JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---An interesting question of law arises in this writ petition which is directed against the passing and confirmation of an order for restoration of land under section 3 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974-hereinafter referred to as the Act". 2. On 30-7-1965, Bapurao passed a registered sale-deed showing the sale of Survey No. 191, Village Patodekhurd, Taluka Kinwat, District Nanded to the petitioner. After the coming into force of the Act, respondent No. 3 gave an application under section 3 claiming that he was the transferor, that he was a tribal, that the petitioner was a non-tribal and that he was willing to take back the land in compliance with the statutory obligations. An enquiry was held and the Deputy Collector held that the land belonged to respondent No. 3, that it was he who had sold the same to the petitioner, that the sale-deed showed Bapurao to be the vendor as he was the recorded pattedar of the land and that an order for restoration had to be made in favour of respondent No. 3. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the M.R.T. That was Appeal No. 185/A/1978 Nanded. The Tribunal held that there was no substance in petitioner's challenging the locus standi of respondent No. 3 to apply under section 3. However, before an order for restoration could be made, the alienor had to give an undertaking in the prescribed form. Such an undertaking had not been obtained. The appeal was, therefore allowed and the case remanded to the Deputy Collector with a direction to get the required undertaking as a condition precedent to the order for restoration in favour of respondent No. 3. The matter went back to the original authority which obtained the requisite undertaking, and thereafter passed an order for restoration in favour of respondent No. 3. This restoration was challenged in a fresh appeal to the M.R.T. bearing No. 356/A/1979 Nanded. The Tribunal held that petitioner could not take exception to the locus standi of respondent No. 3, which question had been decided earlier and the said decision could not be reopened. 3. In the instant petition, exception is taken to the finding of the authorities below about the eligibility of respondent No. 3 to seek restoration. I uphold the objection and allow the petition for the reasons given below. 3. In the instant petition, exception is taken to the finding of the authorities below about the eligibility of respondent No. 3 to seek restoration. I uphold the objection and allow the petition for the reasons given below. REASONS 4. The preliminary objection that no exception can be taken to the eligibility of respondent No. 3 to seek restoration, is based upon the failure of the petitioner to challenge that part of the order of the M.R.T. in the first appeal, which contention is now sought to be re-agitated. In the appeal of 1979, the Tribunal affirmed this contention by observing thus : "The appellant in the present appeal has raised the same points which had been raised in the previous appeal and which were decided against him. Now all those points which have been decided in the previous appeal are not liable to be reagitated now. The case was remanded previously on the specific point only. The undertaking for which the case was remanded has been obtained........ On this short point, the appeal is liable to be dismissed." Petitioner has given an explanation for the failure to challenge the Tribunal's order in the first appeal. This is set out in para 3 of the petition, wherein it is mentioned that petitioner was advised not to challenge the order of remand as it was an interlocutory order, and , that he could challenge the same, after the final adjudication. The averments appearing in the petition have been sworn to in a supplementary affidavit. I do not see why the truthfulness thereof should be doubted. If mistaken legal advice was the reason for the omission, petitioner cannot be blamed. Therefore, the delay or the earlier omission, cannot be a ground for preventing petitioner from questioning that finding. 5. Turning to the merits, the Deputy Collector's finding is to the effect that the land originally belonged to Sara and Chinna. The Pattedar of the land was Chinna, whose son Bapurao is. In a petition between Sara and Chinna or Bapurao and Sara, the land was allotted to the share of Sara, Sara contracted to sell the land to the petitioner, but in village papers the recorded occupant was Bapurao. On a request made by Sara, Bapurao affixed his signature as the vendor, but the proceeds were paid to and received by Sara. On a request made by Sara, Bapurao affixed his signature as the vendor, but the proceeds were paid to and received by Sara. Bapurao appears to have been examined and he has testified to the above effect. In fact, he has given an undertaking that he will raise no objection if the island restored to Sara. Mr. Bora contends that the authorities below were in error in acting upon the version of Sara even though it had the approval of Bapurao. In this connection he points out that the Act contemplates restoration of land to a "tribal transferor". The expression "tribal transferor" includes his successor in interest. The "transfer" contemplated by section 3 is the transfer of land belonging to a tribal made in favour of a non-tribal between 1-4-1956 to 6-7-1974. To get the benefit of section 3, the transferor must be either the transferor named in the transfer-deed or his successor-in-interest. The authorities under the Act cannot decide questions which are properly speaking the domain of the Civil Counts. Now, it has to be pointed out that the petitioner did question the stand that he had purchased land from Sara and that Bapurao was mere name-lender to that vendor. According to him, his vendor was Sara in fact and in name. The show put up by Bapurao and Sara was of no consequence and the authorities below had no jurisdiction to enquire into the alleged identity of the real transferor. There is substance in this contention. First, there is the definition of the word "tribal transferor". Next, there is the fact that the expression 'tribal Transferor' does not include the undisclosed or real owner vis-a-vis the named transferor. Though the definition of a "tribal transferor" is not exhaustive, there are other indications in the Act that in deciding who the transferor and transferee are, the authorities cannot go beyond the deed of transfer if there be any. First, there is the definition of "successor-in-interest" being limited to a person acquiring land by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. Next, there is the indication in section 3 that restoration proceedings can be begun either sou motu or on the application of a tribal transferor. The enquiry prescribed by section 3 is summary in nature. This is an indication of the limited scope of the enquiry, thus pointing to the jurisdiction under the Act being confined. Next, there is the indication in section 3 that restoration proceedings can be begun either sou motu or on the application of a tribal transferor. The enquiry prescribed by section 3 is summary in nature. This is an indication of the limited scope of the enquiry, thus pointing to the jurisdiction under the Act being confined. There is no discussion in the order of Deputy Collector as to why he accepted the versions of Sara and bapurao in the face of denial of the petitioner. The Tribunal in the 1978 appeal also has not appraised the point seriously. Undue weight has been given to the circumstance of Bapurao supporting Sara's version by saying that he had no objection for the restoration of the land to Sara. But if the versions of these two persons were true, the sale-deed would have been executed by Sara and Bapurao giving his, approval thereto by a mere recital that he approved of the transaction, inasmuch, as the real owner was Sara, prima facie, the story trotted out by Sara and Bapurao is incredible. In the result, the order passed for restoration of the land to Sara, cannot be sustained. Therefore, the order. ORDER Petition allowed. Order for restoration of land upto respondent No. 3 quashed. Respondent No. 3's application dismissed. Security granted on behalf of petitioner shall become inoperative. Costs in this proceeding, as incurred Rule in the above terms made absolute. Counsel for the State seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave is granted as the instant petition involves a substantial question of law of general importance and requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. Petition allowed. -----