Judgment :- 1. The claimant in M.V.O.P. No. 38 of 1979 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, is the appellant. Her son, Xavier, died in a bus accident on 29-8-1975. The accident involved stage carriage bearing legislation No. KLP 1835. That vehicle is said to have hit the bicycle which the deceased, Xavier was riding throwing Xavier on to the road and he was crushed under the vehicle. He succumbed to the injuries shortly thereafter. He was aged 24 years at that time, and was earning Rs. 250/-per month. The claim of the appellant before the Tribunal was for an amount of Rs. 75,000/-, towards compensation, against the first respondent-owner, second respondent-driver, and the third respondent-insurer of the stage carriage, KLP 1835. 2. The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 15,000/-towards compensation with interest at 6 percent from the date of the award. An amount of Rs. 15,000/ -was deposited pursuant to that award in April, 1981. The appellant seeks enhancement of the amount of compensation by a further amount of Rs. 60,000/-. She also seeks interest from the date of claim petition as also costs in the proceedings. 3. The accident in which the deceased son of the appellant was involved was not in dispute before the Tribunal, or even in this appeal. There was, however some attempt to make out that it was not due to the negligence of the second respondent-driver that the accident occurred. 4. Two witnessess were examined in support of that case. Their testimony contradicts each other in all material particulars. DW-1, the investigating officer, stated that the investigation conducted by him disclosed that when the deceased, Xavier, over-took the bus, a cow intercepted the cycle throwing the cyclist on to the road and the right-back-wheel of the bus fatally ran over him. The second respondent-driver of the bus, who was examined as DW-3, bad an entirely different story. According to him, a cow hit the cyclist, who, in turn, hit against a telephone post and that caused injuries, which resulted in his death. In view of the contradiction in the versions of these witnesses, the Tribunal chose to accept the account of two of the eye witnesses, PW-1 a Sub Inspector of Police in Madras State and PW-2, both of whom were passengers in the bus. In view of the contradiction in the versions of these witnesses, the Tribunal chose to accept the account of two of the eye witnesses, PW-1 a Sub Inspector of Police in Madras State and PW-2, both of whom were passengers in the bus. According to PW-1, when the cyclist was overtaking the bus, the driver swerved the vehicle to the right and hit the cyclist throwing him on to the road and crushing him under the vehicle. This version was substantially corroborated by PW-2, who was another independent witness, travelling in the same vehicle. The conclusion come to by the Tribunal on the basis of these materials cannot be considered as perverse or even erroneous. The case of the appellant was therefore rightly rejected by the Tribunal, and we do not see any reason to interfere with that finding. 5. The main point of dispute, however, relates to the process of quantification of damages. Admittedly, the deceased son of the appellant, who was aged 24 years at the time of the accident, was earning an amount of Rs. 250/-per month as an employee of Mercantile and Marine Services, Cochin. Ext. P1 SSLC book proves his age and his qualifications. Ext. P2 evidences that the deceased has also acquired KGT Certificate. Ext. P3 salary certificate sustains the case of the claimant about the average monthly earnings of the deceased. Those points cannot, therefore, be effectively disputed. 6. After finding that the average monthly earnings of the deceased was Rs. 250/-, the Tribunal held that he would have required at least Rs. 150/-towards expenses, since he was having a motor cycle. The contribution of the deceased to the petitioner was, therefore, taken as Rs. 100/-. Adopting the multiplier of 15 and after deducting 1/6 for lump sum payment and uncertainties in life, the Tribunal determined the compensation due as Rs. 15,000/-. 7. Counsel for the appellant submitted that eventhough the Tribunal had to make assumptions, conjectures and estimates in assessing the probable contributions of the deceased to the claimant had not the life of the deceased been snuffed off as a result of the tortious act of the respondents, such estimates had to be reasonable, fair and balanced. Counsel submitted that undue parsimony and niggardliness cannot be the measure to assess damages and ascertain compensation. Reference is made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in N.K.V. BROS. Counsel submitted that undue parsimony and niggardliness cannot be the measure to assess damages and ascertain compensation. Reference is made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in N.K.V. BROS. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, AIR 1980 SC 1354, which approved the decision of this court reported in P. B. Kader v. Thatchamma, AIR 1970 Kerala 241. A more realistic, fair and sympathetic approach in the matter of assessment of compensation, would, according to the counsel, have resulted in the award of a more reasonable amount to the aged mother of the deceased, who was deprived of the assistance of her son by the tortious act of the respondents, resulting in the death of her son. He also contended that the multiplier should have been adopted with reference to the increased life expectancy of the average Indians in the matter of determination of compensation as found by the Supreme Court and this Court in similar cases. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Sudhakar & others, 1977 ACJ 290, State Insurance Officer v. Thankamma,1980 KLT 562, and P.B. Kader v. Thatchamma, AIR 1970 Kerala 241. 8. It is beyond dispute that in assessing damages and ascertaining quantum of compensation, the Tribunal has to depend largely on conjectures, estimates and reasonable guess work. The determination on the basis of actuals is impossible in the nature of claims involving fatal accidents, since the court or Tribunal has to make good "what would have been" and not what actually is. This process necessarily involves reasonable and well-informed assumptions. The Tribunal has to ask itself as to what would have been the actual position had the deceased lived his full life? The answer to that question can only be based on a reasonable guess depending on assumptions about the probable contribution of the deceased and the period of such contributions. The possible longevity of the deceased, had he not been snatched away by the accident is again a matter of conjecture. He would have died of other causes. He would have been disabled due to other factors. His earning capacity would have been impaired due to other circumstances. Those are matters in relation to which an exact ascertainment is ordinarily impossible. He would have died of other causes. He would have been disabled due to other factors. His earning capacity would have been impaired due to other circumstances. Those are matters in relation to which an exact ascertainment is ordinarily impossible. So must it be as to the amount of contributions which the dependent would have received, had not the life been snatched away by the toritous act attributable to the respondents. There would have been a diminution in the amount of contribution due to various circumstances. He would have married, he would have quarrelled with the dependent, he would have lost his earning capacity due to disease or other factors, or he would have lost his earnings by gambling etc. What the courts are expected to do is to balance the probabilities of future, not only the advantages in favour of the dependent but also the possible disadvantages, and then come to a fair, reasonable and sympathetic conclusion as to what should be adopted as a basis for assessment. Reference in this connection may be made to the following passage from Mc Gregor on Damages: "The courts have evolved a particular method for assessing loss of earning capacity, for arriving at the amount which the plaintiff has been prevented by the injury from earning in future. This amount is calculated by taking the figure of the plaintiffs present annual earnings less the amount, if any, which be can now earn annually, and multiplying this by a figure which, while based upon the number of years during which the loss of earning power will last, is discounted so as to allow for the fact that a lump sum is being given now instead of periodical payments over the years. This latter figure has long been called the multiplier; the former figure has now come to be referred to as the multiplicand. Further adjustments, however, may have to be made to multiplicand or multiplier on account of a variety of factors, viz., the probability of future increase or decrease in the annual earnings, the so-called contingencies of life, and the incidence of inflation and taxation." (para 1165-14th Edn.) 9. Though the above observations were made with reference to personal injury claims, those apply, with appropriate modifications, to fatal accident cases as well. Though the above observations were made with reference to personal injury claims, those apply, with appropriate modifications, to fatal accident cases as well. It was observed further in para 1284 that: "Claims for wrongful death are second only to claims for personal injury in providing evidence of the difficulty of making lump sum damages awards with any degree of accuracy. It is true that there is not here the need to predict the exact course which the injury will take in the future, but there is possibility that the deceased's wages or salary would have increased through inflation or other causes, or alternatively that there would have been a decrease in earnings and there is the possibility that the dependants would have died prematurely." 10. In Mallett v. Mc Monagle,1960 AC 166, a case under Fatal Accidents Act, which was approved by the Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC. 1354, Lord Diplcok observed: "The purpose of an award of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act is to provide the widow and other dependants of the deceased with a capital sum which with prudent management, will be sufficient to supply them with material benefits of the same standard and duration as would have been provided for them out of the earnings of the deceased had he not been killed by the tortious act of the defendant, credit being given for the value of any material benefits which will accrue to them, (otherwise than as fruits of insurance) as a result of his death." 11. Lord Pearce observed in the same decision: "Any assessment must contain elements of reasonable prophecy and arithmetic. In assessing the proper figure, the jury have to take into account both the possibilities for good and for bad, striking a fair balance as they see it, on such evidence of the future probabilities as is given to them. To assume for certainty all the most advantageous possibilities and take no account of the disadvantageous is not to strike a fair balance". 12. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest followed the same lines and stated, that "In cases such as that now being considered it is inevitable that in assessing damages there must be elements of estimate and to some extent of conjecture. All the chances and the changes of the future must be assessed. 12. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest followed the same lines and stated, that "In cases such as that now being considered it is inevitable that in assessing damages there must be elements of estimate and to some extent of conjecture. All the chances and the changes of the future must be assessed. They must be weighed not only with sympathy but with fairness for the interests of all concerned and at all times with a sense of proportion." 13. In Taylor v. O'Connor, 1971 AC 115, Lord Pearson dealt with the process of assessment of compensation as follows: "There are three stages in the normal calculation namely. (1) to estimate the lost earnings, that is, the sums which the deceased probably would have earned but for the fatal accident; (2) to estimate the lost benefit, that is, the pecuniary benefit which the dependants probably would have derived from the lost earnings, and to express the lost benefit as an annual sum over the period of the lost earnings; (3) to choose the appropriate multiplier which, when applied to the lost benefit expressed as an annual sum, gives the amount of the damages, which is a lump sum". 14. These guidelines should be determinative of the process of assessment of damages. An element of reasonable prophecy, fair balancing of future probabilities advantageous and disadvantageous alike, a fair element of sympathy for the deprived and an anxiety to substitute to the extent possible, those benefits which were lost by the sad demise of the person on whom the claimant used to depend all go into that process. 15. Judged on the basis of these guidelines, we are of the opinion that the assessment made by the Tribunal requires to be reviewed in some respects. 16. Though counsel for the appellant urged that at least 20 years should have been adopted as the multiplier, we are not persuaded to accept that submission. The claim was urged on the assumption that the age of the claimant was 46 at the time of the accident and average longevity should be taken as 65 to 70 years. There is no definite evidence about the actual age of the applicant. According to some of her own averments, it would be at least 48 at the time. The Tribunal has adopted the multiplier as 15. There is no definite evidence about the actual age of the applicant. According to some of her own averments, it would be at least 48 at the time. The Tribunal has adopted the multiplier as 15. In the nature of the evidence before it, we cannot hold that the Tribunal erred in adopting that figure. 17. As far as the value of dependency is concerned, the Tribunal seems to have been unduly parsimonious. The evidence of PW-4, Xavier, indicates that in addition to his monthly salary of Rs. 250/-the deceased was also provided a Motor Bike by his employer, and was paid a daily batta of Rs. 15/- for outstation work. The Tribunal seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the deceased had to maintain the motor bike. That assumption is not supported by any evidence. The batta of Rs. 15/- per day for outstation work way back in 1975 would definitely have taken care of all out of pocket expenses of the deceased and would have provided some little extra. This fact also has been completely ignored by the Tribunal in determining the monthly value of the dependency. Taking all these factors into account, we are of the opinion that the deceased would have contributed at least 50 percent of his monthly salary to the appellant. 18. As we have seen already, the value of dependency cannot be treated as a static figure as it was on the date of the accident. A young man of 24 years earning Rs. 250/- would, had he lived, gone up the ladder and earned substantially larger amount of salary during the 15 years which has been adopted as the multiplier. Revision and consequent enhancement in wages seem to us to be irreversible phenomena, which also have to enter into the reckoning in assessing the future changes and chances. Considering all these aspects, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal ought to have adopted the possible average monthly contribution of the deceased to the appellant as Rs. 175/- instead of Rs. 100/-. 19. The Tribunal has made a deduction of 1/6 of the total amount towards lump sum payment and future uncertainties. We see no reason to alter that standard. The amount of compensation will, therefore, be recomputed as Rs. 175 x 12 x 15: Rs. 31,500/ (1/6) Rs. 5,250/-: Rs. 26,250/-. 20. 175/- instead of Rs. 100/-. 19. The Tribunal has made a deduction of 1/6 of the total amount towards lump sum payment and future uncertainties. We see no reason to alter that standard. The amount of compensation will, therefore, be recomputed as Rs. 175 x 12 x 15: Rs. 31,500/ (1/6) Rs. 5,250/-: Rs. 26,250/-. 20. The Tribunal awarded interest only from the date of the award. We are of the opinion that it should date back at least from the date of filing the claim petition, namely, 25-11-1975, as claimed by the appellant. Though counsel urged that the rate of interest as awarded is far too low, we are not inclined to consider that submission, since the appellant has not claimed any higher rate of interest in the memorandum of appeal. 21. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we allow this appeal and modify the award of compensation as follows: "The appellant will be entitled to receive an amount of Rs. 26,2501- instead of Rs. 15,000/- as compensation along with interest at the rate of 6 percent on the above amount from the date of filing the claim petition, viz, 25-11-1975. The third respondent insurer shall pay the above amounts after deducting any amount already paid by it in accordance with the award of the Tribunal". The appellant will also be entitled to costs in the Tribunal and this Court, along with Advocate's fee of Rs. 200/- each. Allowed.