D. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition by the judgement-debtor is directed against the order of the executing court rejecting his petition under S. 47 of the Civil P. C. resisting the execution filed by the opp. party-decree-holder. ( 2 ) THE opposite party filed O. S. No. 9 of 1973 against the petitioner and some others praying for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession in respect of the properties described in Schedule 'a' to the plaint. The opposite party who is the mother of the petitioner, claimed exclusive title and possession over the suit land on the basis of a permanent lease deed said to have been executed on 29-4-1952 by its owner Kamal Lochan Misra. The occasion to file the suit, as stated in the plaint arose when the defendants (including the petitioner) fraudulently got their names recorded in the settlement records in respect of the suit land. It was specifically stated in para 10 of the plaint that on the basis of the settlement records the defendants threatened the plaintiff on 25-10-1972 to dispossess her from the suit properties. In the suit the petitioner as well as the other defendants were set ex parte. The suit was decreed ex parte on 2-8-1973. The ordering portion of the judgement reads as follows :"the suit is decreed ex parte against the defendants with costs. It is declared that the plaintiff has got right, title and possession over the suit land. Pleader's fee on uncontested scale. "the decree was drawn up accordingly on 2-8-1973. ( 3 ) THE opposite party filed execution case No. 17 of 1980 on 5-2-1980 praying for delivery of possession of the suit land to her. In the proceeding the petitioner and other judgement debtors filed objection on 26-11-1980 objecting to the execution, inter alia, on the grounds that the execution case was not maintainable; that the plaintiff decree-holder had lost her title and interest over the property by the date of the decree sought to be executed; that the alleged permanent lease executed in her favour by late Kamal Lochan Mishra was a fraudulent transaction and that the litigation was an outcome of malice of the decree-holder towards the judgement-debtors. ( 4 ) AS it appears from the impugned order passed by the executing court, the point urged at the hearing of the objection petition was that the decree was not executable since there was no express direction in it for delivery of possession of the properties in favour of the decree-holder. No other point appears to have been urged before the court. The executing court on consideration of the matter overruled the objection and held that from the reliefs sought in the plaint and discussions in the judgement it was manifest that the reliefs sought by the plaintiff were granted by the court and accordingly the execution proceeding was maintainable. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order is erroneous since in the absence of a direction for delivery of possession in the decree, the execution of the decree which is merely a declaratory one should have been held to be not maintainable. The learned counsel for the opposite party contended, on the other hand, that no exception could be taken against the impugned order since it was within the competence of the executing court on the facts and in the circumstances of the case to interpret the decree in the manner it has done. ( 6 ) FROM the decree under execution in the case, it is clear that there is no express direction for delivery of possession of the suit land to the plaintiff. The principle is also well established that ordinarily the executing court cannot go behind the decree. But it is within the competence of the executing court to interpret the decree sought to be executed and for doing so the court can refer to reliefs sought in the plaint and discussion in the judgement to ascertain the true import of the decree. In the present case, as noticed earlier, the plaintiff prayed for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the suit land. She asserted in the plaint that she was in possession of the disputed properties but after the entry in the settlement record of rights in their favour, the defendants were threatening to dispossess her. The suit was tried and disposed of ex parte. She asserted in the plaint that she was in possession of the disputed properties but after the entry in the settlement record of rights in their favour, the defendants were threatening to dispossess her. The suit was tried and disposed of ex parte. Relying on the evidence on record, the court found the plaintiff to be in possession of the property and accordingly passed the decree referred to earlier. Apparently, the court did not feel the necessity to direct recovery of possession in view of its finding that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit properties. Taking these facts and circumstances into consideration, the executing court interpreted the decree to mean that the reliefs sought in the plaint were granted in favour of the plaintiff. One of the reliefs sought, was to direct recovery of possession. Therefore, it cannot be said that the executing court travelled beyond its jurisdiction or committed any illegality in holding the execution case to be maintainable overruling the objection raised by the petitioner. Thus there is little scope for this court for interfering in this matter in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The view taken by me gains support from the decisions reported in AIR 1972 SC 1371 (Bhavan Raja v. Solanki Henuji); AIR 1976 SC 1476 (Mulla Alibhai v. Madrosai Hakima and Coronation High School) and (1968) 34 Cut LT 228 (Chandra Sekhar Rath v. Lingaraj Mohapatra ). ( 7 ) IN the result, the revision petition is dismissed, but is the circumstances of the case without any order for costs. Petition dismissed. .