A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) A suit for mesne profit instituted by the plaintiff-opposite party against the defendant-petitioner having been decreed, the defendant preferred an appeal and while allowing the appeal and sending the case back on remand to the trial court for retrial, the appellate court ordered that if the defendant-appellant fails to take steps for examining the Pleader Commissioner within two weeks from the receipt of the record in the trial court, "the appeal shall stand dismissed on contest with costs to the respondent". The record reached the trial court on 23-4-84 and the trial court directed the defendant-petitioner to take steps by 30-4-84 for summoning the Pleader Commissioner. On 30-4-84, however, the defendant filed an application before the trial court for extension of time for the purpose of summoning the Pleader Commissioner on the ground of illness of the defendant and the trial court allowed the application in the presence of the plaintiff-opposite party and extended time by fixing 24-5-84 for taking such steps. On that date the defendant came to the trial court for taking steps as directed by the order of the trial court passed on 30-4-84, but came to know that the trial court on 7-5-84 sent the record back to the appellate court, after passing the following order : "no step taken by the defendant in accordance with the order passed by Hon'ble appeal court. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as per order of the Hon'ble A. D. J. Therefore send the record to the Ld. 10th Court of A. D. J. for passing necessary dismissal order". ( 2 ) ON further enquiry thereafter, the defendant came to learn that the appellate court on 25-5-84 passed the following order dismissing the appeal :- "the Court below has informed by his Memo No. 179 D/-15-5-84 that the appellant failed to take steps for examining the Pleader Commissioner within the time specified in the judgement, i. e. , within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of the record there. In view of the direction made by this Court in the judgement passed on 5-4-84, the appeal stands dismissed with costs to the respondent". In view of the direction made by this Court in the judgement passed on 5-4-84, the appeal stands dismissed with costs to the respondent". ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the defendant-petitioner filed an application under S. 151, Civil P. C. , before the appellate court for passing necessary order giving the defendant an opportunity to examine the Pleader Commissioner after setting aside the orders of the trial court D/-7-5-84 and of the appellate court D/-25-5-84. The appellate court by its order D/-20-12-84 has rejected the petition on the ground that it has "no jurisdiction to entertain the petition or to accord the relief sought for". ( 4 ) I am afraid that the trial court committed grave errors, one after another, leading to miscarriage of justice. The first error it committed when it entertained the application of the defendant for extension of time and in fact extended it. The trial court ought to have realised that the time limit having been fixed by the appellate court, it was that court only which could extend the period. But having entertained and allowed the application, however erroneously, it committed another no less grave error by recalling that order behind the back of and without notice to the parties, thereby making a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice on which all our laws of procedure are founded. "there must be", as observed by Vivian Bose, J. , in the decision of the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 at p. 429 "ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice, which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and they should not be precluded from participating in them". ( 5 ) THERE should be no manner of doubt that under our laws of procedure, unless the relevant statute provides otherwise, any decision arrived at without due notice to the party or the parties concerned is liable to be set at naught at the instance of the party affected. ( 5 ) THERE should be no manner of doubt that under our laws of procedure, unless the relevant statute provides otherwise, any decision arrived at without due notice to the party or the parties concerned is liable to be set at naught at the instance of the party affected. It is beyond dispute that, unless there is an express provision to the contrary, no party can be visited with an adverse order unless he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to appear and urge that such an order was not to be passed. The second order of the trial court recalling its first order was, therefore, patently erroneous. It is true that the first order of the trial court extending time was also equally erroneous. But even assuming that the first order being thus manifestly erroneous, the trial court could review the same under S. 114 or S. 151 of the Code, it is obvious that the order having been passed in favour of the defendant could not be reviewed, varied or otherwise altered without notice to him. But even then, however gross the illegality of the second order may be in cancelling the first order, that cannot, by itself, legalese the first order. As already noted, the first order was also vitiated with manifest error apparent on the face as the trial court could not extend time fixed by the Appellate Court. The first order of the trial court extending time also must therefore fail, even though the second order setting aside the first order also cannot but fail. ( 6 ) BUT now that the defendant has applied for extension of time before the Appellate Court itself was that court right in holding, as it did in the impugned order D/- 20-12-84, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant the relief prayed. I have no doubt that the appellate court had the requisite jurisdiction and ought to have exercised the same. There is no doubt a catena of authorities suggesting that once time is fixed by the decree, the same cannot be extended by the court granting the decree. I have no doubt that the appellate court had the requisite jurisdiction and ought to have exercised the same. There is no doubt a catena of authorities suggesting that once time is fixed by the decree, the same cannot be extended by the court granting the decree. One of the reasons for such a view is that such extension would amount to alteration of the judgement while under O. 20, R. 3, once the judgement is signed it shall not afterwards be altered or added to save on review under S. 114 read with O. 47 of the Code or for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or mistakes or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission as provided under S. 152 of the Code. But I do not think that there can be any such strait jacket formula. When time fixed by a judgement does not form part of the substantive portion of the judgement, but only relates to the procedure or mode in which the substantive portion is to operate or to be carried out, extension of time so fixed would not amount to addition to or alteration of the judgement within the meaning of O. 20, R. 3. A somewhat similar view was expressed by A. K. Sarkar, J. , (as his Lordship then was) sitting singly in Printing and Industrial Machinery v. Swastika Press, ( (1952) 90 Cal LJ 105 at pp. 113-114) and this view has been approved by a later Division Bench of this Court, speaking through P. N. Mukherjee, J. , in Indrapuri Studio v. Shanti Debi, ( (1967) 71 Cal WN 1034 at pp. 1037-1038 ). I have no doubt that the time fixed by the judgement of the appellate court in the instant case related, not to the substantive, but to the procedural part thereof providing the mode in which the judgement was to operate and therefore could be extended even if it was a decree. ( 7 ) BUT when this application under S. 151 for extension of time was made before the appellate court, the time fixed had already elapsed and the appeal also stood dismissed. Can the time be still extended thereafter ? There are authorities for the view that in such cases the court loses seisin over the matter and the time can no longer be extended. Can the time be still extended thereafter ? There are authorities for the view that in such cases the court loses seisin over the matter and the time can no longer be extended. But this can no longer be regarded to be good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 . In that case the relevant portion of the order of the High Court which allowed the appeal against the dismissal of the suit by the trial court was as hereunder :- "we grant the plaintiff three months time to pay the court-fee for the Trial Court and also for the High Court. . . . . . . . . . If the amount is not paid within time given the appeal will standdismissed. If the Court-fee is paid within the time given, the appeal will be allowed with costs and the suit brought by the plaintiff will stand decreed with costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 8 ) THE plaintiff could not deposit the amount within time given and applied to the High Court for extension of time. The application was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that "the appeal has already stood dismissed as the amount was not paid within time given". A subsequent application by the plaintiff under S. 151 read with O. 47, R. 1, Civil P. C. , for extension of time to pay the amount was also dismissed as the High Court was of the view that such extension could be made only in cases "which were not finally disposed of" and that time could be extended "only before the final order was actually made". Posing the question as to "whether the High Court in the circumstances of the case was powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment", the Supreme Court answered the question with an emphatic negative and after pointing out that "s. 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired and S. 149 is equally liberal", the supreme Court proceeded to observe as hereunder :- "such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart), are in essence, in terrarium, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time, but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous he could not ask for extension of time or that Court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which courts have molded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed. " ( 9 ) THE order passed in the instant case and the order passed by the High Court in the above noted Supreme Court case in Mahanth Ram Das ( AIR 1961 SC 882 ) (supra), are in pari materia and, therefore, the appellate court in this case had perfect jurisdiction to entertain the application for extension of time and to extend time. The appellate court, as already noted, having rejected the application on the assumption that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the same has, therefore, failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law within the meaning of S. 115 (1) (b), Civil P. C. , and this order, therefore, must be struck down. ( 10 ) BUT though I strike down the impugned order of the appellate court rejecting the application for extension of time, I do not think that I should send the case back for trial of the application for that, in my view, would be productive of unnecessary delay. ( 10 ) BUT though I strike down the impugned order of the appellate court rejecting the application for extension of time, I do not think that I should send the case back for trial of the application for that, in my view, would be productive of unnecessary delay. That was also the course adopted by the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ram Das at p. 884 (of AIR 1961 SC 882 ) (supra ). The defendant-petitioner in the instant case applied for extension of time before the time fixed had expired. If the trial court rejected the application on that date on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to extend time fixed by the appellate court, the petitioner could very well approach the appellate court for extension of time before the expiry of the time fixed. But instead, the trial court entertained the application, extended the time to a much later date and then behind the back of the petitioner recalled and rescinded its earlier order and sent away the record to the appellate court for recording dismissal of the appeal and the appellate court also recorded dismissal of the appeal behind the back of and without any notice to the petitioner. I have already noted that all these were done in blatant violation of the rules of natural justice and were, therefore, illegal. Actus curie nominees gravafit; these wrong acts of the courts cannot be allowed to affect the petitioner adversely. The case of the illness of the petitioner, for which he originally prayed for extension of time to the trial court has not been disputed at any stage and was accepted by the trial court. ( 11 ) CONSIDERING all these facts and circumstances, I not only set aside the impugned order but I also set aside the order of dismissal of the appeal recorded by the appellate court and allow the application for extension of time made to the appellate court and grant the petitioner two weeks time from the date of the receipt of information by the petitioner of the arrival of the record of the case by the trial court to take steps for the examination of the pleader Commissioner. If the petitioner does take such steps within such time, the trial court shall proceed to decide the suit afresh on the evidence already on record and such further evidence as may be adduced by and through the Pleader Commissioner, as expeditiously as possible. But if the petitioner does not take any such step within such time as aforesaid, the decree originally passed by the trial court shall stand. ( 12 ) THE Rule is accordingly disposed of. ( 13 ) LET the record of the suit along with the copy of this order go down at once to the trial court. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. .