ORDER In this writ petition the challenge is of the circular ROC No.2548/78 F1 dated 10.9.1982 issued by the first respondent. The impugned circular as I find from the copy disclosed in the typed set of papers filed along with the writ petition reads as follows: /ROC 2548/78.FI CIRCULAR Sub: COURTS - Civil - Compulsory-printing of judgments - Doing away with - Filing of typewritten/ cyclostyled/mechanically reproduced copies of judgments for purposes of Appeal - Acceptance of -Regarding. Sub- rule (1) of rule 1 of Order XLI, C.P.C. is proposed to be amended so as to enable the filing of typewritten or cyclostyled or mechanically reproduced or printed copies of the judgments appealed against. The amendment seeks to do away with the compulsory printing of judgments and make the printing of judgments optional and filing of printed copies thereof also optional. Order XLII of the First Schedule to C.P.C. is also sought to be amended on the like terms, enabling the filing of typewritten or cyclostyled or mechanically reproduced copies of judgments appealed against and making printing of judgments and filing of printed copies of judgments optional. Consequential amendments to Rules 135 and136 in the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, Vol.1 (1941 Edition) relating to compulsory printing of judgments and orders have also been proposed. The amendment to Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders seeks to delete the existing rules 135 and136. The issue of the amendments proposed to the Civil Procedure Code and the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, is pending approval of the Government. It is likely to take sometime for securing the approval of the Government of the aforesaid amendments and issue thereof, the High Court directs that on and from 15.9.1982, the printing of judgments and orders need not be insisted upon, the filing of such printed copies for purposes of appeal need not also be insisted upon. In appeals against original decrees, such number of typewritten/cyclostyled/ mechanically reproduced or printed copies of judgments and orders, as are necessary for service on the respondents to the Appeal and four additional copies, apart from the certified copy of the judgment/order, are to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The copies so filed shall be neatly and legibly prepared on thick paper and be free from errors. The copies so filed shall be neatly and legibly prepared on thick paper and be free from errors. In case, the judgment is typed or cyclostyled, it must be typed or cyclostyled on one side of the paper only. In appeals against Appellate decrees, the memorandum of appeal is to be accompanied by one certified copy of the decree of the Court of first instance and of the Appellate Court and such number of typewritten/cyclostyled/ mechanically reproduced or printed copies of the judgments of each of the said Courts, as provided for inOrder XLI , rule 1 of the First Schedule to the C.P.C. 1908. These instructions may be adhered to strictly on and from 15.9.1982, after putting the Bar and the litigant public on notice. The receipt hereof may be acknowledged. High Court, Madras 600 104, Dated: 10th Sept. 1982. Sd. S. Janarthanam, Registrar.” On a reading of the impugned circular, the effect of it appears to be that filing of printed copies of judgments and orders is made optional. Earlier to the impugned Circular, dated 10.9.1982, there was a Notification on 1.2.1979 proposing amendments to Orders 41 ,41-A ,42 and43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, as well as rules 135 and136 of the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, Vol.1, Part I. The notification covered other provisions also about which we are not concerned. On the date when the writ petition was filed, the amendments had not been implemented and come into effect. Even on the date of the impugned circular the amendments had not come into effect and implemented. As a result the position was the unamended provisions of the Code and the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders held the field. As per the said provisions, the filing of printed copies of judgments and orders is obligatory. Order 41 , rule 1 of the Code (unamended) contemplated that the copy of the judgment shall be a printed copy in every case in which the High Court has prescribed that the judgment shall be printed when a copy is applied for, for the purpose of appeal. Order 41 , rule 1 of the Code (unamended) contemplated that the copy of the judgment shall be a printed copy in every case in which the High Court has prescribed that the judgment shall be printed when a copy is applied for, for the purpose of appeal. Rule 135 of the Civil Rules of Practice lays down that when a copy of judgment or order passed by a Civil Court is applied for by a party to the suit, the copy shall be printed subject to the limitation that the length of the judgment or order exceeds 700 words. Order 41-A , rule 2 of the Code speaks about the memorandum of appeal to be accompanied by twelve printed copies of the judgment. Order 42 , rule 2 of the Code (Madras Amendment) says that a memorandum of appeal shall be printed or typewritten and shall be accompanied by four printed copies of each of the judgments of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. Order 43 , rule 2 of the Code says the rules of Order 41 and of Order 41 -A shall apply so far as may be, to appeals from the orders specified in rule 1. Rules 135 and136 of the Civil Rules of Practice speak about compulsory printing of judgments and orders. 2. The point raised by Mr. R.Thillai Villalan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the Circular is wholly incompetent because it runs into conflict and brings about inconsistency with the provisions of the Code and the Civil Rules of Practice and this cannot be countenanced. In answer Mr. P. Chandrasekaran, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents, submits that the source of power for the impugned Circular is Article 227(2)(b) of the Constitution of India as well as Clause 37 of the Letters Patent of this Court. On going through the said provisions, I do not think that the submission of the learned Government Advocate is correct and could be accepted. On going through the said provisions, I do not think that the submission of the learned Government Advocate is correct and could be accepted. Article 227(2)(b) of the Constitution is qualified by the proviso to both Article 227(2) and (3) and the proviso reads as follows: “Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.” The very reading of the proviso makes it clear that any rule made shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force and shall further require the previous approval of the Governor. Here we find the patent inconsistency with the provisions of the Code and the Civil Rules of Practice and furthermore, it is not claimed that the impugned Circular had the previous approval of the Governor. Hence reliance on Article 227(2)(b) of the Constitution is a misconception. In this connection, I would like to refer to two pronouncements of the High Court of Gujarat. P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in Keshavlal Chokshi Firm v. Manubhai Keshavlal Chokshi Firm v. Manubhai A.I.R.1968 Gujarat 223 while spelling out that there was no clash or conflict between the proviso to Article 227 and section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which gives the powers to certain High Courts to make the rules, observed as follows: “The proviso to Article 227 declares that any rules made by the High Court in exercise of its rule-making power under Article 227 clause (2) shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the time being in force. This limitation imposed by the proviso to Article 227 which requires that the rules must not be inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the time being in force is, therefore, by the clear and specific language of the proviso applicable only where rules are made by the High Court in exercise of its rule-making power under Article 227, clause (2) and has no application where rules are made by the High Court in exercise of rule-making power under some other statutory provision. The proviso to Article 227 also does not operate as a limitation on the exercise of the rule-making power belonging to the High Court under section 122 of the Code. Article 227 clause (2) and section 122 of the Code are two distinct and different provisions conferring rule-making power on the High Court and the limitation imposed by the proviso to Article 227 is applicable only to the exercise of the rule-making power conferred under Article 227 clause (2) and cannot be imported so as to restrict the scope and ambit of the rule-making power conferred under section 122 of the Code.” The same observations were quoted with approval subsequently by the learned Judge as Chief Justice (as he then was), once again speaking for the Bench in United Industries v. Dalwadi and Co. United Industries v. Dalwadi and Co. A.I.R. 1969 Gujarat 18. Even with regard to the scope of the power of the High Courts under section 122 of the Code, a pench of this Court, consisting of Madhavan Nair and Cornish, J. in Venkataswamy v. Venkata-ramana Rao Venkataswamy v. Venkata-ramana Rao 67 MLJ.669=(1934) M.W.N. 1001=40 L.W.599=I.L.R.58 Mad.285=A.I.R.1934 Mad.692(2) after referring to section 128 of the Code, observed as follows: “So if the rule is consistent with the present Code, it will have the same force and effect as if it had been made under the present Code. Power of the High Court to make rules is contained in section 122, Civil P.C. which says that: ‘The High Courts established under the High Courts Act, 1861, or the Government of India Act, 1915, etc. may, from time to time after previous publication, make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of Civil Courts subject to their superintendence, and may by such rules annul, alter, or add to all or any of the rules in the first schedule. may, from time to time after previous publication, make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of Civil Courts subject to their superintendence, and may by such rules annul, alter, or add to all or any of the rules in the first schedule. These rules, according to section 128, Civil P.C. must not be inconsistent with the provisions in the body of the Code.” When the very rule formulated by the High Courts pursuant to powers under section 122 cannot run into conflict with the provisions of the Code, and only taking note of this position, the amendments proposed covered not only the provisions of the Civil Rules of Practice, but also the provisions of the Code, it is not possible to comprehend a bare Circular as the present impugned one to come into conflict and be inconsistent with the provisions of the Code as they stood on the date of the impugned Circular. 3. The other reliance on clause 37 of the Letters Patent of this Court is not a proper and a complete answer to the contention raised. Clause 37 relates to proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the High Court, including certain enumerated ones. Even there they say that while making such rules and orders, guidance shall be taken as far as possible from the provisions of the Code. The set of expressions ‘as far as possible’ has received a wider connotation, as to say ‘as far as consistent with’. If an authority is required, I can refer to the pronouncement of the Bench of this Court in Hinde v. Brayan inde v. Brayan (1884) I.L.R.7 Madras 52. I had occasion, while dealing with the case in Ganapathy v. Anbalagan Ganapathy v. Anbalagan (1983)1 MLJ.329 to refer to this pronouncement of the Bench of this Court as well as the pronouncement of a single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in Rani v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Rani v. Deputy Director of Consolidation A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 528. In my view, invoking the power under Clause 37 of the Letters Patent of this Court, it is not possible to bring in a circular which practically militates against and is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code and the Civil Rules of Practice. On the date of the impugned circular, none of the proposed amendments had come into effect and got implemented. On the date of the impugned circular, none of the proposed amendments had come into effect and got implemented. Hence, I had to hold that the first respondent lacked the competency to pass the impugned Circular. This is sufficient for the petitioner to succeed in the writ petition. However, Mr. P. Chandrasekaran, learned Government Advocate appearing for the. respondents, would submit that the petitioner could not be stated to have any locus standi or be an affected person to maintain the writ petition. The petitioner is the Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Court Judgment Printers Association and it is claimed that the members of this Association did have and even today, by virtue of orders of stay, continue to have the benefit of having the judgments and orders of Courts printed through their Printing Presses. By virtue of the Circular, making the printing of the judgments and orders optional, the trade of the members of the petitioner-Association could certainly be said to have been affected. Hence, I do not think that I should hold that the petitioner is incompetent to maintain the Writ Petition. 4. Mr. P. Chandrasekaran, learned Government Advocate, also brings to my notice that by Notification dated 23.12.1983 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 4.1.1984, the amendment to rule 41 , rule 1(i) of the Code has come into effect. That is a subsequent event and I am not expressing any opinion over the same because that is not put in issue in the present writ petition, and we are only concerned with the power and competency of the first respondent to issue the impugned circular on its date. 5. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.