A. S. QURESHI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are under-trial prisoners. They have filed the present petition challenging the judgment and order dated 17-9-1986 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Bhavnagar rejecting the bail application of the present petitioners. Mr. H. M. Chinoy learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the prosecution had failed to file the chargesheet within 90 days and therefore the petitioners are entitled to be enlarged on bail as a matter of right. ( 2 ) MR. S. P. Dave learned A. P. P. does not dispute that the petitioners would be entitled to be released on bail if the chargesheet was filed beyond 90 days. However he has contended that in this case the chargesheet was filed on the 93rd day because the Court was closed on 90 91 and 92nd day. Hence in his submission the prosecution was prevented from filing the chargesheet on the 90th day as the Court was closed. He has therefore submitted that if the Court is closed on 90th day the limitation period would be considered to be within time if it is filed on the next working day. He has relied on this principle of computation which is laid down in the Limitation Act. Mr. Dave has also relied on the provisions of the General Clauses Act which also lays down that if the period of limitation expires on a closed holiday then the next working day would be regarded as within time. ( 3 ) MR. Chinoy has submitted that the method of computation in the Limitation Act as well as General Clauses Act do not apply in this case. For this submission he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1986 (3) SCC 141 (154) (Chaganti Styanarayana v. State of A. P.) wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:as the terms of proviso (a) with reference to the total periods of detention can be interpreted on the plain language of the proviso itself we do not think it is necessary to invoke the provisions of the General Clauses Act or seek guidance from the Limitation Act to construe the terms of the proviso. It is quite clear that the Supreme Court has negatived the submission that for the purpose of computation of limitation the principle of Limitation Act or General Clauses Act could be enacted while calculating the limitation under sec. 167 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The reason is quite obvious. As far as the limitation under the Limitation Act and the General Clauses Act are concerned they pertain to the causes related to the filing of claims etc. whereas the provisions of sec. 167 of the Code pertain to the personal liberty of the under-trial prisoners. The individual liberty of a citizen is guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an invaluable right. Any infringement or abridgment thereof however small has to be viewed seriously. In the case of limitation under sec. 167 (2) of the Code the limitation period has to be construed strictly which means that the 90 days or 60 days limitation has to be regarded as exactly the 90th day or 60th day as the case may be and not a day beyond. The prosecution should be vigilant to see that the chargesheet is filed as early as possible. It should not take chance and wait till the last day. If it does wait and the last day happens to be a closed holiday the limitation would expire on that day and the accused would be entitled to bail as a matter of right. Hence it is held that in computing the limitation under sec. 167 (2) of the Code the method of computation under the General Clauses Act or under the Limitation Act cannot be brought in. The computation has to be strictly the number of days as set out in the aforesaid provisions of the Code. ( 4 ) IN the result the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute to the extent that those of the petitioners in whose case the chargesheet has been filed beyond 90 days will be released on bail in the sum of Rs. 5 0 each and a surety for the like amount on condition that they will report at Bhavnagar City Police Station Division-A once a week during the trial. Order accordingly. Petition allowed. .