JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. 1. The Petitioner is a judgment-debtor in an ejectment suit and has filed this petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 02.11.1985 passed by the Small Cause Court, Allahabad (Annexure 7') and those passed by the revisional court on 03.08.1985 (Annexure 9') dismissing Petitioner's objections against maintainability of the execution application. 2. Brief facts are that a suit for ejectment by the original landlord Lax man Prasad was decreed against the Petitioner on 14.07.1979 and despite revision the decree was maintained. Petitioner's writ was also dismissed by the High Court. During the pendency of the execution the original decree holder transferred the property to Respondent No. 4 by sale deed dated 01.01.1985 whereupon the purchaser made an application for substitution of her name in the pending execution proceedings. The application was allowed despite several objections raised by the Petitioner and a revision too also dismissed. By means of the present writ petition he seeks quashing of the aforesaid orders. 3. The petition has not been admitted as yet. The main Respondent, who has put in appearance, has filed a counter affidavit setting out all the relevant facts. The Petitioner has been heard at length on several dates. 4. The first submission was that there was neither any valid assignment by the original decree holder nor the sale deed forming the basis of assignment had been duly proved, besides being vague for want of particulars. 5. In paragraphs 15 & 16 of the petition the fact of sale of the property has not been disputed. What has been challenged is only that no particulars of the decree were mentioned in the sale deed and Respondent No. 4 has no right to execute the same. It was also asserted that only a private copy of the sale deed had been filed which could not be legally proved. These allegations have been denied in the counter affidavit wherein it has been clearly asserted that the original sale deed had been filed before the executing court and the vendor himself had duly proved it. In an affidavit vendor had also admitted having transferred the property to Respondent No. 4. These allegations have been denied in the counter affidavit wherein it has been clearly asserted that the original sale deed had been filed before the executing court and the vendor himself had duly proved it. In an affidavit vendor had also admitted having transferred the property to Respondent No. 4. In these circumstances I do not find any sufficient reason to accept the version of the Petitioner particularly when he has placed no other material on record to show that only an ordinary copy of the sale deed had been filed. While exercising writ jurisdiction the court ought not to go into disputed questions of fact and when two courts have found that the sale deed had been duly executed the deserve to be accepted. 6. The next question raised was that the application for bringing on record the name of Respondent No. 4 as decree holder in the execution proceeding was captioned as one u/s 151 and Order I, Rule 10 of the Code and such an application was not legal. It is stressed that Respondent was bound by this caption and assistance of no other provision can be sought. This submission is totally devoid of any merit. It is the substance of the application which is material and not the caption which is assigned to an application by any party. It is true that Order 1, Rule 10 CPC only applies to suits where under the court has the power either to add or to strike off the name of any party as a Plaintiff or Defendant. Section 141 make the procedure laid down in the code in respect of suits applicable to miscellaneous proceedings also and the only exception made therein is a proceeding Under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 146 of the Code lays down that any application or a proceeding that could be taken by a person may also be taken by or against the person claiming under him. Reading together these two Sections it is obvious that the assignee of a decree would also acquire all rights of the assignor. It has not been disputed before me that Section 146 applies to execution proceedings also. In that view of the matter if the assignment takes place during the pendency of execution proceedings the assignee has a right to apply and take those proceedings. It has not been disputed before me that Section 146 applies to execution proceedings also. In that view of the matter if the assignment takes place during the pendency of execution proceedings the assignee has a right to apply and take those proceedings. Taking of the proceedings as envisaged by the Section is not limited to taking out only of fresh proceedings and would also include continuance of a pending proceeding. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has seriously assailed this position. According to him aid of Section 146 CPC cannot be taken since the application had not been made under that provision. The right to continue the proceeding has been granted u/s 146 but how is this to be done is laid down in Order XXII for suit and Order XXI Rule 16 for execution proceedings. Under Order XXII Rule 12 the applicability of Rules 3, 4 and 8 only as regards execution proceedings is excluded. From this it naturally follows that other provisions of Order XXII would apply to execution proceedings except the above three rules. These provisions save abatement of an execution proceeding on the death of the decree-holder for failure of his legal representatives to come on the record. Similarly Rule 4 deals with the case of the Defendants. Rule 8 applies when a Plaintiff becomes an insolvent. The very nature of the provisions contained in Rule 12 shows that barring three cases covered by Rules 3, 4 and 8 of the Order all other provisions will be applicable with full force to execution proceedings. Much effort was- made by the learned Counsel to impress that this was not so. However, he seems to have failed to notice a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kunwar Bhagwat Pratap v. Keshav Shukla 1970 ALJ 56 where the court, after examining a large number of authorities, observed as under ; If Rule 12 of Order XXII CPC is strictly construed, then the effect would be that the legal representatives of the decree holder who died during the pendency of the execution petition filed by him cannot be substituted in his place in the execution proceedings nor can the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor be so substituted. In other words, the execution proceeding shall abate and thus a situation will arise which Rule 12 of Order XXII has precisely provided to guard against. In other words, the execution proceeding shall abate and thus a situation will arise which Rule 12 of Order XXII has precisely provided to guard against. Considering the general effect of non applicability of Rules 3 and 4 it should be held that that a suit may abate on the death of a Plaintiff or a Defendant if his legal representatives are not brought on the record within a period prescribed by law, there is no such abatement in the case of an application in execution and the proceedings shall continue even on the death of a decree holder by his legal representatives and on the death of a judgment debtor against his legal representatives. ". 8. Correctness of this dictum can also be tested with the aid of an extreme case by way of an example; if any execution application was filed on the last date of limitation and the decree holder dies during its pendency can the same be continued by his legal representative from that very stage or he will have to apply afresh for executing the decree, which would be already beyond limitation? If the argument of the Petitioner's learned Counsel was to be accepted then no substitution in place of the decree holder can be made in view of the language of Order 21 Rule 10 CPC as interpreted by him and only a fresh execution application can be made by such legal representative although it would then be barred by time. If this view is accepted the decree cannot at all be executed. As rightly pointed out in 1970 Allahabad 56 i supra) it was precisely to meet such a situation that Rule 12 indirectly provides that the execution shall not abate. If the execution does not abate then in the absence of substitution of this legal representative, how will the execution proceed? Neither can the execution proceed without some one being brought on the record nor will it abate. Can it remain on the file undisposed of? The answer to this must come in the negative for it would lead to ridiculous or even drastic results. If such be the result then to do justice recourse to the provisions of Section 151 CPC alone would be the only remedy. Since an application to this effect has infact been moved by Respondent it cannot be said to be not maintainable. If such be the result then to do justice recourse to the provisions of Section 151 CPC alone would be the only remedy. Since an application to this effect has infact been moved by Respondent it cannot be said to be not maintainable. The whole argument is thus devoid of any substance and must be rejected. 9. In that very case the court, while considering the provisions of Order 21, Rule 16 CPC observed as under: Order XXI, Rule 16 CPC has been interpreted as giving right to the legal representative of a decree holder to continue proceedings in execution on the death of the original decree holder rather than compelling him to start a fresh execution application. The execution application may be in the form provided for fresh execution application under Rule 11 of Order XXI for want of any other form, but the right of the legal representatives of the decree-holder to continue the execution proceedings from the stage at which the original decree holder died is there. It was, therefore, not necessary for a fresh execution application to be moved by the legal representatives of the judgment debtor are concerned, the execution could continue u/s 50(1) of the CPC against them as well. 10. In view of this clear and binding decision of a Division Bench of this Court, I cannot agree with Petitioner's submissions in this regard. 10. In view of this clear and binding decision of a Division Bench of this Court, I cannot agree with Petitioner's submissions in this regard. Rule 16 of Order 21 CPC is in following terms: 16 Application for execution by transferee of decree--Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree holder: Provided that, where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until (he Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution J-- Provided also that, where a decree foe the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others. Explanation Nothing in this rule shall affect the provisions of Section 146, and a transferee of rights in the property, which is the subject matter of the suit, may apply for execution of the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by this rule ". 11. The rule itself lays down that in the event of transfer of decree holder's interest by (i) assignment in writing or (ii) by operation of law, the transferee also acquires a right to apply for execution to the Court which passed it but only after issue of notice both to the transferor and to the judgment-debtor. 12. According to the Petitioner, Rule 16 only gives a right to the assignee to apply for execution of the decree but does not envisage substitution of his name for the original decree holder. This only puts too narrow and technical an interpretation of this provision and cannot be accepted. In fact the language is only suggestive of the fact that the assignee has also the same right to apply for execution as his assignor had. This only puts too narrow and technical an interpretation of this provision and cannot be accepted. In fact the language is only suggestive of the fact that the assignee has also the same right to apply for execution as his assignor had. It does not, however, bar the substitution of his name in a pending execution for the original decree holder. 13. A similar matter came up before the Supreme Court also in Dhani Ram Gupta and Others Vs. Lala Sri Ram and Another, AIR 1980 SC 157 against the decision of the High Court holding that, "assignee of a decree had no right to execute the decree until the assignment was recognised by the court". In appeal against this order the Supreme Court relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dwar Buksh v. Fatik Jali ILR Cal 250 from which the following observations were quoted with approval: If, however, there is an assignment pending proceedings in execution taken by the decree holder, I see nothing in the Code which debars the Court from recognising the transferee as the person to go on with the execution. The recognition of the Court is no doubt necessary before he can execute the decree but it is the written assignment and not the recognition which makes him the transferee in law. 14. Thus from all that has been said above, the clear legal picture that emerges is that the court can permit substitution of the assignee of decree for the original decree holder in a pending execution and it is not always necessary that the assignee should launch a fresh execution proceeding. I hold accordingly. 15. The question as to whether the sale deed was vague is also without any substance inasmuch as it is no body's case that except for the decree in question there was another decree between the parties or the original decree holder and the Petitioners were having the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of any other property except the house in question. The sale deed clearly mention that House No. 172, Pan Dareeba, Allahabad was sold which is the same as the property in dispute. It is also an undisputed fact that in respect of this house a decree for eviction had been obtained by the vendor against Dulari Devi and others. The sale deed clearly mention that House No. 172, Pan Dareeba, Allahabad was sold which is the same as the property in dispute. It is also an undisputed fact that in respect of this house a decree for eviction had been obtained by the vendor against Dulari Devi and others. In the sale deed it is recited that vendors suit for arrears of rent and ejectment has also been decreed and its execution proceeding is pending in which certain objections have been got filed at the instance of the judgment debtor and the matter was pending in the Court. The sale deed permitted substitution of the vendee for a vendor and to carry on the necessary proceedings pursuant to that decree in execution thereof including the right to obtain full possession over the property. Boundaries of the property sold fully tally with the disputed property and there is nothing to show that these do not pertain to the same house. Mere omission to mention either the suit number or particulars of the execution proceedings in the sale deed cannot therefore invalidate the assignment as being vague. All these aspects have been duly considered by the executing and revisional courts in their orders which are being assailed in this writ petition. 16. It is lastly urged that the assignee merely prayed for substitution of her name and not to execute the decree. Reliance for this is placed on a Supreme Court decision in Jugal Kishor v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376 . However, a perusal of the facts of that case would show how at variance are they with these of the present case and the controversy involved therein was also quite different. In that case the assignee had filed an execution application merely for declaration to establish his right to execute the decree. The portion of the decision on which the learned Counsel was trying to place reliance was only the minority view. For all these reasons the argument has no merit. 17. I have given reasoned decision only because the learned Counsel for the Petitioner prayed that all his submissions should be considered and taken note of. 18. Thus after considering all the submissions of the Petitioner I do not find any merit in any of them and the petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 19. 17. I have given reasoned decision only because the learned Counsel for the Petitioner prayed that all his submissions should be considered and taken note of. 18. Thus after considering all the submissions of the Petitioner I do not find any merit in any of them and the petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 19. In the end the learned Counsel for the Petitioner orally prayed for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court not knowing perhaps that such a prayer could not legally be made in this case in view of clear provisions contained in Article 133(3) of the Constitution. The prayer, therefore, does not even deserve any consideration. Stay order, if any, shall stand vacated.