JUDGMENT - M.S. JAMDAR, J.:---The main question that arises for consideration in this petition relates to the interpretation of Ordinance 310 of the Marathwada University, on the basis of which the application of the petitioner for the eligibility certificate for admission to the four year degree course in engineering, conducted by the engineering colleges within the jurisdiction of the Marathwada University was rejected. 2. The petitioner passed Intermediate Examination held by the Board of Intermediate Education, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh in the year 1984. This Examination is recognised as equivalent to the Higher Secondary Certificate examination of the Maharashtra State Board of Higher Secondary Education. The petitioner secured 84 marks out of 150 in Physics, 72 out of 150 in chemistry and 141 out of 300 in Mathematics in the above referred intermediate examination of the Board of Intermediate Education, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh on the basis of this performance, the petitioner sought admission to the Tulja Bhavani Engineering College for the first year of the four year degree course in engineering. Even though, the overall percentage of the marks obtained by the petitioner in the qualifying subjects. viz Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics was less than 50% the petitioner was admitted by respondent No. 2 on the basis of his interpretation of Ordinance 310. The petitioner was admitted on 22nd July, 1985 and thereafter, he submitted his application for eligibility certificate on 12th September, 1985 through respondent No. 2 who is Principal of Tulja Bhavani Engineering College. This application was not decided by the University till 15th October, 1985 on which date the Dy. Registrar (Examinations) of respondent No. 1, University, inter alia, informed the 2nd respondent vide his letter (copy of which is produced at Ex. J., pg. 37 of the petition) that the petitioner and three other students were found not eligible for admission to the engineering course as the percentage of the marks secured by them in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics was below 50. It appears from the subsequent correspondence, which is produced on record, that respondent No. 2 moved the University authorities by his letter Dt. 24th Oct., 1985 to grant eligibility to the petitioner and other similarly situated students. This request was rejected by the University authorities vide letter Dt. 5th November, 1985. Thereafter second respondent vide his letter Dt. 26th Nov., 1985 (copy of which is produced at Ex. G. Pg. 24th Oct., 1985 to grant eligibility to the petitioner and other similarly situated students. This request was rejected by the University authorities vide letter Dt. 5th November, 1985. Thereafter second respondent vide his letter Dt. 26th Nov., 1985 (copy of which is produced at Ex. G. Pg. 20 of the petition) moved the Vice Chancellor to look into the matter and give his decision in respect of the interpretation put by him on the relevant Ordinance. He also mentioned in that letter his own reasoning in respect of the said interpretation. This is what the Principal stated in his aforesaid letter to the Vice Chancellor :--- "1. This is in reply to your letter Dt. 5th Nov., 1985, I may submit here that since equal weightage is given to all the three subjects in Maharashtra Board, a procedure based on equal weightage should also be applied for calculating percentage of marks from other States, if the marks in three subjects do not carry equal marks there. It is this procedure which has been followed by us as given in our letter dated 24-10-1985. I may add here that the method followed by you in this case is not consistent with the principle of equal weightage reflected in 100 marks each for the subjects allotted by Maharashtra H.S.C. Boards..." However, by his letter Dt. 27th Nov., 1985 (copy of which is at Pg. 17 of the petition), the second respondent informed the petitioner of the decision of the University rejecting his application for admission, adding that the University was being requested the matter and grant eligibility as a special case. 3. Thereafter petitioner's father moved the Vice Chancellor by his application Dt. 17th Dec., 1985. But by the letter Dt. 24th Dec., 1985 (Ex. K to the petition, Pg. 35), he was informed by the Dy. Registrar (Examination) that the reply regarding the case of his son was already sent to the Principal and that the said reply holds good. Thereafter petitioner's father made a representation to the Chancellor, who forwarded it to the Registrar with a request to look into the matter and to take such action as was deemed necessary. Registrar (Examination) that the reply regarding the case of his son was already sent to the Principal and that the said reply holds good. Thereafter petitioner's father made a representation to the Chancellor, who forwarded it to the Registrar with a request to look into the matter and to take such action as was deemed necessary. The Registrar by his letter dated 10th Feb., 1986 informed petitioner's father that as informed earlier, the petitioner was not eligible to seek admission to the first engineering class of the B.E. 4-year degree course of Marathwada University according to the existing rules. After receipt of this reply, the petitioner filed this petition on 6th March, 1983. During the pendency of this petition by interim Order Dt. 21st March, 1986, this Court directed the University, subject to decision of this case, to accept the form and fees from the petitioner for the first year engineering examination. Accordingly, the petitioner was allowed to appear for the examination, results of which, however are withheld. 4. As mentioned above, the decision of the University rejecting petitioner's application for eligibility certificate was communicated to the 2nd respondent by the Dy. Registrar (Examinations) vide his letter Dt. 15th Oct., 1985 and that this decision was communicated by the 2nd respondent to the petitioner vide former's letter Dt. 27th Nov., 1985. However, before that the hall ticket dt. 7th Oct., 1985 (Ex. C Pg. 15 to the petition) enabling the petitioner to appear for the first Semester Examination was already handed over to him. This hall ticket was, admittedly, not withdrawn. On the basis of the said hall ticket the petitioner appeared for the examination which commenced on 2nd November, 1985. His result was also duly declared, petitioner passing in some subjects. 5. Relying, therefore, on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Shri Krishna v. The Kurukshetra University)2, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 376 Shri Deshmukh the learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged, and in our view rightly, that the University was not competent to refuse the eligibility certificate. As mentioned above, the hall ticket was issued on 7th October, 1985 and if he University wanted to cancel the admission of the petitioner, steps should have been taken to withdraw the hall ticket and prevent the petitioner from appearing for the examinations. This admittedly, was not done. As mentioned above, the hall ticket was issued on 7th October, 1985 and if he University wanted to cancel the admission of the petitioner, steps should have been taken to withdraw the hall ticket and prevent the petitioner from appearing for the examinations. This admittedly, was not done. The question, no doubt, that fell for consideration of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court was slightly different. In that case the candidate was allowed to appear at part II Law examination, held in May 1973, but his candidature was cancelled subsequently on June 26, 1973 on the ground that percentage of marks obtained by him at the part I examination was short and was refused admission to the Part III class. The question in that case related to cancellation of the candidature for the examination and not of admission to the law course. But, the ratio of that decision cannot be restricted only to cases where candidature to subsequent examination is cancelled on the ground of some defficiency in the earlier examination. It would also apply to cases where after allowing a student to take University examination, his admission to the course itself is sought to be cancelled by the University on the ground that he is not eligible to get admission for the said course. Obviously, petitioner's performance in the examination could but have been cancelled on the footing that he was wrongly allowed to appear for the same. Hence, if his performance in examination for the first Semester, stands, then automatically admission to the said course also stands and it cannot be cancelled even assuming that he was wrongly allowed to take the examination, because, as held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Krishan's case, the statute which permits the University to cancel the admission exhausts itself once the student is allowed to appear for any examination of the said course. 6. Shri Nawandar, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent University, relying on the decision in (Dilip Singh Yadav v. The Pracharya and Adhikshak Shri Lal Bhadur Shastri Smaraka Rajkiya Ayurved Maha Vidyalaya Handia and others)2, A.I.R. 1986 All. 6. Shri Nawandar, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent University, relying on the decision in (Dilip Singh Yadav v. The Pracharya and Adhikshak Shri Lal Bhadur Shastri Smaraka Rajkiya Ayurved Maha Vidyalaya Handia and others)2, A.I.R. 1986 All. 158 tried to contend that the petitioner was denied eligibility certificate and, consequently, admission to the course in question on the basis of an Ordinance of the University which has force of Law and, hence, simply because the petitioner was allowed to take up the examination, the University would not be estopped from cancelling his admission to the course by refusing eligibility certificate, because there is no estopped against law. The decision however, can be distinguished on facts, because, in that case except initially informing the student that he was eligible to get admission for B.A.M.S. Course nothing was done by the college in pursuance to the said letter. He was informed that he was ineligible to be admitted to B.A.M.S. course as soon as he presented himself in the office of the college for admission on the basis of the aforesaid letter. In the present case, not only the University did not take any decision till 15th October, 1985, but did not take any steps to withdraw the hall ticket, which was handed over to the petitioner before his application for eligibility was decided. He was permitted to appear for the examination and his result was also not withheld. This is, therefore, a case in which the doctrine of estopped is squarely applicable. 7. This view is supported by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of (Miss Sangeeta Srivastava v. Prof. U.N. Singh and others)3, A.I.R. 1980 Del. 27 in which very similar question arose for consideration of the learned Judges. In that case, a student was admitted to M.A. Part I class though she was ineligible as she did not secure the minimum percentage of marks in her B.A. Examination. The University informed the concerned college that her admission be cancelled, but the college did not inform the student and she was treated as regular student throughout the academic year and was made aware of the position only a few days before the examination. The University informed the concerned college that her admission be cancelled, but the college did not inform the student and she was treated as regular student throughout the academic year and was made aware of the position only a few days before the examination. In these circumstances, it was held that the principle of equitable estoppel operated and the University could not prevent the student from appearing for the examination, because the student had not practised any fraud and/or misrepresentation. In this case, not only there is no question of fraud, but there is a bona fide dispute about interpretation of the relevant Ordinance the Principal having taken a different view from the one taken by the University. The petitioner in this case was informed about the decision of the University on 27 November, 1985, long after he appeared for the examination, which as mentioned above, was held on 2nd November, 1985. 8. This brings us to the real controversy, which, as mentioned above, is about interpretation of Ordinance 310 of the Marathwada University. This Ordinance lays down the basic requirement for eligibility for admission to the Engineering Degree Course of the Marathwada University. Clause (2) of this Ordinance, which is relevant, reads as follows :--- "...For admission to Engineering Degree Course, a student must have passed the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination, with English as one of the subjects, of the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education or an examination recognised and equivalent thereto with 50% aggregate marks (45% marks in the case of backward class students, i.e. Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Denotified Tribes and other Backward class students) in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together..." The University has refused the eligibility certificate to the petitioner on the ground that he has not secured 50% aggregate marks in the subject of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together. As mentioned above, the petitioner secured 84 marks out of 150 in Physics, 72 out of 150 in Chemistry and 141 out of 300 in Mathematics. In all, he secured 297 marks out of 600/- i.e. 49.5% and, hence, the University held him to be ineligible for admission to the engineering degree course. As mentioned above, the petitioner secured 84 marks out of 150 in Physics, 72 out of 150 in Chemistry and 141 out of 300 in Mathematics. In all, he secured 297 marks out of 600/- i.e. 49.5% and, hence, the University held him to be ineligible for admission to the engineering degree course. In calculating the percentage of aggregate marks required for admission to the engineering degree course as per Clause (2) of Ordinance 310, the University committed a basic error of ignoring the position that while in the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination held by the Board of Higher Secondary Education in the State of Maharashtra the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics are given equal weightage, in the sense that in each of these subjects the maximum number of marks is the same, viz. 100, in the intermediate examination held by the Board Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh, extra weightage is given to the paper in Mathematics and the three subjects are not treated equally. For the intermediate examination held by the Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh the paper in Physics carries 150 marks, the paper in Chemistry carries 150 marks, while the paper in Mathematics carries 300 marks. This extra weightage given to the paper in mathematics has to be ignored. While calculating whether a candidate passing intermediate examination of the Andhra Pradesh Board has secured 50% aggregate marks in the subject of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together as contemplated by Clause (2) of Ordinance 310 of the Mathematics University. If this is not done, it would operate as favourable discrimination in favour of the students showing better performance in Mathematics. 9. The methodology adopted by the University in calculating the marks obtained by the students passing inter-mediate examination of the Andhra Pradesh intermediate Education Board not only violates the rule of equivalence in real sense of the term, but also the rule of averaged. It must be remembered that the equivalence is of the examination and not of the percentage as mentioned in the relevant clause of the Ordinance. It must be remembered that the equivalence is of the examination and not of the percentage as mentioned in the relevant clause of the Ordinance. 50% of the aggregate marks in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together, secured by students passing the examination in which the maximum number of marks in each of the three subjects is equal; cannot be considered as equivalent to 50% of the aggregate marks in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together secured by the students passing the examination in which dis-proportionate weightage is given to a particular subject or subjects. Unless the marks obtained by a student belonging to the latter class in each of the three subjects are ascertained on uniform basis, the percentage of aggregate marks for the purpose of Ordinance 310 cannot be arrived at in the case of the petitioner, therefore, it was incumbent on the University to ascertain as to how many marks did the petitioner obtain in Mathematics out of 150 because, as mentioned above, the maximum number of marks for the paper in Physics and Chemistry is 150. The average percentage of the aggregate marks in all these subjects taken together cannot be calculated unless the three subjects are treated equally as is done by the H.S.C. Boards in Maharashtra State. This interpretation is supported by the entries of the form prescribed for admission to a degree course in engineering in an Engineering College in Maharashtra State. In the relevant entry the column meant for marks obtained in the qualifying examination is captioned as Marks obtained in subject at H.S.C. or equivalent". In that column the student is expected to mention the marks secured by him out of 100 in each of the three papers. If this method is followed, then the percentage of aggregate marks secured by the petitioner would come to 50.33. It is on the basis of this calculation that the second respondent granted admission to the petitioner for the course in question. He did not do so arbitrarily disregarding the provisions of the relevant Ordinance. He interpreted the Ordinance, and in our view, rightly and tried to convince the University authorities about the correctness of his interpretation. The interpretation put by the Principal on the Ordinance 310 is rational, logical, reasonable and correct. He did not do so arbitrarily disregarding the provisions of the relevant Ordinance. He interpreted the Ordinance, and in our view, rightly and tried to convince the University authorities about the correctness of his interpretation. The interpretation put by the Principal on the Ordinance 310 is rational, logical, reasonable and correct. It is consistent with the rule of equivalence in real sense of the term and also with the rule of averages. The rule of averages contemplates that dis-proportionate weightage given to a particular factor has to be removed before average of all the factors is taken. It is clear that the University authorities did not consider this aspect of the matter and adopted a methodology by mechanically applying the relevant condition of illegibility. As the petitioner did not secure 50% marks in the three subjects, his eligibility was rejected without ascertaining the position as to whether any particular subject has been given disproportionately greater weightage in the qualifying examination given by the petitioner. No doubt, the University may be justified in granting admission to the students who have secured 50% of total marks for the three subjects taken together. But blanker refuse to grant admission to the students securing lesser percentage without calculating the percentage of aggregate marks in the three subjects on uniform basis was certainly arbitrary and wrong. 9-A. Shri Navandar, the learned Counsel for the University, contended that Ordinance 310 is capable of two interpretations and under such circumstances, the interpretation put on the Ordinance by the University authorities must be accepted. According to him, the interpretation put on Ordinance 310 by the University is also rational and reasonable and hence even assuming that the Ordinance is capable of the interpretation sought to be put upon it by the petitioner, the Court should be reluctant to issue writ of Certiorari for quashing the decision of the University arrived at on the basis of its own interpretation of the relevant provision. In support of this provision, Shri Navander placed reliance on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case (Principal, Patna College, Patna and others v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman)4, A.I.R. 1966, S.C. 707 :--- "It is hardly necessary to emphasise that in dealing with matters relating to orders passed by authorities of educational institutions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court should normally be very slow to pass ex-parte interim orders, because, matters falling within the jurisdiction of the educational authorities should normally be left to their decision and the High Court should interfere with them only when it thinks, it must do so in the interest of justice. Even on the merits we think we ought to point out that whether the question involved is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic Council of a University, the High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question is capable of two constructions and it would generally not be expedient for the High Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the construction placed by the said authorities on the relevant regulations appears to the High Court less reasonable than the alternative construction which it is pleased to accept. The limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari are well recognised and it is on the whole desirable that the requirements prescribed by judicial decision in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in dealing with such matters should be carefully borne in mind..." Obviously, the Supreme Court has not laid down that the High Court cannot interfere when the matter relates to the interpretation of a regulation framed by the University. The Court can certainly do so when it is necessary in the interest of justice. Moreover, it would be Court's duty to interfere when the interpretation put by the University authorities on the relevant regulation is obviously wrong and causes injustice to the students in the matter of education. The Court can certainly do so when it is necessary in the interest of justice. Moreover, it would be Court's duty to interfere when the interpretation put by the University authorities on the relevant regulation is obviously wrong and causes injustice to the students in the matter of education. In this case, as observed above, the interpretation put on Ordinance No. 310 by the University ignores the position that in the qualifying examination given by the petitioner, the three relevant subjects were treated unequally and undue weightage was given to Mathematics as against the equal treatment given to the three subjects by the Boards in Maharashtra State. The methodology adopted by the University in calculating the requisite percentage of marks was clearly illogical and not only unreasonable, but wrong. There is, therefore, every justification for interfering with the order of the University in refusing eligibility certificate to the petitioner. 10. Shri Navandar, the learned Counsel for the University tried to support the impugned order by resorting to Clause (2) and (3) of Ordinance 109 read with Clauses (2) and (3) of Ordinances 183 of the Marathwada University. These provisions were incorporated by an amendment carried out by the Executive Council on 30th August, 1985 on the recommendations of the Academic Council and were given retrospective effect from 15th June, 1985. These provisions read as follows : "O. 109 (ii). The Registrar may issue a provisional eligibility certificate to the applicant if the applicant is found prima facie eligible according to the norms laid down by the Marathwada University for registering the name as an external candidate for the University Examination at the applicant's entire risk and on the condition that he shall obtain final eligible certificate before the end of the first term in accordance with the provisions of the Marathwada University Act in vogue. O. 109(iii). The case of such a student who fails to obtain the final eligibility certificate till the end of the first term shall be closed and he shall not be allowed to appear for the respective examination of this University. O. 183(ii). O. 109(iii). The case of such a student who fails to obtain the final eligibility certificate till the end of the first term shall be closed and he shall not be allowed to appear for the respective examination of this University. O. 183(ii). The Registrar may issue a provisional Eligibility Certificate to the applicant if the applicant is found prima facie eligible according to the norms laid down by the Marathwada University to seek admission to a course of this University, at the applicant's entire risk and on the condition that he shall obtain a final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term with the provisions of the Marathwada Act in vogue. O. 183(iii). The case of such a student who fails to obtain the final eligibility certificate till the end of the first term shall not be allowed to appear for the respective Examination of this University." Invoking these provisions, Shri Navandar Contended that as the petitioner did not obtain final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term, the admission of the petitioner to the course itself was liable to be cancelled and, hence, the fact that the petitioner was allowed to appear for the examination at the end of the first Semester has no particular significance. We are unable to accept this submission, firstly because the result of non-production of the final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term, is not cancellation of the admission itself. The result is that a student who fails to obtain the final eligibility certificate before the end the first term shall not be allowed to appear for the respective examination of the University. Admittedly, no such effect was given to the failure of the petitioner to obtain the final eligibility certificate till the end of the first term. As mentioned above, he was allowed to appear for the examination and he did appear. Not only that, his result was also declared. Moreover, failure of the petitioner to obtain final eligibility certificate was not because of any fault of the petitioner. It was a result of the wrongful refusal of the University authorities to grant eligibility certificate, even though the petitioner was entitled to get it. The University on the basis of the wrong interpretation of Ordinance 310 wrongly denied eligibility certificate to the petitioner. It was a result of the wrongful refusal of the University authorities to grant eligibility certificate, even though the petitioner was entitled to get it. The University on the basis of the wrong interpretation of Ordinance 310 wrongly denied eligibility certificate to the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner had applied for the same before the end of the first term and it was refusal of the University that prevented him from complying with Clause (ii) and (iii) of Ordinance 183. 11. In the result, therefore, the petition is allowed. Orders of the University refusing to grant eligibility certificate to the petitioner are quashed. It is declared that the petitioner is entitled to get admission to the four years degree course in engineering of the Marathwada University. The first respondent is directed to issue the eligibility certificate to the petitioner forthwith and to declare his results. It is further directed that in case the petitioner passed the examination, he should be admitted to the second year of the four year degree course if he is otherwise eligible condoning the delay, if any, in seeking the admission. Rule made absolute to that extent. No order as to costs because the dispute relates to the interpretation of the relevant Ordinance. Rule made absolute. -------