JUDGMENT - COUTO G.F., J.: - Can the District Court in a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, implead persons who claim to be entitled to the compensation awarded in a land acquisition proceedings or to a part thereof, or who claim to be interested in the acquired property, when the same persons were not parties before the Collector, is the question that arises in this revision application. The petitioner's answer to this question is in the affirmative, while the respondents are of the opposite view. 2. The facts are not in dispute and strictly speaking, it is not necessary for me to advert to them in detail. It suffices to say that proceedings had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the acquisition of a plot of land situated at Curchorem, for the construction of Police Staff Quarters. It appears that initially, only the respondents Dr. Kusha Kudchadkar and Prabhakar Kudchadkar were shown as the persons interested in the land proposed to be required. However, before the passing of the award, the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (Lotlikars) filed an application before the Collector alleging to be interested parties, since the acquired land belonged to them. The Collector passed his award, but since he felt that he was unable to determine who was entitled to the compensation, he referred the dispute raised by the aforesaid respondents Lotlikar, to the District Court under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said reference is still pending disposal in the District Court, South Goa, and at one stage of the said proceedings, the petitioner herein filed an application dated 7th March, 1985 praying that he be impleaded as a party in the said reference, since, according to him, the acquired land is a joint property in which he also has a right, share and interest. The learned Judge however, by his order dated 14th August, 1985, dismissed the application on the ground that no new parties can be added in a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. He held the view that such reference is to be disposed of only amongst the parties who are impleaded in the same reference, which is to be otherwise adjudicated in its precise terms. He held the view that such reference is to be disposed of only amongst the parties who are impleaded in the same reference, which is to be otherwise adjudicated in its precise terms. He added that apart from this, if the applicant/petitioner herein so desires, it was open to him to approach the Land Acquisition Officer to re-frame the terms of the reference, or to file a suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction to get redress to his grievances. It is against this order that the present revision application is directed. 3. Mr. S.K. Kakodkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the District Judge, South Goa, was wrong in dismissing the application on the ground that no new parties can be added in a reference made under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Collector or Land Acquisition Officer. He invited my attention to section 53 of the Act which provides that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will apply to the proceedings before the Court under the same Act. He urged that there is noting in the Land Acquisition Act, and in its scheme, which is inconsistent with the impleading of interested parties in a reference and much to the contrary, this impleading is fully consistent with the Act. In fact, “person interested” is defined in section 3(b) as including all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land under the Act and that a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. This definition is wide enough to include in it persons who claim any kind of interest in the land. Therefore, a person who claims to have a share in the said property is, naturally, to be held as an interested party. The petitioner has approached the Court precisely with a case that he is one of the co-owners of the acquired land and, as such, he is claiming a share in the said property. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that under the Land Acquisition Act he is a person interested. The petitioner has approached the Court precisely with a case that he is one of the co-owners of the acquired land and, as such, he is claiming a share in the said property. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that under the Land Acquisition Act he is a person interested. The learned Counsel further contended that the reference was made by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 30 of the Act in order that the District Court would determine the persons to whom the compensation is payable. This reference is different from the reference under section 18 of the Act, for under the latter provision, any person interested who has not accepted the award, may by written application to the Collector, require the matter to be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land or the amount of the compensation among the persons interested. When a reference under section 18 is made, it is compulsory to the District Court to cause a notice to be served on the applicant as well as on all the persons interested in the objection, except such of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded. The Court is bound while giving this notice, to specify the date on which it will proceed to determine the objection. Now, according to the learned Counsel, if in a reference under section 18, the object of which is only the determination of the measurement of the acquired land or the amount of the compensation to be paid, the Court is bound to give notice to all the persons interested in the objection, even if some of them were not before the Collector, there is no reason whatsoever to close the doors of the Court to a person who claims to have a right or interest in the acquired land, but was not before the Collector, in a reference made under section 30. In fact, section 30 provides for a reference in two cases, one being a reference of any dispute as regards the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the parties who were before the Collector, and the next being in respect of a dispute as regards the persons to whom the compensation or any part thereof is payable. In fact, section 30 provides for a reference in two cases, one being a reference of any dispute as regards the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the parties who were before the Collector, and the next being in respect of a dispute as regards the persons to whom the compensation or any part thereof is payable. In a reference of the second type, there is no reason whatsoever to close the doors of the Court to a person who claims to have a right or interest in the acquired land and, therefore, has a claim to, at least, part of the awarded compensation. He placed reliance in support of this submission on the decisions of the Patna High Court in (Babulal Mehtar and another v. Fakria Mehtar and anr.)1, A.I.R. 1985 Pat. 249, and (Mt. Sakalbaso Kuer v. Brijendra Singh ors.)2, A.I.R. 1967 Pat. 243, as well as decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in (Bagh Singh ors. v. Special Land Acquisition, Collector, Jalandhar Anr.)3, A.I.R. 1984 Punjab and Haryana 177. The learned Counsel finally contended that the view taken by the learned District Judge should not be affirmed, for it will give unnecessarily cause to multiplicity of proceedings. 4. This view of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was however, strongly opposed by Mr. B. Reis and Mr. L.V. Talaulikar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and 7 and 8 respectively. In fact, Mr. Reis contended that the problem is not one of mere procedure or of mere formalities, but, on the contrary, is a question of jurisdiction. According to him, under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Court has a limited and restricted jurisdiction and can dispose the matters only within the strict terms of the reference. He further argued that the reference by the Collector is, in the circumstances, a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Judge. Mr. Talaulikar fully adhered to the submissions made by Mr. Reis. Reliance was placed by both the Counsel in this connection, on the decisions of the High Courts of Punjab and Haryana, Patna, Allahabad, Bombay, Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and also of the Supreme Court in (Niranjan Singh ors. v. Amar Singh ors.)4, A.I.R. 1984 Punjab Haryana 250, (The State of Bihar v. Parsuram Prasad Verma etc.)5, a.i.r. 1977 Pat. 78, (Tejdhari ors. v. Amar Singh ors.)4, A.I.R. 1984 Punjab Haryana 250, (The State of Bihar v. Parsuram Prasad Verma etc.)5, a.i.r. 1977 Pat. 78, (Tejdhari ors. v. Baul ors.)6, A.I.R. 1981 All. 47, (Nagadeo Krishna Parkar v. Mamlatdar of Alibag)7, A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 200, (Rai Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. The Secretary of State for India in Council)8, 32 Bom.L.R. 522 and (Majir Ahmed (deceased) through his heirs and legal representatives, Akhtari Bibi ors. v. Rajlakshmi Dassi ors )9, A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 263, (Mohammed Ibrahim Sahib and ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bhimavaram)10, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 226, (Municipality Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin ors.)11, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 305 and (Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra)12, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 404. 5. The proposition advanced by Mr. Reis is not at all disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In fact, in all fairness, he accepted that the question to be dealt with is one touching the jurisdiction of the District Judge who has to decide whether or not he can implead parties who were not referred to in the reference made to him by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer under section 30 of the Act. It is not necessary, in the circumstances, to deal in detail with this submission of Mr. Reis and it suffices to say that it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the District Court in a reference made under the Land Acquisition Act is restricted by the terms of the reference. I need not, therefore, advert to the different authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents to support this view, particularly to the decisions in A.I.R. 1984 P H. 250, A.I.R. 1977 Patna 78, A.I.R. 1981 All. 47, A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 200, 32 Bom.L.R. 522 and A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 404. Therefore, the question to which I have to address myself is whether the District Judge will have jurisdiction to allow, in a reference made to him by the Collector under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the impleading of a person who claims entitlement to the compensation awarded in acquisition proceedings or to a part thereof, although the said person was not a party before the Collector. 6. 6. Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that when the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the court. This provision of law, therefore, enables the Collector to make a reference to the District Court when a dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation awarded in the proceedings, or in respect of the person to whom the same compensation or part thereof is payable. Mr. Kakodkar contended that since under the Act “person interested” includes all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of the land, any person who has a right in the acquired property will be an interested party and, therefore, will be entitled to get the compensation awarded or part thereof. Now, according to the learned Counsel, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the proceedings before the District court by virtue of section 53 of the Act. Thus, if a person interested for some reason or the other was not before the Collector, there is no bar under the Act for him to be impleaded in the reference proceedings before the District Court. He further contended that the dispute is as to who is entitled to the payment of the compensation and, therefore, in a reference made under section 30 to determine the persons to whom the compensation or part thereof is payable, the adding of a party who claims interest in the property and, therefore, an entitlement to the compensation or part thereof, is entirely permissible, since the dispute is the same. In fact, such dispute is related only to the determination of the person or persons who are entitled for the compensation. This is not in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, the learned Counsel further argued, for in a reference under section 18, the District Court is bound under the provisions of section 20 to give a notice not only to the applicant, but also to all persons interested in the objection. This is not in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, the learned Counsel further argued, for in a reference under section 18, the District Court is bound under the provisions of section 20 to give a notice not only to the applicant, but also to all persons interested in the objection. If this is so, there is no reason for not allowing the impleading of an interested party in a reference under section 30 of the Act. I am afraid that these submissions of the learned Counsel are not well-founded. The Land Acquisition Act is a piece of legislation enacted for the purpose of compulsory acquisition of Land whenever so required for a public need. This acquisition has, naturally, to be expeditious in order to satisfy the public requirements and that adequate and quick compensation is awarded to the owners of the acquired land. Under the scheme of the Act, therefore, only those persons who have a right or interest in the acquired land are persons interested and, as such, only such persons can take part in the proceedings, which by their own nature, could not be complicated. The proceedings begin with a notification under section 4 making public that a particular piece of land may be needed to be acquired for a public purpose. This notification is meant to give an opportunity to the owners of the land proposed to be acquired to raise objections, if any, to the said acquisition and such objections are heard as provided in section 5-A of the Act. Then, the declaration under section 6 is to specify the particular area that is going to be acquired for a particular public purpose. After that, a notice is given under section 9 to the persons interested, meaning by that the persons whose names are entered in the survey records relating to the concerned land. Thereafter, inquiry is held and the award is passed. It is thus clear that under the scheme of the Act, the persons interested and who take part in the proceedings are those whose names are entered in the relevant survey records. Thereafter, inquiry is held and the award is passed. It is thus clear that under the scheme of the Act, the persons interested and who take part in the proceedings are those whose names are entered in the relevant survey records. Section 18 of the Act, however, provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application, require the Collector to refer the matter for determination of the Court as regards the measurement of the land proposed to be acquired and the amount of compensation awarded. This means that any person who is a person interested within the meaning of the Act, can even after the award is made by the Collector and even if he has not been made a party in the proceedings, intervene in the same by making an application for reference under section 18. The Collector has no discretion to dismiss such application and he is bound to make the reference, provided, of course, such application is made within the time specified in sub-section (2)(a) and (b) of section 18. Therefore, when such reference is made on application of a person who was not a party to the proceedings before, the said person becomes a party before the Collector and the reference is made with such person as a party. Now, under section 18, the reference can be made only for determination of the actual area which is acquired or for determination of the fair compensation. If a dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation awarded or as to whom the compensation is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the District Court. This is a discretionary power of the Collector, for under the Act he is empowered to decide the said dispute himself and only if he is of the opinion that he is unable to decide such dispute, he may refer such dispute to the decision of the District Court. It becomes thus clear from the scheme of the Act that there are four kinds of disputes that can be referred to the District Court for determination. These disputes are in respect of the measurement of the area acquired, in respect of the quantum of fair compensation, of the apportionment of the awarded compensation, and finally, in respect of the persons to whom the compensation is payable. These disputes are in respect of the measurement of the area acquired, in respect of the quantum of fair compensation, of the apportionment of the awarded compensation, and finally, in respect of the persons to whom the compensation is payable. These disputes are manifestly the disputes raised by persons who are before the Collector, for obviously, the Collector will not be aware of the claims of persons who are not before him and think that they have a right, share or interest in the acquired land and therefore, are entitled to the awarded compensation or a part thereof. This being the case, the dispute that is referred to in section 30 is the dispute that the persons interested who are before the Collector had raised before him. This dispute is the one which is referred by the Collector for the determination of the District Court. 7. I already said that it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the District Court while disposing a reference under the Land Acquisition Act is restricted by the terms of the reference itself. This being so, if a dispute that arose before the Collector among the parties who are before him is referred to the District Court, it necessarily follows that a person who was not before the Collector and who claims to have interest in the land and, therefore, is entitled to the payment of compensation or par thereof is raising a new dispute and, as such, such person cannot be impleaded. This in no manner means that such person is deprived of a remedy to get redress to his grievances. The doors of a Civil Court are always open to him and he may approach the court with a suit to get his right duly determined. I am aware of the contrary view taken by the Patna High Court in the case of Sakalbao Kuer (supra). It was held in that case that since no other proceedings has been prescribed for a reference under section 30, aid has to be taken to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in that respect and that there is nothing inconsistent with the application of the provisions of Order I, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code in regard to a reference under section 30 of the Act. It was also observed that under section 30 there are two kinds of reference, one being in respect of the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the interested persons, and the other as to the persons to whom the compensation awarded or part thereof is payable. The Court held the view that in the second type of reference, undoubtedly, the impleading of a party in the District Court under Order I, Rule 10, is permissible. A similar view was also taken by the learned Single Judge of the said High Court in Babulal Mehtar's case (supra) and also in Bagh Singh case (supra) by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. However, I am unable to accept the said view, for I am of the considered opinion, for the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraph, and above that the impleading of a party under Order 1, Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. I amy also note that Bagh Singh's case is distinguishable and what the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held was in the background of the particular facts of the said case. In fact, the learned Judge, after having discussed the law on the subject, observed that: “In the face of this settled legal position, how can the petitioners who even in the absence of mentioning of their names in the Reference are entitled to all the benefits arising from the award itself be denied the right to be impleaded as parties to the litigation at a stage prior to the passing of the said award. As per the observations in the abovenoted judgments, the petitioners have virtually to be deemed to be parties to those References. Their innocuous prayer is only that their names be so mentioned. This cannot possible be denied to them.” That was a case where the petitioners were alleging that the acquired land was from their respective joint Khatas in which they were co-owners alongwith the persons who actually made the application under section 18(2) of the Act. They also had alleged that though the individual co-shares who had filed and signed those applications under section 18 of the Act did so as their authorised agents, yet even in the absence of such authorisation they were entitled to be joined as parties to the litigation pending in the lower Court. They also had alleged that though the individual co-shares who had filed and signed those applications under section 18 of the Act did so as their authorised agents, yet even in the absence of such authorisation they were entitled to be joined as parties to the litigation pending in the lower Court. Their applications had been dismissed and the learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court considering that, in such a case, it can be safely concluded that the co-owner, who is wanting enhancement in the compensation was also acting on behalf of other co-owners because their interests are joint and indivisible, can be made a party. The learned Judge further observed, following the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in (Kishen Chand v. Jagannath Parshad)13, I.L.R. 1903(25) All. 133, (Padmanabha Menon v. Bhaskara Menon)14, 1963 Ker.L.J. 724 and Mt. Salkalbaso Kuer v. Brijendra Singh (supra), that it has been ruled that in the Land Acquisition Act there is nothing inconsistent with the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code and thus, the Land Acquisition Court, in exercise of its powers under the later-mentioned provision read with section 53 of the Act can certainly add a person as a party if it appears to it just to do so, or necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the questions involved in the case. He added that if under the provisions of section 20 of the Act the Land Acquisition Court is required to cause a notice specifying the day on which it will proceed to determine the objection and directing all “persons interested” to put in appearance before the Court on that day, it is rather difficult to hold that a person interested with reference to a particular land which has been compulsorily acquired under the Act, could not come before the said Court and claim such notice and be heard. Apart from the fact that the case dealt with by the Single Judge was one where the property acquired was joint and the co-owners had no distinct and specified shares therein and, therefore, the claim for compensation made by one co-owner would enure for the benefit of the other co-owners as well, a circumstance that makes that case completely distinguishable from the case at hand, with utmost respect I may say that it appears to me that the learned Judge failed to appreciate a very important and essential aspect of the case. The dispute referred by the Collector under section 30 of the Act is either in respect of the apportionment of the compensation awarded among the persons who were before hi, or as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable. In either of these cases, it is clear, in my view, that the impleading of a third person to determine the said dispute is not at all necessary, nor it will be just and proper. In fact, the claim raised by such a person will give cause to a new dispute, a dispute that was not at all before the Collector. This being so, naturally, the adding of such person will not be necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the questions involved in the referred dispute, nor it will be just to do so, since the scope of the reference will be completely changed and this will definitely exceed the terms of the reference and, therefore, will go beyond the restricted jurisdiction of the District Court acting in a reference under the Land Acquisition Act. In my view, therefore, the reasoning of the learned Judge is not acceptable. I am otherwise fortified in this view by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Municipality, Nagonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin ors. (supra). That was the case under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and a reference for apportionment under section 25 of the said Act which corresponds to section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made. A person who had not appeared before the Acquisition Officer and whose name was not mentioned in the reference had applied to be made a party to the proceedings before the District Court. A person who had not appeared before the Acquisition Officer and whose name was not mentioned in the reference had applied to be made a party to the proceedings before the District Court. It was held that such a person cannot be added as a party to the proceedings before the Court, nor can be urge his claim to compensation on such reference. In this connection, it was observed that on the terms of section 25, the Collector can pass no award until rival claims are adjudicated on a reference by the Court and that in fact, when a reference is made either under section 25 of the Hyderabad Act or under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector will have to wait until the matter referred to the Court is finally adjudicated before completing the award. Then, it was added that this being the scheme of the Act, the question is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim of any person who has not filed his claim before the Collector and that it cannot be forgotten that the Land Acquisition Act is a special legislation prescribing a special procedure for the compulsory acquisition of the property and the fixation of compensation. It also provides for special remedies in the event of the persons interested being aggrieved by the award or any matters dealt with by it. One of the remedies is the right to have a reference made to the Civil Court. It was further observed that it is now uniformly held by all the courts in this country that no person who is not a party to the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer can have the benefit of the reference, nor can he agitate the claims before the Court on such reference being made under section 18 of the Indian Act. Then, after discussing the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 206 (supra), the Court observed that the addition of parties by the Civil Court who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector, is wholly inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act and therefore, the Civil Court cannot add such parties to a land acquisition proceedings before it nor can it award any compensation to one who joined in the proceedings for the first time in the Court of the Special Judge without applying to the Collector for any order of reference. Then, making a reference to what was held by the Calcutta High court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 53, (Indumathi Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani)15, as well as the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Kishen Chand v. Jagannath Prasad (supra), it was observed a under: - “In the Allahabad case the Bench had held that the provisions of section 53 of Land Acquisition Act which provide for the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in so far as they may be applicable to the proceedings under that Act are sufficiently large to allow the adaptation of section 32 of the Civil Procedure Code corresponding to Order 1, Rule 10 of the present Civil Procedure Code to the matter before the Judge and a person who was not a party tote proceedings before the Collector and who claims title by adverse possession was allowed to be added as a party to the reference before the Judge that was made by the Collector under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. In our view also the Allahabad decision does not sufficiently consider the question that where a reference made to it is restricted to the determination of a particular dispute between specified persons, it has no jurisdiction to enlarge the scope of that dispute or the parties to that dispute other than those who are specified. Nor is there any justification in applying the entire provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to the matters referred to it. Section 53 of specific in empowering the application of those provisions save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. Nor is there any justification in applying the entire provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to the matters referred to it. Section 53 of specific in empowering the application of those provisions save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. As such, the application of Order 1, Rule 10 and the addition of the parties who have not been made parties to the reference by the Collector is unwarranted and is without jurisdiction being wholly inconsistent with the Act, and, therefore, not covered by section 53.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. The above observations in Municipality, Nalgonda v. Hakeem Mohiuddin Co., undoubtedly support the view I have taken that if a person who was not a party before the Collector is allowed to be impleaded by the District Court in a reference to it, the nature of the dispute referred to will be substantially changed, for a new dispute incorporating the claim of such a person will be raised. This is not permissible, as the jurisdiction of the District Court in a reference under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is restricted to the precise terms of the reference. Such impleading would amount to an enlargement of the terms of the reference and as such, the District Court would act without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, if it so orders. 9. I thus find no substance in this revision application and consequently, dismiss it with costs. Application dismissed. -----