This revision petition arises from the order dated 16.1.1985 passed by the learned Muasiff (I), Jorhat, in Title Suit No. 96 of 1980j rejecting the prayer of the petitioners for adding them as party to the suit under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC. 2. The question for consideration is whether the petitioners Abinash Chandra and Sankai Ghosh, are to be added as parties under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC in the Title Suit No. 96 of 1980, The learned counsel for the parties have referred me to the decisions in Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar a Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 ; Bindeshwari vs. Dr. Sheo Nandan, AIR 1973 Pat. 347 ; Deputy Commissioner vs. Rama Krishan, AIR 1953 SC 521 ; Narayana Chandra vs. Matri Vandar, AIR 1974 Calcutta 358 and (1956)/ All E. R. 273, Amon vs. Raphael. A close reading of these decisions reveals that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a 'direct interest' in the subject-matter of litigation as opposed to 'indirect interest' or 'commercial interest' or 'equitable interest' or 'eventual interest'. 3. Mr. K. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners sub­mits that the petitioners have a 'direct interest' in the subject matter of the litigation for the reason that the Jorhat Munici­pality (defendant-1) has allotted the bazar room nos. 15 and 17 to Abinash Chandra Aich (petitioner-1) and Sankar Ghosh (petitioner-2) respectively under notification dated 19.S.1980 Annexure A (11) to the Affidavit-in-Reply and that the said bazar room nos. 15 and 17 are also the subject-miter of the litigation. 4. Mr. A. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondents sub­mits that the claims of the respondents in the suit arc, inter alia, for declaration that notifications dated 24.1.80 and 12.3.80 issued by the Jorhat Municipality are illegal and void; and that bizar rooms including the room nos. 15 and 17 are in the possession of the plaintiff-respondents; and that the lear­ned Munsiff has passed an injunction order restraining the Municipality from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff-res­pondents and not to give effect to the notifications aforesaid; and that the interest of the petitioners is an 'eventual interest'. 5. The notification dated 24.1.1980 was issued by the Muni­cipality canceling the settlement of bazar rooms including room nos. 5. The notification dated 24.1.1980 was issued by the Muni­cipality canceling the settlement of bazar rooms including room nos. 15 and 17 in favour of the defendant-respondents and the notification dated 12.3.1980 was issued by the Municipality in­viting application from the intending persons for the settlement of bazar rooms aforesaid. 6. The suit was filed on 19.8.1980. The notification for allotment of the rooms in favour of the petitioners was made on 19.8.1980. The notification dated 1.9.8.1980 has created an interest or a right in favour of the petitioners to occupy the rooms although they may not be occupying the same at present. 7. The question which arises for consideration is whether the interest of the petitioners is an 'eventual interest' or a 'di­rect interest'. An 'eventual interest' is an interest of a party in the fruit of litigation, that is, a party may be eventually affec­ted by the ultimate decision of the Court. A 'direct interest', such as would render the interested party incompetent to testi­fy in regard to the matter, is an interest which is certain, at not contingent or doubtful. (See Black's Law Dictionary). 8. As stated above, the notification for allotment of two rooms in favour of the petitioners has created a right or in­terest in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners have interest in the subject matter of the litigation. The only question for consideration is whether they have a 'direct interest' or an 'even­tual interest'. The petitioners can testify before the Court that the impugned notifications are valid in order to protect their interest. If the petitioners are not made as parties, it would render them incompetent to testify in regard to the matter or to have their say in respect of the subject-matter of the Litigation in order to protect their aforesaid rights. It is settled that the relief for declaration and injunction under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act is purely discretionary and the plain­tiff cannot claim it as of right. The relief has to be granted by the Court according to sound legal principles. In the other words, the circumstances in which a declaratory decree under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon the facts of each case. (See Supreme General Films vs. Brijnath, AIR 1975 SC 1810 and Executive Committee vs. Laxminarayana. AIR 1976 SC 888 ). In the other words, the circumstances in which a declaratory decree under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon the facts of each case. (See Supreme General Films vs. Brijnath, AIR 1975 SC 1810 and Executive Committee vs. Laxminarayana. AIR 1976 SC 888 ). The plaintiffs may also require further relief with regard to the notification dated 19.8.1980. Without such a relief, it may be a hurdle to get the relief for declaration sought for in view of the above principles. This is, however, my tentative view. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the petitioners have no direct interest. Therefore, the presence of the petitioners before the Court will be necessary in order to ena­ble the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The Court below has not discussed this aspect of the matter, namely whether the petitioners have a direct interest or not. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 16.1.1985 passed by the learned Munsiff (I), Jorhat, is set aside and the petitioners are allowed to be added as defendants in the suit. The petition is allowed. No Costs.