ORDER 1. This is a revision against the order dated 29-4-1985 passed by the Civil Judge, Jalaun (at Orai). 2. The opposite party filed a suit against the applicant for releasing the goods of 80 deposit receipts, or, in the alternative for a sum of Rs. 17,26,475.90 along with pendente lite and future interest. The opposite party is a registered body under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. It carries on banking business. Orai Sahkari Kraya Vikraya Samiti, Orai (Jalaun) (to be referred hereafter as "the Samiti") is also a society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. The applicant is U. P. State Warehouse Corporation registered under the U. P. Warehouse Act, 1958. The Samiti had been taking loan from the opposite party for the last many years. The Samiti used to keep its goods with the applicant. The applicant used to issue warehouse receipts for the same. The Samiti used to take loan by pledging the said warehouse receipts with the opposite party. The warehouse receipts are negotiable under S. 31 of the U. P. Warehouse Act, 1958. When the loan of the opposite party was not paid by the Samiti, the opposite party asked the applicant for delivery of the goods pledged by the Samiti. The Samiti had pledged the goods of 80 warehouse receipts. The applicant showed its inability to return the goods of 80 receipts after releasing the goods of 8 receipts in favour of the opposite party. The opposite park charged 15 per cent per annum as interest on the amount loaned by it. The applicant failed to deliver the goods to the opposite party in spite of a registered notice. The opposite party alleged that it was entitled to recover from the applicant Rs. 11,81,283.35 as principal together with Rs. 4,63,555.62 as interest, Rs. 81,386.93 as penal interest and Rs. 250/- as costs of the notice. 3. The applicant failed to deliver the goods to the opposite party in spite of a registered notice. The opposite party alleged that it was entitled to recover from the applicant Rs. 11,81,283.35 as principal together with Rs. 4,63,555.62 as interest, Rs. 81,386.93 as penal interest and Rs. 250/- as costs of the notice. 3. The suit was contested by the applicant inter alia on the grounds that the major quantity of the goods kept with the applicant had already been returned to the Samiti under the written orders of the opposite party, that the applicant is not the debtor of the opposite party, and there is no question of payment of interest, and the opposite party cannot claim the delivery of the goods or the price thereof as the goods had been returned to the Samiti with the express consent and under the written orders of the opposite party that the suit was barred by limitation that the suit was barred by the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, and that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the Samiti. 4. The Civil Judge decided the question of non-joinder of the Samiti as a preliminary issue and held that the Samiti is not a necessary party. Hence this revision. 5. Section 115(1) of the CPC provides as below, : "115. Revision. - (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit : Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where - a. the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or b. the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." 6. Sri R. N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that the impugned order amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity which may affect the ultimate decision of the suit, and which may occasion failure of justice. He contended that the impugned order if allowed to stand, would cause irreparable injury to the applicant in view of the specific plea raised by the applicant that the goods were returned to the Samiti under the express consent and written orders of the opposite party. 7. My attention was drawn to S. 31 of the U.P. Warehose Act, 1958, which provides as below : "31. Receipt transferable by endorsement.- The receipt issued by a warehouse man shall, unless otherwise specified thereon, be transferable by an endorsement and shall entitle the holder in due course to receive the goods specified in it on the same terms and conditions as the original depositor." It was submitted that the applicant issued receipts to the Samiti and the latter pledged the same with the opposite party and obtained loan. In a suit for recovery of loan due to the opposite party, the Samiti was a necessary party. 8. Reliance was placed on P. S. Pattabhiraman v. Ganapathy Kanappa Mudali, AIR 1962 Mad 202 wherein the suit had been filed by the plaintiff claiming to be a holder in due course of a promissory note against the sons of the executant without making the original payee party to the suit and it was held that the original payee was a proper party. 9. In Hardeva v. Ismail, AIR 1970 Raj 167 (FB) two tests were laid down for determining as to whether a party is a necessary party or not. Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and secondly, it should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party. 10. In Smt. Gomati Devi v. Ram Prasad Prabhudayal, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 6 it was held that under O. I, R. 10, Civil P.C. it is the duty of the court to determine that the person who has applied for being added as a party is or is not a necessary party to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 11. 11. In Singheshwar Rai v. Babulal Rai, AIR 1980 Pat 187 it was held that the wishes of the plaintiff were immaterial if the court considered presence of the party necessary for adjudicating on all issues involved in the suit without changing its nature. 12. It was submitted that in view of the pleas raised by the applicant, it is not possible to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the issues raised without making the Samiti a party to the suit. 13. Sri A. Kumar, learned counsel for the opposite party, made twofold submissions. Firstly it was said that the revision is not maintainable. Secondly it was said that in view of the provisions of S. 70(1)(d) of the U. P. Co- operative Societies Act, 1965, a dispute between the opposite party, which is a co- operative society, and the Samiti, which is also a co-operative society, would have to be referred to arbitration, and S. 111(c) of the Act would bar the jurisdiction of the court to try any dispute between the opposite party and the Samiti. 14. Reliance was placed on a number of cases in support of the first submission. In D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2324 it was held at page 2327 as below : "..............The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power under S. 115 of the Code." In Sher Singh (dead) through LRs. v. Joint Director of Consolidation. AIR 1978 SC 1341 : 1978 All LJ 685 it was held, at page 1344 (of AIR) : (at p. 688 of All LJ) as below : "............ It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. If a subordinate court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Civil P.C. to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiciton of the court to try the dispute itself." In Smt. Shanti Devi v. Kishan Lal, 1979 All LJ 651 it was held, at page 653, as below :- "Under S. 115 of the CPC this Court can interfere only if there is jurisdictional error in the judgment of a subordinate court. This Court has no jurisdiction under S. 115 of the C PC to interfere with the order of a subordinate court either on the ground of an error or the question of fact or law. Its power is confined to interference only if it is found that a court below has committed an error of jurisdiction by refusing to exercise it or by exercising it." In Abdul Ghaffar Quareshi v. Raghubir Singh, 1979 All LJ 1140 it was held, at page 1142, as below : "There is yet another point on which this revision is liable to fail. The same is that this Court has no jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Court below, even if it be assumed that the interpretation placed by it was incorrect. The interpretation is concerned with ascertaining the sense and meaning of the subject-matter. This Court has no jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC to interfere with an order even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not, if it has jurisdiction to make that order. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with them initially, to come to a different conclusion, would hardly justify interference in revision, when there was no illegality." In Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 a reference was made to the proviso introduced in sub-cl. (1) of S. 115, CPC. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with them initially, to come to a different conclusion, would hardly justify interference in revision, when there was no illegality." In Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 a reference was made to the proviso introduced in sub-cl. (1) of S. 115, CPC. It was held that the impugned order refusing the request of the applicant to recall a witness for further cross-examination did not amount to a case decided. It was further held that under the proviso even if an order amounted to deciding a case, its variance or reversal has to depend upon the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in cls. (a) and (b). In Kishan Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Rajendra Paper Mills, AIR 1984 All 143 it was held that an order allowing or refusing amendment for impleading a certain party is a case decided but the High Court should, however, interfere only when the case falls under exceptions embodied in the proviso to S. 115 CPC. 15. It was submitted that as the opposite party is an endorsee of the receipts issued by the applicant to the samiti, the opposite party is entitled to recover the goods on the basis of the said receipts without impleading the Samiti. It was urged that the impleadment of the Samiti was not necessary for effectually and completely adjudicating the issues raised in the suit. 16. On the second submission, my attention was drawn to S. 70(1)(d) of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 which requires that the dispute between a co-operative society and any other co-operative society or societies shall be referred to the Registrar for arbitration. Section 111(c) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of any dispute required to be referred under S. 70 to the Registrar for arbitration. It was submitted that it is not disputed that the opposite party as well as the Samiti are the societies registered under the U. P. Co- operative Societies Act, 1965, and as such, any dispute between them had to be referred to arbitration, and the court was not competent to decide the same. 17. It was submitted that it is not disputed that the opposite party as well as the Samiti are the societies registered under the U. P. Co- operative Societies Act, 1965, and as such, any dispute between them had to be referred to arbitration, and the court was not competent to decide the same. 17. Sri R. N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the applicant, placed reliance on Allahabad District Co-operative Ltd. v. Hanuman Dutt Tewari, AIR 1982 SC 120 : 1982 All LJ 50 and submitted that the dispute in the present case could not be covered by the words "business of a co-operative society". 18. Sri A. Kumar, learned counsel for the opposite party, submitted that in the aforesaid case it has been held that the word `business' was equated with the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity as a society. In this case, the dispute was squarely covered by the words "business of the co-operative society". 19. Sri R. N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the applicant, lastly submitted that even if S. 70 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 is applicable, it would not come into play as in this case there was a triangular dispute, and the applicant is not a co-operative society. 20. I have carefully considered the submissions made before me. In N. S. Venkatagiri Ayangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, AIR 1949 PC 156 it was held by the Privy Council that S. 115, CPC applies where court acts illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of trial, which was material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. 21. In Brij Gopal Mathur v. Krishna Gopal Mathur, (1973) 1 SCC 635 : AIR 1973 SC 1096 the Supreme Court laid down that the High Court can interfere when any of the three grounds mentioned in S. 115, CPC exists and there is substantial failure of justice. In M. L. Sethi v. Sri R. P. Kapoor, (1972) 2 SCC 427 : AIR 1972 SC 2379 the Supreme Court held that the High Court can interfere when the court below acts with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure which is material in the sense that it may have affected the ultimate decision. 22. In M. L. Sethi v. Sri R. P. Kapoor, (1972) 2 SCC 427 : AIR 1972 SC 2379 the Supreme Court held that the High Court can interfere when the court below acts with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure which is material in the sense that it may have affected the ultimate decision. 22. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court have been incorporated by the Legislature when it added the proviso to S. 115, CPC by the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. The questions which require consideration are :- 1. Whether the court below acted with material irregularity in passing the impugned order? 2. Whether the impugned order would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made? 23. There is a distinction between `necessary party' and `proper party'. A `proper party' is one whose impleadment may facilitate the disposal of a suit or proceeding. A `necessary party' is one without whose impleadment it may not be possible to adjudicate completely and effectively the points in issue in a suit or proceeding. Without a `proper party' a suit or proceeding can proceed but without a `necessary party' it may fail. 24. Even if the Samiti may be a proper party, it cannot be said to be a necessary party. The controversies raised in the suit can be completely and effectively adjudicated in the absence of the Samiti also. Failure to join a person who is a proper but not a necessary party does not affect the maintainability of the suit. I may refer to Devidas v. Shri Shailappa, AIR 1961 SC 1277 . I am unable to accept that the impugned order suffers from any error of law. 25. Even if it is accepted that the Civil Judge committed an error of law in passing the impugned order, it cannot be said that the order will affect the ultimate decision of the suit, and the essential basis for interference is not there. If the applicant is able to prove that the goods were returned to the Samiti under the express consent and written orders of the opposite party, the suit of the opposite party will fail. There can be no question of failure of justice if the Samiti is not impleaded. If the applicant is able to prove that the goods were returned to the Samiti under the express consent and written orders of the opposite party, the suit of the opposite party will fail. There can be no question of failure of justice if the Samiti is not impleaded. The impugned order does not cause irreparable injury to the applicant as it will be open for the applicant to examine the officials of the Samiti and produce such oral/documentary evidence as it may be having in support of the pleas raised. 26. In the circumstances, the impugned order is not vitiated in law, and cannot be interfered with in revision. 27. As far as the application of S. 70 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 is concerned, any dispute between the opposite party and the Samiti has to be referred to arbitration, and the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred. The opposite party has, however, not raised any dispute with the Samiti. The claim of the opposite party is confined to the applicant. The dispute will not become triangular merely because the applicant has raised pleas concerning the Samiti. The opposite party cannot be directed to implead the Samiti for the additional reason that it does not claim any relief against the Samiti. 28. I, therefore, hold that the applicant has failed to make out a case for interference under S. 115 of the Civil P. C. 29. The revision is dismissed with costs.