Jagarnath Sah v. Pannalal Mahto — 1986 DIGILAW 201 (PAT)

Judgment S. S. Sandhawalia, C. J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent must succeed on the twin ground that under Sec.32 of the Bihar Land reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act the board of Revenue is the final court of fact and its findings on issues of fact are not to be lightly disturbed in the writ jurisdiction. 2. The facts herein yet again evidence the protracted trace of litigations within our country. The lis arises from a sale deed dated the 7th November, 1985, executed by the vendor Trijugi Narain Seth, in favour of the appellant jagarnath Sah. However, the sale-deed could not be presented before the regis tering authority within time and there ensued a long litigation for compulsory registration, culminating in the registration of the document on the 24th June, 1969, and other formalities being completed even later on the 1st August, 1969. 3. The pre-emptor, Rameshwar Lal, then filed an application for preemption giving rise to the present proceedings. In the court of the first instance, the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, apart from the evidence adduced on the record, made local inspection and, after hearing the parties at length, recorded an eloborate judgment dated the 3rd November, 1971 rejecting the claim for preemption. An appeal was carried to the Additional Collector, who allowed the same and remanded the case back to the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, for reconsideration of the entire issue afresh. In compliance with that order, the proceedings were again hotly contensted, and, inter alia, the vendee took the firm stand that the disputed area lay within the boundaries of the Improvement trust and was not agricultural in nature, and, therefore, beyond the scope of section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and acquisition of Surplus Land Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). It was equally the firm stand that the disputed land did not belong to an agriculturist, and, in fact, belonged to a trader and businessman, and, there was a business house built there upon and even the purchase was for a business purpose, namely that of setting up an atta chakki. 4. It was equally the firm stand that the disputed land did not belong to an agriculturist, and, in fact, belonged to a trader and businessman, and, there was a business house built there upon and even the purchase was for a business purpose, namely that of setting up an atta chakki. 4. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, by the order dated the 27th september, 1974 (Annexure 1), appeared to be somewhat unmindful of the settled rule that the right of pre-emption is a weak right, which can be defeated on all legitimate grounds and by all legitimate means. He came to a hesitant finding in the following terms :- "under such circumstances, there is enough material to allow the petition for pre-emption. As such, the petition for pre-emption is allowed. " 5. On an appeal to the Additional Collector, the aforesaid finding was affirmed, somewhat haltingly on the ground that after careful consideration of the facts, he was inclined to accept the pleadings of the respondents lawyer, vide order dated the 7th January, 1976 (Annexure 2 ). 6. The matter was thereafter carried in revision to the Board of Revenue, under Sec.32 of the Act. The learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, bihar, took firm notice of the fact that the basic question herein, which had been repeatedly urged throughout in the lower stages also in the chequered history of the litigation, was that the land in dispute does not come within the purview of section 16 (3) of the Act. On this factual aspect, he came to the under-mentioned clear and categoric finding of facts :- - "in this case, it is clear that the pre-emptor is not a Raivat of the adjoining land. It is nowhere his assertion that he is a cultivator and that he cultivates the adjoining land. There is also evidence to the effect that the land in question was homestead site. It is also nowhere the case of any one of the parties that the vendor is a cultivator. In fact, neither the vendor nor the vendee, nor the pre-emptor are cultivators. Then there is also the fact that the land is situated by the side of the National Highway in the midst of a Bazar. It is also nowhere the case of any one of the parties that the vendor is a cultivator. In fact, neither the vendor nor the vendee, nor the pre-emptor are cultivators. Then there is also the fact that the land is situated by the side of the National Highway in the midst of a Bazar. All this makes it abundantly clear that this is a case which does not come within the purview of Sec.16 (3) of the Act, because, by allowing pre-emption in this case, the purpose of the section, namely, consoli dation of holdings so as to encourage better production will not be served. The only effect will be to enable the pre-emptor to have more shops and more atta-chakkis. Accordingly, the order of the learned Additional Collector is set aside and the revision is allowed. " 7. The pre-emptor-respondent then preferred Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case no.2831 of 1978, against the order of the Board of Revenue (Annexure 3)- The learned Single Judge entered the thicket of facts to find that the Cadastral Survey plots involved in the dispute corresponded to the Revisional Survey Plots and made inferences therefrom. He chose to refer and rely on the local inspection made by the Depty Collector, Land Reforms. Adverting to evidence, he come to the conclusion that the land of the pre-emptor was contiguous to the plots in dispute. He further delved into the realm ot facts, to differ from the firm findings of the Board of Revenue that it did not satisfy the factual requirements for an application under Sec.16 (3) of the Act. Consequently, the writ application was allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue was set aside and those of the courts below restored. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant has rightly contended that it is now well, settled by the the recent Division Bench judgment in Kamleshwari Prasad yadav V/s. The State of Bihar and others, Letters Patent Appeal No.12 of 1981. decided on the 9th October, 1985, (Reported in 1986 BLJ 677) that the final court of fact in this context is the Board of Revenue, dispite the labelling of the jurisdiction as revisional one, under Sec.32 of the Act. decided on the 9th October, 1985, (Reported in 1986 BLJ 677) that the final court of fact in this context is the Board of Revenue, dispite the labelling of the jurisdiction as revisional one, under Sec.32 of the Act. Forcefully, it was submitted that the learned Single Judge seemed to be oblivious of this aspect and has entered the thicket of facts to disturb the well-considered and even the undisputed findings before the court of fact. 9. The submission aforesaid is plainly meritorious. It will appear that there existed some shadow of doubt as to the true nature of the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue, under Sec.32 of the Act. However, all controversies have now been set at rest by the Division Bench judgment in kamleshwar Prasad Yadav V/s. The State of Bihar and others (supra ). Therein, after an exhaustive discussion on principle and precedent and the statutory provisions, it has been concluded as follows :- "to conclude on this aspect, the answer to the question posed at the very outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the Board of Revenue is the final court of fact in the proceedings before it under Sec.32 of the Act. " In the light of the above, it seems somewhat axiomatic that the learned single judge was not well-warranted in himself delving into the issues of fact which had been plainly and unequivocally determined by the court of fact, having jurisdiction to do so. 10. Equally well-settled it is that the writ court is not ordinarily a court of fact and it would be both to disturb well-considered findings of a tribunal authorised by law to determine the same. This aspect is now concluded by the repeated mandates of Full Bench judgments within this court itself. Reference may be made to Mahanth Dhansukh Giri and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, AIR 1985 Patna 129, wherein, after discussion on principle and precedent, it was held as under :- "to conclude, it must be held that there are inherent limitations in the writ jurisdiction, to enter into or disturb the concurrent findings of fact by authorities having jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon. " 11. " 11. In the light of the aforesaid binding precedent, it has consequently to be held that the learned Single Judges intrusion into pure issue of fact found by the Board of Revenue was not well-warranted. 12. On the aforesaid twin ground, this appeal must succeed and, with the deepest difference, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside and that of the Boad of Revenue is restored. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.