JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) BEING aggrieved by the Judgment and decree dated 2-12-1983 passed by the 10th Additional District Judge, Indore in Civil First Appeal No. 20a of 1982, thereby confirming the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the trial court on the ground of section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act 1961, the tenant-appellant has filed this second appeal in which following substantial questions of law have been raised : Whether the lower appellate Court has committed an error of law in not allowing the appellant to bring on record the events happened during the pendency of suit and appeal ? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court has erred in not permitting the appellant to produce additional documentary evidence ? ( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal may be stated, in brief, thus: Plaintiff No. 1 sushil Kumar is the uncle of plaintiff No. 2 Dilip Kumar. It is not in dispute that house no. 35/2 (old No. 35) Khatipura Road, Indore is owned by the plaintiffs in which the defendant is residing as their tenant in two rooms on the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 25/-, his tenancy commencing on the 18th of each English calendar month. ( 3. ) FURTHER according to the plaintiffs the defendant has been in arrears of rent for which a notice of demand dated 11-4-1975 was sent by registered post which was served on the defendant on 14-4-1975 which was not paid by the defendant within the stipulated period which has caused mental pain to the plaintiffs. Thus, the defendant has committed nuisance for which they sought the decree of eviction on the ground of section 12 (l) (e) of the said Act. ( 4. ) FURTHER according to the plaintiffs, plaintiff No. 2 Dilip is at present staying in house No. 500, Mahatma Gandhi Marg. Indore which belongs to his father, namely ramcharan; that the plaintiff Dilip Kumar now wants to live in the suit house for which he genuinely and bona fide needs the suit accommodation in possession of the defendant and that for this purpose he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation in the city of Indore for that purpose. ( 5. Indore which belongs to his father, namely ramcharan; that the plaintiff Dilip Kumar now wants to live in the suit house for which he genuinely and bona fide needs the suit accommodation in possession of the defendant and that for this purpose he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation in the city of Indore for that purpose. ( 5. ) THE defendant in his written statement did not dispute the fact that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit house and are his landlords. He also did not dispute the rate of rent or the quantum of rent which was in arrears as claimed in the demand notice. However, the arrears sent by money order was received back. He, therefore, contended that he had not committed any default in payment of arrears of rent. However, he deposited the amount of arrears in the trial Court within time. ( 6. ) THE defendant contested the plaintiffs claim on the ground of bona fide requirement and also denied that he had committed any nuisance. According to the defendant the plaintiffs are members of a joint Hindu family and there are 15 to 20 houses of their ownership in the city of Indore; their family business is to purchase houses; to keep tenants after constructing them and sell them after obtaining a good sale price; that the plaintiffs wanted to enhance the rent which the defendant refused and, therefore, the plaintiffs alleged requirement is mala fide and faked one. ( 7. ) THE trial Court on consideration of evidence and material on record adduced. by the parties came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree on the ground of nuisance, but he found that the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving their case on the ground of section 12 (l) (e) of the said Act and accordingly passed a decree for eviction on that ground as also the arrears of rent and mesne profits as claimed in the suit. ( 8. ) ON an appeal being filed by the tenant the learned lower appellate Court has maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court by concurring with the finding of bona fide need recorded by the trial Court. Hence this appeal. ( 9. ( 8. ) ON an appeal being filed by the tenant the learned lower appellate Court has maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court by concurring with the finding of bona fide need recorded by the trial Court. Hence this appeal. ( 9. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he had submitted an application under Order 6, Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code before the First Appellate court dated 30-11-1982 (I. A. No. 2) whereby he wanted to amend the written statement by pointing out that the plaintiffs have obtained possession of two rooms on the basis of an eviction decree obtained by them in 1980 against their tenant laxmanrao Naik, which after keeping vacant for some time, the plaintiffs uncle chhaganlal has started residing therein since last 3 or 4 months ; that another tenant manilal was living on the ground floor, the possession of which is now with the plaintiffs who are deliberately not using the same and that the accommodation vacated by another tenant Tahir Ali has been let out by the plaintiffs to another person ; that the plaintiffs had filed eviction suit against another tenant Babulal bhawsar on the ground of bona fide need which was dismissed by the trial Court as also by the first appellate Court and that when the plaintiffs purchased the suit house in 1971, plaintiff No. 2 Dilip was then aged only 11 years and his father has actually purchased the house as the manager and Karta of the joint Hindu family in the name of dilip. Therefore, the plaintiffs do not require the suit accommodation for their residence. ( 10. ) THE appellant also filed another application before the lower appellate court under Order 41, Rule 27 read with section 151 Civil Procedure Code dated 30-11-1982 (I. A. No. 3) whereby the appellant wanted to file certified copies of the plaint in the case of their tenant Laxmanrao Naik and proceedings of that suit, copy of the plaint filed against the tenant Manilal as also the judgment passed by the trial Court and first appellate Court in the case of their tenant Babulal as also a certified copy of the sale-deed dated 18-8-1971 of the suit house purchased by the plaintiffs. He, thus, wanted permission to adduce this additional evidence. ( 11. ) THE plaintiffs by -their replies dated 28-4-1983 opposed both these applications. He, thus, wanted permission to adduce this additional evidence. ( 11. ) THE plaintiffs by -their replies dated 28-4-1983 opposed both these applications. ( 12. ) THE learned lower appellate Court while deciding the appeal on merits has also considered these applications and dismissed the same for which it has given reasons. ( 13. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that while considering the amendment application, even though filed before the lower appellate Court, it could not consider the merits of that application and could not decide the appeal on the merits thereof as the learned lower appellate Court should have only considered the scope of that application as to whether the same is material for determining the controversy in suit and it is with that consideration only it should have allowed the application or relected the same and in support of this submission he placed reliance on the decision reported in Soniram vs. Smt. Asrafi Bai (1977 (II) M, P. Weekly Notes, note 450 and 1981 MPRCT, Note 73.) ( 14. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that house No. 500, mahatma Gandhi Marg is a joint family property where plaintiff Dilip Kumar is staying with his father and he is also one of the owners thereof and that in that house there is sufficient accommodation for residence. He, therefore, submitted that even though he has admitted that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit house and are his landlords, he is still entitled to challenge their derivative title to indicate on what pretext eviction is being sought and in support of this submission the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decisions reported in Devi Das vs. Mohanlai ( AIR 1982 SC 1213 ) and Mirkhan vs. Kutub Ali ( 1979 MPLJ 155 = 19/9 JLJ 126 ). ( 15. ( 15. ) AS regards the merits of the case the learned counsel for the appellant, after taking me through the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, laid stress upon the testimony of P. W. 1 Dilip Kumar in para 11 and that of P. W. 4 Ranchhod in para 6 of his statement as also para 5 of the statement of P. W. 7 Moolchand and contended that both the lower Courts have committed an error in decreeing the plaintiffs suit on the ground of section 12 (l) (e) of the said Act and in support of this submission he placed reliance on the decisions reported in Ramswaroop vs. Prem Narain Verma (1973 mpu505 = 1973jlj 541) and Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ). ( 16. ) IN this Court also the appellant has filed I. A. No. 2550 of 1986 dated 30th july, 1986 under Order 6, Rule 17 read with section 151 Civil Procedure Code with a prayer to amend the written statement that as the plaintiff Dilip Kumar was only a minor aged 11 years when the suit house was purchased in 1971, on the day when the present suit was filed on 17-4-1976, plaintiff Dilip Kumar was still a minor aged only 16 years and the suit on his behalf having not been filed by the next friend or guardian, plaintiff Dilip Kumar was not competent to file the present suit in his own name and, therefore, the suit as filed is not maintainable. ( 17. ) THIS application is also opposed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents, who by their reply filed on 31-7-1986 have submitted that the age of Dilip Kumar has been approximately mentioned as 11 years in the sale deed, whereas his date of birth is 12-8-1956, in support of which he has also filed a photostat copy of the mark sheet given by shashkiya Nutan Uchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, No. 2, Indore, in which his date of birth has been shown as 12-8-1956 and therefore, on the day when the suit was filed dilip Kumar was major and thus competent to sue in his name. The said reply is supported by an affidavit filed by his father Ramcharan. ( 18. The said reply is supported by an affidavit filed by his father Ramcharan. ( 18. ) THE learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute this fact that while considering an application under Order 6, Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code merits of that application are not to be considered. However, he submitted that by the proposed amendment the facts which the defendant appellant wants to bring on record have already been elicited in evidence in respect of the other accommodation which is said to have fallen vacant as would be clear from the testimony of P. W. 1 Dilip Kumar, D. W. 2 Kiku Bhai, D. W. 3 Virendra Kumar and the defendant D; W. 1 Harjiwan. All the evidence has already been discussed properly and in details by the learned lower appellate Court while considering the said amendment application. Therefore, according to the learned counsel this is not a case where in absence of evidence or of material on record the learned lower Court has gone into the merits of the said application. The learned lower appellate Court on the basis of that evidence has come to a conclusion that the alternative accommodation said to be in possession of the plaintiff is neither suitable nor convenient nor it is occupied by the uncle of the plaintiff Dilip Kumar, as the accommodation in favour of Tahir Ali was let out for a non-residential purpose, which obviously cannot be treated to be a residential accommodation in which the plaintiff can be called upon to stay. ( 19. ) THE learned counsel further submitted that even though the written statement has not made those specific averments which now he wants to incorporate by amendment of the written statement, parties having already gone to trial with the facts known to them, amendment in such a case cannot be allowed and in support of his submission he placed reliance on the decisions reported in Nagubai Ammal vs. B. Shama Rao ( AIR 1956 SC 593 ); J. B. Mangharam and Co. vs. Employees State insurance Corporation (1963 JLJ 772); Uma Shankar vs. Prabhu Dayal (1978 JLJ Note 65) M/s J. B. Mangharam and Co. vs. E. S. I. Corporation ( AIR 1969 MP 110 ); 1960 mplj 281 and 1974 MPLJ Note 39. ( 20. vs. Employees State insurance Corporation (1963 JLJ 772); Uma Shankar vs. Prabhu Dayal (1978 JLJ Note 65) M/s J. B. Mangharam and Co. vs. E. S. I. Corporation ( AIR 1969 MP 110 ); 1960 mplj 281 and 1974 MPLJ Note 39. ( 20. ) AS regards the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the tenants right to challenge the derivative title of the landlord the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the defendant-tenant having admitted the plaintiffs as the landlord and owner and having accordingly paid rent, he cannot challenge the title of the landlord in any way nor can he be permitted to challenge the plaintiffs title by showing that it is a joint family house, especially when the defendant Harjiwan in his statement has clearly admitted that plaintiff Dilip Kumar is the sole owner of this house. He, therefore, submitted that the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable on facts and in support of his contention the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decisions reported in AIR 1973 PC 251; Mirkhan Nathekhan vs. Kutub Ali ( 1979 MPLJ 155 ) ; Smt. Barkat Bai vs. Bhanwarlal ( AIR 1975 Raj. 32 ), as also Sukhad Rai vs. Ram Harsh ( AIR 1977 SC 680 )and 1984 MPWN Note 107. He, therefore, submitted that both the lower Courts having concurrently found that plaintiff Dilip Kumar is the sole owner of the suit house, the defendant cannot challenge the samee on any ground in this second appeal. ( 21. ) AS regards the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the principle laid down in the decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 (Supra) on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance, cannot be disputed. However, so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the plaintiffs have successfully proved the bona fides of the requirement and in support of his submission the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on 1973 MPLJ 505 = 1973 JLJ 541 and 1962 JLJ Note 215. He also submitted that plaintiff Dilip Kumar is now married about which also there is evidence, which is not controverted in any way. He also submitted that plaintiff Dilip Kumar is now married about which also there is evidence, which is not controverted in any way. Therefore, what was the extent of accommodation with the other tenants and what was the nature of that accommodation which was vacated by the other tenant has also been properly considered by the learned lower appellate Court and consequently there are no valid grounds to interfere with the finding of fact as the learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out that the learned lower appellate Court has misread or ignored any material evidence on record. He, therefore, submitted that it is now well settled that no interference in second appeal on a finding of fact is called for even though it is said to be erroneous, but it is only when the lower Courts have acted illegally on a question of law or that they misread or ignored any material evidence that an interference can be made in such cases, which is not the position here. He, therefore, submitted that no interference in the finding of fact recorded on merits regarding the bona fide requirement of the plaintiffs is called for. ( 22. ) AS regards the amendment application filed by the appellant in this court by which the appellant wanted to point out that when the suit was instituted plaintiff Dilip kumar was minor, as in the sale deed his age was shown to be 11 years, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the plaint the plaintiffs age has been shown to be 19 years and while recording the statement of plaintiff Dilip Kumar the learned trial court has also recorded the apparent age of Dilip Kumar to be 22 years. That apart, the age of the said plaintiff Dilip Kumar was never challenged in the trial court nor was it challenged before the lower appellate Court as even in the appeal memo filed by the appellant before the lower appellate Court as also in this court the plaintiff Dilip Kumar has been shown to be a major. He further submitted that in reply to the said application the plaintiff has pointed out that according to the school certificate the date of birth of Dilip Kumar has been recorded as 12-8-1956. He further submitted that in reply to the said application the plaintiff has pointed out that according to the school certificate the date of birth of Dilip Kumar has been recorded as 12-8-1956. which is the correct date about which the plaintiffs father in support thereof has also filed his affidavit. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that on the date when the suit was filed, plaintiff Dilip Kumar was a major. ( 23. ) AS regards his age shown in the sale deed to be 11 years, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it was mentioned by mistake. He, therefore, submitted that the appellant at this stage now cannot be permitted to amend the written statement, which is filed with a view to protract the proceedings as even assuming for the sake of argument that Dilip Kumar was a minor no failure of justice thereby has been caused nor any prejudice has been caused to the defendants case, as at best it is only an irregularity and not an illegality and in support of this submission he placed reliance on the decision reported in Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ). He, therefore, submitted that this application deserves to be dismissed. ( 24. ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel and after going through the record as also the case law cited, I am of opinion that considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the application filed by the appellant before the lower appellate Court under O. 6, R. 17 Civil Procedure Code as also the one under O. 41, R. 27 Civil Procedure Code have been rightly rejected. ( 25. ) THE position has to be accepted that the Courts are generally lenient in allowing amendments. This is not to say that any and every amendment sought for by a party should be allowed merely on asking for it. The wide discretion vested in the courts to allow amendment of the pleadings at any stage of the suit, which includes appeal, has to be judicially exercised with due application of mind. This is not to say that any and every amendment sought for by a party should be allowed merely on asking for it. The wide discretion vested in the courts to allow amendment of the pleadings at any stage of the suit, which includes appeal, has to be judicially exercised with due application of mind. One of the principal considerations to be kept in view by the Courts while judging the question whether to allow the proposed amendment or not is whether the changes sought to be brought about in the proceeding will so drastically change the nature and character of the suit that the other side will be seriously prejudiced and may not be in a position to offer a fair contest in the case. Judged by this principle, in the present case, it cannot be said that the proposed amendment is of such a character which would put the defendant to irreparable loss and injury and prejudice, which cannot be otherwise compensated as has been held, in the decision reported in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon (AIR 1969) SC 1267.) ( 26. ) AS regards the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that he can challenge the derivative title of the landlord and point out that it is a joint family house, the same cannot be accepted in view of the fact that there is no challenge to the ownership nor there is any dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant. That apart, there already being evidence about the averments made by the said proposed amendment application, even on that count the learned lower appellate Court has rightly rejected the said applications. ( 27. ) AS regards the merits of the case also both the lower Courts" have concurrently found that the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving their genuine bona fide requirement and consequently no interference therewith is called for. ( 28. ) AS regards the application filed in the present case, it no doubt appears from the certified copy of the sale deed of the suit house placed on record that therein the age of Dilip Kumar has been shown to be 11 years. ( 28. ) AS regards the application filed in the present case, it no doubt appears from the certified copy of the sale deed of the suit house placed on record that therein the age of Dilip Kumar has been shown to be 11 years. But admittedly no challenge regarding the age of the said plaintiff Dilip Kumar was made either in the trial Court or before the lower appellate Court and even in this Court this application was filed on the date of hearing of this appeal. The respondent by his reply has pointed out that in fact he was major on the day he filed the suit and is also now married and there appears no reason to doubt this fact that he was major on the day when the suit was filed and even assuming that he was a minor on that date, still no prejudice having been caused to the appellant nor it has resulted in any failure of justice, coupled with the fact that there is the primary evidence of the father regarding the date of birth of his son Dilip kumar, I see no valid ground to allow this application, though the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the affidavit of the father has not been properly verified. Therefore, this application deserves to be rejected, which is accordingly dismissed. ( 29. ) IN the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the lower Courts are maintained. Counsels fee Rs. 350/- (three hundred fifty ). Appeal dismissed.