JUDGMENT : Sharad Manohar, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the application made by the Appellant under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation in connection with the injury received by him by virtue of the accident caused to him during the course of his employment and arising out of his employment with the Respondent company, viz., M/s. South India Corporation (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay. 2. The facts of the case, partly admitted and partly in dispute, may be stated as follows: The Appellant was employed as a workman to work on the ship 'Pamilla Tide' belonging to M/s. Tidex International Ins., which ship was working for the O.N.G.C, at the relevant time. The Appellant was doing the work as a painter and chipper. There is no dispute that his monthly salary was Rs. 450/- and he was employed to work on the ship from a period sometime prior to October, 1977. The accident in question took place on 5.11.1977 and as the evidence goes the Applicant was in the employment for about 3 months before the date of the accident. As will be presently pointed out, the contention of the Respondent company has been that the Applicant was not their employee and hence they were not liable to pay any compensation to the Appellant. One important document, which is part of I he record in this Court, may be referred to here at this stage itself. On 24.10.1977, the Respondent company had written a letter addressed to the Inspector of Police, Yellow-gate Police Station, Bombay. This is what the letter states: Dear Sir, Kindly arrange to issue temporary documentary permit for one week from 24.10.1977 to 30.10.1977 to our employee, Mr. Mohammed Haniff who has been appointed to transit business in the docks in connection with the work of our firm. The particulars are mentioned thereafter in which not only the name of the present Appellant is mentioned as the employee of the Respondent company, but even the address of the work is mentioned as M/s. Tidex International Ins. and the purpose of the visit is mentioned to be 'to work on boat' 'Pamilla Tide'. It is not in dispute that no appointment letter as such was given to the Appellant. and the purpose of the visit is mentioned to be 'to work on boat' 'Pamilla Tide'. It is not in dispute that no appointment letter as such was given to the Appellant. Hence this is the most important document showing that the Appellant was the employee of the Respondent company itself and that it was the Respondent company who had employed him to work on the ship 'Pamilla Tide' belonging to Tidex International Ins. As will be presently pointed out, no unequivocal evidence to the contrary has been produced by the Respondent company at all to prove that it was M/s. Tidex International and not the Respondent company who was the employer of the Appellant at the relevant time. 3. Then we come to the case and claim of the Appellant before the lower court. (a) He has stated in the examination-in-chief that on 5.11.1977 while he was in the employment of the Respondent company he met with an accident on the ship 'Pamilla Tide' in the Bombay High. He stated that his duty hours were from 7.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. and that his monthly wages were Rs. 450/-. He was doing the work of chipping and painting and staying in the ship itself. He further states that he was working in the said ship for about 2 months prior to the date of the accident. He produced the letter, dated 24th October 1977, referred to above, which shows that according to the Respondent company he was the employee of the company and not of the ship or of Tidex International Ins. who was the owner of the ship. He has also stated that he was required to work also beyond the office hours. (b) In para 2 of his evidence, he stated that the accident took place at 4.30 p.m. when he had gone to the bathroom to wash his hands. He stated that the laundry machine was there and it was working at that time. The bathroom is just next near the laundry machine. The sea was rough at that time. The Applicant's feet slipped and he fell on the laundry machine and received injuries including the fracture of his right hand. He stated that the laundry machine was there and it was working at that time. The bathroom is just next near the laundry machine. The sea was rough at that time. The Applicant's feet slipped and he fell on the laundry machine and received injuries including the fracture of his right hand. He stated that there was no board in the bathroom giving warning and that nobody had ever instructed him not to go near the laundry machine and that bathroom was the only place where he could wash his hands. He further stated that there was no operator near the laundry machine and that person who washed the clothes works the machine. He also stated that he was removed to the Breach Candy Hospital by the Captain of the ship and a helicopter was required to be used for that purpose. He also stated that it was the Respondent company which bore all the expenses incurred by him in the hospital. (c) In para 3 of his evidence, he has stated that he had made application to the company for giving him work and he produced a copy of the said application. He further stated that the company did not give him any work nor did it give him compensation. He also referred to the notice sent by him to the company, through his advocate and produced before the court the copy of the notice as also the reply received from the company. Although it is stated in his evidence that he was producing the copy of the notice, my attention was not invited to the said copy. However, the notice appears to be dated 21st June, 1978 given by Mr. P.A. Nainan, Advocate, on behalf of the Appellant to the Respondent company, claiming compensation in connection with the injuries received by the Appellant in the accident in question. The company's reply to the notice is dated 3rd July, 1978 which is on record. That reply refers to the Appellant's notice dated 21st June, 1978. This is what the reply states: We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 21st June, 1978 which we received on 3rd July, 1978. We are unable to understand the contents of this letter as we have nothing to do with the employment of your seaman. That reply refers to the Appellant's notice dated 21st June, 1978. This is what the reply states: We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 21st June, 1978 which we received on 3rd July, 1978. We are unable to understand the contents of this letter as we have nothing to do with the employment of your seaman. We understand that you have already written directly to Tidex International and perhaps you may receive reply from them directly. In the circumstances, we repudiate any liability. (d) It is, thus, clear that, according to the company, the Appellant was not an employee of the company at all. The reply dated 3rd July, 1978 does not state that the Applicant was an employee of Tidex International. It only makes a reference to the letter allegedly written by the Applicant to M/s. Tidex International Ins. No such letter written by the Applicant before the letter dated 21st June, 1978, is brought on record. At least my attention was not invited to the same and I have not noticed any such notice in the record although I have gone through the entire record myself. However, there is a subsequent letter dated 6.10.1978 written by the Appellant to M/s. Tidex International Ins. In that letter, it is nowhere stated by the Applicant that at the time of the accident, he was in the employment of M/s. Tidex International Ins. But it is stated in that letter that during the leave period he had received only a part of the pay and that he should be paid the balance of the pay and that he should be given employment for some light work and that compensation should be paid to him for disablement of his hand. No reply appears to have been received by the Applicant to this letter from M/s. Tidex International Ins. The instant application, out of which the present appeal arises, was thereafter filed by the Appellant and was entertained by the court under the Workmen's Compensation Act on 15.11.1978. By the application, it was the contention of the Applicant that he was an employee of the Respondent company, that the accident arose out of and during the course of the employment and hence, he was entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent company on the basis of permanent total disablement of the amount of Rs. 29,400/-. By the application, it was the contention of the Applicant that he was an employee of the Respondent company, that the accident arose out of and during the course of the employment and hence, he was entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent company on the basis of permanent total disablement of the amount of Rs. 29,400/-. He also prayed for interest and penalty, payable under the law. 4. The claim was resisted by the Respondent company on various grounds. But the main grounds on which the claim is rejected by the trial court are two: (a) that the Applicant was not an employee of the Respondent company; and (b) that the accident did not arise out of and during the course of the employment. 5. In support of his claim, the Applicant examined himself as also the doctor, who had treated him, viz., Dr. Pandit. The Applicant also examined one Abdul Aziz Peersab, who was working in a shift in the Bombay High on the same ship on which the Applicant was working in November, 1977. The Respondent company did not examine any person to prove that the Applicant was not working as an employee of the company on ship 'Pamilla Tide' with a view to rebut the inference, if any, arising out of the evidence of the Applicant that he was working as an employee of the Respondent company. But the Respondent company examined one Jungher Kunter. However, it appears that he was examined only for the purpose of showing that the accident did not take place during the course of the employee it or out of the employment. After examining the evidence, the learned Additional Commissioner held that the Applicant had not proved the Respondent company to be his employer. He also held that the Applicant had failed to prove that the accident took place out of the employment. However, on tie question as to whether the Applicant was entitled to the amount of claim or not, he recorded the finding that in case the Applicant had proved the Respondent company to be his employer, then the Applicant would have been entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 17,640/- plus interest plus penalty u/s 4-A and costs, if imposed. However, in view of his finding that the Applicant has failed to establish the Respondent company's liability to pay compensation, the application was dismissed by the learned Commissioner. 17,640/- plus interest plus penalty u/s 4-A and costs, if imposed. However, in view of his finding that the Applicant has failed to establish the Respondent company's liability to pay compensation, the application was dismissed by the learned Commissioner. 6. I will first examine the evidence led by the Applicant in relation to the question whether the Applicant was the employee of the Respondent company or not. In this connection, the most important letter that is there on record is the one which is already referred to above. The letter, dated 24.10.1977, is written by the Respondent company itself addressed to the Inspector of Police. The relevant part of the letter is already set out by me above. From the letter, it is clear that immediately after the Applicant's employment the Respondent company had owned the Applicant as its own employee; not as the employee of M/s. Tidex International Ins. This letter is produced by the Applicant at the very beginning of his evidence. No evidence is led by the Respondent company to repel the inference emanating from this letter. In fact no explanation is coming forth from the Respondent company as to why it was stated in that letter that the Applicant was the company's employee. In fact it is not explained at all by the company as to what was the occasion for the company to write a letter to the Inspector of Police if the Applicant was not the employee of the Respondent company but was the employee of M/s. Tidex International Ins. 7. We have then the various vouchers for the medical bills paid by the Respondent company. It will be recalled that after the accident the Applicant was removed by the officers of the ship to the Breach Candy Hospital by helicopter. It appears that the relevant expenses for transporting him by the helicopter were paid by M/s. Tidex International Ins. But we do not know whether M/s. Tidex International have recovered those expenses back from the Respondent company. There is no evidence on that point led by the parties, one way or the other. We have on record the various bills sent by the Breach Candy Hospital to the Respondent company as also to M/s. Tidex International Ins. But we find that all those bills are paid by the Respondent company and not by M/s. Tidex International Ins. There is no evidence on that point led by the parties, one way or the other. We have on record the various bills sent by the Breach Candy Hospital to the Respondent company as also to M/s. Tidex International Ins. But we find that all those bills are paid by the Respondent company and not by M/s. Tidex International Ins. In some cases, it is mentioned that the Respondent company was acting on behalf of M/s. Tidex International Ins. But I will refer to that aspect of the bills a little later. (a) The 1st bill is written by the Secretary to the Breach Candy Hospital which is dated 24th November, 1977. It is addressed to the Respondent company. It is a bill of Rs. 2,146/-. There is not even any reference to Tidex International in that bill. (b) Then we have got the next bill dated 19th December, 1977. It is no doubt addressed to Tidex International C/o. South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. (c) We then have a 3rd bill dated 19th December, 1977 for Rs. 3,000/-. That too is addressed to Tidex International C/o. South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. (d) There is a similar bill dated 19th December, 1977 for Rs. 150/- addressed to M/s. Tidex International C/o. South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. It will be thus, seen that all the three bills dated 19th December, 1977 are addressed to M/s. Tidex International C/o. South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. (e) But more importantly, we have the bill of Dr. Merchant dated 20th December, 1977 for Rs. 200/-, which bill is addressed to the Chief Accountant, South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. and not to M/s. Tidex International Ins. (f) Similarly, we have the voucher dated 30th January, 1978 showing that the South India Corporation had paid a sum of Rs. 850/- as leave pay to Mohammad Hanif, the present Appellant, for half his wages for the months of November and December, 1977. No doubt the voucher showed that they had debited 'M.V. Pamilla Tide' for the said sum, but the bill is paid by South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. (g) Then we have the bill of the Breach Candy Hospital dated 3rd February, 1978. No doubt the voucher showed that they had debited 'M.V. Pamilla Tide' for the said sum, but the bill is paid by South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt. Ltd. (g) Then we have the bill of the Breach Candy Hospital dated 3rd February, 1978. It is addressed to South India Corporation (Agency) Pvt.' Ltd. (h) Then we have the voucher dated 4.3.1978 of the South India Corporation for payment of half of the monthly wages of the Applicant for the months of January and February 1978. No doubt the voucher states that the payment is made on behalf of Tidex International Ins. (i) Then we have the bill dated 6th March 1978, addressed by the Breach Candy Hospital to South India Corporation for a sum of Rs. 90/-. (j) Then we have a letter dated (illegible) sent by Tidex International to South India Corporation directing South India Corporation to pay the salary for January and February, 1978. It is clear that the voucher dated 4.3.1978 produced by the Respondent company relates to this direction. That voucher showed that a sum of Rs. 750/- was paid by South India Corporation for the wages during the period of sick leave for the months of January and February, 1978 on behalf of M/s. Tidex International Ins. (k) Similar voucher dated 1.4.1978 is also produced showing Applicant's wages for the month of March, 1978 debiting 'Pamilla Tide' in that behalf. (l) Similar voucher for the payment made by South India Corporation to the Applicant as payment of his sick leave salary for the month of April is also produced. It is dated 2nd May, 1978 and the account of 'M.V. Pamilla Tide' is debited by the Respondent in that behalf. (m) Then we have got the bill sent by the Breach Candy Hospital to the South India Corporation for the medical expenses aggregated to Rs. 1,787/-. It will be, thus, seen that some of the bills were sent by the Hospital directly to the South India Corporation, whereas a few of them had been sent to M/s. Tidex International C/o. South India Corporation. In this connection it is to be noted that the injured person, viz. the Applicant, was removed to the hospital by the officers of the Tidex International Ins. In this connection it is to be noted that the injured person, viz. the Applicant, was removed to the hospital by the officers of the Tidex International Ins. But it is not explained by the Respondent company as to how a large number of bills came to be sent by the hospital directly to South India Corporation. No doubt the vouchers produced by the Respondent company show that the payment was made by the company on behalf of M/s. Tidex International Ins. But that fact does not prove that the Appellant was not the employee of Respondent company. No evidence is led by the Respondent company to prove the nature of the agreement between itself and Tidex International. It is possible that the Respondent company makes available own employees to Tidex International for working on its ship 'Pamilla Tide and debits that company for the salary paid lo the employee as also the compensation paid to that employee or the medical expenses paid to that employee. There may be further charges received by the company from Tidex International on account of making available to the corporation the labour as and when required by the corporation. The mere fad that the medical bills are paid by the Respondent company on behalf of the corporation would not mean that the Applicant was not the employee of the Respondent company. The inference arising out of the letter dated 24th October, 1977 is, thus, in no way wiped off by any of these letters and vouchers. If at all, the letters written by the Breach Candy Hospital go a long way to prove that even though the officers of Tidex International transported the Applicant to the Breach Candy Hospital, some of the officers of the hospital know the Respondent company to be the employer of the Applicant. The claim made by the hospital with the Respondent company is otherwise unintelligible. No witness is examined nor any document is produced by the Respondent in that behalf. Beyond coming out with a blank repudiation of liability, the Respondent company has not led any evidence for that purpose. 8. Having regard to all these circumstances, to my mind, the view taken by the learned Commissioner that the Applicant was not in the employment of the Respondent company cannot be sustained. The view is based upon ignorance of all the circumstances and the documents on record. 8. Having regard to all these circumstances, to my mind, the view taken by the learned Commissioner that the Applicant was not in the employment of the Respondent company cannot be sustained. The view is based upon ignorance of all the circumstances and the documents on record. Moreover, a very strong adverse inference has got to be raised against the Respondent company for not leading the evidence which could be easily adduced for proving that the Applicant was employed directly by the Tidex International and not by the Respondent company. Moreover, the Respondent company has not led any evidence explaining its letter dated 24th October, 1977, the relevant portion of which is already extracted above. Having regard to all these circumstances, I must hold that the Applicant has established his case of being an employee of the Respondent company at the time of the accident in question. 9. This brings me to the question as to whether the accident in question took place during the course of the employment and arose out of the employment. In this connection, I have merely to refer to the evidence of the Applicant which has gone on record practically unchallenged. The Applicant has stated in his examination-in-chief that his duty hours were from 7.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. and the accident took place at 4.30 p.m. There is no cross-examination of the Applicant as regards this statement. Further, he has stated that he had gone to the bathroom to wash his hands, that the laundry machine was near there, working and the sea was then rough. He has further stated that his feet slipped and he fell on the laundry machine and got injury in question. There is no cross-examination of this Applicant on this point. Here, it is further stated by him that there was no board in the bathroom giving any warning, that nobody has ever instructed him no to go near the machine and the bathroom was the only place where labourers could wash their hands. There is no cross-examination of the Applicant on this point. A suggestion was made in the cross-examination that he had told the Captain that the accident took place when he had gone to wash his clothes in the washing machine. The suggestion is denied by him. There is no cross-examination of the Applicant on this point. A suggestion was made in the cross-examination that he had told the Captain that the accident took place when he had gone to wash his clothes in the washing machine. The suggestion is denied by him. But no positive evidence is led by the Respondent company to prove that the Applicant had gone to the washing room for washing his clothes in the machine. 10. The Applicant has examined one more witness Abdul Aziz Peersab. He was working as a painter on the same ship in November, 1977. He has stated that during the night time they (meaning thereby, the Applicant and the witness) were also asked to do the work of filling the boiler with cement. He further stated that they were going to the room in which the laundry machines were there to wash their hands after the cement work was over. He further stated that there was no person sitting in that room, the practice being that the person concerned would start the machine and go away. He further stated that they were washing their clothes in the very room; not in the laundry machine, but by taking water separately. He also stated that nobody had warned them and instructed them not to go into that room that no board was there to that effect. He also stated that he could read and their signatures are not taken on any written instructions. In the cross-examination, he stated that he was with the Applicant at the time when the Captain was with him. He stated that the Captain and the entire crew rushed to the spot on hearing the shouts. But nobody was prepared to remove the Applicant. He saw that the Captain and four persons carried and brought the injured on the deck which was on the same floor. He stated unequivocally that Hanif did not then tell the Captain that he was washing the clothes. 11. This then is the state of oral evidence led by the Applicant. Let me now turn to kind of oral evidence led by the Respondent. As mentioned above, the Respondent has examined one Jungher Kunter who is working at present as the Captain in the Tidex International. He stated in his examination-in-chief that the Respondent company works as the agent of Tidex International. Let me now turn to kind of oral evidence led by the Respondent. As mentioned above, the Respondent has examined one Jungher Kunter who is working at present as the Captain in the Tidex International. He stated in his examination-in-chief that the Respondent company works as the agent of Tidex International. He stated that the accident took place at about 5.55 p.m. But beyond his words, no documentary evidence is produced by him to prove that statement. The log-book of the ship could have shown this fact. That is not produced. He stated that one Mr. Arol was the Captain of the ship at that time. The witness has further stated that the washing machine on the ship was located at a distance of about 160 feet from the place of the Applicant's work and that the facilities for washing, etc. for the Applicant were all there at the place of the Applicant's work and that the Applicant was there at the place where he was sleeping. He stated that under their safety rules the Applicant could not go to the bathroom. He stated further that they were following the instructions in the Manual of Safe Work Practices. But in the cross-examination, he admitted that they had not explained the safety rules as regards the washing machine to the Applicant, because he had nothing to do with the washing machine and he was not supposed to go there. Beyond the bare words of this witness, there is nothing on record to show that there was any prohibition for this workman from going to the place where this washing machine was situate. It is not denied by this witness that there was a washing place and that the worker did go there. The evidence of the Applicant's witness, Mr. Aziz, is clear on that point. There is nothing in the evidence of this witness Jungher which nullifies that evidence. He admitted that the ship was pitching and rolling while in the sea. He admitted that there could be a signboard showing 'No Entry'. But he admitted that nowhere such a notice was displayed in any ship. When he was asked as to whether anybody could enter the laundry room, he answered that if one takes a key and opens it, he can go inside. He admitted that there could be a signboard showing 'No Entry'. But he admitted that nowhere such a notice was displayed in any ship. When he was asked as to whether anybody could enter the laundry room, he answered that if one takes a key and opens it, he can go inside. A question was put to him as follows: Q.: They (meaning thereby, the workers) were not prevented from entering and using the laundry room? Ans.: I cannot answer this kind of question. The Applicant and his colleagues were sleeping in the ship itself and in between also they were asked to do the work. I was not in the ship at that time of the accident. This is the kind of evidence led by and on behalf of the Respondent to prove that the accident had not taken place during the course of the Applicant's employment and that it did not arise out of the employment. 12. To my mind, the evidence of the Applicant on the question that the accident took place at 4.30 p.m. has gone unchallenged. Moreover, it is the Respondent's own evidence that even after the duty hours the Applicant and similar workers were required to do some of the ship's work. Hence even if it is assumed that the accident took place after 5.00 p.m., as stated by the witness Jungher (which evidence I find it difficult to believe), still it cannot be believed that the accident did not take place during the course of employment. The Applicant and similar other workers were sleeping in the ship itself and as per the evidence of the Captain of the ship they were required to do the work in between as well. If that was so, anything that was done by the workers arising out of the work for which he was employed must be said to have occurred "during the course of the employment" as well as "out of the employment". In this connection, Mr. Solkar invited my attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in P.E. Davis and Co. Vs. Kesto Routh. This is what has been stated by the Calcutta High Court as the principle underlying the expression "out of employment" and "during the course of employment". In this connection, Mr. Solkar invited my attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in P.E. Davis and Co. Vs. Kesto Routh. This is what has been stated by the Calcutta High Court as the principle underlying the expression "out of employment" and "during the course of employment". An injury received within reasonable limits of time and space, for instance, in cases where the workman meets with an accident while i n the act of satisfying thirst or satisfying his bodily needs, in the use of food, drink and even tobacco, is to be regarded as injury received in course of K. Ramabrahmam Vs. The Traffic Manager, ; Cook v. Gateshead Corporation (1944) 37 BWCC 106 ; Scott v. Seymour 1941 All ER 717; Blovelt v. Sawyer (1904) 1 KB 271; Armstrong Whitworth and Co. Ltd. v. Bedford, (1920) 13 BWCC 68 ; Knight v. (Howard) Wall Ltd. (1938) 4 All ER 667 ; Doncaster v. Tinsley Park Colliery Co. Ltd. (1943) 36 BWCC 10 ; Fernley v. Bates 1919) 10 BWCC 308 , relied on. The principle underlying is that an act which is reasonable and necessary, having regard to all the circumstances, though not one which is part of the workman's original duty may be within the sphere of his employment. What is necessary is that there should be a causal connection between the accident and the employment and further that the cause should be a proximate cause and not a very remote cause. But at the same time if a workman in the course of his employment has to be in a particular place and by reason of his being in that particular place has to face a situation in which he receives injuries that fact itself would be a sufficient causal connection between the employment and the accident. Disagreeing with the view taken by the learned Commissioner, therefore, I am of the opinion that the Appellant must be deemed to have made good his case that the accident took place, causing injury to the workman in the course of the employment and out of the employment. 13. The only question then remains is the one of the quantum of compensation. The Applicant had made a claim of Rs. 29,400/- as compensation with interest and penalty and cost. 13. The only question then remains is the one of the quantum of compensation. The Applicant had made a claim of Rs. 29,400/- as compensation with interest and penalty and cost. The learned Commissioner has held that the Applicant would be entitled to the amount of Rs. 17,640/- if the liability of the Respondent company was established. The claim of Rs. 29,400/- is evidently made by the Applicant on the basis of permanent total disability. From the evidence by him, it does not appear that his is the case of permanent disability. Mr. Solkar is right in saying that even though the Applicant's hand has been crippled only for heavy work and not for very light work, nobody would be giving him employment in such condition. But I have to go by the law laid down by the statute and the statute provides that this is a case only of partial disability although it is also a case of permanent disability and the statute provides in the case of such permanent partial disability, the compensation payable would be Rs. 17,640/- if the disability is to be extent of 60%, as is held by the learned Commissioner. I find no reason to disagree with the learned Commissioner on this point. Hence, the claim of the Applicant has got to be allowed to this extent. 14. Then there comes the question as to whether the Respondent should be held liable for penalty and interest provided by Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act. So far as the question of interest is concerned, I find no difficulty in holding that the Applicant must be held entitled to interest at the minimum of 6% prescribed by the statute. Section 4-A requires the employer to deposit the amount with the Commissioner or to pay the same to the workman and if the amount is not deposited within one month from the date when it becomes due, the Commissioner has the power to levy interest. The section does not make it clear as to what is the date from which the interest should be made payable. As per the normal interpretation of Section 4-A, the amount should have become payable, if not on the date of the accident, at least on the date when the claim was made. Mr. The section does not make it clear as to what is the date from which the interest should be made payable. As per the normal interpretation of Section 4-A, the amount should have become payable, if not on the date of the accident, at least on the date when the claim was made. Mr. Solkar referred to some authorities showing that the amount became payable on the date of the accident itself. But I am prepared to assume that if not on the date of the accident, at least on the date of the claim the amount became payable. In the instant case, the claim was made by the Applicant at least on 21st June, 1977, if not earlier. To my mind, having regard to the kind of evidence led by the company, it cannot be held that this repudiation is the honest repudiation or bona fide repudiation. Knowing that the Applicant was a poor person, the company evidently told him to go and do his work. The threat implicit in the company's letter of repudiation dated 3rd July, 1977 is that the company was not prepared even to consider the Applicant's claim unless the court directed the company to loosen the strings of its purse. Such attitude of the company is quite reprehensible. I could have appreciated the bona fides of the Respondent company had the company deposited some amount in the court in order to show its bona fides. But even that has not been done. In these circumstances, to my mind, in the first place, the Applicant must be held entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent at least from the date of the claim, that is to say from 21st June, 1977. Secondly, to my mind, the Respondent is also liable to pay penalty (on account of false repudiation of liability) to the Applicant. The statute gives power to the court to impose penalty to the extent of 50 per cent of the amount due as compensation. (Sic. Penalty of 25 per cent of the amount of compensation) is imposed upon the Respondent. However, it is made clear that no interest shall be payable on the amount of this penalty. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The order passed by the learned Commissioner is hereby set aside and the Respondent company is ordered to pay to the Applicant: (i) the sum of Rs. However, it is made clear that no interest shall be payable on the amount of this penalty. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The order passed by the learned Commissioner is hereby set aside and the Respondent company is ordered to pay to the Applicant: (i) the sum of Rs. 17.640/- as compensation payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act; (ii) the interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 21st June, 1977 till the date of the payment; (iii) 25 per cent of the amount of Rs. 17,640/- as penalty u/s 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Respondent company shall also pay costs to this Applicant in this Court as well as in the trial court. The costs in this Court are quantified at Rs. 1.000/- in all. The costs in the trial court shall be as per the determination of the Commissioner in question.