JUDGMENT Ashwini Kumar Sinha, J. The Civil Revision and the Miscellaneous Appeal-both arise out of the same judgment and order dated 25.4.1977, passed in Misc. Appeal No. 28/12 of 1972/76 Common questions - of law being involved in both these cases, they have been heard together and hence the present judgment will govern both. 2. The significant questions involved are: (i) Whether the Miscellaneous (Second) Appeal is maintainable? (ii) Whether the compromise decree dated 21.12.63 (on the compromise petition filed on 10.12.63 in Title Suit No. 273 of 1959) contravenes section 4 of the Bihar Building. (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ? (iii) Whether the compromise, decree, just referred to above, contravenes the provisions of section 11 of the Act? (iv) Whether the aforesaid compromise decree, in the facts of the present case, required registration and the same having not been registered, whether the petitioners/appellants could avoid the same ? 3. Originally the present revisional application and the appeal were filed by the tenant Kedar Nath Rastogi. The petitioner/appellant (Kedar Nath Rastogi) died during the pendency of the revisional application/appeal on 7.5.81 and his heirs and legal representatives were substituted. In the civil revisional application the wife and two sons were substituted, in place of the deceased Kedar Nath Rastogi, as petitioners, and the daughters of the deceased Kedar Nath Rastogi were substituted as opposite parties no. 9 (1) (d) (e) (f) - vide order no. 7 dated 20-1-83; whereas, in the miscellaneous appeal the wife and the two sons of the deceased Kedar Nath Rastogi were substituted as appellants the three daughters of the deceased were substituted as respondent no. 9, 10 and 11 vide order no. 10 dated 3-3-83. It would be pertinent to mention just here that the miscellaneous appeal stood dismissed as against respondents no. 9 to 11 (i.e., against the substituted daughters of deceased Kedar Nath Rastogi) for late compliance of order no. 10 dated 3-3-83 (referred to above). 4. As the appeal had stood dismissed as against respondents no. 9 to 11 (as just referred to above) on 8.9.83 a Bench of this Court ordered that the competency of the appeal would be heard at the time of final hearing of the appeal itself. These were some of the relevant facts to be stated even before stating the cases of the parties. 5. 9 to 11 (as just referred to above) on 8.9.83 a Bench of this Court ordered that the competency of the appeal would be heard at the time of final hearing of the appeal itself. These were some of the relevant facts to be stated even before stating the cases of the parties. 5. Before the significant points as referred to in paragraph 2 above, are dealt with, it is most pertinent to state the cases of the parties. Civil Revision No. 957/17. 6. The opposite parties no. 1 to 8 (respondents in the miscellaneous appeal) filed a suit for eviction of the premises in question and also for realisation of Rs. 96/- as arrears of rent for three months, i.e. since Jeth Sudi 6 Sambat 2016 to Bhado Sudi 6 Sambat 2016, against not only Kedar Nath Rastogi but also against his brother Ram Chandra Rastogi. This suit filed before Munsif, 1st, court, Patna was numbered as Title Suit No. 273/59. Both the defendants entered appearance and filed written statement denying all the allegations made in the plaint. Allegation of being a "defaulter" was also denied. Their case was that the rent was regularly sent by Money Order which, according to the defendants, were all the time refused by the landlords; to other words, according to the defence, there was no default in the eye of law. 7. In the aforesaid title suit a compromise petition was filed on 10-12-63 and the suit ended in a compromise decree dated 21.12.63. A copy of the compromise petition dated 10.12.63 was marked as Annexure-1 to the civil revisional application and in order to deal with the significant point involved, as referred to in paragraph 2 above, it is pertinent to quote-the entire compromise petition, HINDI 8. The landlords, i.e., opposite parties no. 1 to 8/ respondents, thereafter put the compromise decree in execution. This was numbered as Ex. Case No. 2 of 1969. At this stage it is again very pertinent to state that Ram Chandra Rastogi did not file any objection in the execution case. It was only Kedar Nath Rastogi who filed an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter refer to as the Code) in the execution case. This was numbered as Misc. Case No. 52 of 1970. It was only Kedar Nath Rastogi who filed an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter refer to as the Code) in the execution case. This was numbered as Misc. Case No. 52 of 1970. This Kedar Nath Rastogi (one of the judgment debtors), the sole objector, pleaded that the compromise decree was obtained fraudulently and he (Kedar Nath Rastogi) never entered into any compromise in that suit, It was stated by the objector that (i) on the alleged date of compromise, he was of unsound mind and under medical treatment at Ranchi. He further pleaded that the compromise petition was forged and fabricated and as such the decree under execution was null and void and not binding upon him, (ii) the sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) also alleged that the decree was vague and in executable as it was not clear from the compromise decree as to what was to happen after the expiry of five years term (from the date of the compromise) (iii) it was also pleaded that by the compromise, a fresh tenancy for five years was created and hence it needed registration u/s 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act and as it was not registered the same was invalid and in executable; (iv) it was also pleaded that before accepting such a compromise, the court should have satisfied itself that the grounds mentioned for eviction under section 11A of the Act were fulfilled and the court having not done so, it contravened the provisions of section 11 A of the Act, (v) it was also pleaded that the objector (Keder Kath Rastogi) did not Join the compromise and hence it was not binding on him. The objector’s case was that he was absent on the date of the compromise. About the execution itself, it was pleaded that the processes under the provisions of Order 21 rule 22 of the Code was never served upon him; rather notices were served surreptitiously (Bala-bala) by bringing the process server in collusion. It was further pleaded that the objector learnt on 26.5.70 from one Jai Narayan Singh that the decree-holder/landlord had got issued the delivery of possession and that she was arranging to get the same executed by bringing armed force. With such allegations, the sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) filed the application under section 47 of the Code in Ex. It was further pleaded that the objector learnt on 26.5.70 from one Jai Narayan Singh that the decree-holder/landlord had got issued the delivery of possession and that she was arranging to get the same executed by bringing armed force. With such allegations, the sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) filed the application under section 47 of the Code in Ex. Case No. 2/69 which, as already stated above, was numbered as Misc. Case No. 52/70. 9. To the aforesaid objection filed by the sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi), a rejoinder was filed on behalf of the decree-holder/landlords. The decree holders stand was that (i) the compromise decree was quite valid and there was nothing legally wrong in it; (ii) the compromise decree was actually acted upon and the present sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) accepted the same and in pursuance of which he had been paying rent at the enhanced rate of Rs. 80/- p.m. since last five years; (iii) the judgment debtors including the present sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) had full knowledge of the decree from the date of its passing, (iv) the notices and the processes in the execution case were duly served upon the judgment debtors including the present sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi); (v) when the Nazir went to effect the delivery of possession on 26.5.70, it was this objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) who along with his son and others resisted the Nazir and objected to the delivery of possession without any just cause find did not show the delivery of possession to be made to the decree-holder; and (vi) it was false on the part of the objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) to state that he came to know about the execution proceeding at a very late stage from Jai Narayan Singh. These were the replies to the objections raised by the objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) on behalf of the decree holder. 10. Before mentioning the findings of the executing court as well as that of the court of appeal below, it is most pertinent to refer the compromise petition dated 10.12.63, which has already been quoted in paragraph 7 of the judgment, ending in a compromise decree on 21.12.63. This compromise petition has been marked as Annexure-1 in the present civil revisional application as well as in the miscellaneous appeal. 11. This compromise petition has been marked as Annexure-1 in the present civil revisional application as well as in the miscellaneous appeal. 11. Both the parties, in support of their respective case led evidences (oral and documentary) and after hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties and on a most proper appraisal of the evidence adduced by the respective parties; the Execution Munsif held as follows : (1) There was no vagueness in the compromise petition, as alleged by the objector. It was held that the suit being a suit for eviction from the building in question, the stipulations in the compromise petition that the defendants judgment debtors would be allowed to continue in the house in question for five years from the date of the compromise did not leave any doubt that they had to vacate the house in question after the expiry of that term the absence about the mode of vacation of the-house in question by the judgment debtors did not amount to any vagueness or ambiguity. (ii) That the decree being a consent decree neither constituted a fresh/new tenancy nor a licence. Hence, the submission advanced on behalf of the judgment debtor/objector-that by the compromise a fresh tenancy for five years was created and hence it needed registration was without any substance. (iii) That before accepting the compromise the court did satisfy itself that the grounds mentioned for eviction in section 11A of the Act were fulfilled. The court held that originally the monthly rental was at the rate of Rs. 32/. p.m. and thus the arrears claimed for three months was Rs. 95/ tenant could be legally evicted from the premises in question if there was arrear of rent for two months against him; whereas, in the present case the arrear of rent was for a longer period (i.e. for three months) and thus before accepting the compromise the court did satisfy itself that the ground mentioned in section 11A of the Act did exist on the relevant date. (iv) The objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) and his brother (Ram Chandra Pd. Rastogi) the judgment debtors) were joints at the time of signing of the compromise petition. Although the present sale objector (Kedar Natn Rastogi) has not put his signature on the compromise petition yet be (Kedar Nath Rastogi) had personally executed the Vakalatnama in favour of his lawyer along with his brother Ram Chandra Pd. Rastogi) the judgment debtors) were joints at the time of signing of the compromise petition. Although the present sale objector (Kedar Natn Rastogi) has not put his signature on the compromise petition yet be (Kedar Nath Rastogi) had personally executed the Vakalatnama in favour of his lawyer along with his brother Ram Chandra Pd. Rastogi. The suggestion to the landlord's witness to (O.P.W. 6) (Gaud Shankar Prasad) to the effect that it was not the object of (Kedar Nath Rastogi) but his brother Ram Chandra Pd. Rastogi who put the signature of his brother Kedar Nath Rastogi on the Vakalatnama was absolutely baseless, as the objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) adduced no evidence, whatsoever, to support such an allegation. Even though, according to the objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) he was absent on the date of the compromise;' in the situation as above it was very natural and proper for his brother Ram Chandra Pd. Rastogi to enter into the compromise for the benefit of the joint family. It was further held that according to the terms of the compromise, the judgment debtors were allowed five years time to vacate the building in question and this act must be deemed to be beneficial for the judgment debtors (including Kedar Nath Rastogi). (v) The sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) acted upon the compromise by paying the enhanced rate of rent and by continuing in occupation of the building in question for full five years as provided in the compromise. (vi) The lawyer, in whose favour the judgment debtors (including Kedar Nath Rastogi) executed the Vakalatnama was the common lawyer. He was Sri Govind Prasad. This learned lawyer was not alive at the time when the parties started; adducing evidence in the execution proceeding and the writings on the Vakalatnama were identified by the landlord witness O. P. W. 6 (Gauri Shankar Prasad). Their lawyer had put his signature on the compromise petition. In law a common Vakalatnama having been executed in favour of the learned lawyer he was quite competent and entitled to enter into the compromise. Their lawyer had put his signature on the compromise petition. In law a common Vakalatnama having been executed in favour of the learned lawyer he was quite competent and entitled to enter into the compromise. Incidentally, I would like to observe here that neither, on the date of the compromise petition (10.12.63) nor on the date of the compromise decree (21.12.63), the provisions of Order 23 rule 3 of the Code had not undergone the amendment, as amended by the code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 And, thus, the learned lawyer, for the benefit of the joint family and for the interest of the parties whom be represented, was duly authorised and competent under the law to agree to compromise-terms and having agreed to the terms on the compromise factually put his signature of the same. (vii) The objector had acted upon the compromise decree (21.12.63) and he did not choose to raise any objection till the filing of the execution case by the decree-holder/ landlord. If he had any legal objection about the validity of the compromise decree (21.12.63), he could get it corrected by a separate suit. (viii) That the notices as required under the law, under Order 21 rule 22 of the Code, were duty served on the objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) in the execution case. With the aforesaid findings the Execution Munsif dismissed the Misc. Case No. 52/70 filed by the sole objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) under section 47 of the Code. 12. Aggrieved by the order dated 21.2.72, passed by the Execution Munsif, in Misc. Case No. 52/70, Kedar Nath Rastogi (the judgment debtor) preferred an appeal which was numbered as Misc. Appeal No. 28 of 1972/12 of 1976. This appeal, by the Judgment-debtor/objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) was also dismissed by the lower appellate court on 25.4.77 and the order dated 21.2.72, rejecting the objections of the judgment-debtor (Kedar Nath Rastogi) and dismissing the miscellaneous case (no. 52/70), was confirmed. Thus, the present miscellaneous (second) appeal by one of the judgment debtors/objector (Kedar Nath Rastogi) against the lower appellate court judgment dated 25.4.77, passed in Misc. Appeal No. 28 of 72/12 of 76); but by way of abundant precaution, he also filed the present civil revisional application. Re : Misc. (Second) Appeal No. 199/77. 13. The learned counsel for the landlords/respondents 1 to 8 took a preliminary objection that the present Misc. Appeal No. 28 of 72/12 of 76); but by way of abundant precaution, he also filed the present civil revisional application. Re : Misc. (Second) Appeal No. 199/77. 13. The learned counsel for the landlords/respondents 1 to 8 took a preliminary objection that the present Misc. (Second) Appeal was not maintainable. The learned counsel contended that under the provisions of section 97(2) (a) read with section 97 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (No. 104 of 1976), it were only the pending appeals (against the order passed under section 47 of the Code) on the date of the amending Act that were saved and could be dealt with under the provisions of the old Act. But by virtue of the provisions contained in section 97 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, no fresh appeal was maintainable after the commencement of the amending Act, even though the order passed under section 47 was passed prior to the amending Act. The learned counsel, by way of elucidating the preliminary objection, submitted that sub-section (2) of section 47 of the Code wag omitted by the aforesaid amending Act of 1976 and the deeming provision with regard to the orders under section 47 of the Code was expressly deleted and hence the learned counsel contended that the inevitable result was that thereafter orders passed under section 47 could not be considered as a decree by any legal fiction. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel contended that somewhat analogous power of converting a proceeding into a suit or a suit into a proceeding was clearly taken off the Statute Book. The learned counsel, in this background, contended that all that which thus remained after the amending Act was a simple definition of the word "decree" in section 2 (2) without the deeming provision which included an order under section 47 and equally the removal of the power of conversion under sub-section (2) thereof. The learned counsel contended that such an intention and the scheme of the amending Act was obvious by the insertion of section 99A in the Civil Procedure, Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. The learned counsel contended that such an intention and the scheme of the amending Act was obvious by the insertion of section 99A in the Civil Procedure, Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Thus, in short the learned counsel for the landlords/respondents 1 to 8, contended that the provisions of section 97 (2) (a) of the Amending Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976) preserves the right of appeal only in respect of the pending appeals and does not extend to cases where the right to file the appeal had accrued prior to 1.2.77 against an order passed under section 47 of the Code. 14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/appellants contended that despite the Amending Act of 1976, an appeal would still be maintained against an order passed under section 47 of the Code if such an order satisfied the essential characteristics of a decree. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor/appellants fairly conceded that after the amendment, an appeal against such an order which was purely interlocutory in nature would no longer be maintainable; However, the learned counsel submitted that where such an order substantially and conclusively adjudicated on the valuable rights of the parties with regard to or any of the matters in controversy an appeal against the same would still be maintainable. The learned counsel faced with the hurdle that an execution proceeding is not a suit contended that determination in a proceeding which is continuation of a suit must be taken as a determination in the suit so as to amount to a decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the Code. 15. In order to appreciate the aforesaid respective submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective contesting parties it in all fairness, must be stated that the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/appellants did not place reliance upon the case of M/s Parshava Properties Ltd. v. A.K. Bose (A.I.R. 1979 Patna 308) and submitted that as, in that case the judgment by the trial court was delivered after the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1976, there was no question of an appeal being maintainable. In fact, in all fairness, the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/appellant submitted that now that the case of M/s Parshava Properties Ltd. (supra) has been overruled by the recent Full Bench case of Most. In fact, in all fairness, the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/appellant submitted that now that the case of M/s Parshava Properties Ltd. (supra) has been overruled by the recent Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi v. Ramnandan Singh (1986 P.L.J.R. 175), he, in support of his submission, did not place reliance upon the ratio decided in the case of M/s Parshava Properties Ltd. (supra). The learned counsel for the judgment-debtors/appellants submitted that the ratio decided in the Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi v. Ramnandan Singh (supra) supports his submission and tried to persuade me that, correctly understanding the ratio decided in Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra), the present miscellaneous (second) appeal was maintainable and a view contrary to that is not possible. I must say that the persuasive effort and the vehemence with which Shri Ghosh, appearing for the judgment debtors/appellants, sought to rely upon the ratio decided in the aforesaid Full Bench case brings credit to the ingenuity of the learned counsel. But, in my opinion, the submissions are nevertheless unwarranted, fallacious and proceeds upon an inherent fallacy and upon a total misconception of the ratio decided in the Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi v. Ramnandan Singh (supra). The learned counsel for the landlords/respondents 1 to 8 also, in support of his submission (about the non-maintainability of the present appeal) relied upon the very same Full Bench case of Most, Narmada Devi (supra). Thus, the learned respective counsel for both the parties, in support of their respective submissions relied upon the recent Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra) (1986 P.L.J.R. 175). 15A. In the recent Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra), it has been held as follows :- (i) That after the Amending Act, 1976, no appeal is now maintainable against any order, whatsoever, passed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (ii) The Amending Act, 1977, in taking away the right of appeal, proceeds on a reasonable classification that the ratio decided in the case of M/s Parshava Properties Ltd. v. A.K. Bose (A.I.R. 1979 Patna 308) and in the cage of Rai Mathura Prasad v. Special Officer, Bihar Religious Trust Board and others (A.I.R. 1984 Patna 227) were not correctly decided and these two cases were overruled. The real question in the aforesaid Full Bench case of Most. The real question in the aforesaid Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra) was question no. iv, which, in my opinion, is pertinent to quote. "If the answer to question is in negative would section 97 (2) (a) of the Amending Act reserved the right of appeal only in respect of pending appeals or would extend also to cases where the right to file the appeal had already accrued prior to 1st of February, 1977 against an order passed under section 47 of the Code? It was held in the aforesaid Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra) that section 97 (2) (a) of the Amending Act protects both the appeals already pending as also the right to file the appeal who had a party accrued against an order under section 47 of the Code passed prior to the enforcement of the Amending Act. 16. Having held as above, it was further held in the Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra) that in the context of section 97 (2) (a) of the Amending Act, the right to file an appeal accrues in passing of the actual order under section 47 of the Code and not earlier. 17. Now, in the light of the aforesaid ration decided in the aforesaid Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra), it is common ground that the order under section 47 of the Code (in Misc. Case No. 52/70) was passed on 21.2.72, i.e. prior to the Amending Act, 1976, and thus the right to appeal had accrued before 1.2.77 and, therefore, Misc. (First) Appeal (No. 28 of 72/12 of 76) was entertained and correctly entertained. But the aforesaid Misc. (First) Appeal (filed by the original judgment debtor Kedar Nath Rastogi) was disposed of and dismissed on 25.4.77. i.e. after coming into force of the Amending Act, 76 (Act 104 of 1976). 18. As all the relevant provisions of the Amending Act, 1976, including the amendment in the definition of "decree" have already been discussed at great length, it does not need to be repeated over again. 19. Thus, in view of the ratio decided in the Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra). I hold that there is no substance in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtors/appellants and I hold that the present miscellaneous (second) appeal is not maintainable. 20. 19. Thus, in view of the ratio decided in the Full Bench case of Most. Narmada Devi (supra). I hold that there is no substance in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtors/appellants and I hold that the present miscellaneous (second) appeal is not maintainable. 20. There is yet another aspect of the matter which, though not needed to be mentioned, in view of what I have held just above, may be mentioned. I have already stated in my early part of the judgment that the present miscellaneous (second) appeal stood dismissed as against respondents 9 to 11 (the substituted daughters, in place of the objector Kedar Nath Rastogi) for late compliance of order no. 10 dated 3.3.83 and this Court, on 8.9.83 had ordered that the competency of the appeal would be heard at the time of final hearing of the appeal itself. As I have already - held above that in view of the ratio decided in the Full Bench case of Most Narmada Devi v. Ramnandan Singh (supra) (1980 P.L.J.R. 175) the present miscellaneous (second) appeal is not maintainable; the point of in competency of the appeal does not need to be elaborately dealt with. If needed to be dealt with, it could be safely held that the compromise decree dated 21.12.63 in T.S. No. 273 of 1959 bring joint and several; the appeal had become incompetent as, if allowed would end in two contrary and conflicting decrees; more so, when the other judgment-debtor Ram Chandra Rastogi (against whom also the compromise decree was passed) did never file an objection under section 47 of the Code. 21. Thus, the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the land-lords/respondents 1 to 8 to the effect that the present miscellaneous (second) appeal is not maintainable, succeeds. 22. Having held that the present miscellaneous (second) appeal is not maintainable there remains only the other three submissions as already indicated in paragraph 2 of this judgment, which are dealt with in the civil revision. Re : Civil Revision No. 957/77. 23. The learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner submitted that the compromise decree (in T.S. No. 273/59) contravened the provisions of section 4 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The learned counsel submitted that the original rent of Rs. 32/- per month having been enhanced to Rs. 23. The learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner submitted that the compromise decree (in T.S. No. 273/59) contravened the provisions of section 4 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The learned counsel submitted that the original rent of Rs. 32/- per month having been enhanced to Rs. 80/- p.m. by the compromise was forbidden by law and hence it contravened the provisions of section 4 of the Act. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlords/opp. parties no. 1 to 8 contended that the provisions of section 4 of the Act applied only to an existing lease and a living tenancy. The submission was that if there was a lease only then question of contravention of section 4 may arise, but the learned counsel submitted that merely because the consent decree envisaged a higher rate to be payable, it did not create any fresh lease or a fresh tenancy and hence the provisions of section 4 were not contravened. The learned counsel further submitted that the compromise decree only deferred eviction for another five years. Eviction of the premises in question by the judgment debtors including the petitioner remained intact and by the compromise only its immediate effect was deferred. The learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner in support of his aforesaid submission relied upon the Full Bench case of Gulab Chand Prasad v. Budhwanti and anr. (1985 P.L.J.R. 622) and the learned counsel for the landlords/opposite parties no. 1 to 8, in support of his submission relied upon (i) the case of Bai Chanchal and others v. Sayed Jalaluddin and ors. (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1981), (ii) the case of Konchada Ramamurti Subudhi v. Gopinath Nayak and ors. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 919) and (iii) the case of Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ram Narain and ors. (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22). 24. At the out set 1 must state that the stand of the learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner is self-contradictory. Firstly, the learned counsel submits that by enhancement of the rental from Rs. 32/- to Rs. 80/- p.m. contravenes section 4 of the Act, and, secondly, in the same breath he submits that the compromise decree has created a fresh lease for five years. Firstly, the learned counsel submits that by enhancement of the rental from Rs. 32/- to Rs. 80/- p.m. contravenes section 4 of the Act, and, secondly, in the same breath he submits that the compromise decree has created a fresh lease for five years. At this very stage I feel it to be pertinent to mention one more fact that this point (i.e., the compromise decree contravenes section 4 of the Act) was not urged/agitated on behalf of the judgment debtor/petitioner before the Execution Munsif, as it appears on a perusal of the order passed by the Execution Munsif. Any way, the point urged by the learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner that the compromise decree contravenes section 4 of the Act has to be dealt with. The compromise petition (Annexure-1 to 'the civil revisional application) has been quoted in full in paragraph 7 above. The consent decree does not state that a new tenancy was being created. The learned counsel for the petitioner in his ingenuity, submitted that the terms of the consent decree should be interpreted as indicating an intention to create a new tenancy. I am unable to find any such terms. On the face of it, all that the consent decree envisaged was that the decree-holder/landlord agreed to let them (the judgment debtors) continue in possession for a period of five years and in pursuance of that the judgment debtors (including the petitioner) agreed, as a concession on the part of the decree-holder/landlord, to pay Rs. 80/- p.m. for the premises in question from the date of the compromise and, in fact the judgment debtor/petitioner, factually, having acted upon the same went on paying that rental for full five years. It is true that under the provisions of section 4 of the Act it is not lawful for any landlord to increase or claim any increase in the rent which is payable for the time being in respect of any building except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is also true that sections 5 to 8 of the Act provide as to how and in what manner and circumstances the House Controller will determine the fair rent. These principles, as just referred to above, are, as provided, under the Act itself. It is also true that sections 5 to 8 of the Act provide as to how and in what manner and circumstances the House Controller will determine the fair rent. These principles, as just referred to above, are, as provided, under the Act itself. But, in the facts and Circumstances of the present case, as already stated in great detail above, it is abundantly clear that the rental of the premises in question was not enhanced but as a good gesture on the part of the decree holder/landlord/opp. parties no. 1 to 8 to agree to let the judgment debtors continue in the premises in question for a further period of five years from the date of the compromise, the judgment debtors, as a concession, themselves agreed to pay the rental for the premises in question at the rate of Rs. 80/- p.m., Thus, in the peculiar facts of the present case, I hold that the original lease did come to an end and the tenancy was not a living one and in that view of the matter the question of contravention of tile provisions of section 4 of the Act did not arise. I further hold that the terms of the compromise decree can, in no way, be interpreted as creating a new tenancy or a new lease constituting the decree holder as landlord and the judgment debtors as their tenants. The terms, as they stand, neither constitute a tenancy nor a licence. I further hold that all that the decree-holder/landlord did was to allow the judgment debtors (including the petitioner) to continue in possession for five years on payment of Rs. 80/- p.m. as a concession for entering into the compromise. I further hold that it is difficult to impute to the decree holder landlord an intention to create a fresh tenancy on the terms as they stand. As already stated above, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor/petitioner, in support of his submission placed reliance upon the Full Bench case of Gulab Chand Prasad v. Budhwanti and anr. (supra). I further hold that it is difficult to impute to the decree holder landlord an intention to create a fresh tenancy on the terms as they stand. As already stated above, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor/petitioner, in support of his submission placed reliance upon the Full Bench case of Gulab Chand Prasad v. Budhwanti and anr. (supra). The significant question which necessitated decision in that case was whether the excess rent paid by the tenant to his landlord consequent upon a mutual (though illegal) enhancement of rent would be automatically adjusted against all subsequent defaults in payment of monthly rent for the purposes of sections 4, 5 and 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. Thus the present point under consideration was not the question to be considered in that case. Hence the reliance placed upon the Full Bench case of Gulab Chand Prasad v. Budhwanti and anr. (supra) by the learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner, is under a total misconception and is misplaced on the facts of the present case and the ratio decided in that case does not support the present submission of the learned counsel for the judgment debtor/petitioner. The Full Bench case of Gulab Chand Prasad (supra) is thus clearly distinguishable on facts. Thus the first submission, as indicated above, in this revisional application, advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner fails as being without any substance. 25.1 have already indicated above, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the landlords/opposite parties no. 1 to 8 and I have also referred to the cases on which the learned counsel has placed reliance in support of his own submissions. In the situation of facts as in the present case the real test is the intention of the parties whether they intended to create a lease. If the document created an interest in the property, it would be a lease; but if it only permitted another to make use of the property only for some time it does not create an interest in the property and thus it would not create a lease. In my opinion, the facts in the case of Bai Chanchal and others v. Sayed Jalaluddin and ors. (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1081), relied upon by the learned counsel for the landlords/ opposite party nos. In my opinion, the facts in the case of Bai Chanchal and others v. Sayed Jalaluddin and ors. (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1081), relied upon by the learned counsel for the landlords/ opposite party nos. 1 to 8, are almost at par with the facts of the present case and the ratio decided in that case is fully applicable in the facts of the present case. I hold that the learned counsel for the landlords/opposite party nos. 1 to 8 has very correctly relied upon this case in support of his submissions. Similarly, a perusal of the facts in the case of Konchada Ramamurti Subudhi v. Gopi Nath Nayak and ors. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 919) shows that the facts of that case were also almost at par with the facts of the present case and thus the ratio decided in that case also supports the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the landlords/opposite parties no. 1 to 8. Thus, 1 hold that the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the landlord/opp. parties no. 1 to 8 are quite valid legal and meritorious. 26. This takes me now to consider the second submission of the leaned counsel for the judgment-debtors/petitioners, i.e., whether the compromise decree contravenes the provisions of section 11 of the Act, in other, words, whether before accepting/recording the compromise the court satisfied itself that the grounds mentioned for eviction in section 11 of the Act existed. The submission was that the court without satisfying itself about the existence of the ground of eviction, as envisaged under section 11 of the Act, recorded the compromise and thus it contravened the provisions of section 11 of the Act and the decree was a nullity. 27. The arrear of Rs. 96/- was claimed in the suit as arrears for three months at the time of the filing of the suit at the rate of Rs. 32/- p.m. The arrear claimed by the landlord/opp. parties no. 1 to 8 was thus for three months under the law a tenant could be legally evicted if there was arrears of rent for two months against him. In the present case the arrear was obviously for a, longer period and thus it cannot be said that the court did not apply its mind before accepting the compromise. 28. 1 to 8 was thus for three months under the law a tenant could be legally evicted if there was arrears of rent for two months against him. In the present case the arrear was obviously for a, longer period and thus it cannot be said that the court did not apply its mind before accepting the compromise. 28. It is true that the court's jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction is, no doubt, conditioned by the existence or proof of one or more of the grounds specified in the statute. But the satisfaction of the court, which is an essential pre-requisite for decreeing eviction, need not necessarily be the product of a contested proceeding. What is material is the cognizance or the awareness of the court that the, requisite grounds exist. It is also well established that the satisfaction may also nevertheless arise by reason of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the parties to the record. If the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in section 11 of the Act were shown to have existed when the court had recorded the compromise, such an order/decree, passed on the consent of the parties, is not necessarily void. Satisfaction of the court, which is a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some state the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it can validly be postulated that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. The learned counsel for the judgment debtors/petitioners, in support of his submission placed reliance upon the case of Firojilal Jain v. Man Mal and another (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794), on the case of Smt. Kaushalya Devi and ors. v. K.L. Bansal (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838), on the case of Sri Nivash Fogla v. Singheshwar Sahu (1975 P.L.J.R. 409) and also on the case of K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshdri (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1311). v. K.L. Bansal (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838), on the case of Sri Nivash Fogla v. Singheshwar Sahu (1975 P.L.J.R. 409) and also on the case of K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshdri (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1311). The gist of the ratio decided in all these cases is a well established principles of law; i.e. if a decree for eviction is passed without satisfying about the existence of any of the conditions as envisaged under section 11 of the Act, such a decree could not be supported in law and was invalid. It is also well established that where the court proceeds solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the court is not competent to pass the decree and such a decree under execution must be held to be a nullity. The learned counsel for the landlords/opp. parties no. 1 to 8 very fairly conceded to such well established principles of law, but he submitted that mere compromise is not enough unless the compromise falls under any of the clauses of section 11 of the Act. The learned counsel for the landlords/opp. parties no. 1 to 8 very strenuously urged that it has to be seen whether the compromise decree embodies any of the clauses under section 11 of the Act; if not, then the court is empowered to travel beyond the decree and look to the circumstances and facts right from the pleadings up to the date of compromise decree. In support of this submission, advanced by the learned counsel for the landlords/opp. parties on. 1 to 8, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the case of Nagina Das Ram Das v. Dalpat Ram Iccharam alias Brij Ram and ors. (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471) and also upon the case of Roshanlal and another v. Madanlal and ors. (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2130). 29. As already stated above, the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/petitioner has urged that there was not even a scintilla of material from which the satisfaction of the court as to the existence of a ground under section 11 of the Act could be spelled out and as already stated above, the reliance has been placed upon the cases of Firoji Lal Jain v. Man Mal & anr. (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794), on the case of Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838) and also on the case of K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1311). It is pertinent to mention that all these cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtors/petitioners, in support of his submission, have been noticed in the case of Nagin Das Ram Das v. Dalpat Ram Iccha Ram @ Brij Ram and ors. (A.I.R. 1974, S.C. 471). The Supreme Court having considered the aforesaid earlier cases (just referred to above relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners) held in the case of Nagin Das Ram Das (supra) as follows :- "From a conspectus of the cases cited at the Bar the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of passing of the decree, there was some material before the court, on the basis of which, the court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidences recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted." It was further held as follows ; "Be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity is taken, the executing court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the balls of which the cent court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If on the face of it the decree does not show the existence of such materials or jurisdictional facts the executing court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any metaral furnishing an intention for the trial court’s jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. If on the face of it the decree does not show the existence of such materials or jurisdictional facts the executing court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any metaral furnishing an intention for the trial court’s jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the rent court could have as distinguished from must have been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the executing court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the rent court.” 30. After distinguishing the cases (referred to above) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the present case, the Supreme Court. while laying down the ratio as just quoted above (in the case of Nagin Das v. Dalpat Ram (supra) relied upon the case of K.K. Chari v. Z.M. Seshardri (supra) thus the reliance placed upon the case of R.M. Seshardri (supra) by the learned counsel for the petitioners is under a misconception and the ratio decided in that case does not support the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The other Supreme Court cases (relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners) have already been distinguished in the case of Nagin Das v. Dalpat Ram (supra) and thus the ratio decided in those cases also does not support the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The ratio decided in those cases are well established principles of law but the question arises whether the case in hand is in line with the earlier cases of the Supreme Court (referred to above) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 31. On the facts of the present case I hold that the case in hand is not in line with the cases of Kaushalaya Devi’s case (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838) and Feroji Lal Jain's case (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794. 31. On the facts of the present case I hold that the case in hand is not in line with the cases of Kaushalaya Devi’s case (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838) and Feroji Lal Jain's case (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the reliance placed upon Seshadri's case (1973 S.C. 1311) is unwarranted and proceeds upon an inherent fallacy; rather, in my opinion, it supports the submission advanced by tile learned counsel for the landlords/opposite party nos. 1 to 8. 32. The compromise petition (Annexure-1 to the revisional application) has been quoted in full in paragraph 7 above. In the compromise petition, in paragraph 3, it has been admitted that the arrears of rent till date have been paid. It is better to quote the exact sentences : “AAJ TAK KA KERAYA MUDAIYAN KO WASUL VO VEVAK HO CHUKA HAI”. The judgment debtors further agreed to pay the rental at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month and the judgment debtors further averred/agreed that the landlord will be getting the rental at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month hereafter. It is again pertinent to quote the exact sentences, though at the cost of repetition: “YAH KE MUDALEHUM NE KERAYA MOBLIG 80 (ASSI RUPYA) MAHWAR YANI 40 (CHALIS RUPYA) FI LO KE HISAB SE MAH WO MAH DENA SWIKAR KIYA AUR ISI HISAB SE 80 (ASSI RUPYA) MAHWAR SE KERAYA MUDAIYAN LIYA KAREGI.” From the above it is abundantly clear that the admission in the compromise was thus an admission of the material fact which constituted a ground for eviction under section 11 of the Act. Further the rent was admittedly in arrears for a period more than two months which the judgment debtors/petitioners had neglected to pay not only till before the institution of the suit but till before the compromise was arrived at. Admittedly, the arrears of rent for three months was paid by the judgment debtors/petitioners at the time of entering into the compromise. I hold that since, in the instant case there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree of the fundamental fact that could constitute a ground for eviction under section 11 of the Act, the executing court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. I hold that since, in the instant case there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree of the fundamental fact that could constitute a ground for eviction under section 11 of the Act, the executing court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. Thus, I further bold that the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/petitioners to the effect that there was not even a scintilla of material from which the satisfaction of the court as to the existence of ground under section 11 could be spelled out in without any substance. And, I further hold that the cases relied upon (referred to above) by the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/petitioners do not advance the stand taken on behalf of the petitioners. Thus from a conspectus of the cases stated at the Bar, I hold that the compromise decree does not contravene of the provisions of section 11 of the Act and the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners fails. 33. Then remains only the last submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, to be considered; i.e. the compromise decree required registration under section 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act and the same having not been registered, the petitioners, in law, could avoid the same. With regard to the submission the main thrust was that as the compromise decree amounted to creation of a lease for five years, it did require registration. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlords/opposite party nos. 1 to 8 submitted that the answer to the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners would turn on the tenor/terms of the compromise. The learned counsel for the landlords/opposite party nos. 1 to 8 submitted that a bare perusal of the compromise petition shows that there was no intention to create the lease not did the compromise decree create any lease and hence the same was not register-able. 34. At this stage, I feel it to be pertinent to state that the court of appeal below (in Misc. Appeal No. 28/72/12/76) took into consideration the terms of the compromise petition (which ended in the compromise decree) and it held that the compromise was not a transfer nor were the judgment debtors, in the present case, inducted on the premises in question under the compromise. Appeal No. 28/72/12/76) took into consideration the terms of the compromise petition (which ended in the compromise decree) and it held that the compromise was not a transfer nor were the judgment debtors, in the present case, inducted on the premises in question under the compromise. It further held that there was no mention in the compromise decree that the premises in question was being leased afresh nor was there any thing to show that a new tenancy was created. It further held that paragraph 3 of the compromise petition indicated that the arrears due were paid and that the compromise decree was only for eviction. It is well known that in all cases of decree for eviction a time is fixed by the court requiring the defendant/tenant to vacate. In the present case what has been done is that the judgment debtors/petitioners themselves agreed to fix up the time for vacating the premises in question and the landlords/opp. party nos. 1 to 8, on the concession by the judgment debtors/petitioners to vacate the premises after five years from the date of the compromise, agreed to allow them to continue in the premises in question for five years. 35. It is true that, in so many terms, in the compromise petition it is not expressly provided that the defendants/petitioners would vacate the premises in question after expiry of five years from the date of the compromise. But reading the compromise petition as a whole it is more than obvious that it is implied that the defendants/ judgment /debtors/petitioners would vacate the premises in question after expiry of five years. The court of appeal below further held that the compromise was acted upon by the parties and a bare perusal of the compromise petition it appeared that it was neither a new lease nor was a new tenancy. 36. The learned counsel for the judgments debtors/petitioners in support of his aforesaid submission, relied upon the case of Sachindra Mohan Ghosh v. Ramjas Agrawala (I.L.R. 11 Patna 98 A.I.R. 1932 Patna 97). The learned counsel for the petitioners, as already stated above, submitted that the compromise decree operated to create a lease and was therefore not exempted from registration. Such a proposition of law, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be disputed and is well settled. The learned counsel for the petitioners, as already stated above, submitted that the compromise decree operated to create a lease and was therefore not exempted from registration. Such a proposition of law, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be disputed and is well settled. But the main question is, in order to answer the present submission, whether the terms of the compromise (embodied in the decree) created a lease. This necessarily needs interpreting the compromise petition (ending in the decree) and it has to be seen as to whether the parties intended to create a lease ? In the case of Sachindra Mohan Ghosh v. Ramjas Agrawala (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners the terms of the compromise embodied in the decree were such (which is quoted in placitum-A of that case) that Their Lordships held that the terms of the compromise (embodied in the decree) did create a lease and in that view of the matter, it was held that a decree operating to create a lease was not exempted from registration. In the present case I have already mentioned about the interpretation of the terms of compromise (embodied in the decree) given by the court of appeal below. I have also purposely and pertinently, quoted the entire compromise petition in paragraph 7 above. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the land-lords/opp. party nos. 1 to 8 relied upon the case of Smt. Nai Baha v. Lata Ram Narayan & ors. (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 22), upon the case of Kunchada Ramamurti Sabudhl v. Gopi Nath Nayak and ors. (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 919) and upon the case of Bai Chanchal and ors. v. Sayed Jalaluddin & ors. (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1081). 37. The answer to the present point really turns on the terms of compromise. I hold that after a careful consideration of the terms of the compromise and tile whole tenor of the compromise petition, it is absolutely dear that there was no intention to create a lease between the parties. It is dominant intention of the document which must guide the construction of its contents, In the recitals of the compromise petition, it is clear that just a temporary arrangement, just by way of concession made by the landlords/opp. It is dominant intention of the document which must guide the construction of its contents, In the recitals of the compromise petition, it is clear that just a temporary arrangement, just by way of concession made by the landlords/opp. parties 1 to 8 for the intermediate occupation of the premises in question before vacating the premises in question was made. Taking the entire tenor of the compromise petition, it is absolutely clear, without any vagueness, that neither the parties intended to create a new lease nor was any new lease created. Thus I hold that the court of appeal below very correctly held that the terms of compromise petition (ending in the decree) did not create a new lease. 38. I, therefore, on a very careful consideration of the terms of the compromise and the whole tenor of the compromise petition, hold that it is absolutely clear that there was no intention to create a lease between the parties, I further hold that the dominant intention of the document was not to create a new lease and in fact no new lease was created by the terms of the compromise ending in compromise decree. The compromise decree, in the present case did not create any interest in the property and therefore, no new lease was created in favour of the defendants/petitioners Thus, I hold that there is, therefore, no question of registration of the decree, as contended by the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/petitioners. 39. Thus the reliance placed upon the case of Sachindra Mohan Ghosh v. Ramjas Agrawala (I.L.R. 11 Patna 98 A.I.R. 1932 Patna 97) by the learned counsel for the petitioners is unwarranted and proceeds upon an inherent fallacy. The facts of that case are very clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. On the other hand I hold that the ratio decided in the case of Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lalu Ram Narayan and ors. (supra), Konchad a Ramamurti Subudhi v. Gopnath Nayak (supra) and Bai Chanchal and ors. v. Sayed Jalaluddin & ors. (supra) fully support the submission advanced on behalf of the landlords/opp. party nos. 1 to 8. 40. On the other hand I hold that the ratio decided in the case of Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lalu Ram Narayan and ors. (supra), Konchad a Ramamurti Subudhi v. Gopnath Nayak (supra) and Bai Chanchal and ors. v. Sayed Jalaluddin & ors. (supra) fully support the submission advanced on behalf of the landlords/opp. party nos. 1 to 8. 40. Though if bearing re-petition, it is pertinent to mention again that although in the compromise petition it is not expressly provided that the defendants would vacate the premises in question after the expiry of five years from the date of compromise; yet, I, on a most careful consideration of the terms of the compromise and the entire tenor of the compromise petition, hold that dominant intention of the compromise (ending in the compromise decree) was that the defendants would vacate the premises in question after the expiry of five years from the date of the compromise and the same is very much implied in the compromise which, ultimately, ended in a compromise decree. 41. Thus, all the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/ petitioners fail. I further hold that the order under revision i.e., the order of the court of appeal below dated 25.4.77 does not suffer of any jurisdictional error. I further hold that the court of appeal below neither has acted illegally nor has acted with any material irregularity and the impugned order under revision is quite valid and legal. I further hold that the order of the Execution Munsif dated 21.2.70 (in Misc. Case No. 52/70) is also quite valid and legal and the Execution Munsif, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, very rightly, in law, dismissed the miscellaneous case. 42. Incidentally, it is also important to note that the Judgment debtors/petitioners had placed two more objections before the Execution Munsif (i) that the appellant did not join the compromise and hence it was not binding on him and (ii) that no process of the execution proceeding was served upon him and every thing was done Bala-bala. These two objections, urged by the judgment debtors/petitioners before the trial court were not pressed before the court of appeal below. 43 For the aforesaid reasons I further hold that the compromise decree was quite valid, legal and executable. 44. In the result, the civil revisional application fails and is dismissed. These two objections, urged by the judgment debtors/petitioners before the trial court were not pressed before the court of appeal below. 43 For the aforesaid reasons I further hold that the compromise decree was quite valid, legal and executable. 44. In the result, the civil revisional application fails and is dismissed. I have already held above in paragraph 21 of the judgment that the present miscellaneous (second) appeal was not maintainable. (Lines have been underlined by me for emphasis).