ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh, J. - 1. This is defendants• appeal who lost in both the Courts. Two short questions of law are agitated in this appeal and as such, it is not necessary for me to make detailed investigation of respective cases of parties pleaded and proved In Courts below. 2. To dispose of the two contentions which appellants' counsel has raised in this appeal, I may refer immediately to the few admitted facts relevant to the questions agitated. The plaintiffs themselves based their claim on the fact that the suit land was Zamindari land and they were bolding the land as Pukhta mourusi tenant while, on the other hand, the defendants themselves claimed that they were sub-tenants under the plaintiffs. The two provisions of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, for short, the 'Act' on "which the twin contentions agitated by Shri Vajpai are based may be read in Section 38 and 56 of the Act. Indeed, counsel's contention based on Section 315 further is that because of the steps taken by the defendants there under in 1955 to assert their statutory right, they acquired a tide in the suit land' adverse to the plaintiffs and as such, the suit was barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Shri Sapre, appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents, while conceding to the fact that in 1955, defendants had filed an application in Tahsildars' Court making the requisite deposit contemplated under Section 38 (2), but in that application they also made a prayer for mutation and as such, the effect of the decision rendered thereon must be decided in terms of Section 86 (4) of the M. B. Lana Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. Counsel has also cited a number of decisions to repel and rebut appellants' contention that the suit was barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and urged that the concurrent finding of the Courts below on the question invited no interference of this Court in second appeal. 3. 1 take up first the last question because, according to me, the question has an over-bearing and overwhelming effect on the final decision 10 be rendered in this appeal. I am constrained to observe at once at this stage that both Courts erred in law ill holding the suit to be within time. 3. 1 take up first the last question because, according to me, the question has an over-bearing and overwhelming effect on the final decision 10 be rendered in this appeal. I am constrained to observe at once at this stage that both Courts erred in law ill holding the suit to be within time. Ignoring the implications of the application made by the defendants under Section 38 (2) of the Act, the relevant portion whereof, I extract below along with sub-section (1) thereof :- "38. Conferral of pacca tenancy right on tenants and sub-tenants (1) Subject to the provisions of this section every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be a pacca tenant of the land comprised in this holding from the date of vesting. (2) Every sub-tenant or tenant of a subtenant who deposits with the Tahsildar within the period specified in sub• sections (3) and (4) the following amount to be paid to the proprietor of tenant or sub tenant as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a pacca tenant of the land comprised in his holding. Till amount is deposited, his former status shall continue. The right of becoming a pacca tenant by depositing money shall firstly be that of the tenant of the sub tenant, if any, and if he fails to deposit money shall be that of sub tenant:- xxx xxx xxx However, before I proceed to deal, discuss and dispose of the important contentions of matter of limitation, I feel disposed to deal summarily Shri Vajpai's contention based on section 56 of the Act as I do not see any merit in that. Counsel contended that the order passed by the Tabsildar under Section 38 (2) which had been affirmed in successive appeals and revision and even by this Court on (he writ side, having attained finality, in terms of Section 56 of the Act, no relief can be granted to the plaintiffs in the instant suit for the simple reason that they had not made any prayer in the suit for declaration of the proceedings initiated in 1955 by the plaintiffs to be null and void and the successive orders rendered therein also to be w void I see sufficient merit in the contention of Shri Sapre that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to impunge the orders passed in the proceedings initiated in the Tahsildar's Court because the application which the defendants had filed was a composite application in that it also contained a prayer for mutation. Counsel rightly submits that whenever any order by a Revenue Court is passed in mutation proceeding, the effect of the order rendered therein can be set at naught in a suit instituted in civil Court; even without assailing in terms validity of the order. Indeed, because, mutation cannot and does not confer title in law, which a party can establish in Civil Court independently, in accordance with law The first contention of Vajpai, therefore, fails. 4. Now I take up the question of limitation. If I read anything in Section 38 (2) of the Act in the context not only of sub-section (1) thereof but also clause (b) of Section 158 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, for short, the 'Code', it is this. A sub-tenant, staking l1is claim to be a pakka tenant under Section 38 (2) would leave nothing in the hands of anybody else except the estate because he thereby asserts not only his tenancy rights in the land, but virtually ownership in the land. Indeed, as appears clear from sub-section (1) of Section 38 the tenant of a proprietor under whom a sub-tenant used to hold the land, ceased to have any interest in the land as soon as not he, but the subtenant becomes a pakka tenant. Indeed, as appears clear from sub-section (1) of Section 38 the tenant of a proprietor under whom a sub-tenant used to hold the land, ceased to have any interest in the land as soon as not he, but the subtenant becomes a pakka tenant. What is further contemplated under sub section (2) is that a sub• tenant becomes a pacca tenant by depositing requisite amount to exercise the statutory right granted to him there under and the superior interest of the tenant is put on the stake as soon as his sub-tenant chooses to exercise his statutory right. Now according to Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code, a pakka tenant becomes a bhumiswami by operation of law, which lea yes obviously nothing in the hands of the tenant Shri Sapre's contention, therefore, that the Courts below rightly decided issue No.2 on the question of limitation in favour of the plaintiff is not tenable: inasmuch as the Courts below, as earlier alluded, overlooked the legal position manifested in sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 38 of the Act and Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code. The statutory rights envisaged under the provi3ions aforesaid are indeed to be judicially noticed as yet. I say this after hearing arguments advanced at the Bar and applying my mind to the decisions cited by Shri Sapre. I have no hesitation to say at once that the legal adage-once a tenant always a tenant-is statutorily effaced by the provisions of Section 38 of the Act and S. 158 of the Code. The special law must prevail on the general law and must be given full meaning and effect. 5. In so far as the inter-action of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 38 of the Act, Section] 58 (1) (b) of the Code and Article 65 of the Limitation Act is concerned, I have very little hesitation to say that indubitably what is required to be proved by a sub-tenant while contending plaintiff's suit to be barred by Article 65 is mere assertion of right under Section 38 (2) to become a pakka tenant. That is all; he does Dot have to say anything or prove any' thing else. That is all; he does Dot have to say anything or prove any' thing else. Whatever may happen in the course of proceedings initiated by him under Section 38 (2) would have little bearing on the question of adverse title or possession to enable him to invoke Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Whether Tahsildar's order was rightly passed in the proceeding and indeed, in the instant case, the plaintiffs have not challenged any of the orders in the concerned proceedings, would have little bearing on the question of applicability of Article 65 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the instant case. Thus, therefore, in the instant case, the defendants having made requisite deposit in terms of Section 38 (2) of the Act and having made an application there under claiming their right to become a pakka tenant of the suit land, it would be deemed conclusive of the question. If the plaintiffs were minded to recover possession of the suit land from the other side, they should have sued the defendants within twelve years and not in 1970, by filing the instant suit after lapse of fifteen years. On the admitted facts, I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiffs, suit was barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and the Courts below erroneously decided issue No.2 in plaintiff's favour. 6. I proceed now to look at the decisions cited by Shri Sapre in support of his contention though I have a little doubt that in so far as the controversy which has surfaced in the instant case is concerned, they have little relevance. The sheetanchor of Shri Sapre's contention is based on a judgment of this Court in Khushilal’s case, rendered on 31-10-1969 in Second Appeal No. 235 of 1969, a copy of which was filed in the Courts below. Indeed, the Courts below were bound to follow the decision, but they misapplied the decision to the facts of the instant Case. I have gone through the decision in Khushilal's (supra), but I find nothing therein to indicate that if ever the Court was at all addressed on the question of inter-relation of the different provisions of different statutes, earlier alluded, namely, Section 38 (2) of the Act, Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code and Article 65 of the Limitation Act. I have gone through the decision in Khushilal's (supra), but I find nothing therein to indicate that if ever the Court was at all addressed on the question of inter-relation of the different provisions of different statutes, earlier alluded, namely, Section 38 (2) of the Act, Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code and Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Indeed, in that Case, the finding of the Court was that defendants bad failed to prove that they were sub-tenants and stopped at that; no notice was taken of the important legal consideration that it was not necessary for the defendants to prove that they were sub-tenants, in asserting the claim or adverse possession as earlier alluded and that mere assertion of the claim ought to have been held sufficient. 7. The reported decision of this Court to which my attention is drawn by Shri Sapre may now be looked into. The Full Bench of this Court Ayyub Khan [1] held, per majority, indeed construing Section 38 of the Act itself, that the Civil Court and not the Tahsildar was final arbiter to decide the claim made under Section 38 by a person on the ground of being a subtenant for being conferred the status of a pucca tenant. The majority view, according to me, supports the stand rightly taken by Shri Vajpai that the moment the application before Tahsildar was filed, by the defendants in the instant case, they asserted their adverse title or possession against the plaintiffs because the character of their possession changed on and from that date with that event. Their assertion of adverse possession became evident as it gave a cause of action to the plaintiffs on that day itself to agitate the matter in civil Court and not await Tansildar's decision in the matter the latter having no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The short noted decision in Pyarelal[2] is on the scope merely of Article 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act and it deals with the common law adage-once a tenant, always a tenant-which, for reasons earlier alluded, has no application to the facts of the instant case. The short noted decision in Pyarelal[2] is on the scope merely of Article 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act and it deals with the common law adage-once a tenant, always a tenant-which, for reasons earlier alluded, has no application to the facts of the instant case. JoohaBai [3] on the other hand, is a decision though rendered on Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, is not applicable to the instant lis for the simple reason that the inter-action on Article 65 of the Limitation Act of the provisions of the Code and the Act above referred, did not come up for consideration in that case. Two other decisions, Tapesar Rout [1] and Mst. Bhago, [2] do not, in any manner, avail Shri Sapre because, in both casts, their Lordships Were merely concerned with the scope and applicability of Articles 142 and 144 and nothing more. That brings me almost to the end of the story the case-law cited by Shri Sapre bas failed to advance or support his contention in any manner and the view taken by me is not indented in any manner. 8. Before I conclude, it behoves me to stress that the legislative endeavour manifested in the enactment of the Zamindari Abolition Act must be given full judicial support by enforcing the legal mandate of the Act abolishing intermediaries between the State and the tiller of the soil and indeed, therefore, construing the provision of Article 65 accordingly, to achieve the purpose. This, indeed, is the mandate of Art. 39 of the Constitution. By section 4 (1) of the Act, Zamindari land being vested in the State, Zamindar's extenant's claim to his "interest based on title" must be tested on the anvil of Article 65 in a case where his claim is opposed by any person claiming to be in actual possession of the land, indeed being tiller of the soil since before abolition of Zamil1daries. Because, Article 65 itself uses the term "adverse possession" and the Act also deals with such land's possession and brings about a change in its nature, I may be required, indeed, to refer, in this connection, to the classical exposition of the term, noted by their Lordships in P. Lakshmi Reddy [3] approving Privy Council's dictum in Radhamoni's case [4] as follows: "The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor (Emphasis added). A passage from Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures is quoted with approval by their Lordships in para 7 of the report from which I venture to extract only a portion : ...."It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession." 9. Bearing in mind the above principles, I have held above that Section 38 in terms envisaged a competition between "tenant" and a person claiming to be a "sub-tenant" in the matter of acquisition of the status of a "pakka tenant". Indeed, if latters' actual possession over the land in question extends in continuity for over twelve years, he would have perfected his "title' wit the aid of Section 38 and 158 (1) (b), under Article 65 itself. Indeed right and incidence of a "pakka tenant" statutorily envisages this position inasmuch as not only his actual possession of the land is made indeterminable, his "interest" is made heritable and also transferable. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellant/defendants having been in actual possession of the land even before he staked his claim under sub-section (2) of Section 38 and having continued uninterruptedly in possession of the land for more than twelve years (since 1955), before the instant suit was filed in 1970, the respondents/plaintiffs could not have any surviving cause of action against them enforceable in the suit, as time began to run against them since the date when the competition began. It may be that in 1959 with the enactment of the Code, his claim to become a "bhumiswami" was born but the fact remained that the competition between the plaintiffs and the defendants as respects right to possession of the suit land in the status of a "pakka tenant" had begun much earlier, in 1955. It may be that in 1959 with the enactment of the Code, his claim to become a "bhumiswami" was born but the fact remained that the competition between the plaintiffs and the defendants as respects right to possession of the suit land in the status of a "pakka tenant" had begun much earlier, in 1955. Because, as observed, Article 65 envisaged Dot only competition of claims to "title", but to "possession". There can be no doubt, therefore, that Article 65 would become invokable in such a case and the terminus a quo in the instant Case would evidently be 1955. 10. For all the foregoing reasons, I have no hesitation to hold, in conclusion, at once, that the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are not sustainable in law. I hold that the plaintiff's suit is barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act read with Section 38 of the Act and Section 158 (1) (b) of the Code. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. 11. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.