Judgment :- 1. The revision-petitioners are the plaintiffs in a suit for injunction. The dispute in this matter is in respect of 31.25 acres of rubber plantation. This forms part of 62 45 acres. This property was purchased by the revision petitioners in 1977. The plaintiffs and the defendant entered into an agreement on 30-3-1979 for the sale of the entire 62.45 acres for a consideration of Rs. 51/2 lakhs. The sale deed was to be executed on 3ist March, 1980. Rupees 11/2 lakhs was paid as advance. Defendant was put in possession of the whole property in pursuance of the agreement. The agreement stipulated that the defendant would pay the balance amount with 12 per cent interest. Rupees 50,000/- was paid on 15-6-1979 and another Rs. 50,000/-was paid on 31-12-1979 by the defendant. According to the plaintiffs-petitioners the defendant could not perform his part of the contract till 31-3-1980. As the defendant had paid a consideration of Rs. 21/2 lakhs six sale deeds were executed in favour of the nominees of the plaintiffs. Ext, A9 is one of such documents. The total consideration for these six sale deeds was Rs. 2 lakhs 70 thousand. As the defendant failed to perform his part of the contract, the plaintiffs entered into possession of the disputed property by virtue of the clause stipulated in Ext. A2 agreement. Subsequent to the surrender by the defendant to the plaintiffs the rubber trees were slaughter tapped and the plaintiffs replanted the entire area for which licence was also obtained from the Rubber Board. Plaintiffs further contended that the defendant attempted to trespass into the property and therefore the suit was filed. Along with the suit an interim injunction application was filed. 2. The defendant filed counter affidavit denying the allegations in the plaint. According to the defendant he was put in possession of the property as per the provisions of Ext A2 agreement. According to him, the plaintiffs had not recovered possession of the property. He also contended that the entire consideration agreed to between the parties was paid by him and only a small sum of Rs. 21,000/- was due from him and when this amount was offered the plaintiffs refused to accept the same, It is also alleged that the plaintiffs refused to execute the sale deed. He also contended that the entire consideration agreed to between the parties was paid by him and only a small sum of Rs. 21,000/- was due from him and when this amount was offered the plaintiffs refused to accept the same, It is also alleged that the plaintiffs refused to execute the sale deed. The trial court dismissed the interim injunction application and an appeal filed against that order ended in dismissal. Both the courts below found that the plaintiffs have not established prima facie case of possession and therefore not entitled to the interim injunction prayed for. 3. The scope of S.115 CPC, to interfere with the findings of the courts below in a matter like this is very limited. The counsel for the petitioners cited one of the earliest decisions in this regard. In Keshardeo v. Radha Kishun (AIR. 1953 SC. 23) so many earlier decisions of the Privy Council as well as of various High Courts have been referred to. In Mohount Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v. Khetter Moni Dessi,1 Cal. W.N. 617, the High Court of Calcutta expressed the opinion that sub clause (c) of S.115, CPC was intended to authorise the High Courts to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate courts, so as to prevent grave injustice in non-appealable cases. This decision was, however, dissented by the same High Court in Enat Mondul v. Baloram Dev, 3 Cal. W. N. 581. As early as in 1894 in Rajah Amir Hassen Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh. 11 Ind. App. 237, the Privy Council made the following observations on S.622 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was replaced by S.115 of the Code of 1908. "The question then is, did the judges of the lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity. It appears that they bad perfect jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." In Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board. Madras, 76 Ind. App. 67, the Privy Council examined the scope of S.115 CPC. It was held: "S. 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final. Madras, 76 Ind. App. 67, the Privy Council examined the scope of S.115 CPC. It was held: "S. 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law." 4. S.115 CPC. was amended by Act 104 of 1976 and 3rd clause was added to the main section. The newly added clause reads as follows: "Provided the High Court shall not, under the section, vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where: (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." The learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that by adding the 3rd clause the scope of S.115 has been enlarged, whereas the respondent's counsel would argue that the scope of S.115 has been very much minimised by the new clause added by Act 104 of 1976. By virtue of the new clause this Court can interfere with the orders of the subordinate courts only if it is proved that there occasioned a failure of justice or caused an irreparable injury to the party against whom the order was made. The newly added clause is over and above the restrictions imposed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) to clause (1) of S.115. The newly added clause is over and above the restrictions imposed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) to clause (1) of S.115. As per clause (1) of S.115 this Court can interfere with the orders passed by the subordinate courts only if it is proved that the subordinate courts bad exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. A concurrent finding of subordinate courts in an interlocutory matter based on facts and evidence is not liable to be interfered in revision 5. In a case between a landlord and a tenant the Supreme Court in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy (AIR. 1980 SC. 1253) held as follows: "A concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bonafide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under S.25. In such a case, merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power." It was also held in another case. M/s. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill v. Yograjsinha (AIR. 1984 SC. 1894) by the Supreme Court as follows: "Therefore, we are of the opinion that both the learned Assistant Judge and the High Court were not justified in interfering with the order of the trial court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction on the only ground that a different view on facts elicited was possible. This approach hardly permits interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction." 6. The courts below held that the plaintiffs petitioners had not established prima facie case of possession. The short question that would arise for consideration is whether this Court sitting in revision is justified in interfering with the finding of the courts below. The broad probability of the case is also to be borne in mind. Admittedly the plaintiffs who were the owners of the property handed over possession of the same to the respondent in pursuance of Ext. A2 agreement. It is not specifically mentioned as to when the plaintiffs-petitioners re-entered the property. The petitioners have also no case that the accounts between the parties were settled. The respondent has paid huge amounts to the petitioners as part of the consideration. A2 agreement. It is not specifically mentioned as to when the plaintiffs-petitioners re-entered the property. The petitioners have also no case that the accounts between the parties were settled. The respondent has paid huge amounts to the petitioners as part of the consideration. It was not a mere token amount by way of advance that was paid by the respondent. Under the circumstances it is not likely that the respondent meekly surrendered possession of the property to the petitioners. Petitioners have no case that they took forcible possession of the property. All these circumstances were adverted to by the courts below and I do not find any serious informity in the appreciation of evidence. 7. Both sides have filed several documents in this case. The courts below have examined these documents and considered their evidentiary value to find out a prima facie case of possession. This Court need not make a reappraisal of that evidence. Suffice it to say that the courts below were justified in holding that the petitioners have not proved prima facie case of possession. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the respondent has not fulfilled his part of the contract and therefore he is not entitled to avail the benefit of S.53(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. The applicability of S.53(a) of the T P. Act does not loom large in this case, since the suit is only for an injunction simpliciter. S.53(a) may come into operation only when a suit for possession is filed by the plaintiffs. Whether the respondent has committed breach of the contract or he was not prepared to fulfil the contract may be relevant at the time of the trial of the suit. The petitioners were not successful in proving prima facie case of possession and therefore the petition for temporary injunction was rightly dismissed by the Courts below and I see no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below. The CRP. is dismissed. The parties to bear their costs. Dismissed.