JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a pretty new matter, the appeal being filed only a few days back. This was at the time of admission itself that first respondents counsel entered opposition on the ground of non-maintainability of the appeal in law and I directed the matter to be listed for final hearing without noticing the other two respondents. ( 2. ) DEPUTY Government Advocate Shri Roman, appearing for the first respondent, State of Madhya Pradesh, has rightly pressed, in my opinion, the preliminary objection as to maintainability of the instant appeal relying on a number of decisions of different High Courts. It is counsels contention that law is by now well-settled that when an appeal is dismissed as time-barred, the cross-objection fails with the appeal and does not survive for decision. It is his contention that in the instant case that is what has happened and, therefore, against the impugned order by which the appellants cross-objection was dismissed, the instant appeal against that order is not maintainable. ( 3. ) STRONG reliance is placed by Shri Roman on the view expressed on the question by Chhagla, C. J. , speaking for the Division Bench in Charity Commissioners ( AIR 1956 Bom. 86 ) case. In that case what happened was that the appeal before their Lordships was time-barred and their Lordships refused to condone the delay under section 5 of the limitation Act. However, taking the view that the appeal was held as not maintainable on the ground of limitation, it was also held that the cross-objection did not survive on that ground. A learned Single Judge of Punjab High Court in a decision reported in karora Singh v. Kartar Singh (AIR 1951 Simla 170) also took the same view in same circumstances. His Lordship called in aid a decision of a Division Bench of Allahabad high Court in the case of Ramjiwan Mal v. Chand Mal (ILR 10 All. 587) as also that of a division Bench of Lahore High Court in Jai Gopal Singh v. Munnalal (AIR 1924 Lah. 43)to concur in the view expressed by the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts that unless an appeal was properly before the Court, the Court had no power to proceed merely with the cross-objection without assuming jurisdiction in respect of the appeal. 43)to concur in the view expressed by the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts that unless an appeal was properly before the Court, the Court had no power to proceed merely with the cross-objection without assuming jurisdiction in respect of the appeal. A Full Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Alagappa v. Chockalingam (AIR 1919 Mad. 784)also took the same view that "when an appeal is dismissed as presented out of time, the memorandum of cross-objection cannot be heard. "wallis, C. J. , in that case, observed that the right of a respondent to proceed by way of memorandum of cross-objection is strictly incidental to the filing of the original appeal in time, and it will be open to a party against whom a memorandum of objections is filed to set up the bar against hearing of the cross-objections when the appeal itself was filed out of time. ( 4. ) I see no reason to differ from the view expressed by the High Courts of allahabad, Bombay, Madras and Punjab which merely, in my opinion, give effect to the plain language of sub rule (1) of rule 22 of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code, which I quote : "22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal. (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the rinding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour, and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. " The provision, according to me, contemplates explicitly only a contingent right to file cross-objection indeed only when an appeal is filed and also a contingent right further to press the cross-objection for decision only when the Court assumes jurisdiction to decide the appeal. " The provision, according to me, contemplates explicitly only a contingent right to file cross-objection indeed only when an appeal is filed and also a contingent right further to press the cross-objection for decision only when the Court assumes jurisdiction to decide the appeal. It is clearly envisaged, in my opinion, that though a cross-objection is filed within time, it can be pressed for decision only when the appeal is heard and decided except when it is withdrawn or dismissed for default, pre-empting a hearing and decision in the appeal. The mere filing of cross-objection does not ipso facto, according to me invest in the respondent an independent right to be heard on it and this position is borne out by sub-rule (4) of rule 22 itself which has to be read evidently as an exception to sub-rule (1 ). It explicitly reserves to the respondent the right to be heard independently on the cross-objection only in two classes of cases, contemplated therein. This sub-rule evidently ensures procedural fairness of pre-empting injustice being caused to the respondent by appellants action of withdrawal of the appeal or default in its prosecution. Thus, therefore, when the appellate Court, acting under section 3 of the limitation Act, dismisses an appeal as time-barred and refuses to hear it on merit, there would be no occasion for the respondent to support the impugned decree. It is only when the respondent supports the decree, according to the express mandate of sub-rule (1) that he can press his cross-objection to any part of the decree or to any finding rendered in the impugned judgment. ( 5. ) I need stress also that as in the case of appeal, so in the case of cross-objections, the remedy in each case being a creature of the statute, the right which is created as also its ambit shall be governed solely by the relevant statutory provision itself. It needs to be further stressed that a party has a right, albeit absolute (under section 96, Civil procedure Code); to go by way of an appeal and he need not wait for the other side to file an appeal and only then to take a cross-objection. It needs to be further stressed that a party has a right, albeit absolute (under section 96, Civil procedure Code); to go by way of an appeal and he need not wait for the other side to file an appeal and only then to take a cross-objection. But if a party has deliberately waived his right to file an appeal and has opted for availing the qualified alternative remedy of cross-objections, he cannot urge that his contingent right was not of a qualified remedy, but of an indefeasible and absolute remedy as is contended in this court before me by Shri Katare. Not only the judicial dicta, but the plain language of sub-rule (1) of rule 22 of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code leaves no room for consideration of Shri Katares contention and I must say that counsels reliance on a bench decision of this Court in Satyabhamadevi ( 1974 MPLJ 906 = 1975 JLJ 57 ) is wholly misconceived as also meritless. The only question which arose in that case was, whether cross-objections could be filed in a Letters Patent appeal filed in the High Court and this Court took the view that though Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code did apply even in una a case, filing a cross-objection, the leave of Single Judge had to be obtained as Clause 10 of Letters Patent required leave to be obtained for filing the appeal itself. ( 6. ) FOR all the foregoing reasons, I hold this appeal to be misconceived and not maintainable and accordingly, it is dismissed without any order, however, as to costs. Appeal dismissed.