Judgment :- 1. The substantial question of law arising for consideration in this second appeal is whether the respondents-defendants are entitled to the benefit of S.4A(1) (a) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969. 2. In the suit filed in 1964 for redemption of a mortgage, the trial court passed a preliminary decree for redemption rejecting the contentions of the defendants that the plaintiffs have no title. The question of value of improvements was relegated to the final decree. Appeal and Second Appeal were dismissed. While so. Act 1 of 1964 was amended by Act 35 of 1969 incorporating S.4A among other provisions. In the final decree proceedings defendants claimed protection under S.4A(1)(a). That claim was upheld by the trial court and the appellate court. Hence this second appeal. 3. Thevi and her brother Madan mortgaged 23 cents of land with an old shed in Vanchiyoor, Trivandrum for 700 fanams in favour of two persons by name Krishnan and Kunjan under Ext. P1 in 1082. Mortgagees assigned their rights in favour of one Kunchena Krishnan in 1089. After the death of Madan, Kunchi the mortgagor gave Ext. P3 superior mortgage on 25-10-1099 in favour of one Neelakandan Krishnan for 1400 fanams reserving 700 fanams with him for redeeming Ext. P1 mortgage. Instead of redeeming the mortgage the superior mortgagee assigned his right to the assignee-mortgagee Kunchena Krishnan by Ext. P4 in the year 1101. He in turn assigned his rights to defendants 1 to 6 under Ext. P5 on 17-9-1018. 4. In order to claim protection under S.4A (1)(a), the person must be a mortgagee with possession of the land and be must have been holding the land for a continuous period of not less than fifty years as on 1-1-1970, Under Explanation II to S.4A, the period during which the predecessor-in-interest or predecessors¬in-interest was or were in possession shall also be taken into account in computing the continuous period of fifty years. In this case, the qualifying period of fifty years as on 1-1-1970 will be satisfied only if continuous possession is calculated from 29-7-1082 on which date the original mortgage Ext. PI was executed. If calculated from the period of Ext. P3 superior mortgage in 1099 the condition will not be satisfied. In this case, the qualifying period of fifty years as on 1-1-1970 will be satisfied only if continuous possession is calculated from 29-7-1082 on which date the original mortgage Ext. PI was executed. If calculated from the period of Ext. P3 superior mortgage in 1099 the condition will not be satisfied. Therefore the question for consideration is the date from which possession as mortgagee has to be calculated for considering the claim under S.4A(1) (a). The intention of the Legislature seems to be to protect the mortgagees with long periods of possession as such as on 1-1-1970 from being evicted. The contention of the appellants is that as soon as the assignee-mortgagee Kunchena Krishnan took assignment of Ext. P3 superior mortgage on 25-7-1101 under Ext. P4 his mortgage right got extinguished or merged with the superior mortgage right and thereafter there is no question of the original mortgage being alive or in existence. According to them, for the purpose of claiming protection under S.4A(1) (a) Kunchena Krishnan and thereafter defendants 1 to 6 are entitled to claim possession only from 25-7-1101. 5. What is relevant is continuous possession of the mortgagee. In computing such continuous possession as on 1-1-1970 as mortgagee the only period of absence of direct possession that could be included is the period during which the predecessor-in-interest or predecessors-in-interest was or were holding the property. Predecessor-in-interest more or less indicates a person who has preceded another in a given state, position, right etc. Identity of interest seems to be involved in it. A person having a bigger interest may not be able to claim the possession of a person having only lesser interest as the possession of his predecessor. A superior mortgagee who redeems a prior mortgage as directed and with the funds reserved by the mortgagor may not be able to say that the prior mortgagee whose interest he redeemed is his predecessor-in-interest. In terms of the provisions of S.92 of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be construed that he got himself subrogated to the position of the mortgagee. The release deeds may be only evidence of extinguishment of an inferior interest and that must enure only to the mortgagor. It is being done with the money of the mortgagor and at his direction. The release deeds may be only evidence of extinguishment of an inferior interest and that must enure only to the mortgagor. It is being done with the money of the mortgagor and at his direction. The possession of the original mortgagee cannot be claimed by the redeeming superior mortgagee for the purpose of calculating continuous possession in order to claim protection under S.4A(1)(a). This is all what the decisions in Raghavan Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai (1979 KLT. 510 (FB)) and Raghavan Vaidyan v. Parvathi Amma (1973 KLT 1024), relied on by the appellants lay down. Raghavan Nair v, Anandavally Amma (1986 KLT 623) referred to by the appellants also only held that S.4A envisages direct and immediate possession and possession of a sub-mortgagee is not possession of the mortgagee for the purpose of calculating continuous possession. The analogy of the possession of a member of a tarwad redeeming a mortgage has also no bearing for our purpose. 6. The position in this case is entirely different. There cannot be any dispute that Kunchena Krishnan who got assignment of the original mortgage was entitled to treat the original mortgagees as his predecessors-in-interest. For that reasoning defendants 1 to 6 are also entitled to treat them as predecessors-in-interest. The superior 'mortgagee has not redeemed the prior mortgage as directed by the mortgagor. He has only assigned his rights to the assignee-mortgagee who was already in possession. So far as the mortgagee who was already in actual physical possession either by himself or through his predecessors is concerned, there is no further question of treating anybody as predecessors-in-interest simply because he added to his credit a superior mortgage right also. By taking a superior mortgage for an additional amount from the mortgagor or by taking assignment of a superior mortgage given by the mortgagor to somebody else he was not divested of his possession, but he goes on to have continuous possession in continuation of bis earlier possession. The position may be different if the superior mortgagee redeems him. Simply by taking a superior right if the original mortgagee or his assignee loses the right which he otherwise had if he had not taken the superior right it will really be anomalous. It may be against the spirit with which S. 4A was introduced. The position may be different if the superior mortgagee redeems him. Simply by taking a superior right if the original mortgagee or his assignee loses the right which he otherwise had if he had not taken the superior right it will really be anomalous. It may be against the spirit with which S. 4A was introduced. In such a situation destruction of his right by the fiction of merger or extinguishment is not what the Legislature might have intended when it wanted to protect the mortgagees having possession of fifty years or more as on 1-1-1970. Therefore, I am of opinion that the courts below were right in holding that defendants are entitled to fixity of tenure under S.4A(1)(a). 7. The next contention was that the property is not agricultural land and the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not applicable since it is exempted under S.3(1)(ii). S.3(1)(ii) of the Land Reforms Act exempts from the provisions of Chapter IT leases only of buildings, including a house, shop or warehouse and the site thereof, with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto. Kerala Land Reforms Act is a measure of agrarian reform. As held in Sankaran Nambissan v. Sarvothama Rao (1972 KLT 891) and Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala (1972 KLT 411), the Act would apply only to agricultural lands in the sense of Art.3IA(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution. Grant of fixity of tenure and creation of deemed tenancy could only be with reference to agricultural lands. In this case the property is within the limits of Trivandrum Corporation. In Madhavan Thampi v. Padmavathy (1974 KLT 310) it was observed: "The limits of the Corporation are frequently extended and it is not correct to say that all properties in the city limits are non-agricultural lands. The property at present contains a number of trees and a building. The income from the property will be more than the rent that may be got if the building is let out. At the time of mortgage nearly 20 coconut trees (yielding and young plants), six or seven jack trees and a number of Other trees like areca, tamarind, mango were in it. That shows that the property is agricultural is character both at the time of the mortgage and on 1-1-1970. That being so it is an agricultural land. At the time of mortgage nearly 20 coconut trees (yielding and young plants), six or seven jack trees and a number of Other trees like areca, tamarind, mango were in it. That shows that the property is agricultural is character both at the time of the mortgage and on 1-1-1970. That being so it is an agricultural land. S.4A will apply to this property." In this case, the property is 23 cents. It was having 33 coconut trees most of which were bearing. There were several other bearing trees and an old thatched shed. Simply because the property is in the Corporation area, it cannot be said that it is not an agricultural land. By no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the land is appurtenant to the building. Even though there is no clear evidence regarding the comparative income of the building and the land, the circumstances indicate that importance is to the agricultural income of the property. Therefore, there is no merit in the argument that the land is appurtenant to the building and the property is not agricultural land. The defendants are therefore entitled to fixity of tenure as found by the courts below. The second appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.