Judgment :- 1. The facts briefly stated are: 2. The petitioner in 1970 started private practice as a general physician at Cochin. His consulting rooms were attached to his residence. This was only a "consulting clinic". There was no facility to accommodate in-patients. He was working alone, with equipment just the minimum required to carry on his practice. He continued this kind of practice till March 1974. 3. In 1974 the petitioner started a 'hospital' under the name Jacob Nursing Home. It was inaugurated on 21-12-1974. From March 1974 itself the hospital was functioning but with only one medical resident doctor and staff numbering less than 29. Thereafter some more members were added to the staff by employing more doctors and members like laboratory technician, compounder, receptionist, nurses, sweepers, watchman and also under-trainee student nurses. All of them got employed in the establishment from the date on which the hospital was inaugurated. The hospital was started with loan facilities provided by the Bank of Baroda, at a very high rate of interest and it is alleged that the returns from the hospital were not sufficient even to pay the instalments due to the bank. 4. The hospital set up in 1974, the petitioner submits, will be an establishment within the meaning of S.1(3) (b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 for short the Provident Funds Act. It is covered by entry 55 in the list of 'Establishments' to which the Provident Funds Act has been made applicable by the Central Government, by Notification G.S.R. 1082 dated 15-9-1973. 5. This was the state of affairs when the petitioner received a notice from the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, that the hospital started by him in 1974 is an establishment within the meaning of 'medical practitioners and other medical specialists' shown as entry 42 in the list of Establishments to which the Act had been made applicable by notification No. G.S.R. 1398 dated 17-9-64 and since it completed five years from the date of commencement on 31-3-1975, employing 20 or more persons, it is liable to pay the contributions to the 'Fund' established under the Provident Funds Act. The petitioner in reply to the said notice stated that the hospital was started only in 1974 and that it started functioning with all equipments only in January 1975 and therefore it was entitled to the exemption from payment of the Provident Fund in terms of S.16(1) (b) of the Provident Funds Act for the period of five years from 1975. He had also stated that in any event, he was entitled to claim the exemption from the date of inauguration of the hospital namely, 21-12-1974. The Regional Commissioner however, was not agreeable with the above argument because according to him, the hospital established in 1974 could be treated only as an extension of the establishment covered by entry 42 in the list of establishments notified by the Central Government in the year 1964. He accordingly entered a finding that the hospital is nothing but a continuation of the establishment which the petitioner was running since 1970 and consequently rejected the claim of the petitioner for the'infancy exemption' provided for under S.16(1) (b) of the Provident Funds Act. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the second respondent who by Ext.P12 order has affirmed the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. It is this order Ext.P12, that is under challenge in this O.P. 6. The case raises a short but important point which after hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties, appears to be one not covered by any authority. In the absence of authority it requires to be decided on principle. The point arising for consideration is covered by the question, whether the 'hospital started by the petitioner in 1974, is an establishment distinct and different from the establishment shown as entry 42 namely "medical practitioners and specialists" the petitioner was having at the time of its inauguration and coming within the purview of entry 55 as contended by the petitioner? 7. The department has found that the hospital inaugurated in 1974 is nothing but an extension of the establishment, the petitioner was having on the date of its inauguration and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit, provided for under S.16(1) (b) of the Provident Funds Act. 8. 7. The department has found that the hospital inaugurated in 1974 is nothing but an extension of the establishment, the petitioner was having on the date of its inauguration and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit, provided for under S.16(1) (b) of the Provident Funds Act. 8. To say that an establishment is a continuation of an existing one, it should be established that the business in the context "an occupation, profession or trade" The Random House Dictionary) organised by the new establishment is a continuation or extension of the business carried on by the existing establishment. The department therefore should establish that the business carried on by the petitioner at the time of the inauguration of the hospital and the business started and continued after the inauguration of the 'hospital' is one and the same so as to say that the business carried on by the petitioner after the starting of the hospital is an extension of his business be was carrying on prior to that date. 9. Now turning to the facts of the case on hand, there is no dispute that the establishment, the petitioner was having during the period from 1970 to 1974, was only a'consulting clinic' whereas the establishment inaugurated on 11-12-1974 is a hospital. The department in order to sustain the order under challenge therefore should establish there is no distinction between a clinic on the one hand and the hospital on the other. There is no definition of the expression 'hospital' in the Act. For that matter 'clinic' is also not defined. It has therefore become necessary to give these 'words' meanings consistent with the intention of the legislature discernible from the provisions of the Provident Funds Act. It is in evidence that the hospital inaugurated in 1974 can accommodate in-patients and the in-patients are provided with all medical facilities. On the other hand in the establishment, the petitioner was owning prior to 1974, admittedly no such facilities were available. He was then only practising the profession which may be an 'establishment' within the meaning of "Medical Practitioners and Medical Specialists". The question then would arise whether such an establishment would be a "hospital" so as to say that the hospital, the petitioner got inaugurated in 1974, is only an extension of his existing establishment. The answer to this question depends upon the meaning of the word 'hospital' vis-a-vis 'clinic'. The question then would arise whether such an establishment would be a "hospital" so as to say that the hospital, the petitioner got inaugurated in 1974, is only an extension of his existing establishment. The answer to this question depends upon the meaning of the word 'hospital' vis-a-vis 'clinic'. 10. There is little guidance that is available from the etymological history of the word "hospital". But to me it appears to be a place where patients are received for continuous treatment to the exclusion of places to which patients 'merely go for the purpose of occasional medical or surgery aid', as is normally obtained at a clinic. In short, a hospital signifies everything, where in-patients are received; and in common parlance a hospital is regarded as being something distinct and different from a clinic. A reference in this connection to the decision of Vaisey, J. in Re Alfred Ford (1945 (I). All England Law Reports 288) is relevant. This is what is stated in this decision: "Little guidance can be derived from the etymological history of the word, but it seems to me, prima facie, to indicate a place in which patients are received for continuous treatment -and to exclude places to which patients merely resort for the purpose of occasional medical or surgery aid such as is normally obtained in the out-patients' department of hospitals. In the ordinary sense of the word I am of opinion that "hospital" signifies a building where in-patients are received and the fact that in ordinary parlance a hospital is regarded as being something different from a dispensary is indicated in the affidavit of the secretary". 10. Another p coint suggested in the decision is this: "If any one were asked to give a list of the hospitals in Birmingham he would not have included these eleven departments" I think that the same test can be applied here also. If anyone is asked to give a list of hospitals in the Cochin Corporation, it is certain that none would include a 'clinic' in the category of 'hospitals.' Hospital is a 'word' understood in common parlance as an institution/ establishment where in-patients are received and treated; a place where in-patients are provided with all medical facilities in contradistinction to a clinic where the patients go for occasional medical or surgical aid. This meaning stands to reason; and I am of the view, also is consistent with the object sought to be achieved by the notification by which entry 55 was included in the list of establishments to which Provident Funds Act applies. It must be remembered that entry 55. namely "hospital" was included in the list of establishments to which the Provident Funds Act has been made applicable by the Government by issuing a notification under Clause.2 of sub-s. 3 of S.1 of the said Act, at a time when entry 42 "Medical Practitioners and Specialists" was already there, having been included in the list by Notification G. S. R.1398 dated 17-9-1964. If the establishment covered by entry 55 is the same as the establishment coming under entry 42, then, we may have to presume that the Government without any purpose has included entry 55 in the list of establishments mentioned above. The question then is, will the court be justified in holding that entry 55, in the circumstances, is redundant or superfluous and therefore of no effect or consequence. It is axiomatic that any construction which would make any provision of a statute otiose or a'dead letter,' must be avoided. This principle of construction must be borne in mind while construing the provisions of a Notification issued under authority conferred on the Government by a statute. Such notifications like statutory rules will form part of the statute itself. I am therefore of the opinion that the establishments sought to be covered by entry 42 and entry 55 are not one and the same; they are distinct and different. 11. Having understood the law thus we have to consider whether the third respondent has considered the issue in right perspective. This is what the third respondent has stated in the impugned order. "I have heard the arguments advanced by the parties and scrutinised the relevant records. It is a recognised rule of interpretation that the expressions used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. The Act is a piece of social legislation. As per the rules of interpretation, words in the plural would include one in the singular. Therefore the notification in question will apply to nursing homes, hospitals etc. The Act is a piece of social legislation. As per the rules of interpretation, words in the plural would include one in the singular. Therefore the notification in question will apply to nursing homes, hospitals etc. which are run by medical practitioners individually or in partnership. The petitioner's establishment is neither a teaching hospital or an authorised institution to train nurses, and no evidence has been adduced in support of the statement that some of the nurses are trainees. The Act is not concerned about the quantum of wages paid and dues not make any distinction between permanent, temporary and casual employees. What is material is the number of persons found employed on a regular basis. The petitioner who is a highly qualified Doctor had himself furnished the list of persons "regularly employed for wages" by him as on 30-4-1975. There has been no mention any where that some persons are student nurses and nurses trainees. The claim now put forward is therefore clearly an after thought. S.16(1)(b) states that the Act shall not apply to an establishment employing fifty or more persons or twenty or more, but less than fifty persons, until the expiry of three years in the case of the former and five years in the case of the latter, from the date on which the establishment is or has been set up. As per entries in the cash book of April, 1970 the establishment was set up in 1970 and the infancy period is only upto 1975. It is immaterial that the establishment was started in a modest way in 1970. The fact that the activities were expanded later will not alter the date of set up of the establishment. In the circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled for any further infancy protection under the Act. I therefore uphold the order of coverage of the establishment under S. (1) (3) (b) of the Act with effect from 1-4-1975 as Medical Practitioners and Medical Specialists". The discussion in the above excerpts would indicate that the authority concerned was of the view that no Nursing Home or hospital run or maintained by a Doctor is entitled to be declared a hospital to which the provisions of the Provident Funds Act are made applicable with effect from 31st August, 1973. The discussion in the above excerpts would indicate that the authority concerned was of the view that no Nursing Home or hospital run or maintained by a Doctor is entitled to be declared a hospital to which the provisions of the Provident Funds Act are made applicable with effect from 31st August, 1973. There is nothing either in S.16 or in any of the provisions in the notification suggesting that the hospitals mentioned therein must be hospitals run by persons other than the doctors. That'clinic' and 'hospital' are not one and the same is clear from the way in which the Provident Funds Act has dealt with them. If that be the position, the hospital, the petitioner started in 1974, cannot be said to be a continuation of the 'clinic' he was running prior to the said date. In short from the facts made available it should be held that the hospital, the petitioner started in 1974 is an establishment distinct and different from the clinic he was running till then. The hospital was started only with effect from 21-12-1974. For five years from 21-12-1974 the petitioner therefore is entitled to the 'infancy concession' provided for under S.16 (1) (b) of the Provident Funds Act. In view of my finding above, the order under challenge is liable to be vacated. I accordingly quash Ext. P12. In the circumstances no order as to costs. Allowed.