K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) AS the questions that arise for determination in these cases are common, we propose to dispose of them by a common order. ( 2 ) AS on 1st November, 1956, on which day the new State of Mysore now called Karnataka comprising of the areas specified in section 7 of the States Reorganisation Act came into being, the municipal laws prevailing in the fifferent integrating areas of the new State, provided for the imposition of a duty or tax called "octroi" considered to be an archaic and obnoxious levy by many in the country. The uniform Karnataka Municipalities Act of 1964 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1964) that came into force from 1st April, 1965, and the uniform Municipal Corporations Act of 1976 (Karnataka Act 14 of 1977) that came into force from 1st June, 1977, in the cities of bangalore and Hubli, Dharwad and on the appointed dates in other places provided for the continuance of the levy of octroi by the local authorities in the State. On the incessant demand of trade, industry and economists, the State of Karnataka, probably the very first State to under-take the reform, abolished the levy of octroi with effect from 1st April, 1979. In order to compensate the local bodies for the loss of octroi, which was one of their main sources of revenue, the State by virtue of the legislative powers derived from article 246 of the Constitution read with entry no. 52 of List II of the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, enacted a progressive legislation called the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 27 of 1979) ("the Act" ). The Act which came into force from 1st June, 1979, provided for levy of tax on three goods, namely, (i) all varieties of textiles, namely, cotton, woollen, silk or artificial silk including rayon or nylon whether manufactured in mills, power-looms or handlooms and hosiery cloth in lengths; (ii) tobacco and all its products and (iii) Sugar other than sugarcandy, confectionary and the like. ( 3 ) BUT, the trade and industry that welcomed the abolition of octroi, did not welcome the Act and a large number of traders challenged its validity before this Court in Writ Petition No. 7039 of 1979 and connected cases. ( 3 ) BUT, the trade and industry that welcomed the abolition of octroi, did not welcome the Act and a large number of traders challenged its validity before this Court in Writ Petition No. 7039 of 1979 and connected cases. On 24th August, 1979 a Division Bench of this Court consisting of chandrasekhar, C. J. , and Bopanna, J. , allowed the said writ petitions and struck down the Act [vide Hansa Corporation v. State of Karnataka ILR (1980) 1 Kar 165]. On an appeal filed by the state Government against the said decision of this Court in Hansa Corporation's case ILR (1980) 1 Kar 165, the Supreme Court on 25th September, 1980, reversed the same and upheld the validity of the Act [vide State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation AIR1981 SC 463 , (1980 )4 SCC697 , [1981 ]1 SCR823 ). ( 4 ) AFTER the Supreme Court decided Hansa Corporation's case AIR1981 sc 463 , (1980 )4 SCC697 , [1981 ]1 SCR823 , the State undertook a series of amendments to the Act from time to time, however, providing sufficient ammunition also to challenge them. But in order to appreciate the limited controversy raised in these cases, it is enough to notice three such amendments only. ( 5 ) ON 18th February, 1981, the Governor of Karnataka by virtue of the powers conferred on him by article 213 (1) of the Constitution, promulgated the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 (Ordinance no. 3 1981) ("ordinance") inter alia amending section 3 of the Act. The ordinance was replaced by the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein (Amendment) Act, 1981 (Karnataka Act 12 of 1981) ("the 1981 Act" ). This Act assented by the governor on 4th April, 1981, was given retrospective effect from 18th February, 1981. The bill that became the 1981 Act was not introduced in the legislature with the previous sanction of the president of India ("president" ). ( 6 ) THE karnataka Taxation and Certain Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 (karnataka Act 13 of 1982) ("the 1982 Act") enacted to amend the various taxation laws of the State including the Act, received the assent of the Governor on 1st April, 1952, came into force from that date. ( 6 ) THE karnataka Taxation and Certain Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 1982 (karnataka Act 13 of 1982) ("the 1982 Act") enacted to amend the various taxation laws of the State including the Act, received the assent of the Governor on 1st April, 1952, came into force from that date. Section 7 (15) of this Act introduced 13 more items detailed therein to the Schedule to the Act. ( 7 ) THE Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Karnataka Act 38 of 1984) ("the 1984 Act") enacted amending several provisions of the Act, however, received the assent of the President on 28th September, 1984, and came into force from 1st April 1983, [vide section 1 (2) of the said Act]. Section 6 (3) of this act substituting the earlier entries incorporated by the 1982 Act from 1st April, 1982, or validating what was sought to be achieved by the 1982 Act which is material reads thus : "6. Amendment of Schedule.- In the Schedule to the principal Act, -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) for items 4 to 16 and entries relating thereto, the following items and entries shall be and shall be deemed to have been substituted on the first day of April, 1982, namely :- 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) for items 4 to 16 and entries relating thereto, the following items and entries shall be and shall be deemed to have been substituted on the first day of April, 1982, namely :- 4. Iron and steel, that is to say - (i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runner scrap, and iron skull scrap; (ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes); (iii) skelp bars, tin bars, sheet bars, hoe-bars and sleeper bars; (iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted, in coil form as well as straight lengths); (v) steel structurals (angles, joints, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections); (vi) sheets, hoops, strips and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities in straight lengths and in coil form as rolled and in rivetted condition; (vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii) discs, rings, forgings and steel castings; (ix) tool, alloy and special steels or any of the above categories; (x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings; (xi) steel tubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings; (xii) tin plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tin-free plates; (xiii) fish plate bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails heavy and light crane rails; (xiv) wheels, tyres and axles and wheel sets; (xv) wire rods and wires rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper; (xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings, or end pieces of any of the above categories. 5. Cement. 6. All kinds of paper including carbon paper, blotting paper, water proof paper, PVC coated paper, ferro paper, ammonia paper, stencil paper, pulp boards, art boards, duplex boards, triplex boards, card boards, corrugated boards and the like but excluding newsprint. 7. Industrial machinery and parts and accessories thereof. 8. Aluminium ingots. 9. Industrial gases other than LPG. 10. Coal and coke (excluding charcoal ). 11. 7. Industrial machinery and parts and accessories thereof. 8. Aluminium ingots. 9. Industrial gases other than LPG. 10. Coal and coke (excluding charcoal ). 11. All petroleum products, that is to say - petrol, diesel, crude oil, lubricating oil, transformer oil, brake or clutch fluid, bitumen (asphalt), tar and others but excluding LPG, kerosene and naphtha for use in the manufacture of fertilisers. 12. Refrigerators, air-conditioners and parts and accessories thereof. 13. Electrical goods, that is to say, electrically operated motors, fans, geysers hot plates, ovens, heaters, mixers and grinders, including parts and accessories thereof and such other items as may be notified by the State Government from time to time. 14. All kinds of automobiles excluding passenger buses, tractors, tractor-trailers and power tillers. 15. All kinds of ores. 16. Jute. '; (4) items 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 shall be omitted; (5) after item 16, the following items shall be inserted, namely :- 17. All industrial packaging materials; and 18. All raw materials, component parts and any other inputs (e. g. processing or any other chemical solvents used in the solvent extraction or process, catalysts of and the like), which go into or may be used in the manufacture of an intermediate or finished product, when brought into local areas by an industrial unit or any other dealer. Explanation.- The expressions "industrial unit" means a manufacturing unit, which falls within the definition of a "factory" under the Factories Act, 1948 (Central Act LXIII of 1948), but excludes (i) Handicrafts Manufacturing Units, (ii) Handloom weaving Units and (iii) any other group or class of industries, which, may with reference to their nature, competitiveness, employment potential or such other factors, be notified by the State Government.. "raw materials, component parts and any other inputs" do not include sugarcane, cereals, oil seeds, pulses, timber or wood of any species, silk cocoons raw, thrown or twisted silk, or such other inputs as may be notified by the State Government for purposes of exemption from tax under entry 18 from time to time; but include aluminium ingots and ores of all kinds. '" with this survey of legislation, we now pass on to notice the steps taken by the Government to effectuate them. '" with this survey of legislation, we now pass on to notice the steps taken by the Government to effectuate them. ( 8 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act as amended by the 1981 and 1984 acts, the Government of karnataka published three notification on 13th November, 1984, all bearing No. FD 26 CET 84 but superscribed as I, II and III evidently to distinguish one from the other. These three notifications are set out in full on pages 198 to 209 of the Act published by the government incorporating the amendments made upto August, 1984, and therefore, they are not set out here. ( 9 ) IN these petitions presented on 24th February, 1986, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the 1981 Act or to declare that the same was unenforceable for non-compliance with article 304 (b) of the Constitution and for striking down the three notifications issued by he government on 13th November, 1984. ( 10 ) BEFORE noticing the grounds on which the challenge of the petitioners is founded, it is necessary to notice the later proceedings that ensued before this Court and the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) IN Writ Petition No. 18224 of 1982 and connected cases a large number of traders one of them being "m/s. Jyothi Home Industries" challenged the validity of the 1981 and 1982 Acts before this Court, on a large number of grounds one of them being that the 1981 Act was violative of article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and the other was that the 1982 Act was unenforceable for non-compliance of articles 255 and 304 (b) of the Constitution. On 15th, 26th, and 27th September, 1983, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Venkatachaliah and swami, JJ. , disposed of them upholding the contentions of the petitioners on the non-compliance of article 304 (b) of the Constitution. The operative portion of the order made by the court since reported in [1987] 64 STC 254 (Kar) (App.); (1984) 1 Kar LJ 394 and to be hereafter referred to as 1st Jyothi's case, reads thus : "81. , disposed of them upholding the contentions of the petitioners on the non-compliance of article 304 (b) of the Constitution. The operative portion of the order made by the court since reported in [1987] 64 STC 254 (Kar) (App.); (1984) 1 Kar LJ 394 and to be hereafter referred to as 1st Jyothi's case, reads thus : "81. In the result, for the foregoing reasons we allow these writ petitions in part and : (a) Declare that the provisions of section 7 (1) (a) and section 7 (15) of the Karnataka (Amending act 13 of 1982) are unenforceable by reason of non-compliance with the requirement of the proviso to article 304 (b) or article 255 of the Constitution, until such compliance is show; (b) Issue a writ of mandamus in each of these cases to the respondents directing them to forbear from enforcing the provisions of section 7 (1) (a) and section 7 (15) of the amending Act 13 of 1982, as long as non-compliance with the proviso to article 304 (b) or with article 255 (c) of the constitution continues; (c) Quash that part of the Notification bearing No. FD 14 CET 82, dated 2nd April, 1982, which purports to bring to tax items 4 to 16 in the Schedule to the principal Act. " This order was challenged by some of the petitioners and the State in Shah Hirachand Babulal and Company v. State of Karnataka (Civil Appeal No. 11455 of 1983 and connected cases) before the Supreme Court. On 28th November, 1984 the Supreme Court on taking note of the president's assent to the 1984 Act disposed all of them in these words : "during the pendency of these appeals the Karnataka Legislature adopted the Karnataka Tax on entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein (Amendment) Act, 1983 amending the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale therein Act, 1979, in relation to the definition of local area and addition of 13 items in the schedule. This Amendment Act has received the assent of the President on 28th September, 1984, and this is no more in dispute. The Act was published in the Gazette as per notification dated October 24, 1984, and came into force with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1983. This Amendment Act has received the assent of the President on 28th September, 1984, and this is no more in dispute. The Act was published in the Gazette as per notification dated October 24, 1984, and came into force with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1983. The only contention that found favour with the High Court was that the amended provision was unenforceable for want of assent of the President. That objection no more survives. Therefore, the State appeals will have to be allowed. Nothing worthwhile could be canvassed in support of the other contentions in the writ petitions and therefore they must fail. Accordingly the appeals preferred by the State of Karnataka are allowed and the writ petitions filed by the petitioners in the High Court are dismissed. All writ petitions filed in this court are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. " But, even this was not the end of the challenges. ( 12 ) WE have earlier noticed that on 13th November, 1984, the Government issued three notifications. Then the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Karnataka Act 28 of 1985) ("the 1985 Act"), was enacted inter alia amending clause (5) of section 2 of the Act. On the enactment of this Act M/s. Jyothi Home Industries and several others again challenged the validity of the 1981 and 1984 acts and the three notifications issued by the Government on 13th November, 1984, before this court in Writ Petition No. 19807 of 1984 and connected cases which we will hereafter refer to the same as 2nd Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 208 on a very large number of grounds. On 21st february, 1986, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Venkatachaliah and Vithal Rao, JJ. , dismissed them and had upheld the 1981 and 1984 Acts and the three notifications issued by the government. ( 13 ) IN this endless relay race of challenges to the Act and the innumerable amendments, we are informed that the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3228 of 1986 was a not a party to the 2nd jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 208 (Kar) while the other was a party to the same, which is not disputed by the respondents. With this narration of events, it is useful to notice the grounds of challenge before us, the justification pleaded for the same and then deal with the contentions. ( 14 ) THE petitioners have urged that the Bill that ultimately became the 1981 Act introduced without the previous sanction of the President or had not received the assent of the President in conformity with the requirements of articles 255 and 304 (b) of the Constitution impeding the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India, was at any rate unenforceable and the three notifications issued thereunder were illegal and unenforceable. ( 15 ) IN a common return, the respondents without disputing the factual position asserted by the petitioners on the Bill being introduced without the previous sanction of the President or that Act not being assented by the President, have however, sought to sustain them on more than one ground. First the respondents have urged that the validity of the 1981 Act having been upheld by this Court in the two Jyothi's cases [1987] 64 STC 254 (App); 1984 (1) Kar LJ 394 and [1987] 64 STC 208 the ground on which the present challenge is founded was unavailable to them and in any event cannot be examined by this Court. Second, the resondents have urged that this Court should not examine the belated challenge of the petitioners. Lastly, the respondents have urged that the assent given by the President to the 1984 Act must in law be treated as the President giving his assent to the 1981 Act also. ( 16 ) SRIYUTHS K. Srinivasan and G. S. Ullal, learned Advocates, had appeared for the petitioners. Whenever we refer to the name of any one counsel, we should be understood to refer to the name of the other counsel also. Sri S. Rajendra Babu, learned Government Advocate, had appeared for the respondents. Both sides in support of their respective cases have relied on a number of rulings and we will refer to them at the appropriate stages. ( 17 ) AS the two preliminary objections urged by the respondents go to the root of the matter, it is proper to consider them first and then examine the merits if that becomes necessary. Both sides in support of their respective cases have relied on a number of rulings and we will refer to them at the appropriate stages. ( 17 ) AS the two preliminary objections urged by the respondents go to the root of the matter, it is proper to consider them first and then examine the merits if that becomes necessary. ( 18 ) SRI Babu had urged that this Court in 1st Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 254 (App); 1984 1 Kar lj 394 and the Supreme Court on appeals had upheld the 1981 Act and this Court cannot examine its validity on a new ground, though not urged earlier. In support of his contention Sri babu has strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Smt. Somawanti v. State of punjab AIR1963 SC 151 , [1963 ]33 Compcas745 (SC ), [1963 ]2 scr774. ( 19 ) SRI Srinivasan had urged that the point or ground on which the present challenge was founded had not been raised, considered and decided in the two Jyothi's cases [1987] 64 STC 254 (Kar) (App); 1984 1 Kar LJ 394 and [1987] 64 STC 208 (Kar) or by the Supreme Court and, therefore, this Court was not precluded from examining and deciding the same. ( 20 ) WE have carefully read the orders of this Court in the two Jyothi's cases [1987] 64 STC 254 (App); 1984 1 Kar LJ 394 and [1987] 64 STC 208 and the order of the Supreme Court on appeals directed against the 1st Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 254 (Kar) (App); 1984 1 Kar LJ 394. We find that in all of them the point or ground on which the present challenge is founded had not been raised, considered and decided. When that is so, we cannot on principle hold that this Court is precluded from examining the present challenge on the ground or point urged before us. Every sound principle of law does not support such a course. ( 21 ) IN Somawanti's case AIR1963 SC 151 , [1963 ]33 Compcas745 (SC ), [1963 ]2 SCR774 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a new argument addressed before it on a point earlier decided by the court in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji AIR1955 SC 41 , (1955 )57 BOMLR595 , [1955 ]1 SCR777 and its binding effect as a precedent. When confronted with that situation, it was urged for the appellant-Somawanti that an argument on the point had not been addressed in the earlier case and, therefore, the same does not operate as a binding precedent. In repelling the same Mudholkar, J. , speaking for the majority, expressed thus : "the binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. " The terms "an argument" and "a point" are not one and the same. Both are separate, distinct and different. We are of the view that an argument on a point or a ground is different from the point or ground and one cannot be confused with the other. The point decided in a case is different from an argument addressed on that point. What was done by this Court in 2nd Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 208 is also to the same effect. We are of the view that the principle enunciated in somawanti's case AIR1963 SC 151 , [1963 ]33 Compcas745 (SC ), [1963 ]2 SCR774 does not support the preliminary objection urged for the respondents. ( 22 ) ON the foregoing discussion, we hold that there is no merit in this preliminary objection urged for the respondents and we reject the same. ( 23 ) SRI Babu had next contended that this Court should decline to examine the belated challenge of the petitioners. ( 24 ) THE liability of the petitioners to taxes, at any rate, arises from the three notifications issued by the Government on 13th November, 1984. If that date is the basis for challenge then there is no such an unreasonable delay to throw out the challenge of the petitioners on that ground. Even if there is some delay, in such an event also having regard to the fact that rule nisi had already been issued, it is more proper for this Court to decide the cases on merits rather than on any technical ground. For these reasons, we see no merit in this objection of the respondents and reject the same. With this we now proceed to examine the merits. For these reasons, we see no merit in this objection of the respondents and reject the same. With this we now proceed to examine the merits. ( 25 ) SRIYUTHS Srinivasan and Ullal have urged that the 1981 Act and the three notifications issued on 13th November, 1984, under section 3 of the Act as amended by that Act, interfere with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India guaranteed to the petitioners under article 301 of the Constitution and that the 1981 Act which had not been assented to by the president as required by article 304 (b) of the Constitution was unenforceable and the three notifications issued on the authority of such an unenforceable provision were illegal and invalid. ( 26 ) RAJENDRA Babu had urged that section 3 of the Act as originally enacted itself empowered the government to issue notifications retrospectively and that even otherwise the assent given by the president to the 1984 Act in law also results in giving such assent to the 1981 Act. ( 27 ) SECTION 3 of the Act as originally enacted reads thus : "3. Levy of tax.- There shall be levied and collected a tax on entry of the scheduled goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein at such rate not exceeding two per cent ad valorem as may be specified by the State Government and different rates may be specified for different local areas. " This section is the charging section of the Act and, therefore, the same must be construed strictly. The language of this section expressly or by necessary intendment does not empower the government to exercise its power retrospectively. In the absence of clear and specific language, we cannot construe the charging section 3 as empowering the Government to exercise its power retrospectively. Every sound rule of construction of statutes militates against the construction suggested by Sri Babu. ( 28 ) IN Hansa Corporation's case AIR1981 SC 463 , (1980 )4 SCC697 , [1981 ]1 SCR823 the Supreme Court construed the unamended section 3 of the Act in these words : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 28 ) IN Hansa Corporation's case AIR1981 SC 463 , (1980 )4 SCC697 , [1981 ]1 SCR823 the Supreme Court construed the unamended section 3 of the Act in these words : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . Even if, therefor, a literal grammatical construction were to be adopted, on a proper reading of the section power is conferred on the State Government by section 3 not only to specify different rates for different areas but also to specify local areas entry into which of scheduled goods would provide the taxing event. There is thus a power to choose and specify local areas as well as choose and specify rate of taxation subject to maximum prescribed in the section. " Section 3 as originally enacted did not empower the Government to issue notifications from a date anterior to the date of publication of the notification or to give them retrospectivity. On the other hand, section 3 of the 1981 Act by amending section 3 of the original Act expressly conferred power on Government to issue notifications either prospectively or retrospectively. The amendment made was a deliberate one and was made to take power to bring the Act into force retrospectively. Every one of them only lead to the conclusion that section 3 of the Act as originally enacted did not empower the Government to issue notifications retrospectively. We see no merit in this contention of Sri Babu and we reject the same. ( 29 ) THE challenges to the 1981 Act as violative of articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution have been rejected by this Court in two Jyothi's cases [1987] 64 STC 254 (App); 1984 (1) Kar LJ 394 and [1987] 64 STC 208 and in particular in the 2nd Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 208. Learned counsel for the petitioners did not also urge any of those grounds that are concluded in the earlier cases. What remains to be considered is only the very last and limited ground urged before us and no other. Learned counsel for the petitioners did not also urge any of those grounds that are concluded in the earlier cases. What remains to be considered is only the very last and limited ground urged before us and no other. ( 30 ) THE tax levied under the Act is not a compensatory tax and the same interferes with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under article 301 of the Constitution and calls for compliance with the requirements of article 255 or 304 of the Constitution is concluded by the Supreme Court in Hansa Corporation's case AIR1981 SC 463 , (1980 )4 SCC697 , [1981 ]1 SCR823 as also in 1st Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 254 (App) (Kar); 1984 (1) Kar LJ 394 (Kar ). We must, therefore, examine the question on that basis only. ( 31 ) PART XIII of the Constitution dealing with trade, commerce and intercourse in the territory of india, inspired by the commerce clause of the American Constitution and section 92 of the australian Constitution around which great constitutional controversies in America and australia arose is not in pari materia or analogous to those provisions or any other provisions of other federal Constitution in the world. A provision similar to article 304 of the Constitution on the scope of which the question really turns is not found in any other federal Constitution of the world and even in Government of India Act of 1935 also. We cannot, therefore, derive support from the other Constitutions or the treatises on the Constitutional Law of other federal constitutions in the world and any search for the same will not help us. The two acknowledged treatises on Indian Constitutional Law, viz. , Seervai's Constitutional Law and Basu's constitutional Law, the learned articles of M. Ramaswamy on "indian Constitutional provisions" against barriers to trade and commerce examined in the light of American and Australian experiment (vide : J 1 ILI 320 to 399) and M. P. Singh's article on "freedom of Trade and commerce v. Power of Taxation" (Vol. 17 J. ILI pages 366-397) do not deal with the precise question. But, fortunately for us the true scope and ambit of Part XIII and in particular article 304 has been explained by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases, though their correctness is doubted by some jurists (see Singh's aforesaid article ). 17 J. ILI pages 366-397) do not deal with the precise question. But, fortunately for us the true scope and ambit of Part XIII and in particular article 304 has been explained by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases, though their correctness is doubted by some jurists (see Singh's aforesaid article ). Hence, our task is only one of applying the law declared by the Supreme Court stearing clear of the controversies raised by jurists and others over the same. ( 32 ) THE 1984 Act, which is a later Act, had received the assent of the President is not in dispute. Before giving his assent to a later amending Act, as the 1984 Act, we must assume that the president had examined the whole Act, all the earlier amendments made before and their constitutional effect also and on being fully satisfied with the requirements of the Constitution would have given his assent to the same. Without being satisfied with the earlier amendments, it is even inconceivable to hold that the President would give his assent to a later amendment. If this is the true position, then it follows, the President in law had given his assent to the earlier amendments made to the Act and in particular to the 1981 Act with which only we are concerned. Any other construction would not be in consonance with the high constitutional position of the President under our Constitution. Even otherwise, this conclusion of ours is set at rest by the Supreme Court. ( 33 ) IN Venkatrao Esajirao Limbekar v. State of Bombay AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 SCC81 , [1970 ]1 SCR317 ("venkatrao" case) the supreme Court was examining the validity of an amendment made by the then State of Bombay in 1958 to the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1950 which had not received the assent of the President. The 1958 amendment had received the assent of the President though not the original Act enacted by then State of Hyderabad. In examining that aspect, with which only we are concerned, an unanimous Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Grover, J. , expressed thus : "similarly when Bombay Act XXXII of 1958 which was meant for amending Hyderabad Act xxi of 1950 was enacted the assent of the President had been given. In examining that aspect, with which only we are concerned, an unanimous Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Grover, J. , expressed thus : "similarly when Bombay Act XXXII of 1958 which was meant for amending Hyderabad Act xxi of 1950 was enacted the assent of the President had been given. If the assent of the president had been accorded to the amending Acts, it would be difficult to hold that the President had never assented to the parent Act, namely, Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950. Even if such assent had not been accorded earlier, it must be taken to have been granted when amending Act III of 1954 was assented to. " These principles enunciated by the Supreme Court referring to the requirement of the assent of the President under article 31a of the Constitution also governs the requirement of assent under article 304 (b) of the Constitution. This case firmly lays down that assent given by the President to a later amending Act had to be treated as the President giving his assent to an earlier amendment or the original Act though in fact they had not been so assented to by the President. On this principle we are bound to hold that the President had in law, given his assent to the 1981 act. ( 34 ) BUT, Sri Srinivasan had urged that the principle enunciated in Venkatrao's case AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 SCC81 , [1970 ]1 scr317 on the very observation made therein to the effect that the same had not been raised and argued before it, cannot be treated as the ratio or as a binding precedent and cannot, therefore, be followed by this Court as ruled by the Supreme Court in Rajpur Ruda Meha v. State of Gujarat AIR1980 SC 1707 , 1980 Crilj1246 , (1980 )0 GLR40 , (1980 )1 scc677 , [1980 ]2 SCR353. ( 35 ) WE are of the view that what had been enunciated in Venkatrao's case AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 SCC81 , [1970 ]1 scr317 , notwithstanding the observations relied on by Sri Srinivasan is a firm legal principle enunciated on the very question that arises before us and, therefore, the same must be treated as the law declared by the Supreme Court and binding on us under article 141 of the Constitution. We are of the view that Rajpur Ruda Meha's case AIR1980 SC 1707 , 1980 Crilj1246 , (1980 )0 GLR40 , (1980 )1 SCC677 , [1980 ]2 SCR353 relied on by Sri srinivasan does not lay down a different proposition and assist him. ( 36 ) IN Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Company Limited AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552 a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court was examining the validity of the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and an order made thereunder called the Kerala State Electricity supply (Kerala State Electricity Board and Licensees Areas) Surcharge Order, 1968. In that case one of the questions that arose for decision was effect of assent given by the President to a later amendment made to the Kerala Act in 1967. On that question, the majority speaking through alagiriswami, J. , expressed thus : "we agree that the assent should be deemed not merely to the substitution of the words 'five years' by the words 'seven years' in the kerala Act, but to the Act as a whole, that is, amended by the 1967 Act and any repugnance between the Kerala Act and the Electricity Act, 1910 and the electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 should be deemed to have been cured by such assent. When assenting to the 1967 Act the President should naturally have looked into the whole Act, that is, the 1961 Act as amended by the 1967 Act. . . ". What emerges from this enunciation, which is in accord with the enunciation made in venkatrao's case AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 scc81 , [1970 ]1 SCR317 , however without noticing and referring to the same is that assent given by the President to a later amending Act must be construed as giving his assent to the Act and all its earlier amendments. But, notwithstanding this emphatic and clear enunciation, Sri srinivasan has sought to distinguish the same on the grounds that the Court was only dealing with the assent given to an Act that merely extended the life of the original Act and not to the act or an amendment made to that Act as in the present case. We are afraid that this distinction made by Sri Srinivasan is without a difference. We are afraid that this distinction made by Sri Srinivasan is without a difference. We are of the view that the ratio in Indian aluminium Company's case AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552 cannot be distinguished on any of the grounds urged by Sri Srinivasan. We are, therefore, of the view that the ratio in Indian Aluminium Company's case AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552 governs the precise question that arises before us. ( 37 ) SRI Ullal relying on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan AIR1966 SC 764 , [1966 ]1 SCR890 had urged that there cannot be a "deemed assent" to an Act and the same must be real and factual. ( 38 ) WHAT we have held earlier is also an answer to this contention of Sri Ullal and the same calls for rejection for those very reasons. ( 39 ) IN Jawaharmal's case AIR1966 SC 764 , [1966 ]1 SCR890 the precise question that came up for consideration in Venkatrao's case AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 SCC81 , [1970 ]1 SCR317 and Indian aluminium Company's case AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552 , viz. , what is the legal effect of an assent given to a later amendment of an Act did not arise for consideration and the ratio in that case does not really bear on the point. We are also of the view that the principles in Jawaharmal's case AIR1966 SC 764 , [1966 ]1 SCR890 are not also in conflict with the principles enunciated in Venkatrao's case AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 SCC81 , [1970 ]1 scr317 and Indian Aluminium Company's case AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552. Lastly in Jawaharmal's case AIR1966 SC 764 , [1966 ]1 SCR890 the Court gave relief for the second period on which Sri ullal laid great emphasis on the construction of the Acts passed by the State of Rajasthan from time to time and not on the ground that is urged before us. For all these reasons we find no merit in the contention of Sri Ullal and we reject the same. For all these reasons we find no merit in the contention of Sri Ullal and we reject the same. ( 40 ) ON the application of the ratio in Venkatrao's case AIR1970 SC 126 , (1971 )73 BOMLR102 , (1969 )2 SCC81 , [1970 ]1 SCR317 and Indian Aluminium Company's case AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552 we hold that the President by giving his assent to the 1984 Act, had in law given his assent to the 1981 act. On this conclusion, it also follows that the objection that the 1981 Act was unenforceable for want of previous sanction of the President to the Bill or the assent of the President to that Act necessarily falls to the ground. ( 41 ) WITH this we now pass on to examine the challenge to the three notification issued by the government. ( 42 ) IN 2nd Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 208 (Kar) the Division Bench rejecting the challenges to the impugned notifications on various other grounds, on their scope and ambit, expressed thus : "34. The first point to note is that the three notifications issued on 13th November, 1984, had different periods of retroactive operation. Notification No. I became effective from 1st April, 1982; Notification No. II from 1st April, 1983 and Notification No. III from 24th October, 1984, though all the three were promulgated on 13th November, 1984. They must be deemed to have come into operation on those respective dates in the past. The effect of the fiction does not stop there. The three notifications, fictionally, must be held to have subsisted and were operative from such points of time of their commencement upto the dates they were superseded. Notification no. I must, consistent with the putative set of facts which the fiction bids to be assumed, be held to have continued from 1st April, 1982, upto 31st March, 1983, and from 1st April, 1983, notification No. II must be deemed to have commenced its operation. The supersession takes place only when Notification No. II becomes operative. So are the periods of operation and the points of time of supersession of Notification No. II superseded by Notification No.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . So are the periods of operation and the points of time of supersession of Notification No. II superseded by Notification No.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . But, it is plain that the liability to tax arising prior to 13th November, 1984, was not altogether intended to be wiped out after 13th November, 1984". We are bound by this construction and counsel for the petitioners did not contend to the contrary. ( 43 ) BUT, Sri Srinivasan relying on the rulings of the Supreme Court in Kalyani Stores v. State of orissa AIR1966 SC 1686 , [1966 ]1 SCR865 , State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah AIR1967 SC 1189 , [1967 ]2 SCR673 and State of Kerala v. A. B. Abdul Kadir AIR1970 SC 1912 , (1969 )2 SCC363 , [1970 ]1 scr700 had urged that the three notifications that really impede the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India guaranteed to the petitioners cannot be enforced for want of presidential assent to the 1981 Act. ( 44 ) SECTION 3 of the Act creates the charge. The notifications cannot be read de hors section 3 of the Act. The notifications have been issued to effectuate section 3 of the Act. As held by the majority in Indian Aluminium Company's case AIR1976 SC 1031 , (1976 )1 SCC466 , [1976 ]1 SCR552 , the assent of the President to the notifications issued by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act is not at all required. ( 45 ) WHEN once it is held that the 1981 Act or section 3 as amended by that Act is valid and enforceable, it follows from the same that the three notifications that do no suffer from any other constitutional and legal infirmity must necessarily be held to be valid. We may incidentally notice that in the 2nd Jyothi's case [1987] 64 STC 208 (Kar) noticing some of the rulings relied on by Sri Srinivasan, the Division Bench had upheld them. We are of the view that every one of the rulings of the Supreme Court relied on by Sri Srinivasan do not really bear on the validity of the notifications. We are of the view that every one of the rulings of the Supreme Court relied on by Sri Srinivasan do not really bear on the validity of the notifications. ( 46 ) WE have earlier set out section 6 (3) of the 1984 Amendment Act in full (vide para 7 supra ). This section incorporates new items 4 to 17 from 1st April, 1982. While the I notification regulates the period from 1st April, 1982 to 31st March, 1983, the II regulates the period from 1st April, 1983 to 24th October, 1984. The last regulates the taxes from 24th October, 1984, and onwards. We are of the view that on the very terms of section 6 (3) of the 1984 Act and the Act, as originally enacted, the three notifications are authorised, legal and valid. ( 47 ) AS all the contentions urged for the petitioners fail, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in these cases. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.