Jagdish Prasad v. Sumitrabai — 1986 DIGILAW 206 (MP)

ORDER K.L. Shrivastava, J.- l. This order shall also govern the disposal of Civil Revision No 202 of 1985 (Om Prakash v Smt. Padmavati and others). These revisions involve a common question. 2. These revision petitions under section 23-E of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Principal Act' or 'the Act') are directed against the orders passed by the Rent Controlling Authority Indore in Cases Nos. 654/84 (Sumitrabai and two others v. Jagdish Prasad) and 279/83 (Smt Padmavati and another v. Omprakash) holding that the cases are not liable to be transferred to the Civil Court under section 9 of the M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act 1985 (for short 'the amending Act 1985'). 3. Facts giving rise to these petitions are these. In contesting the applications under the special provisions under section 23 A occurring in Chapter III-A of the Principal Act which was added by the M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act 1983 (for short the Amending Act of 1983) providing for recovery of accommodation by landlords on the ground of bona fide requirement in new forum of the Rent Controlling Authority and by summary inquiry with only a right of revision, it was urged by the tenant, the present petitioners, that as the application for their eviction is not by the widow alone but also by others who are not covered under the restrictive definition of 'landlord' as given in section 23-J of the Principal Act, the jurisdiction of Rent Controlling Authority (for short 'the Authority') stands excluded and the cases have to be transferred to the civil Court as provided by section 9 of the Amending Act of 1985. 4. In case No. 279/83, the case of the widow Padmavati under sec. 23 A (a) of the Act is that the accommodation in question is required bona fide for her residence as she being a. T.B. patient wants to reside separately from her son who has been impleaded as co-applicant. In the other case, the version of Sumitrabai with her two sons as co-applicants, is that accommodation in question is required bona fide by her for the business of her elder son. In the other case, the version of Sumitrabai with her two sons as co-applicants, is that accommodation in question is required bona fide by her for the business of her elder son. It may be pointed out at this very stage that the bona fide requirement of landlord under S. 23-A (a) for residence includes his own requirement and the requirement of his family members and the requirement under, section 23-A (b) for business, covers his requirement and also the requirement of his major son. 5. The point for determination is whether the impugned orders deserve to be set aside in exercise of this Court's revisional jurisdiction under section 23-E of the Act. 6. Sec. 23-J of the Act inserted by the Amending Act 1985 embodies the restrictive definition of 'landlord' for the purpose of Chapter III-A of the Act and amongst others. includes a widow. A combined reading of the provisions embodied in section 23-A and 23-J of the Act shows that a person' falling within the definition of landlord as given in the latter provision may submit an application for eviction of tenant on the grounds of bona fide requirement as catalogued in the former provision. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that under section 5 of the M.P. General Clauses Act 1957 (for short 'the G.C. Act') singular includes the plural and, therefore, unless all the applicants fall in the category envisaged under section 23 J of the Act, the Authority bas no jurisdiction to entertain their application for eviction. 8. On a careful consideration, I am of the view that the tenant's aforesaid contention has no force and must be repelled. 9. It is pertinent to reproduce the relevant portion of section 5 of the G. C. Act It reads thus :- "In all Madhya Pradesh Acts, unless a different intention appears; (a) (b) words in the singular shall include the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular." 10. The net result of reading section 23-A of the Act together with section 5 of the G. C Act is that an application under the former provision may be by plurality of landlords though the word employed therein is landlord in the singular. 11. The net result of reading section 23-A of the Act together with section 5 of the G. C Act is that an application under the former provision may be by plurality of landlords though the word employed therein is landlord in the singular. 11. The crucial question which requires an answer is whether in order that the Authority gets jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 23-A of the Act all the applicants, in case there are more than one must be covered under the restrictive definition of the word' landlord' inserted in the Principal Act by the Amending Act of 1985. For the reasons which follow, the answer has to be in the negative. 12 As pointed out in the decision in Matadeen's 1985 JLJ 134 case the Amending Act of 1983 inserted the new chapter III•A containing sections 23-A to 23-1 for expeditious trial of eviction cases. Later in order to curb its misuse, the Legislature, by the Amending Act of 1985 restricted its benefit to specified landlords. For the purpose of the Chapter aforesaid it gave the word 'landlord' a restrictive definition by inserting section 23-J in the Principal Act. It may be noted that the definition of 'Landlord' as given in section 2 (b) of the Act is very wide. 13. As observed in the decision in B. Johnson v. C.S. Naidu 1985 JLJ 793 landlords mentioned in section 23-J of the Act including a widow are a special category and deserves a separate procedure enquiring speedy relief on account of the greater hardship from which they suffer as compared to landlords. 14. According to the decision in R.D. Saxena's case AIR 1972 SC 1579 construction of a provision should be such as to advance the remedy and to suppress the' mischief. As Donning L.J. put it, a Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but be can and must iron out the creases. 15. It may be pointed out that regarding procedure to be followed, rule 16 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Rules 1966 lays down as under ;- 16. Code of Civil Procedure to be generally followed :- "In deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided by the Act and these rules the Rent Controlling Authority shall as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908". Code of Civil Procedure to be generally followed :- "In deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided by the Act and these rules the Rent Controlling Authority shall as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908". (Emphasis supplied) 16. The position of an applicant in an application under section 23-A of the Act is ordinarily analogus to that of plaintiff in a civil suit. 17. In regard to suits. Order 1, rule 1 CPC embodies the enabling provision for joinder of plaintiffs. In order that a suit is properly constituted, necessary parties have to be on record. In eviction matter ordinarily all the co-landlords are necessary parties. In the decision in Kamta Goel's case AIR 1977 SC 1599 it was on the facts of that case that it was held that a co heir of the deceased landlord who had been realising rent on behalf of the whole body of the landlords, was entitled, being their representative, to institute proceedings for eviction against the tenant. Situation may not be such in all cases. 18. As held in Shivaji's case 1985 MPLJ 10 eviction suit against a trespasser stands on a different footing and anyone of the co-landlords may institute such a suit. An application under section 23-A of the Act for eviction of a tenant also stands on a pedestal different from that of a suit for eviction against a tenant and for its proper constitution the joinder of all co-landlords is not at all necessary. This is so because the Act specifically provides by the Special Provisions embodied in section 23-A and 23-J thereof filing of the same by such only of the body of landlords as if; covered under the restrictive definition of landlord as embodied in the latter provision and who seeks eviction of the tenant on the grounds of bona fide requirement without impleading in the application for eviction any other co-landlord irrespective of the fact whether or not the latter is within or without the aforesaid restrictive definition. The general provision of other enactments touching the subject thus stand excluded by the special provisions. The general provision of other enactments touching the subject thus stand excluded by the special provisions. It may, however, be stated that even where other co-landlord is arrayed as a co-applicant, the jurisdiction of the Authority in disposing of such an application will be limited by the terms of the relevant provisions to the consideration of only such claims for eviction all fall under section 23-A (a) and (b) ibid and that too in relation to only such of the landlords as are covered within the restrictive definition of 'landlords' as given in section 23-J. 19. It may be pointed out that there is no logic why a landlord covered by the restrictive definition of landlord and having the ground of bonafide requirement should stand deprived of the speedy remedy before the Authority only because there is another co-landlord as a co-applicant who is not within the coverage of that restrictive definition, Effect of section II- A of the Act inserted in Chapter III-A of the Principal Act by the Amending Act of 1985 has also to be considered. The section reads thus- "11-A Certain provisions not to apply in certain categories of landlords. The provisions of the Chapter so far as they relate to mailer specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the landlord defined in section 23-J." It is clear that the provision excludes the applicability of section 12 (1) (e) and (f) ibid in respect of landlord covered by the restrictive definition of 'landlord' as given in section 23-J ibid and such a landlord has to seek his remedy for eviction on the grounds of bona fide requirement before the Authority and not in the ordinary civil Court. 20. At this "stage reference may also be made to the decision in Shantaram case 1971 JLJ 556 wherein it has been held that if the need of one of the several co landlords is established even for a portion of the demised premises, decree for eviction may be passed in respect of the entire premises. 21. 20. At this "stage reference may also be made to the decision in Shantaram case 1971 JLJ 556 wherein it has been held that if the need of one of the several co landlords is established even for a portion of the demised premises, decree for eviction may be passed in respect of the entire premises. 21. It has come to my notice that C.R. No. 57 of 1986 preferred by six landlords against the order of the Rent Controlling Authority Dewas, dismissing their application under section 23-A of the Act on the ground that one of them does not fall within the definition of 'landlord' as given in section 23-J ibid has been summarily dismissed by this Court on 3-3-86. The relevant excerpt from the order runs thus- "However, I am of opinion that the view taken by the learned Rent Controlling Authority does not call for any further interference in exercise of the revisional powers as the petitioners are still at liberty to file proper suit on the ground of bona fide requirement by those landlords who are covered by S.23 J and so far as the co-landlord who is not covered can be joined as a defendant so that all the necessary parties are on record and in such a situation the learned Rent Controlling Authority has to decide the case in accordance with law, with there observations this revision petition is dismissed summarily without notice to the other side." On a careful reading of the excerpt I find that it cannot be said that the question under consideration has thereby been decided, taking a contrary view. Therefore, there is no need to refer the question to a larger bench for decision. 22. In the ultimate analysis, I bold that in an application under section 23-A of the Act even if landlords other than those covered within the restrictive definition of the term 'landlord' as given in section 23 J ibid are also joined as applicants, such joinder cannot have the effect of divesting the Rent Controlling Authority of the jurisdiction to entertain the application and grant relief of eviction to only such of them as are entitled to It in terms of sections 23-A and 23 J ibid. Only because in an application under section 23-A of the Act, in addition to the landlord covered by the definition of the term in section 23-J of the Act, there are other co landlords joined as co applicants or relief of eviction not covered under section 23 A ibid is claimed, the right of speedy remedy before the Authority given by the Legislature to the specified landlord covered under the definition in section 23-J in terms of section 23-A ibid cannot be denied. Such denial would result in non exercise of the 'exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the specified landlords vested in the Authority by law. 23. For the foregoing reasons I am of the view that no interference with the impugned orders, in exercise of this Court's revisional jurisdiction under section 23-E of the Act is called for. It is another matter that in the context of the contract of tenancy being with her, the non-applicant Sumitrabai may consider it convenient to delete the names of her sons from the array of the applicants. 24. In the ultimate analysis, the revision petitions being without merit, are dismissed with costs as incurred. Parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controlling Authority Indore on 29-8-86.