JUDGMENT - V.A. MOHTA, J.:---By this Letters Patent appeal under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code before amendment of 1976, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 14th/21st July, 1967 confirming the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court, for partition and separate possession of 28/288th share in field Survey No. 187/6 of mouza Malkapur has been challenged. 2. The suit has been filed on 30th November, 1940 initially claiming relief in respect of field Survey No. 187/2. By various amendments the description of the property and so also the survey number of the field was changed from 187/2 to 187/6, on the ground of mutual mistake. Initially, the applications for amendment were rejected and suit dismissed. Dismissal was confirmed upto stage of second appeal. However, the amendments came to be allowed by this Court in a Letters Patent Appeal and matter remanded for fresh enquiry (L.P.A. No. 4 of 1947 decided on 13th March, 1952). 3. The trail Court after remand held factual issues in favour of the plaintiffs but dismissed the suit as not maintainable on various grounds such as (i) the bar of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, (ii) bar of limitation, and (iii) want of necessary parties. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeal. The second appeal filed by the present appellant [original defendants 12(a) to12(o) and 13] before the High Court was dismissed. 4. M/s. Binraj Murlidhar Shop of Malkapur---the respondent No. 1/original plaintiff---had earlier filed a suit for realization of its debt in the year 1926, being Civil Suit No. 11 of 1926 from the defendants Nos. 1 to 6 in the present suit, Aziz Begum-mother of defendant No. 1 and one Samdani Begum. The said suit was compromised, the debtors agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/-. In satisfaction of that amount, the debtors sold their undivided share in the two fields described as field Survey Nos. 108 and 187/2 of Malkapur, by a registered sale deed dated 30th November, 1928. M/s Binraj Murlidhar was not given possession of the property. Several suits for partition and separate possession of certain properties including the two fields referred to above between the eight debtors and their co-sharers had earlier commenced in 1919 in which a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession was passed on 17th March, 1925. M/s Binraj Murlidhar was not given possession of the property. Several suits for partition and separate possession of certain properties including the two fields referred to above between the eight debtors and their co-sharers had earlier commenced in 1919 in which a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession was passed on 17th March, 1925. A Commissioner for affecting partition as contemplated under Order 20, Rule 18(2) Civil Procedure Code was appointed and the Collector was directed to partition the estate assessed in the revenue. Some property was actually partitioned and in respects of some, the process was going on. M/s. Binraj Murlidhar got itself impleaded in the proceedings for partition of field Survey Nos. 180 and 187 on the basis of sale deed dated 30th November, 1928. Share in respect of field Survey No. 180 was actually handed-over to the said shop. On 11th February, 1932, the following order came to be passed: "Mr. Gupte appears for the applicant. He does not wish to proceed against" the field Survey No. 187 as there is some mistake in Khatedars right for the time being and wants to proceed against field Survey No. 180 only at Malkapur. Intimation to the effect will be sent to the Collector." 5. As indicated earlier, the present suit was filed on 30th November, 1940, in which several amendments were made from time to time. The suit as amended states that on account of mistake of both parties in the sale deed, field Survey No. 187/2 was wrongly described as having an area of 7 acres 18 gunthas. The description indicated that real intention of the parties was to transfer 1 acre, 17 gunthas of land of the share of the debtors in field Survey No. 187/6, area 5 acres 16 gunthas of mouza Malkapur having a well therein. In this suit, only 8 defendants, defendant No. 7 was a receiver of the properties in Insolvency Case No. 101 of 1930 on the file of Additional District Judge, Khamgaon, filed against the insolvent Khwaja Kutubuddin. 6. Now, the factual position as regards the mutual mistake in the description of the property and number of field is duly established on the basis of evidence and those findings cannot be and are not questioned before us. 6. Now, the factual position as regards the mutual mistake in the description of the property and number of field is duly established on the basis of evidence and those findings cannot be and are not questioned before us. The first point raised by Shri Bobde the learned Counsel for appellants relates to the applicability of the bar of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the present suit. The substance of the contention is that this question about partition and possession of field Survey No. 187/6 (which was subject matter of a decree of partition and possession in suit by a separate suit. It is further contended that the plaintiff had actually applied for substitution and indeed had got physical possession of age out of the two properties and under the circumstances, they were not entitled to file a separate suit. We do not see any substance in this contention for variety of reasons. In the first place, no final decree as contemplated under section 47, Civil Procedure Code was passed in 1909 suit. Only Preliminary decree proceedings were then going on and they had not terminated into final decree. Section 2(2) defines 'decree' as follows: "decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 47 or section 144 but shall not include--- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or, (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation---A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final." It is a settled position in law that final decree proceedings are mere continuation of the preliminary decree proceedings and there is no executable decree unless final decree proceedings are finally disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final." It is a settled position in law that final decree proceedings are mere continuation of the preliminary decree proceedings and there is no executable decree unless final decree proceedings are finally disposed of. In this connection, reference may be made to the following observation in a decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 136 of 1980 and others, decided on 24th February, 1982, in the matter of (Marotrao Balaji Chavre v. Laxman Tanba Shingru and others)1, 1982(2) Bombay Cases Reporter 233: "It is obvious that final decree proceedings are mere continuation of the preliminary decree proceedings and as the matter is not disposed of there no executable decree and consequently, section 47, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be attracted". 7. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the decree for partition as far as property covered by Order 20, Rule 18(1) C.P.C. is concerned is in the nature of a final decree. It is difficult to accept this contention. Heavy reliance was placed in support of the proposition on the case of (Ramabai Govind v. Anand Daji)2, A.I.R. 1945 Bombay 338. The point involved in the said matter was, whether an application to send papers to the Collector for partition was governed by Articles 181 and 182 of the old Limitation Act. It was held that such an application is in the matter of mere proceedings in the suit rather than an application to execute the decree and hence, no period of limitation for making it was prescribed. Far from supporting the point canvassed, the following observations in the said judgment clearly indicate that a decree passed even under Order 20, Rule 18(1) is in its very nature preliminary: "A decree under Order 20, Rule 18(1), does not direct the judgment debtor to obey it. It declares the shares of the different shares and directs the partition to be made by the Collector. It is only after such partitions is made by the Collector that the judgment debtor can be called upon to put the decree-holder in possession of the share allotted to him. It declares the shares of the different shares and directs the partition to be made by the Collector. It is only after such partitions is made by the Collector that the judgment debtor can be called upon to put the decree-holder in possession of the share allotted to him. It is only at that stage that the decree can be regarded as having become final and capable of execution." Referring to Civil Manual issued by this Court for the guidance of the Civil Courts, it is observed: "This view finds support in the instructions contained in the Civil Manual issued by this Court. In R.I. in Chapter 12 of Vol. 1 of the Manual (at page 145, 1960 Edn.) preliminary decrees are divided into two classes, those in which further action for final decrees is to be taken forthwith by the courts suo moto without any application from a party and those in which subsequent proceedings for passing final decree do not arise as a matter of course. The former are directed to be treated as pending and shown as such in the monthly returns and the records of such suits are to be retained in the original Court until final decrees are passed therein, while the latter are to be treated as disposed of and shown as such in the monthly returns and the records should be forwarded to the record keeper of the District Court and may be called for when subsequently required. A partition decree under Order 20, Rule 18(2) is included in the former class of preliminary decrees and one under Order 20, Rule 18(1) is included in the latter class, be it noted, of preliminary decree. These instructions are being followed ever since the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 was enacted, and a partition decree, whether under sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (2) is classed as a preliminary decree." 8. There is yet another angle to the controversy. It is this. The controversy in the present suit is between a party to 1909 suit and his representative (emphasis supplied). Is such controversy covered by section 47, Civil Procedure Code ? Section 47 before its amendment by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976 read as under :- "47. There is yet another angle to the controversy. It is this. The controversy in the present suit is between a party to 1909 suit and his representative (emphasis supplied). Is such controversy covered by section 47, Civil Procedure Code ? Section 47 before its amendment by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976 read as under :- "47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decrees.---(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representative, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation of jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section as a suit, or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional Court fees. (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. Explanation.---For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed and a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree are parties to the suit." The above explanation was substituted by Act No. 66 of 1956 and several changes have been brought about by 1976 amendment. Sub-section (2) has been omitted and new Explanation is virtually the same except that it omits reference to auction-purchaser. This change legislatively resolves a judicial conflict about action-purchasers rights under this section. Explanation old or new do not fall for consideration in this matter. Having regard to the clear language used in and the legislative intention behind section 47, it seems to us clear that any dispute between a party to the suit and his representative cannot come under the said provision. Explanation old or new do not fall for consideration in this matter. Having regard to the clear language used in and the legislative intention behind section 47, it seems to us clear that any dispute between a party to the suit and his representative cannot come under the said provision. The case of (Seth Kedar Nath v. Arun Chandra)3, A.I.R. 1937 Allahabad 742 pithily puts the proposition thus: "The mere fact that one of the two persons who are litigating and either parties or representatives of the parties would not in itself be sufficient; for example, a judgement-debtor might have transferred his interest by a voluntary sale of a third party and then there may be a dispute between the judgment-debtor and this third party as to the extent of the property which has passed under it. The judgment-debtor is of course a party to the suit and the transferee is a representative of that party; but the dispute between them cannot be said to be a dispute arising between the parties to the suit because it is a dispute between one party and his own representative." In the case of (Hamidgani Ammal v. Ammasahib Ammal)3, A.I.R. 1941 Madras 898 it is observed: "Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, only requires to be decided in execution proceedings those questions which arise between parties to the suit in which the decree has been passed or their representatives and which relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Where a stranger to the suit claims as his immovable property which has been the subject matter of a decree, that claim cannot in law be regarded as being a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree." The decision in Seth Kedar Nath's case has been followed by a larger Full Bench by the same Court in (Mst. Suraj Dei v. Gulab Dei)5, A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 49. 9. Even the case of (Mohammad Akhtar Ali v. Badrudin and others)6, A.I.R. 1973 Patna 187 to which our special attention was drawn does not lay down the contrary. Suraj Dei v. Gulab Dei)5, A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 49. 9. Even the case of (Mohammad Akhtar Ali v. Badrudin and others)6, A.I.R. 1973 Patna 187 to which our special attention was drawn does not lay down the contrary. It merely holds that (i) the word 'parties' in section 47(i) is not conferred to parties arrayed on one side and (ii) even a dispute between representatives of a party which affects the opposite party or his representative is in relation to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and is covered by the said provision. 10. The second point relates to limitation. The plaintiff purchased the joint right, title and interest of the debtors in the property on 30th November, 1928 and thereafter applied to the Court which passed decree in 1909 suit for getting its share partitioned. It was on 11th January, 1932 that the plaintiffs made a statement that it did not wish to proceed in the matter of other field for the reasons stated in the order sheet. This suit was filed on 30th November, 1940. The present appellants were joined as parties by subsequent amendment dated 10th July, 1941. Considering the nature of the relied ultimately claimed in this suit, various amendments were allowed. The suit as amended claims in this suit, various amendments were allowed. The suit as amended claims in substance the relief of partition and separate possession of property identity of which was not in dispute. Mistake lay in the description, area and number of fields. The suit is not based on mistake and the question of rectification of sale deed is merely incidental. Under these circumstances, Article 96 of the old Limitation Act would not apply. It is contended that the only article applicable to the suit was Article 120 which provides a limitation of six years from the accrual of the cause of action. We do not agree. For getting such a relief in the matter of immovable property either Article 136 or 144 would apply. Both provide a limitation of 11 years. It is necessary to go into the debate as to which of the two article applies, as suit is in any case within 12 years from the sale deed. The First Appellate Court as well as the learned Single Judge were also right in holding that no question of limitation really arose in the matter, in the whole background. It is necessary to go into the debate as to which of the two article applies, as suit is in any case within 12 years from the sale deed. The First Appellate Court as well as the learned Single Judge were also right in holding that no question of limitation really arose in the matter, in the whole background. Mistake about field survey number was discovered after the filing of the suit and for all these reasons late joinder of appellant on 10th July, 1941 would not make the suit time barred. Rightly it has been held that the cause of action to claim partition was continuing. 11. Third and last point relates to the maintainability of the suit for want of all the 27 defendants in 1909 suit as parties to the suit. We do not see any substance in this point either. Out of 27 persons 7 had (sic) share in the field. Receiver was representing the estates. He was impleaded as defendant No. 7. Those who had disputed the possession of the appellants were joined as parties. Heirs of the debtors' vendors were also impleaded. The written statement does not disclose the names of the necessary parties. The suit after amendment was concerned not with field Survey No. 187/2 but with field Survey No. 187/6. The defendants did not amend the written statement. The plea to the effect "that the suit was bad for defect of parties" was casually made. It is not demonstrated as to which other party had subsisting interest in the field. The litigation went on for years together. No aggrieved party has made any grievance and under all these circumstances, the First Appellate Court as well as the learned Single Judge were quite right in coming to the conclusion that the suit could not be thrown on this ground. 12. For all these reasons, we see no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. Under the circumstances, we propose to make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. ------