JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is another tenant-landlord litigation whose number is increasing every day in astronomical proportion. It has focussed light on a shaded area of law requiring exposition of few important provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short the Act. The factual foundation of the legal contentions being built shifting sands of facts I was driven to employ my favourite technique to claim a stand on terra firma, as would facilitate instant disposal of the matter. I allowed counsel ample opportunity to make copious use of coloured pencils to mark out emphasis in pleadings and evidence, lest their respective legal contentions lose edge and acquire abscurity. ( 2. ) A rudderless ship is likely to founder in troubled waters. Indeed, the need for installing the legislative radar at the threshold, I have always considered a constitutional imperative. Accordingly, before laying out factual matrix of the case, i proceed rather to extract first the concerned legislative provisions - "2 (e) "member of the family" in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncles wife or widow or brothers son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependant on him. " "23-A. Special Provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a landlord may submit an application, signed and verified, in a manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on one or more of the following grounds for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation, namely :- (a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. " (Emphasis supplied) Indubitably the rival legal contentions agitated before me in this Court rest on interpretation of the words and expressions emphasized in the extract, in one case "living jointly" occurring in Section 2 (e); and in the other case on "required bona fide" and "himself occurring in Section 23-A (a) of the Act. ( 3. ) I extract now the relevant portions of the pleadings and evidence emphasised by counsel - ( 4. ) I revert to address myself at once to the burning controversy which has prompted counsel, indeed rightly, to advance forcefully weighty arguments on the question of interpretation. The landlord/plaintiff who has instituted before the Rent controlling Authority, for short, the Authority, the present proceedings under section 23-A of the Act for eviction of the defendant/petitioner from the suit house, having obtained an order in his favour, the decision is assailed in this revision under Section 23-E of the Act by petitioners counsel, Shri R. D. Jain, on two grounds. Firstly, counsel submits, the landlord made out a specific case for petitioners eviction in terms of Section 2 (e) of the Act, and therefore, his case could not be considered by the Authority or this Court, departing from the plaint, to give him relief. Secondly, counsel submits, on its own findings that the landlords son, Prem Narayan, was not living jointly with the plaintiff/landlord on the date of institution of the application under Section 23-A (a) of the Act, the impugned order could not have been passed for petitioners eviction. It is also Shri Jains contention that the limited right conferred on the landlord under Section 23-A (a) cannot be enlarged by this Court by judicial interpretation, the legislature in its wisdom having qualified landlords requirement explicitly and clearly by the condition that such requirement must be "bona fide". It is contended that even if on evidence the case under clause (a) of Section 23-A is held made out taking the view that the plaintiff/landlord required the suit house "for occupation as residence for himself, neither on pleadings nor on evidence "bona fide" nature of the requirement being made out and indeed in that regard there being no finding either by the Authority, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff/non-petitioner. ( 5. ( 5. ) ON the other hand, Shri Lahoti, who has appeared to support the impugned order, submits that it was not the statutory requirement that the landlord must make out a clear and specific case either on pleadings or on evidence that the tenanted premises was required by him either "for himself or "for any member of his family" as per Section 2 (e) of the Act. It is also counsels contention that the expression "living jointly" contemplates joint living in the sense that the parties have a right to live jointly and such joint living need not, therefore, be continuous and may be short and sporadic. ( 6. ) I have heard counsel at length in this matter and I have also given my anxious consideration to the submissions made at the Bar in the context of the decision cited and other materials placed before me in order to assist the Court in discharging its duty of statutory interpretation. It is apparent that the parent provision is clause (a) of Section 23-A which confers on the landlord the right to recover possession from the tenant on the ground which is statutorily enacted therein. At least one thing which cannot, therefore, be disputed at the Bar is that it would be necessary for the landlord to bring his case within four corners of the statutory provision because, by the special law, jurisdiction is conferred on the special Tribunal (Rent Controlling Authority) to act in the matter, contemplated under Section 23-A only on the conditions - precedent prescribed therein being satisfied. Another thing, which is also apparent and indeed legislatively established, is that it is not only the requirement per se "bona fide" of the landlord, of the tenanted accommodation, whether for "himself or for "any member of his family", that invests the Authority with jurisdiction to decide and grant the application made under Section 23-A (a ). It is rather, the "bona fide" nature of landlords requirement which must be duly pleaded and proved, except in such cases as are legislatively otherwise provided for. It is rather, the "bona fide" nature of landlords requirement which must be duly pleaded and proved, except in such cases as are legislatively otherwise provided for. The third thing, about which I have little doubt, giving plain meaning to the language used in the provision, is that though clause (a) explicitly contemplates variety of circumstances under which a landlord can recover possession of the tenanted premises, because of the fact that the requirement must be "bona fide" it would be incumbent on him to state specifically the particular facts or circumstances which would entitle him to avail the benefit statutorily conferred on him under Section 23-A (a) of the Act. As such, should he require the premises "for himslef" he must plead and prove only that "bona fide" requirement and not any alternative. Should the premises be required either for "any member of his family" or for "a person for whose benefit the accommodation is held", he sould plead that case and prove his "bona fide" requirement in those terms. Not only the use of the word "or" at several places in clause (a) lends credence to this view, the fact that the word is used disjunctively is itself made clear by the object of the provision. Indeed, as I have said earlier, it is made clear that the prime legal requirement is landlords "bona fide" nature of his need to obtain possession of the premises. ( 7. ) I confess that in taking the above view another factor which has weighed with me is expression by the legislature itself of its intent by enacting provisions of sections 23-D (3) and 23-J. I have no doubt that to place a reasonable construction on any particular statutory provision it will be the duty of the Court not only to read the provision first literally to construe it on its plain language but in order to clear doubts to read it also in its context and setting in conjunction with other cognate or collateral provision of the same enactment. This course is verily mandated by the superior and progressive norm of purposive interpretation to advance and promote effectively the legislative intent and object. Lest, social-welfare legislations may lose their force, efficacy and relevance upsetting the constitutional order. This course is verily mandated by the superior and progressive norm of purposive interpretation to advance and promote effectively the legislative intent and object. Lest, social-welfare legislations may lose their force, efficacy and relevance upsetting the constitutional order. When, in 1985, the Act was amended and Section 23-J was inserted a privileged class of landlords was created to secure social justice to them. They comprise the following :- " (i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services; or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or any State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place. " What is to be noticed particularly, however, is the importance of the legislative exercise of amending Section 23-D pari passu, and inserting therein a new sub-section (3) which reads as follows :- "23-D (3) In respect of an application by a landlord, who is a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence services or a company owned or controlled either by the Central or any state Government, or a widow or physically handicapped person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the requirement by the landord with reference to clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be of section 23-A is "bona fide". " ( 8. ) NOW, the question is what purpose was achieved or how social justice was secured by the legislature by undertaking the exercise? In my mind, I am very clear; legislature meant to deal with one type of cases only concerning circumstances under which a landlord was entitled to recover possession of the suit premises, "for himself. " ( 8. ) NOW, the question is what purpose was achieved or how social justice was secured by the legislature by undertaking the exercise? In my mind, I am very clear; legislature meant to deal with one type of cases only concerning circumstances under which a landlord was entitled to recover possession of the suit premises, "for himself. Indeed, for such a landlord the "term" "himself, because of his or her handicap (physical or economic), ex hypothesi, acquires wider connotation to include the need of any other person on whom he or she may be required to depend and a reference in his or her case to the definition clause, Section 2 (e) would not be necessary to bring the case within the ambit of second part of clause (a) of Section 23-A. In virtue of subjection (3) of Section 23-D the bona fide nature of his/her requirement being statutorily recognised and burden being placed oh the tenant to rebut the statutory presumption, such a landlord need not plead specific case under first or second part of clause (a); it would be sufficient for him to state generally his requirement though he or she may be required still to state that he or she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation of his or her own in the same city to fulfil the principal condition envisaged in clause (a ). I had occasions to deal with different aspects of the question in Rambharose, (1986) I MPWN 15 = 1986 mprcj 108; and Sunil Cloth Stores, 1986 MPRCJ 147. On the rationales of those decisions I feel least hesitant and fully confident to sustain the view which I have just taken. ( 9. ) THE second question which has surfaced in this matter and which has a great importance is indeed the connotation of the expression "living jointly" of section 2 (e)6f the Act. I would first like to read the provision on its own terms and try to divine legislative intent with the help of the time-honoured maxims noscitura sociis and viscribusactus. ) THE second question which has surfaced in this matter and which has a great importance is indeed the connotation of the expression "living jointly" of section 2 (e)6f the Act. I would first like to read the provision on its own terms and try to divine legislative intent with the help of the time-honoured maxims noscitura sociis and viscribusactus. There is no dubt that the defnition clause was meant to take care of the situations envisaged under the second part of clause (a) of Section 23-A. Evidently, in a case where the landlord needs "bona fide" the accommodation not for his own use but pleads need of any "member of his family" that necessity arises to circumscribe the right statutorily contemplated. If we read the term "living jointly" in juxtaposition with the sister clause following it, "or any other relation dependent on him", there could evidently be sufficient scope to take the view that the two expressions have created rights in separate classes of relations of the landlord of which the conjunction "or" is primarily suggestive. In other words, a person "living jointly" with the landlord need not necessarily be a person "dependent on him". If it is claimed that a person is living jointly with the landlord, according to me, the joint-living itself envisaged a separate class of cases if the term "living jointly" has to carry any meaning. It must only mean that the person must be actually living or residing continuously, indeed for all intent and purposes jointly, with the landlord, factually exercising the right to live with the landlord jointly, envisaged under Section 2 (e ). This interpretation has support of the fact that while other relations "dependent" on the landlord may have a right to live jointly because of the dependents factor, those relations who are named in the first part of clause 2 (e) itself such as son, unmarried daughter, etc. are concerned evidently with cases of persons actually living jointly because they are naturally expected to enjoy a joint-living in normal and natural circumstances under Indian social system; the matter may be different in the case of "any other relation". Indeed it must not be forgotten that the Act is a piece of beneficent social legislation. It also bears emphasis that a strict construction of the definition clause is statutorily mandated by the term "means" used in it advisedly by the legislature. Indeed it must not be forgotten that the Act is a piece of beneficent social legislation. It also bears emphasis that a strict construction of the definition clause is statutorily mandated by the term "means" used in it advisedly by the legislature. ( 10. ) NOW comes the dictionary as an external aid, which may be used to crosscheck the interpretation intrinsically made. The word "jointly" in the Shorter oxford English Dictionary is given the meaning "continuously, in space or time". In the same volume we also get meaning of the term "living" in various senses but word used in the expression "jointly living", according to me, is gerundial form of the verb live which is also given many meanings. I would be disposed to take the view that the word in the context means "to continue in life". Giving plain meaning to the simple language of the expression, according to me, would connote living together of persons (whether or not joint in mess) in the sense of sharing a common shelter. This view I have taken considering the purpose of the enactment and of the provision under consideration. Indeed, I must also confess that there is support for the view from another external aid, to place which before me counsel have indeed laboured hard. Before the enactment was put on the Statute Book, in the Bill No. 22 of 1960 two alternative definitions of the term "member of the family" were suggested as is evident from the fact that two forms of clause (e) appear in the Bill. When the matter was referred to the Select Committee, it appears from the report of the Committee, that the view which prevailed with it was that the definition should not be confined to the concept of Joint Hindu Family, of which one alternative was a protagonist. This was indeed done for valid and constitutional reasons and there could be little doubt about it, though in clear terms the basis is not spelled out in the Report. Evidently, the enactment proposed being a secular measure dealing generally with the rights of citizens, irrespective of the Personal law governing them, care had to be taken to deal with rights and interests of landlords as a class, vis-a-vis tenants as a class. ( 11. Evidently, the enactment proposed being a secular measure dealing generally with the rights of citizens, irrespective of the Personal law governing them, care had to be taken to deal with rights and interests of landlords as a class, vis-a-vis tenants as a class. ( 11. ) SHRI Lahoti, has rightly drawn my attention to Kewal Singh, (1980) I SCC 290 and particularly to the observations which I read in para 16 as also in the extract therein of an earlier decision in the case of Bega Begum, (1979) I SCC 273. The view stressed in both cases is that almost all Urban tenancy laws enacted in the country envisage the ground of "landlords personal bona fide necessity" to protect his limited interest. Counsel has also drawn my attention to some other decisions to which also I ought to devote attention. However, counsel having conceded that the delhi decision in /. L Mehta vs. Smt. Him Devi, 1971 AIRCJ 272, projects forcefully his contention it is not necessary to deal with the two other decisions cited by him. I propose to examine, therefore, only Mehtas case which turns on the interpretation of term "himself occurring in Section 14 (1) proviso (e) of Delhi Rent control Act. It was held that an extended meaning has to be given to the term and that it cannot be restricted to mean the landlord or landlady alone. In each case, the court held, it had to be seen if the requirement of the landlord in asking eviction of the tenant was justified by the circumstances which revealed requirement of the landlord himself. Though a son of the landlord was earning and married if, he was already leaving with the landlord, that fact had to be taken into consideration. I do not think if the decision at all supports Shri Lahotis contention. On the other hand, for the view taken by me interpreting the term "himself in clause (a) of Section 23-A in the context of Sections 23-J and 23-D (3), I read much support in the decision. It must be noted in this connection that the Delhi Act was bereft of definition clause, similar to one which we read in Section 2 (e) of the Act. It must be noted in this connection that the Delhi Act was bereft of definition clause, similar to one which we read in Section 2 (e) of the Act. It, therefore, become courts duty to expose jurally the expression "himself to envisage the different cases and circumstances in which a landlord may exercise the right given to him to recover possession of the premises on the ground of bona fide requirement to effectuate statutory mandate and also indeed the judicial dicta of the Apex Court that the limited right must be made meaningful. Because of the definition clause embodied in Section 2 (e) in Madhya Prades Act, however, the relevance of the judical dicta of the Apex Court or even of the Delhi High Court, in my opinion, has little scope to be stressed or stretched. ( 12. ) IN the instant case on reading para 4 of both the plaint and written statement afore-quoted I entertain no doubt at all that parties went to trial on the footing that the landlord and his son, Prem Narayan, were not living jointly. Merely because it was pleaded that Prem Narayan occasionally lived or resided with the plaintiff, it would be difficult to accept, on the interpretation of the provision herein made, that a case in terms of Section 2 (e) was pleaded and further that a case of bona fide requirement of the plaintiff in terms of clause (a) of Section 23-A was made out What I read in evidence further supports this conclusion. Plaintiffs own evidence is that for the last 15 years Prem Narayan was living in a different house and was also doing business separately. Indeed there is direct and categorical evidence of the plaintiff that Prem Narayan was living in a rented accommodation separately and that he wanted to shift from there to plaintiffs house to live with the latter. It is true that plaintiff also deposed that not only Prem Narayan wished so but it was also plaintiffs wish that Prem Narayan comesand lives with him. However the question is, whether the pleadings aforesaid or even the evidence does at all entitle the plaintiff in law to claim an order for defendants eviction from the suit premises. Unfortunately, answer to this question cannot be in the affirmative in view of my interpretation of clause (a) of Section 23-A and Section 2 (e) of the Act. However the question is, whether the pleadings aforesaid or even the evidence does at all entitle the plaintiff in law to claim an order for defendants eviction from the suit premises. Unfortunately, answer to this question cannot be in the affirmative in view of my interpretation of clause (a) of Section 23-A and Section 2 (e) of the Act. There is no doubt that the specific case pleaded by the plaintiff, as restated by Shri Lahoti in this Court, is that the plaintiff required the house for "himself to meet the requirement of his son. But the question is whose bona fide requirement has to be considered? Indeed, not his sons requirement; but his own requirement had to be pleaded, because plaintiff was not a landlord of the class envisaged under section 23-J. It may very well be said to be established on evidence as also pleadings that the son had bona fide requirement of the suit premises. But, mere inconvenience of the plaintiff which he suffered in extending occasional hospitality to his son would not make his requirement of the premises bona fide. What else can and may be said in this matter is only that although there was no plea that the instant case is one to which Section 2 (e) is attracted, I have no hesitation to say on pleadings and evidence that such case even is not made out and proved. ( 13. ) FOR all the foregoing reasons there is no escape from the conclusion that this petition must succeed and the impugned order must go Accordingly, I accept this petition and set aside the impugned order by which eviction from the suit premises of the defendant/petitioner was ordered. However, there shall be no order as to costs in this Court. Petition allowed.