Judgment :- 1. Revision petitioners filed E. P. 20/84 to execute the decree for permanent injunction in O. S.39/61 of the Sub Court, Quilon. The learned Sub Judge dismissed the petition holding that the petitioners are not assignees from the decree holders and therefore they are not entitled to execute the decree. 2. The order of the court below cannot be sustained as the petitioners are the purchasers of the property from the original decree bolder. When a decree is not assigned but the assignment covers the property decreed, assignee can get the decree executed. Petitioners do not have a case that they have obtained the decree assigned in their favour from the original decree holder. What they claim is that they purchased the property from the original decree holder. The status of the petitioners as purchasers of the property from the original decree holder is not at all disputed by the respondents. 3. 0.21 R.16 provides that where the interest of any decree holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as the application were made by such decree holder. The first proviso to 0.21 R.16 provides that notice of the application filed by the assignee decree holder shall be given to the transferor and the judgment debtor and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution. Explanation to 0.21 R.16 makes it clear that a transferee of rights in the property, which is the subject matter of the suit, can apply for execution of the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by the rule. As the decree as such is not assigned but the assignments in favour of the petitioners cover the property decreed, they can very well execute the decree. The learned Sub Judge went wrong in dismissing the execution petition. 4. Another contention of the respondents is that the execution petition is barred by limitation as it is filed after more than twelve years. The decree has been granted in favour of the original decree holder granting perpetual injunction against the respondents' predecessor. The learned Sub Judge went wrong in dismissing the execution petition. 4. Another contention of the respondents is that the execution petition is barred by limitation as it is filed after more than twelve years. The decree has been granted in favour of the original decree holder granting perpetual injunction against the respondents' predecessor. In fact, the decree is based on a compromise between the parties. It is not disputed by the respondents that the decree grants perpetual injunction in favour of the decree holder. Counsel for the petitioners contended that as the relief for perpetual injunction was granted the execution petition cannot at all be said to be barred by limitation in view of the proviso to Art.136 of the Limitation Act. In order to appreciate the contention of the revision petitioners it would be appropriate to reproduce here Art.136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963: " Table:#1 " Article 136 of the Limitation Act prescribes for a period of twelve years for the execution of any decree other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court. For the enforcement of a decree granting mandatory injunction the period of limitation is three years (Article 135 of the Limitation Act). The application for the enforcement of execution of a decree granting perpetual injunction is not subject to any period of limitation. This is crystal clear from the proviso to Art.136 of the Limitation Act. In view of the above position the contention of the respondents that the execution petition is barred by limitation is not tenable. 5. The order of the court below is hereby set aside. The executing court is directed to proceed with the execution in accordance with law. The CRP. stands allowed. There is no order as to costs.