J. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) THE grievance of the Insurance Company as the insurer of the motor-cycle is that the owner of the motor-cycle was not made a party to the petition and therefore no award could have been passed against the Insurance Company. It is a fact that the owner of the motor-cycle Dwarkadas Bhagwanbhai who was him-self driving the said vehicle was not made a party to Claim Petition No. 9 of 1976. It is clear on the face of it that no award could have been passed against the Insurance Company in absence of the owner because the owner is to be indemnified against the award which is likely to be passed against the owner. Mr. B. J. Shethna appearing for the respondents submitted that the Insurance Company had not taken up any such contention either in the written Statement or at any stage before the Tribunal and therefore the Insurance Company is not entitled to raise any such contention by filing the appeal. He also submitted that such a technical contention should not be permitted to be raised on behalf of the Insurance Company in the appeal when such a contention not raised before the Tribunal. ( 3 ) MR. Shethna drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas. Shrinivas Nayak AIR 1982 S. C. 1249 in support of his submission. We fail to understand how this decision of the Supreme Court can at all be pressed into service the present case. There the question was whether after making a concession before the High Court it could be urged before the Supreme Court that no such concession was made and the Supreme Court held that such a plea cannot be allowed to be taken before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court even in that case observed as follows:"of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in tare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in judgment". The Supreme Court was thus considering the contention raised before it that such concession was never made and when such concession was recorded in the judgment delivered by the High Court the Supreme Court refused permission to the appellant to raise a contention that no such concession was made. This decision of the Supreme Court is thus not of any assistance in the present case. ( 4 ) MR. Shethna also drew our attention to a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court reported in the case of Mangal Chand v. The Forest Department through Divisional Forest Officer Nichar I. L. R. 1984 Himachal Pradesh 259 The learned Chief Justice of the Himachal Pradesh High Court has observed therein that tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities must always bear in mind that whereas refusal to condone delay might result in injustice by a meritorious case being thrown out without trial condonation of delay would at the highest result in decision of the case on merits. We fail to under- stand how this decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court is of any assistance in the present case. The contention which is raised by filing this appeal cannot be said to be of a technical nature. The Insurance Company has insured the owner of the motor-cycle. By insuring the owner of the motor-cycle the Insurance Company has agreed to indemnify whatever compensation he might have to pay for the injuries caused by the vehicle in question. The question of the; Insurance Company paying the amount of compensation will arise only if and when there is some award passed against the owner of the vehicle. When the owner of the vehicle is not made a party question of passing any award against the Insurance Company does- not arise. No award could have been passed and the Tribunal had even no jurisdiction to pass such an award against the Insurance Company in absence of the owner. The question which is raised by filing the appeal thus goes to the very root of the matter. It is true that the Insurance Company did not raise any such contention either in the written Statement or at any stage before the Tribunal but it cannot be said that the Insurance Company in any way made any concession that it was liable to pay. It is true that the Insurance Company did not raise any such contention either in the written Statement or at any stage before the Tribunal but it cannot be said that the Insurance Company in any way made any concession that it was liable to pay. The question of waiver also does not arise because this is a pure question of law which again goes to the very root of the matter. ( 5 ) MR. Shethna also drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Gujarat v. Sardarbegum and others A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1695. In that case also the question was about resiling from a concession. It appears that the State of Gujarat made a concession before the High Court and the order was passed by the High Court pursuant to the said concession and it was in that connection that the Supreme Court observed that it was not fair to allow the appellant to back out of that concession. That was again after the death of the pensioner in whose favour the writ was issued. This decision of the Supreme Court is thus not of any assistance in the present case. ( 6 ) THE discussion made above will go to show that the point which is sought to be raised by filing the present appeal is not of a formal or technical nature as it goes to the root of the matter. We see no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Shethna that the appellant. Insurance Company is not entitled to raise this contention. When it is obvious that the Tribunal could not have passed the award against the Insurance Company in absence of the insured it is obvious that the award passed by the Tribunal against the Insurance Company as insurer of the motor-cycle requires to be set aside. ( 7 ) MR. Shethna also drew our attention to a decision rendered by one of us (Coram: J. P. Desai J.) on 19-6-1985 in First Appeal No. 1211 of 1982 with First Appeal No. 1181 of 1982. In that case the liability of the Insurance Company was limited as per the Cover Note. That contention was not raised before the Tribunal at any stage. That contention was sought to be raised before this Court in appeal. The first proviso to sec. In that case the liability of the Insurance Company was limited as per the Cover Note. That contention was not raised before the Tribunal at any stage. That contention was sought to be raised before this Court in appeal. The first proviso to sec. 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act 1923 which provided for appeals to the High Court from the orders passed by a Commissioner under the said Act lays down that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. The said question cannot be said to be a substantial question of law. Looking to the said aspect and looking to the facts of those cases the contention was not allowed to be raised by the Insurance Company. There the liability of the Insurance Company was not disputed. Only the extent was disputed. Here the liability of the Insurance Company is disputed not on any technical ground but on the ground that no award could have been passed against the Insurance Company because the owner of the vehicle was not a party to the petition. The ratio of the above decision cannot therefore be pressed into service in the present case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 8 ) THE learned advocate Mr. Shethna submitted before us that even though the amendment sought for in the cross objections bag not been pressed the question of multiplier can be considered by this Court in view of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 C. P. C. and he may be permitted to make submissions on that question. We may mention here as discussed in the beginning that the amendment was in fact sought for but it was not pressed only when the question of court fees arose. In such circumstances we do not think that Mr. Shethna should be permitted to have recourse to Order 41 Rule 33 C. P. C. Again we may mention here that cross-objections have in fact been filed and when the amendment has not been pressed only when it was realized that Court fees may be required to be paid recourse cannot be had to Order 41 Rule 33 C. P. C. ( 9 ) MR. Shethna drew our attention to a decision rendered by one of us (Coram: J. P. Desai J.) reported in Balkrishna Chatrabhuj Thacker v. Devabai w/o. Jadavji Hansraj 1985 Gujarat Law Herald 654 (26 (1) G. L. R. 321) in support of his submission that this Court should exercise the powers under 41 Rule 33 of the Code. In that case the question was whether this Court should exercise the powers under order 41 Rule 33 C. P. C. when a decision was rendered by a Full Bench of this Court during the pendency of the First Appeal in the District Court overruling some decisions of Division Benches of this Court holding that a tenant inducted by a mortgagee was not entitled to protection from being evicted under the Rent Act. The decision was rendered by the Full Bench during the pendency of the appeal and therefore this Court exercised the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 C. P. C. for the reasons recorded in that judgment. Here there is no change of any circumstances nor any change of law pending this appeal and there fore the above decision cannot be pressed into service in the present case. Appeal allowed: Cross objections dismissed. .