JUDGMENT Ashwini Kumar Sinha, J. This Letters Patent Appeal is by the purchasers and is directed against the judgment and order dated 9.3.1984, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 897 of 1975. 2. To be more exact appellants no. 1 to 3 are the heirs and legal representatives of one purchaser Khusi Lal Mahto (who was respondent no. 4 in the writ case) and appellant no. 4 is the other purchaser (who was respondent no. 5 in the writ case). 3. The scale significant question involved in this appeal is as to what is the effect of non-mention of “description of the land” whether held for agriculture, horticultural or homestead as provided in Schedule-I of Form LC 13. Under rule 19 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and acquisition of Surplus Land) Rules, 1963 (for brevity sake know as the Bihar Land Ceiling Rules, 1963) (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). 4. Admittedly, the description of land as to whether it was agricultural, horticultural or homestead was not given in the application filed under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Bihar Act, XII of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Admittedly also the district or the subdivision where the land in question was located was not mentioned in the application. Also admittedly, the classification of each plot was not mentioned in the application. This application had to be in Form L.C. 13. This Form L.C. 13 contains two Schedules-and transferred and Schedule. I refer to “description of land transferred “and Schedule-II refers to “description of adjoining land or the land held by the co-sharer”. 5. The writ petition (Abdul Gafoor) filed an application under section 16(3) of the Act, before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Begusarai, on the ground that the held land adjacent to the land sold in favour of the aforesaid two purchases (who were respondents no. 4 and 5 of the writ case). This application was contended by the purchaser. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Begasurai, by this order dated 18th January, 1968, allowed the prayer for pre-emption. The purchasers then went in appeal and the appellate court set aside the order and remanded the case back to the D.C.L.R. for fresh decision in accordance with law. This application was contended by the purchaser. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Begasurai, by this order dated 18th January, 1968, allowed the prayer for pre-emption. The purchasers then went in appeal and the appellate court set aside the order and remanded the case back to the D.C.L.R. for fresh decision in accordance with law. On remand, the D.C.L.R. by his order dated 27-12-71, upheld the claim of pre-emption made by the writ petitioner (Abdul Gafoor). Thereafter the vendees went in appeal before the Collector but the appeal was dismissed and then the vendees preferred a revision before the Member, Board of Revenue. The learned Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, by this order dated 21-11-74, allowed the revisional application and held that the claim for pre-emption could not be allowed on the ground that the application under section 16(3) of the had Act, to be in Form L.C. 13 but the petitioner (Abdul Gafoor) did not furnish information required under that Form and also on the ground that the pre-emption, though held and adjacent to three of the plots (plot nos. 424, 425 and 23), he did not hold any land adjacent to plot no. 436. On these two grounds the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue, allowed the revisional application and claim for preemption by the petition (Abdul Gafoor) under section 16(3) of the Act, was disallowed. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner (Abdul Gafoor) claiming pre-emption filed the writ case (No. 897/75) praying to quash the order of the Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, dated 21st November, 1974. The learned Single Judge held (i) that the non-mentioning of the description of the land, as provided in Schedule-I of Form L.C. 13 of the Rules, was not fatal, as the information’s furnished in Schedule-I of Forms L.C. 13 were substantial and (ii) no prejudice was caused to the purchaser (vendees) by non-mentioning of classification of the plots in question. Having held as such, the learned Single Judge held that the application under section 16(3) could not be thrown out and thus the writ case was allowed and the order of the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue dated 21-11-1974 (Annexure-4 to the writ case) was quashed. Thus the present L.P.A. 7. Having held as such, the learned Single Judge held that the application under section 16(3) could not be thrown out and thus the writ case was allowed and the order of the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue dated 21-11-1974 (Annexure-4 to the writ case) was quashed. Thus the present L.P.A. 7. The leaned counsel for the appellants contended that the conditions laid down in Rule 19 were mandatory and unless they were complied with, the application under section 16(3) of the Act, for enforcing the sight must fail. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Yugeshwar Tiwari and ors. It is true that a Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the effect of non-mention of “description of the land” as provided in Schedule-I of Form L.C. 13 and the Bench took the view that this was fetal to the maintainability of the application. 9. However, the significant question involved in this appeal is already answered in the Supreme Court case of Hiralal Agrawal v. Ram Padarath Singh and ors. This case of Hiralal Agrawal (supra), though decided on 15th July, 1968, was it seems obvious not brought to the notice of this Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Yugeshwar Tiwari & ors (supra) which was decided later on 26th March, 1969, To me, it appears that if the case of Hiralal Agrawal (supra) would have been brought to the notice of this Court while deciding the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Yugeshwar Tiwari & ors. (supra), the view taken by this Court in Ganesh Prasad’s case (supra) would have been otherwise on the point involved in this appeal. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case held that the object of Rule 19 in prescribing that the application under section 16(3) (in Form L.C. 13 of Schedule I of the Act, must be accompanied by a copy of the registered deed, was to enable the Collector, before the exercise his power, to ascertain the purchase price, the terms and conditions of the sale, the readiness of the applicant to have the land in question reconvened to his on the same terms and conditions in the sale-deed and the fact of the applicant having deposited the relevant amount in the treasury. In that case of the Supreme Court a copy of the registered deed was not furnished along with the application and the Supreme Court, on a consideration of the object of Rule 19 read with sections 16(3) of the Act, held that so long as the application furnisher information necessary for the Collector to proceed with the application, it was a sufficient compliance of the directory prescriptions and the Supreme Court held, in the fact of that case (i.e. non-furnishing of the copy of registered-deed), that it was not fetal to the application not did such an omission deprived the Collector of his jurisdiction to entertain the same nor did it vitiate the proceeding before him or the order thereon made by him. Thus, the argument to the contrary that the conditions laid down in Rule 19 was mandatory was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further held that if the formality prescribed by Rule 19 was not satisfied the application would be bad, would be to nullify the object of the statute and it further held that it could not be the intention of the draftsman who framed Rule 19 and Form L.C. 13. The Supreme Court further held that the omission (as was done in the Supreme Court case) to comply with the requirement was not fetal to the application as the instructions in Form L.C. 13 under Rule 19 read with sections 16(3) of the Act, were only directory and if there was sufficient compliance thereof, the application could be validity entertained by the Collector. 10. A perusal of the judgment in the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Yugheshwar Tiwary (supra) shows that the attention of the learned judges in that case was not draw to the decision in the case of Hiralal Agrawal (supra). 11. In the present case then what has to be seen is whether, in the application under section 16(3) of the Act, in Form L.C. 13 of Schedule-I (under Rule 19), substantial/sufficient information’s were furnished by the applicant or not? It is true that the description of the land whether it was agricultural horticultural or homestead was not given but the map attached to the application under section 16(3) showed that the land was agricultural in character. It is true that the description of the land whether it was agricultural horticultural or homestead was not given but the map attached to the application under section 16(3) showed that the land was agricultural in character. It is also true that the petitioners did not mention the name of the District or subdivision but the applicant did mention the number of the police station and the name of the village, I hold that on the basis of these information’s, there could absolutely be no difficulty in finding as to in which district and in which subdivision the land was located. 12. I further hold that no prejudice has been caused to the purchases by the non-mention of the classification of the plots in question. For these reasons I hold that substantial/sufficient information’s were furnished in Form L.C. 13 of Schedule-1 (under Rule 19) and hence, on the basis of the ratio laid down in the Supreme Court case of Hiralal Agrawal (supra), the application filed under section 16 (3) could not be thrown out. 13. As I have already stated above that this Court in a Bench decision in the case of Ganesh Prasad (supra) took a contrary view, yet in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal Agrawal (supra) the ratio decided by the Supreme Court has to be followed, And, in my opinion, the ratio decided in the case of Ganesh Prasad (supra) with regard to the effect of non-mention of “description of the land” as provided in Schedule-I of Form L.C. 13, must be deemed to be impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Hira lal Agrawal (supra). The learned counsel for the appellants tried to distinguish the decision in the Supreme Court case of Hiralal Agrawal (supra) in the sense that though in that case it was held to be sufficient compliance yet in the present case it could not be held to be as such. The distinction sought to be made in unwarranted and proceeds upon an inherent fallacy. I have already held above that the information’s already supplied by the applicant in the application under section 16 (3) of the Act, in Form L.C. 13 of Schedule-I (under Rule 19) were in sufficient/substantial compliance of Form L.C. 13 of Schedule-I under Rule 19. 14. The distinction sought to be made in unwarranted and proceeds upon an inherent fallacy. I have already held above that the information’s already supplied by the applicant in the application under section 16 (3) of the Act, in Form L.C. 13 of Schedule-I (under Rule 19) were in sufficient/substantial compliance of Form L.C. 13 of Schedule-I under Rule 19. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants also sought to contend that the pre-emptor had got lands more than the ceiling area prescribed under the Act, and hence the pre-emptor was debarred from pre-empting the lands in question. To this objection, the pre-emption had, at the earliest occasion, filed a rejoinder, affidavit and had also adduced evidence in support of his case that the did not have lands in excess of the ceiling area. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue it appears that unfortunately neither party carried this issue to its logical conclusion and there does not seem to have been any finding on this issue either way by the lower courts. Thus, this question is a disputed question of fact cannot be gone into at this stage of Letters Patent Appeal. Thus, I hold that there is no substance in this submission also advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. 15. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. (The lines have been underlined by me for emphasis). S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. I Agree Appeal dismissed.