SHAMSUDDIN AHMED, J. ( 1 ) THESE five revisional applications are taken up together for consideration as the same point of law is involved in all the cases. In all these cases, a point that required determination is if S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. , applied to cases for prosecution of offences under the provision of Essential Commodities Act. Learned Special Judges have found that S. 167 (5) does not apply as offences under S. 7 (1) (ii), E. C. Act is not a summons case and learned Special judges are not Magistrates as contemplated in S. 167, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) MR. Roy and Mr. Sen Gupta appearing for the petitioners have submitted that S. 12aa, Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981, has provided in sub-sec. 1 (a) that all offences under the Act meaning E. C. Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted according to the provisions of the said Act. Clause (c) of the said sub-section has provided that the Special Court may subject to the provisions of Cl. (d) of the section, exercise in relation to the person forwarded to it under Cl. (b), same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under S. 167 of the Code in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that section. Clause (d) deals with release of the accused on bail. Clause (e) authorises the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence on perusal of the police report of the facts constituting an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. Clause (f) has made all offences under the E. C. Act triable in a summary way and has made the provisions of Ss. 262 to 265, Cr. P. C. , applicable as far as may be. Proviso to this clause states that any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Placing their reliance on the provisions stated above both M. Sen Gupta and Mr. Roy submitted that it will appear from Cl. (f) that all offences under this Act have to be tried in a summary way and Ss. 262 to 265, Cr. P. C. , shall apply as far as may be. Placing their reliance on the provisions stated above both M. Sen Gupta and Mr. Roy submitted that it will appear from Cl. (f) that all offences under this Act have to be tried in a summary way and Ss. 262 to 265, Cr. P. C. , shall apply as far as may be. Section 262 appears in Chap. XXI, Cr. P. C. , under the heading "summary Trial". Section 262 provides for proceeding for summary trials. Procedures specified in the Cr. P. C. for the trial of summons case shall be followed in a summary trial. It has also provided that no sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under the said chapter. The learned Advocates argued that by virtue of Cl. (f) of S. 12aa all offences under the E. C. Act have been rendered to be summons case. They further submitted that Cl. (f) has determined the maximum term of imprisonment to be not exceeding two years. According to S. 2 (W), Cr. P. C. , summons case means a case relating to offence not being a warrant case and according to Cl. 2 (x) warrant case means a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. According to them because of this provision referred to above all the cases triable by the Special Judge have become a summons cases and accordingly S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. , applies in all force. Mr. Roy also submitted that Cl. (c) of S. 12aa (1) has made S. 167, Cr. P. C. , applicable in such case without any reservation. Therefore a Special Judge under the Act is bound to apply S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. , in appropriate case pending before him. He also submitted that the fact that he is a Special Judge has no bearing in exercising powers under S. 167 of the Code as he has been specifically vested with such power under Cl. (c) of S. 12aa. Learned Advocate has relied on 1983 Cri LJ 39, Ram Briksh Jadab v. State of W. B. and (1981) 2 Cal HCN 173 : 1981 Cri LJ 1288, Ram Kumar Keshori v. State. These two cases were before the coming into operation of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981. (c) of S. 12aa. Learned Advocate has relied on 1983 Cri LJ 39, Ram Briksh Jadab v. State of W. B. and (1981) 2 Cal HCN 173 : 1981 Cri LJ 1288, Ram Kumar Keshori v. State. These two cases were before the coming into operation of the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981. In the first case it was held that an offence punishable under S. 7 (1) (a) (i) is triable as a summons case and the continuation of investigation beyond the period of 180 days was illegal and the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance on the challan submitted on completion of investigation beyond the period of six months after the arrest of the accuse persons. In the later case the Court held that the extension of time under S. 167 (5) has to be obtained before the expiry of the period of six months from the date of arrest. These two revisions have little relevance in the facts of this Case. Firstly, because the Ram briksh Jadav case it was held that a case under S. 7 (1) (a) (i), E. C. Act, is summons case. This decision is strictly according to the provision of the Cr. P. C. The maximum punishment under this section is one year. Obviously offences triable under S. 7 (1) (a) (i) is a summons case as defined by the Cr. P. C. I may mention again that decision was arrived at when the (Special Provisions) Act did not come into force. With regard to Ram Kumar Keshori's case there is no dispute that the period can be extended beyond six months only if a prayer is made before the statutory period of six months has expired. As it appears the contentions raised by the learned Advocate in this case have to be decided on the merits of their submissions. ( 3 ) I have no hesitation in my mind to agree with the submission of Mr. Roy that Cl. (c) of S. 12aa (1) has vested the learned Special Judge with all the powers of S. 167 of the Cr. P. C. Such power is not in any way restricted by the provision contained in this particular clause or any where in the Special Provision Act, 1981. Roy that Cl. (c) of S. 12aa (1) has vested the learned Special Judge with all the powers of S. 167 of the Cr. P. C. Such power is not in any way restricted by the provision contained in this particular clause or any where in the Special Provision Act, 1981. Therefore there is no restriction on the Special Judge to exercise this Power under S. 167 (5) in appropriate cases namely, a summons case. The question is if all the offences triable by the Special Court under the E. C. Act have been rendered summons cases because of the Special Provision made in S. 12aa is the direct question which I am required to deal with. Section 7 of the E. C. Act provides for punishment for contravention of any order made under S. 3 of the said Act. Under Cl. (a) (i) maximum sentence is one year which can be imposed on contravention of an order made with reference to Cl. (h) or Cl. (i) of sub-s. (2) of S. 3 of the said Act. Clause (h) provides for making an order for collecting any information or statistics for regulation of prohibition of the matter referred to earlier and Cl. (i) provides for making an order for an incidental or supplementary matters. Contravention of the rest of the orders under S. 3 is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years and shall also be liable to fine. As it stands offences punishable under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii) cannot be treated as a summons case. The argument that S. 262 of the Cr. P. C. having been made applicable to all the cases under the E. C. Act before the Special Judge has made cases under the E C. Act summons cases is not tenable. Clause (f) of S. 12aa has made all the offences under the E. C. Act triable in a summary way. In trial of such cases application of S. 262 has been made for the purposes of determining the procedure to be applied and for no other purpose. Offences triable under the E. C. Act has become triable in a summary way not because of application of S. 260, Cr. P. C. , but because of Cl. (f) of S. 12aa (1) (f) of the (Special Provisions) Act. Offences triable under the E. C. Act has become triable in a summary way not because of application of S. 260, Cr. P. C. , but because of Cl. (f) of S. 12aa (1) (f) of the (Special Provisions) Act. Therefore application of S. 262 does not make the offences under the E. C. Act a summons case. It only provides that even though such offences may not be a summons case even then the procedure specified in the Code for the trial of summons cases shall be applicable to them before the Special Judges. ( 4 ) PROVISO to Cl. (f) of this sub-section has limited the maximum sentence that can be awarded to two years. According to learned Advocate that in effect maximum sentence for offence under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii), Essential Commodities Act is two years and accordingly these cases are summons cases as defined by the Code. If I am to accept the submission I am also required to accept that this particular proviso has in fact amended S. 7 of the E. C. Act. From the scheme of summary trial in Chap. XXI of the Cr. P. C. , it is clear that warrant case can be tried in a summary way and maximum sentence that can be awarded is 3 months. These provisions certainly have not rendered warrant cases to be summons cases. Classification of cases into warrant cases remained unaffected. In spite of provision of Chap. XXI of the Cr. P. C. effect of Cl. (f) of S. 12aa, (Special Provisions) Act, cannot go any further. These are only special procedures laid down with certain object in view and does not affect any provision of the Essential Commodities Act unless specifically amended by this (Special Provisions) Act. I accordingly conclude that offences punishable under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii) are not summons cases. ( 5 ) I also intend to consider sub-ss. (5) and (6) of S. 167, Cr. P. C. , in this context. Sub-sec. (6) of this section provides that where an order has been made under S. 167 (5) the Sessions Judge may if he is satisfied on all applications made to him or otherwise that further investigation into the offence sought to be made vacate the order made under sub-sec. P. C. , in this context. Sub-sec. (6) of this section provides that where an order has been made under S. 167 (5) the Sessions Judge may if he is satisfied on all applications made to him or otherwise that further investigation into the offence sought to be made vacate the order made under sub-sec. (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such direction with regard to bail and other matters, as he may be satisfied. According to the provision of the Special Provision Act, S. 12ac Special Judges are also Sessions Judges. It has been held that the Special Judges have the powers of granting as anticipatory bail under S. 438 of the Cr. P. C. as they are Sessions Judges. How this position can be reconciled if it is found that S. 167 (5), Cr. P. C. , applies with the provisions of S. 167 (5) and (6) an order passed under these two sub-sections will be difficult to reconcile. Sub-section (5) imposes an obligation on the Court to stop investigation if it cannot be concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested. Whereas sub-sec. (6) provides vacating the order passed under sub-sec. (5), it cannot be conceived that legislature intended to make a provision which will make any provision nugatory. ( 6 ) MR. Sen Gupta has argued that S. 8, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, is substantially the same as the procedure laid down in S. 12aa. He has particularly stressed that Special Judge contemplated under the said Act has been given power to take cognizance of offence without the accused being committed to him. He has also been vested with powers under Ss. 339 and 339a, Cr. P. C. In sub-sec. (3) of the said section it has also been provided that save as provided in sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) provision of Cr. P. C. , 1898, shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purpose of the said provisions a Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without the jury or without the aid of the assessor and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. Thereafter Mr. Sen Gupta laid stress on a decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 1255 where a provision of the Criminal Law Amendment Act has been considered. It was held on analysis of S. 8 that the Special Judge in the Criminal Law Amendment Act is for some purposes deemed to be a Sessions Judge and for some other purposes deemed to be a Magistrate and some powers exercisable by the Magistrate has been conferred on him. It also held that if the context otherwise requires the word Magistrate may include Magistrate who are not specified in S. 3, Cr. P. C. On the provision of the said Act it was held that the Special Judge in the Criminal Law Amendment is thus for some purpose deemed to be a Sessions Judge and for some other purpose deemed to be a Magistrate and some powers exercised by a Magistrate are conferred on him. Mr. Sen Gupta relying on this decision submits that there is no conflict between sub-sec. (5) and sub-sec. (6) when a Special Judge under the Special Provisions Act exercises power under sub-sec. (5 ). He exercises a power vested in a Magistrate. Therefore sub-sec. (6) will not be nugatory. Elaborating on this Mr. Sen Gupta submitted that under S. 9 of the Cr. P. C. there shall be a Court of Session for every Sessions Division which is to be presided over by a Judge to be appointed by the High Court. Sub-section (3) of the said section, provided that the High Court may also appoint Addl. District Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Sessions. According to Mr. Sen Gupta office of a Judge presiding over in the Sessions Court is a distinct office. Original jurisdiction conferred on the Sessions Judge rests with him. Therefore in matters which are original in nature can be tackled by him in accordance with law. If such matter arises out of an order passed by any Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge or other Sessions Judges not presiding over the Sessions Court of a Sessions Division can easily be entertained by him. Reading S. 167 (6) the jurisdiction for allowing further investigation after it has been stopped by a Magistrate is an original jurisdiction vested in the Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Division. Reading S. 167 (6) the jurisdiction for allowing further investigation after it has been stopped by a Magistrate is an original jurisdiction vested in the Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Division. He can therefore exercise such power even if the order is passed by the learned Special Judge who is deemed to be a Sessions Judge. On this point Mr. Sen Gupta relied on a decision reported in 1978 Cal HC 841. 6a. Amending sub-sec. (3a) to S. 8, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provision contained in sub-sec. (3), the provision of Ss. 350, 549, Cr. P. C. , 1898, shall so far as may be applied to the proceeding before a Special Judge and for the purpose of the said provision, Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. On reading of this Section it appears that there are indications in S. 8 itself that a Special Judge under a Criminal Law Amendment Act is a Magistrate when he acts under certain sections of the Cr. P. C. and is a Sessions Judge in respect of other provisions of the Cr. P. C. Therefore his status is different from that of Special Judge under (Special Provisions) Act. Section 12ac, (Special Provisions) Act, has provided that save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provision of the Code (including provision as to bail and bond) shall apply to the proceeding before a Special Court and for the purpose of the said provision, the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. This provision clearly indicates that in spite of exercise of power under S. 167 the Special Judge is a Court of Sessions and therefore not a Magistrate. Even if the submission of Mr. Sen Gupta that provision of S. 167 (6) the Sessions Judge means a Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Division. It will not be possible for such a Sessions Judge to entertain any application which arises for an order passed under sub-sec. (5) of the said section. The Sessions Judge is competent to deal with an application in respect of a matter in which the powers under sub-sec. (5) has been exercised by a Magistrate. It will not be possible for such a Sessions Judge to entertain any application which arises for an order passed under sub-sec. (5) of the said section. The Sessions Judge is competent to deal with an application in respect of a matter in which the powers under sub-sec. (5) has been exercised by a Magistrate. That is precisely the terms of sub-sec. (5) and sub-sec. (6 ). Mr. Dilip Kr. Dutta Senior Advocate who appeared amicus curiae in this case supported the contention made by Mr. Sen Gupta. I appreciate the ingenuity of Mr. Sen Gupta in advancing the argument with force but I am unable to accept his contentions in view of specific provision of the Special Provision Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act. In this connection I express my sincere appreciation of the valuable service rendered by Mr. Dutta. ( 7 ) MR. Roy, on the other hand, argued that any order passed under sub-sec. (5) by the Special Judge can be altered directing further investigation by the High Court as the Sessions Judge of the Sessions Division cannot pass an order which in effect set aside an order passed by another Sessions Judge. If this contention is accepted we shall have to read the High Court in sub-sec. (6) instead of Sessions Judge. This is not permissible by any rule of interpretation. Considering what has already been stated above I conclude that provision of S. 167 (5) does not apply to cases which are initiated for an offence punishable under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii), Essential Commodities Act. In respect of offences under S. 7 (1) (a) (i) the Special Judge is competent to pass an order under sub-sec. (5) of S. 167, Cr. P. C. In such case S. 482, Cr. P. C. , will take care of sub-sec. (6) of S. 167, Cr. P. C. These applications are accordingly disposed of as under Criminal Revision No. 1207 of 1983. Rule discharged. The rest 4 Criminal Revision. Applications rejected. Rule discharged. .