additional accommodation. P.W. 1's evidence would show that he has his wife and five children and they are residing with him in the building. He also stated that his sister's son is residing with him and that be experiences lack of space in the building. P.W.1 stated that he has no other building. Admittedly, apart from the landlord, his wife and five children are occupying the premises bearing No. 324/ 111 of Ayyanthole Panchayat. P.W.1's evidence would show that one of his sons is married and his daughter-in-law is also residing with him. He deposed that another son is about to get married. P.W. 1's evidence in this regard is not even attempted to be shattered in cross-examination. Evidence of P.W.1 sufficiently establishes that there are only three rooms including the kitchen in his occupation. The appellate authority has rightly held that it is only reasonable that the son of the landlord who is already married and another son who is about to be married need separate rooms to live peacefully with their better halves and that will necessarily require additional accommodation. The above finding has been rightly affirmed by the learned District Judge. Counsel for the revision petitioners could not point out any factor or circumstance to persuade me to come to a different finding from that of the appellate authority as well as the District Judge. 4. Counsel for the revision petitioners argued that even if the bonafide requirement of the landlord has been established, that alone would not be sufficient to grant eviction under S.11(8) of the Act as the court has to necessarily consider the first proviso to S.11(10) of the Act and as that has not been done by the courts below, eviction cannot be granted under S.11(8) of the Act. First proviso to S.11(10) of the Act reads: "Provided that, in the case of an application made under sub-s.(8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord." Counsel for the respondents argued that the tenant has not pleaded in his counter statement anything about the first proviso and therefore the failure to discuss about it in the order of the appellate authority is not at all detrimental to the petition especially in view of the fact that the appellate authority has been fully satisfied about the bonafide requirement pleaded by the landlord for additional accommodation. S.11(8) enables the landlord to claim eviction if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use. First proviso to S.11(10) makes it explicitly clear that the petition under S.11(10) is liable to be rejected if the court is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction would outweigh the advantage to the landlord. It is the satisfaction of the court that counts in this matter. That satisfaction could be reached only after analysing the entire evidence. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence in the case is sufficient to hold that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will not at all outweigh the advantage to the landlord. But, there is no finding by the courts below about the comparative hardship aspect. This has to be necessarily considered in view of the mandate of the first proviso to S.11 (10) of the Act. As S.11(8) is intertwined with S.11(10) and the first proviso there must be definite finding regarding the comparative hardship. There may be a case where landlord has established his bonafides with regard to his claim under S.11(8). From that alone the court cannot jump to the conclusion that the petition has to be allowed for additional accommodation. As the appellate authority and the revisional court have not considered the comparative hardship aspect it has become necessary to remand the case to the appellate authority for the limited purpose of deciding as to whether the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction would outweigh the advantage to the landlord. 5. The order of the District Court is hereby set aside. 5. The order of the District Court is hereby set aside. C.R.P. is allowed and the case is remanded to the Appellate Authority (Sub Judge) Trichur for the limited purpose of deciding the comparative hardship. Appellate authority shall dispose of the appeal on the available evidence with utmost expedition and at any rate before the end of September 1986. It is made clear that parties are not allowed to adduce any further evidence. There is no order as to costs.