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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 192 (MP)

MAHAVIR KUMAR v. PHOOLCHAND

1986-07-30

R.C.SHRIVASTAVA

body1986
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) BY the impugned order dated 17-10-1984, the Rent Controlling authority, Guna, struck out the defence of the petitioner defendant under section 13 (6) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. According to the respondents-landlords by whom the case before the Rent Controlling Authority was instituted against the petitioner, the agreed rate of rent was Rs. 200/- per month. That was disputed by the petitioner-tenant according to whom, the rent was Rs. 100/-per month. The Rent Controlling Authority was of the view that the rate of Rs. 100/- per month having been admitted by the petitioner-tenant, he should have deposited rent at least at that rate and he having failed to do so in violation of section 13 (1) his defence was liable to be struck out under section 13 (6 ). ( 2. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contends that, there having been a dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the petitioner tenant, it was incumbent upon the Rent Controlling Authority to fix a reasonable provisional rent under section 13 (2) and, unless that was done by him, the petitioner-tenant was not bound to deposit rent in compliance with section 13 (1 ). He has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chhogalal vs. Bhagwan Shri Satyanarain (1975 J. L. J. 779 ). ( 3. ) BE that as it may, the primary question which needs to be decided is whether the revision petition is at all maintainable. Sub-section (1) of section 31 of the Act provides as follows : "an appeal shall lie from every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under this Act to the District Judge or an Additional District Judge having territorial jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Judge) and the decision of the appellate Court shall be final. " Section 32 makes provision for second appeal also. " Section 32 makes provision for second appeal also. Section 23-E (1) provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in section 31 or section 32, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Chapter, i. e. ,chapter III-A comprising of sections 23-A to 23-I. Then, sub-section (2) of section 23-E lays down as follows : "the High Court may, at any time "suo motu" or on the application of any person aggrieved, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Rent Controlling Authority, call for and examine the record of the case pending before or disposed of by such Authority and may pass such order in revision in reference thereto as it thinks fit and save as otherwise provided by this section, in disposal of any revision under this section, the High Court shall, as far as may be, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it does for disposal of a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if any such, proceeding of the Rent Controlling Authority is of a Court subordinate to such High Court : provided that no powers of revision at the instance of person aggrieved shall be exercised unless an application is presented within ninety days of the date of the order sought to be revised. " Under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, revisional powers can be exercised by this Court where no appeal lies. On reading these provisions together, as they ought to be it is quite clear that the impugned order is appealable to the District Judge or additional District Judge having jurisdiction and, that being so, the present revision petition is not maintainable. ( 4. ) IT has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order purports to have been passed under section 23-H which occurs in Chapter III-A of the Act and, therefore, it is revisable by this court under sub-section (2) of section 23-E. The argument is, in my opinion, devoid of substance. ( 4. ) IT has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order purports to have been passed under section 23-H which occurs in Chapter III-A of the Act and, therefore, it is revisable by this court under sub-section (2) of section 23-E. The argument is, in my opinion, devoid of substance. The impugned order was clearly passed under section 13 (6) occurring in Chapter III of the Act which section has been made applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority by virtue of section 23-H. From the fact that section 13 has thus been made applicable the impugned order cannot be held to be one passed under section 23-H. So far as sub-section (2) of section 23-E is concerned, it is quite clear that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon this Court thereby can be exercised against orders passed under the provisions of Chapter III-A in which Chapter that provision occurs. ( 5. ) THE conclusion is inevitable that, the impugned order being appealable under section 31 of the Act for the reason that it is an order passed under section 13 (6)occurring in Chapter III and that it being not revisable not only for the reason that it is appealable but also for the reason that sub-section (2) of section 23-E applies only to orders passed under Chapter III-A, the revision petition is not maintainable. ( 6. ) IN the result, therefore, the revision petition is dismissed as not maintainable. Revision Petition dismissed.