Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 215 (MAD)

M. M. Hameed Marican v. M. Mohammed Idress Marican and others

1986-04-25

T.N.SINGARAVELU

body1986
Judgment :- The plaintiff in the suit the revision petitioner herein. He has filed the suit to remove the first respondent as’ the Trustee of a certain Trust and for appointment of a new Trustee including himself with consequential reliefs. The plaintiff paid court-fee of Rs.200 under the residuary section 50 of the Pondicherry Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1972. This was objected to by the other side and the trial court took up the court-fee as the preliminary issue and held that the suit instituted by the plaintiff is not for a mere declaration and that section 50 of the Pondicherry Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1972, will have no application in this case. Consequently, the plaintiff was directed to pay additional court-fee computed on Rs.21,59,375 as per the rate prescribed under section 28 of the Pondicherry Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1972. The plaintiff is aggrieved by this order and has come on revision. 2. I have heard learned Counsel on both sides and perused the pleadings. It is clear that the petitioner-plaintiff is only a beneficiary and not a trustee himself. The relief asked for is for the removal of the present trustee on the ground of mismanagement and for appointment of a new trustee in his place. The other reliefs claimed in the suit are only ancillary reliefs. There is no prayer for possession as such in this case. Since there is no specific provision in the Pondicherry Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1972, the relief has to be valued only under the residuary provision under section 50. In my opinion, none of the ingredients which are necessary to attract the provision under section 28 of the Pondicherry Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1972 exists in this case. 3. It may be stated that, in the matter of valuation of the relief and payment of court-fees, two factors are very relevant and should be borne in mind in deciding the question. Firstly, the averments in the plaint alone have to be taken into account for the purpose of valuation and court-fee. What is not there in the plaint cannot be imported through inference and the plaintiff cannot be compelled to value the relief under a different provision and pay a higher court-fee. Firstly, the averments in the plaint alone have to be taken into account for the purpose of valuation and court-fee. What is not there in the plaint cannot be imported through inference and the plaintiff cannot be compelled to value the relief under a different provision and pay a higher court-fee. Secondly, the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act is a fiscal enactment which should be strictly construed and in case of doubt, the construction should be in favour of the litigant. This is made clear in the decision reported in Lakshmiammal v. Madhava Krishnan. (1978)4 S.C.C.15= A.I.R.1978 S.C.1607. The Supreme Court observed that the courts should be anxious to grapple with the real issues and not spend their energies on peripheral ones. It is observed therein that all access to justice is the basis of the legal system and in that view, where there is a doubt, reasonable of course, the benefit must go to him who says that the lesser court-fee alone be paid. Having regard to the pleadings, it is clear to me that the valuation adopted by the plaintiff is correct and the order of the trial Court directing the plaintiff to pay court-fee on the market value of the properties of- the Trust cannot be sustained. The result is, the civil revision petition is allowed and the order of the trial court on the question of court-fees is set aside. No costs.