Lahiri, J- This is a revision against the impugned order dated 26.10.79 passed by Shri S. N. Rahman, Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Mangaldoi in C. R. Case No. 499/79 discharging the accused (opposite party No. 1) of the charges under section 29 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, for short "the Act". The petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the court under sect­ion 401 read with section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 2. The cognate facts are that the Inspector (Plantation), Mangaldoi, District-Darrang, Opposite party No. 2, filed a com­plaint in the court of the Sub divisional Magistrate, Mangaldoi alleging that the Management of Nanaipara Tea Estate, Oppo­site party No. 1 herein, had violated the bipartite agreement binding upon the Management u/s. 18(1) of "the Act" and, as such, liable to be punished u/s. 29 of "the Act". In due course the case was transferred to the learned Magistrate. On re­ceipt of the summons the Management appeared through their counsel and contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Learned Magistrate upon hearing Counsel for both the parties passed the impugned order holding that be found it difficult to resolve the question as to whether there had been any breach of the terms of the agreement OF not, and, further held that the case involved interpretation of law. Indeed, learned Magistrate did not make any endeavour to determine whether there was any breach of the terms of the agreement or not. Instead of determining the question; learned Magistrate took the copy of discharging the accused holding as follows : "I am at one with the learned Advocate of the accu­sed and I am of opinion that this court has no jurisdiction to try this case''. Against the said order of discharge the affected workman has preferred this revision. It appears that the complainant, Labour Inspector, did not prefer any revision against the order of discharge nor did he pursue the case, presumably having had the measure of the depth of the allegations. Before we deal with the merits of the case, we desire to put on record that the petitioner-workman has since retired having reached the age of superannuation. 3. We are of the firm opinion that the order is liable to be quashed. Learned Magistrate committed an error in holding that he had jurisdiction to discharge the accused before taking any evidence. 3. We are of the firm opinion that the order is liable to be quashed. Learned Magistrate committed an error in holding that he had jurisdiction to discharge the accused before taking any evidence. In our opinion, he has gone wrong. It was a summ­ons procedure case and he had no alternative but to acquit the accused and could not have passed the impugned order dischar­ging the accused of the charge. Be that as it may, learned Mag­istrate wrongly assumed that he could render an order of disc-barge without deciding the question as to whether there was a breach of the terms of "the agreement'' by the Management. In the instant case learned Magistrate left the point undecided. An ac­cused is not entitled to acquittal or discharge because of the inaction or maladroitness of the Magistrate to decide a crucial question of fact. In the instant case, learned Magistrate should have decided as to whether there was optima facie case of breach of the terms by the Management or not. He was duty bound to resolve the question posed by the parties. Learned Magist­rate is wrong in assuming that whenever the Counsel for a party raises a controversial question the Magistrate may leave the di­spute undecided and discharge the accused merely holding that some controversy have been raised by a party. The prime duty of the court is to resolve the controversies raised by the parties. He cannot acquit or discharge an accused merely obse­rving that one of the parties to the action has raised a disp­ute, and, therefore, the accused should be discharged or acquitted. In the instant case, therefore, when learned counsel for the Manage­ment raised the question that there was no bleach of the terms of the agreement', learned Magistrate was bound to decide the qu­estion and only upon reaching the conclusion that there was the breach or not, he could render an order finally disposing the case. In the instant case, the order of discharge is bad, ille­gal and without jurisdiction as the learned Magistrate finally di­sposed of the case without deciding the alleged controversial issue as to whether the Management was liable to be punished for the commission of breach of the terms of the agreement. on this ground alone, the order is liable to be set aside. on this ground alone, the order is liable to be set aside. Further, we find that the learned Magistrate has discharged the accused merely holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the case without indicating the grounds there for. There is no finding whether it was a case of lack of territorial jurisdiction or that the com plaint was incompetent for want of sanction, put or without assigning any reason why the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case. The cryptic order is not a judicial order. There is no reason in the impugned order in support of the conclusion. The conclusion reached by the learned Magistrate is not a finding as there is absolutely no reason to back it up. For the aforesaid reasons we bold that the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 4. Now, the crucial question is whether we should quash the impugned order or quash the entire proceedings, in exercise of power u/s. 482 of "the Code'', which the petitioner has invoked in the instant case. Should we send back the case for fresh trial to the detriment of both the parties ? The parties have al­ready spent time, money and energy in fighting the litigation In our opinion, it would be needless exercise to remit back the case, ask the parties to produce evidence, bear counsel for the parties and then to dispose the case after lapse of years. It has become imperative to dispense quick justice and dispense with long distance litigation and slow motion justice. We can, in the instant case, dispose of the entire matter by making a little ex­ercise, which we propose to do to uphold the cause of justice. Let us, therefore, consider whether there is a prima facie case against the accused u/s. 29 of "the Act", to permit the procee­dings to continue further. 5. Section 29 of "the Act" falls in Chapter VI of the Indus­trial Dispute Act, 1947 and deals with the penalties for certain offences. The section provides, inter alia, for penalty for breach of any settlement or award by the parties thereto. In the complaint it has been stated that on 19.8.74 there was a bipar­tite agreement between the Management and the Union repre­senting the workman. Let us assume in favour of the complai­nant that it was a settlement as defined u/s. 2(p) of "the Act". In the complaint it has been stated that on 19.8.74 there was a bipar­tite agreement between the Management and the Union repre­senting the workman. Let us assume in favour of the complai­nant that it was a settlement as defined u/s. 2(p) of "the Act". We further assume that it was binding on the Management and proceed to decide as to whether the complainant has been able to establish even a prima facie case of breach, which is the es­sential ingredient of the offence. In the complaint it has been alleged that it was agreed upon by and between the parties to the petitioner-workman Shri Narendra Chandra Goswami, who was working as IIIrd Factory Clerk in Grade III would be up­graded to Grade II category with effect from the date of his next annual increment, which would fall due on 1.4.75. In the complaint petition it has been admitted that the Management upgraded Shri Goswami to Grade III with effect from 1.4.75. As such, the part of the promise stipulated in the agreement was duly fulfilled by the Management. The up gradation was not me­rely a paper transaction. The affected workman was granted all the attending financial benefits to which he was entitled as Grade II employee. The sole grievance is that he is still designated an IIIrd Factory Clerk. What is in the name or designation as 1st, IInd or IIIrd Factory Clerk ? We are told at the bar that the workman would not have drawn any extra financial or other benefits in getting the designation IInd Factory Clerk. Be that, as it may, the Manage­ment was never promise-bound to appoint or name the workman IInd Factory Clerk upon upgrading him. The Management was only to upgrade Shri Goswami from Grade III to Grade II, which it did. There was no promise or stipulation in the Agreement to name or redesign ate him as IInd Factory Clerk. The complaint petition itself admits that the terms and conditions for upgrading Shri Goswami were duly fulfilled by the Management. As such, by non-desig­nating the workman as IInd Factory Clerk which was not the terms and conditions of the agreement, the Management never viola­ted any promise or stipulation. It has been contended that while up grading the petitioner the Management ought to have designate him as IInd Factory Clerk. Admittedly there was no teach stipulation in the agreement. As such, by non-desig­nating the workman as IInd Factory Clerk which was not the terms and conditions of the agreement, the Management never viola­ted any promise or stipulation. It has been contended that while up grading the petitioner the Management ought to have designate him as IInd Factory Clerk. Admittedly there was no teach stipulation in the agreement. We are, therefore, cons­trained to hold that the Management has duly fulfilled the pro­mise or the terms and conditions of the agreement. There was no promise or agreement to redesignate Shri Goswami as IInd Factory Clerk. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any breach of the terms of the agreement. We are of the firm opinion that in a criminal prosecution u/s. 29 of "the Act", the terms and conditions of the agreement should be strictly construed as it is a provision which penalizes a defaulter-accused to suffer imprisonment for six months or to pay fine or with both. 6. We, therefore, reach the conclusion that the Manage­ment duly fulfilled the terms and conditions of the agreement in questions that there was no term or condition to redesignate or name the workman as Find Factory Clerk. We bold that when the terms and conditions of the bipartite agreement dated 19.8.75 have been duly adhered by the Management, there was no breach of the agreement or settlement, and therefore, these was no penal liability of the Management u/s. 29 of "the Act.” We reach this conclusion on perusal of the records and upon hearing learned counsel for the parties. For the reasons afore­said and following the letters and spirit of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of west Bengal vs. Swapan Kumar Guha, 1982 (1) SCC 561 : AIR 1982 SC 949 , we hold, on perusal of the entire material at our disposal, including the complaint petition and accepting them at their face value, that there is no case against the accused u/s. 29 of "the Act''. We, there­fore, in exercise of the power u/s. 482 of "the Code'' quash the entire proceedings. 7. In the result, the proceedings in C. R. Case No. 499 of 1979 of Mangaldoi Criminal Court u/s. 29 of the Indus­trial Dispute Act is quashed.