Judgment :- 1. The respondent herein a Municipal Corporation wanted to revise the property tax payable by the revision petitioner. Corporation issued notice under R.7 of the Taxation Rules in Schedule II of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act. The proposal was to enhance the property tax from l.10.1979. The complaint is that a disproportionate amount was proposed as tax in the notice. The revision petitioner was very much aggrieved. He filed a revision before the Commissioner on 5-10-1979. The relevant rule permitting a revision is R.10. The Commissioner considered the matter and passed an order on 24-4-1980 nominally reducing the tax proposed. This order was communicated to the revision petitioner on 24-4-1980. 2. The Rules provide an appeal against the order of the Commissioner to the Standing Committee on Taxation and Finance. The revision petitioner approached the Standing Committee with an appeal. The appeal was filed on 6-5-1980. The Standing Committee found the appeal not maintainable. The reason for holding so was that, the Committee held the opinion that they can entertain an appeal only if the appellant has paid the tax based on the assessment prevailing in the year previous to the year in question before 'making' the appeal. The assessee contended that 'before making' the appeal therein the rule should be interpreted to mean before the hearing of the appeal. In this case the revision petitioner has paid the required tax on 23-9-1980 before the hearing of the appeal. The Standing Committee did not agree. It dismissed the appeal holding that the appeal is not maintainable. 3. The Rules further provide a remedy of an appeal before the District Court against the determination of the Standing Committee. Under R.24, the assessee has a right of appeal before the concerned District Court. The assessee filed an appeal an C. M. Appeal 32 of 1982. 4. The point raised in the appeal was whether the order of the Standing Committee rejecting the appeal before it on the ground that the required tax has not been paid before the filing of the appeal was correct or not in view of the peculiar term used in the rule namely "making the appeal". 4. The point raised in the appeal was whether the order of the Standing Committee rejecting the appeal before it on the ground that the required tax has not been paid before the filing of the appeal was correct or not in view of the peculiar term used in the rule namely "making the appeal". The learned District judge agreed with the Standing Committee and held that it is a mandatory provision that the assessee should pay the tax based on the assessment prevailing in the year previous to the year in question before the filing of the appeal and it is not sufficient to maintain the appeal, a payment of tax before the hearing of the appeal. 5. The provision that came up for construction by the Standing Committee and the District Court was the proviso to Sub Rule(1) of R.23. It reads thus: "Provided that an appeal under this rule in respect of an assessment of property tax shall not be heard, unless the tax based on the assessment prevailing in the year previous to the year in question was paid before making the appeal". This proviso was added to the sub-rule by an amendment of the rule. The amendment was published in the Official Gazette of Kerala on 17th December 1979. It has come into effect only on 17-12-1979. Before the amendment there was no such onerous condition requiring the assessee to pay the tax based on the assessment prevailing in the year previous to the year in question before making the appeal. 6. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that a proper and realistic interpretation of the proviso will enable the petitioner to maintain the appeal since he has paid the tax before the appeal was heard. This is a matter which requires a careful examination. I am not doing it for the obvious reason that this revision petition can be disposed of without resort to an interpretation of the proviso. 7. The proceedings for revision of the tax originated with a notice under R.7. This notice was served on the assessee on 25-9-1979. So it is plain that the issue of notice under R.7, the very initiation of the proceedings for revision of tax commenced prior to the dace of amendment of the rule. True the appeal before the Standing Committee was filed on 6-5-1980 after the introduction of the amendment. This notice was served on the assessee on 25-9-1979. So it is plain that the issue of notice under R.7, the very initiation of the proceedings for revision of tax commenced prior to the dace of amendment of the rule. True the appeal before the Standing Committee was filed on 6-5-1980 after the introduction of the amendment. I should examine the effect of this aspect of the matter. Since the proceedings for revision of tax were started before the amendment, I feel that the amended provision has no application in this case, for the reasons I say instantly. Thus the issue has to be decided as if there was no amendment to sub Rule (1) of R.23. If that is the case, there is no necessity to pay the tax either before filing the appeal or before the appeal is heard. 8. I shall now proceed to summarise my reasons crisply. A right of appeal is a vested right. What is the content of this right. Is the process of rendering the right of appeal less valuable by imposing a more exacting or burdensome condition thereon a matter of procedure only or is it a defilement of the substance of the right of appeal. I think the matter does not admit of any doubt after the decision of the Supreme Court in H. K. Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M. P. (1953 SC 221). Approving this decision the Supreme Court in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury (1957 SC 540) said: "The right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous, condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment". 9. The next question is what is the point of time at which this right of appeal is entrenched to a suitor. Is it at the commencement of the lis or at the time of filing the appeal. The Supreme Court said that "the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unit and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding". The position is plain and clear. The Supreme Court said that "the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unit and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding". The position is plain and clear. The right of appeal is a valuable vested right and that right to invite the superior court to examine his case falls due to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. Such a right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal unless a statute mandates otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment. 10. In this case when the lis commenced the proviso was not part of the rule. The revision petitioner was free to file the appeal without paying the tax. It was certainly not a condition to enable him to file the appeal. 11. The position is made very clear in a decision reported in AIR 1957 SC 540. This decision was approved by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions namely, the decisions reported in Workmen of F.T. & R. Co. v. The Management (AIR 1973 SC 1227), in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora (AIR 1975 SC 1843), and in Keshavlal v. Mohanlal (AIR 1968 SC 1336). I shall quote what Sarkaria, J. observed in AIR 1975 SC 1843. "The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule, viz. (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (see Garikapatti Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhry 1957 SCR 488 (AIR 1957 SC 540) and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369)." 12. (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (see Garikapatti Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhry 1957 SCR 488 (AIR 1957 SC 540) and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369)." 12. In view of these facts and circumstances, I feel that the civil revision petition has to be allowed. 13. When this Civil Revision Petition was filed, the revision petitioner did not take up this position. He subsequently filed an application to amend the revision petition so as to include an additional ground in the revision petition. I feel that the amendment has to be allowed and the revision petitioner should be allowed to raise the above contention. 14. In the result I have to allow this revision. I do so. I set aside the order impugned and remit the case for a proper disposal on merits by the Standing Committee on Taxation and Finance, Calicut Corporation. No order as to costs. Allowed.