SYED KHALEEL AHMED v. S. T. A. T. BANGALORE — 1986 DIGILAW 221 (KAR)

RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THESE Writ Appeals are presented against an order of the learned Single judge dismissing the writ petitions presented by the petitioners in which they had prayed for quashing the order of the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) which had cancelled the permits granted to the appellants on the route Shimoga-Chitradurga. ( 2 ) (I) Brief facts of the case that are necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follow : The appellant in w. A. No. 352/81 filed an application on 12-4-1972 before the Regional Transport Authority, Shimoga (R. T. A.) for the grant ot a Stage Carriage Permit to be operated as an Express Service between shimoga and Chitradurga. The Express service, according to the appellant, was required to meet the needs of the travelling public directly travelling from shimoga to Chitradurga so as to reach chitradurga by about 9. 45 or 10 A. M. , starting from Shimoga at 6. 30 A. M. (ii) The appellant in W. A. No. 474 of 1981 also made an application on 16-5-1969 for grant of a Stage Carriage permit to be operated as an Express service from Shimoga to Chitradurga starting from Shimoga at about 10-30 a. M. , This application was granted by the RTA but on appeal by the objectors, it was set aside and the matter was remitted to the RTA, Shimoga. (iii) The application of the appellant in W. A. 352/81 and of the application of the appellant in W. A. 474/81 again were considered by the RTA, Shimoga on 4-9-1972. By a Resolution of the RTA of the same date, the permits prayed for by both the appellants were granted. Pursuant to the resolution of the RTA permits were issued on 11-12- 1972. The objectors, however, preferred an appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal issued an interim order staying the operation of the permits. Thereafter, by an order dated 30-4-1973, the Tribunal set aside the grant made in favour of both the appellants. Against the said order, the appellants preferred writ petitions before this Court in Writ petitions Nos. 1703 and 3692 of 1973. When these writ petitions were pending before this Court, on 29-8-1973, a Draft scheme called Davangere Pocket Scheme, prepared under Section 68c of the motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (shortly called the Act), was published in the Official gazette. Against the said order, the appellants preferred writ petitions before this Court in Writ petitions Nos. 1703 and 3692 of 1973. When these writ petitions were pending before this Court, on 29-8-1973, a Draft scheme called Davangere Pocket Scheme, prepared under Section 68c of the motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (shortly called the Act), was published in the Official gazette. The said scheme covered a portion of Shimoga-Chitradurga route. (iv) The Writ Petitions were disposed of by Venkataramaiah, J. , (as he then was) on 23-5-1975. The relevant portion of the order of this Court reads thus:"in the appeal filed against the petitioner in w. P. No. 1703/73 the Tribunal considered the question whether there was need for the introduction of the express service. While it did not hold that there was no need for the introduction of an express service, it observed that by converting any of the existing services into an express service by altering its timings it was possible to meet the demands of the situation. On going through the order of the Tribunal I feel that the appeal has not been properly disposed, of. Nowhere does the Tribunal record a firm finding as to the non-existence of the need for the introduction of an express bus service. fn the order passed in the appeal filed against the petitioner in W. P. 3692/73, reference is made to certain matters which were not quite germane for rejecting the application of the petitioner. Even in that case what had to be decided by the Tribunal was whether there was need for the introduction of one more service on the route and not whether the petitioner was running another service of whether he had applied for alteration of timings that service. The Tribunal must have realised that the question of public interest should receive paramount consideration while disposing of cases under the Motor Vehicles Act. The fact that one or the other of the operators would be prejudiced to some extent would not be conclusive on the question whether a permit should be granted or not although it may be one of the factors which may have to be borne in mind. Since the common question which arises for consideration in both these cases is whether there is need for an additional express service on a common route, the Tribunal should have disposed of both the cases together. Since the common question which arises for consideration in both these cases is whether there is need for an additional express service on a common route, the Tribunal should have disposed of both the cases together. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the tribunal should be directed to dispose of the case afresh after setting aside the orders passed by its. In the result, the orders of the Tribunal which are impugned in these two writ petitions are set aside. The tribunal is directed to dispose of the cases afresh in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity to ell the parties to urge their contentions. "this Court took the view that the tribunal had failed to consider as to whether there was need for introduction of two Express Services as it was for that purpose the two applicants made applications, but, without considering the said question, the Tribunal had said, having regard to the existing nun ber of services, there was no need for express service. This Court point out that public interest was paramount and the need served by an express service was entirely different from the need served by another service and therefore the matter wes required to be reconsidered by the Tribunal. Accordingly, this Court by its order dated 23-6-1975 set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matter to the Tribunal. (v) The Tribunal once again allowed the appeal by its order dated 17-12-1975 and set aside the grant of permits in favour of the appellants. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants preferred writ petitions Nos. 7818 and 4297 of 1976 before this Court. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by the learned single Judge by his order dated 14-11-1980. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have presented these writ appeals". ( 3 ) SRI A. S. Viswanath, learned counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal no. 352 of 1981, submitted as follows : the application of the appellant for the grant of a Stage Carriage Permit on the route Shimoga-Chitradurga was with the intention of running en express service to meet the need of the travelling public who were desirous of reaching chitradurga before 10. 00a. M. and return in the afternoon. No other existing service was serving this need. 00a. M. and return in the afternoon. No other existing service was serving this need. As far as the requirement of an express service in the morning, there were number of representations by private individuals, municipal Councils and also a report of the Inspector of Motor Vehicles. On the basis of the evidence on record, the RTA of Shimoga was of the opinion that there was need for running an express bus service in the morning from Shimoga to chitradurga. The Tribunal brushed aside the entire evidence in favour of the grant of permit and recorded a finding that there was no need. The view of the tribunal is perverse. ( 4 ) SRI H. B. Datar, learned counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 474 of 1981, submitted as follows :"the application for the grant of stage Carrioge Permit by this appellant was for the route Shimoga to Chitradirga starting from Shimoga at 10-30 A. M. This was also with the object of serving the requirement of the travelling public who were desirous of travelling through an express service at that time. In the case of this appellant also, the representations by the local authorities, by individuals and the report of the Inspector of Motor Vehicles were in favour of the grant of permit. The only difference between the case of the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 352 of 1981 and this appellant was that in his case, the RTA, chitradurga had not favoured the grant of a permit for an express service at 10-30 A. M. though it had given concurrence for an express service starting from Shimoga at 6-30 A. M. as sought for by the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 352 of 1981. The decision of the Tribunal was perverse and the material evidence available in favour of the appellant were brushed aside and the application of the appellant was rejected on the ground that there was no material to grant the permit in favour of the appellant as sought for. " ( 5 ) RESISTING the above applications Sri Rangaswamy, learned counsel for some of the respondents, submitted as follows : The Tribunal had, on consideration of the materials on record, come to the conclusion that there was no need for granting the permit in favour of both the appellants. " ( 5 ) RESISTING the above applications Sri Rangaswamy, learned counsel for some of the respondents, submitted as follows : The Tribunal had, on consideration of the materials on record, come to the conclusion that there was no need for granting the permit in favour of both the appellants. In particular, as far as the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 474 of 1981 was concerned, the Tribunal had taken note of the fact that after the grant of the permit was set aside by the tribunal, he had made another application for the grant of a Stage Carriage permit to be operated as an express service between Kumsi and Chitradurga from Kumsi earlier and arriving at Shimoga at 10. 30 A. M. and departing from shimoga at 10-35 A. M. He submitted that Kumsi was at a distance of about 15 miles from Shimoga and as he was starting from Kumsi earlier and reaching shimoga at about 10-30 A. M. , there was no need for the grant of another permit for an express service starting from Shimoga at 10-30 A. M. as the need, as pointed out by the appellant himself in his earlier application, had been fully satisfied by securing a permit in his favour from Kumsi to Shimoga and this fact was taken note of by the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that there was no need to grant the permit in favour of the appellant. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has considered this point and disposed of the writ petitions and there was no ground to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. ( 6 ) BEFORE going to the above question, it is necessary to consider another preliminary objection raised by Sri 'rangaswamy on behalf of respondents. He submitted that setting aside the order of the Tribunal would be purposeless as the renewal of the permits was prohibited by Section 68f (1 D) of the Act as the route in question was covered by the Scheme notified under Section 68c of the Act, published by notification dated 29-8-1973 during the pendency of these proceedings before the Tribunal. He submitted that setting aside the order of the Tribunal would be purposeless as the renewal of the permits was prohibited by Section 68f (1 D) of the Act as the route in question was covered by the Scheme notified under Section 68c of the Act, published by notification dated 29-8-1973 during the pendency of these proceedings before the Tribunal. Section 68f (1 D) reads :-" (1d) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1a) or sub-section (1c), no permit shall be granted or renewed during the period intervening between the date of publication, under section 68c of any scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in favour of any person for any class of road transport service in relation to an area or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme: provided that where the period of operation of a permit in relation to any area, route or portion thereof specified in a scheme published under section 68c expires after such publication, such permit may be renewed for a limited period, but the permit so renewed shall cease to be effective on the publication of the scheme under sub-section (3) of Section 68d. " ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that as the permits granted to the appellants were set aside, they did not and could not make any application within the period prescribed under Section 58 (2) of the Act for renewal of the permit and as no permit can be granted or renewed during the period between the date of publication of draft scheme and the date of publication of the approved scheme in view of the bar created under Section 68f (1 D) of the act, no relief can be granted to the appellant. ( 8 ) IN reply to the above objection, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted as follows : According to the above provision, once a draft scheme is published under Section 68c of the Act though no permit could be granted or renewed in respect of any route covered by a draft scheme. Proviso to Section 68f (1 D) makes an exception, viz. , if there was already an existing permit as on the date of publication of the draft scheme such permit could be renewed. Proviso to Section 68f (1 D) makes an exception, viz. , if there was already an existing permit as on the date of publication of the draft scheme such permit could be renewed. In these cases, the learned Counsel pointed out that after the RTA granted the permits in favour of both the appellants permits were issued on 11 -12-1972 and as the period of permit fixed by the rta was 3 years, and as the draft scheme was published on 29-8-1973, on the date on which the draft scheme was published the permits granted in favour of both the appellants were in existence though they had been stated by an interim order made by the Tribunal. Therefore, they submitted that the bar of section 68f (1d) would not operate against them. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel pointed out that though the grants in favour of the appellants were set aside by an order dated 30-4-1973 of the Tribunal, the said order was set aside by this Court in w. Ps. Nos. 1703 and 3692/73 dated 23-6-1975 and therefore it is clear that as on the date of the draft scheme i. e. 29-8-1973 the permits granted in favour of the appellants were in existence and, therefore, the provisions of Section 68f (1 D) would not come in the way of the renewal of the said permits if and when renewal is sought for if renewal was necessary. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the r. 51 appellants and respondents 3 and 4, in support of their respective contentions relied on some of the decisions of the supreme Court : They are :- (i) All Ahmed and Sons v M/s. . Ram Gopal Satyanarain and others (AIR 1974 s. C. 1876 ). As can be seen from the facts of the said case the draft scheme concerned in the said case was published on 3-9-1971 and the permit granted to the appellant therein for the extended route had expired before the publication of the scheme. Therefore, the ratio of the said decision is not applicable to these cases for the reason that in these cases there is no dispute that as on the date of publication of the draft scheme the period of three years for which the permits were granted in favour of the appellants had not expired. Therefore, the ratio of the said decision is not applicable to these cases for the reason that in these cases there is no dispute that as on the date of publication of the draft scheme the period of three years for which the permits were granted in favour of the appellants had not expired. (ii) Anna Transport Corporation limited v. R. T. A , Dharmapuri and others ( AIR 1980 SC 2044 ). In this case, the facts were : Balakrishna Bus Service and Company, respondent-2 in the said appeal, was a private operator on a particular route and the permit was due to expire on 9-10-1974 and it applied for its renewal within the time prescribed by law. The application was notified on 5-6-1974 under Section 57 (3) of the act. Objections were filed by Anna transport Corporation Ltd. , on 25-6- 1974 to the renewal application of Bala- krishna Bus Service and Co. , and the Corporation also applied for the grant of a permit in respect of the same route. Rule 155-A of the Motor Vehicles Rules of the State of Tamilnadu provided for grant of four marks to the State Transport undertaking. As the awarding of four marks would have surely tilted the balance in favour of Anna Transport corporation, Balakrishna Bus Service preferred a writ petition before Madras high Court challenging the validity of the said rule and obtained a stay order. As a result neither the application made by Balakrishna Bus Service nor of Anna transport Corporation Ltd. , could be considered by the R. T. A. In the meanwhile, a draft scheme covering the route was published in the official Gazette under Section 68c of the Act. By the time the said notification was published the permit of Balakrishna Bus Service had already expired. The validity of Rule 155-A was finally upheld by the Madras high Court and consequently it dismissed the writ petition filed by Balakrishna bus Service and directed the RTA to dispose of the application of. Balakrishna bus Service which was pending before it. The RTA rejected the renewal application of Balakrishna Bus Service and granted a permit to Anna Transport Corporation Ltd. The said grant was challenged before the S. T. A. T. , who confirmed the order of the RTA. Balakrishna bus Service which was pending before it. The RTA rejected the renewal application of Balakrishna Bus Service and granted a permit to Anna Transport Corporation Ltd. The said grant was challenged before the S. T. A. T. , who confirmed the order of the RTA. The matter was taken up to High Court by way of a revision and that revision was allowed and a direction was issued to the RTA to consider the renewal application of Balakrishna Bus Service. Aggrieved by the said order, Anna Transport Corporation ltd. , preferred an appeal before the supreme Court, which allowed the appeal on the ground that as the period of the permit held by Balakrishna Bus service had expired before the publication of the draft scheme, it could not be renewed. ( 11 ) FROM the above facts, it is clear that the permit in favour of Balakrishna Bus Service, on the route in question, had expired before the publication of the scheme prepared and published under Section 68c of the Act. It is for that reason, the Supreme Court held that the case did not fall within the purview of the proviso to sub-section 68 (1d) and that the High Court was in error in directing the RTA to consider the renewal application of Balakrishna bus Service. (iii) Charan Transport Co. Ltd. , v. Kanan Lorry Service (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1564 ). The ratio of this decision is also to the same effect. (iv) Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport appellate Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh (A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 2161 ). In the said case the supreme Court held that a person, who is entitled to a renewal of the permit; notwithstanding a Draft Scheme, has to make an application for renewal of his permit in accordance with Section 58 (2) of the Act and that if he failed to make any such application within the time prescribed under Section 58 (2) (a), the right for the renewal stands forfeited and he would not be entitled to the renewal of the permit. ( 12 ) SRI Viswanath, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that as far as these cases are concerned the permits were in force as on the date of publication of the Draft Scheme under Section 68c of the Act and therefore the case of the appellants squarely falls within the proviso under Section 68f (1 D ). As far as applying for the renewal of the permits are concerned, he submitted that they could not make renewal applications as the permits had been set aside by the order of the Tribunal dated 30-4-1973 and stood restored by the order of this Court in the earlier writ petitions dated 23-6-1975 and their operations were stayed again during the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal and again set aside by the order of the Tribunal dated 17-12-1975 which is the subject matter of challenge in these appeals. ( 13 ) AT this stage, it is appropriate and necessary to consider an important question which arises for consideration. The question is : whether in a case in which the operation of a Stage Carriage Permit granted to a person for a specified period is stayed by an order of the Tribunal or the Court in any proceedings and as a result, the grantee was unable to operate the stage carriage for the whole or part of the period for which the permit was granted, the grantee is entitled to operate the permit for the whole or part of the period as the case may be during which he was prevented from operating che stage carriage, after the date of the final order of the Tribunal or the Court, if by such order the validity of the permit is upheld ? ( 14 ) THE above question arises in view of the facts of this case. As stated earlier, the RTA, Shimoga, granted the permit to the appellants on 4-9-1972. Pursuant to the grant, the permits were issued on 11-12-1972. However, the tribunal, on the appeal preferred by the respondents made an interim order staying the operation of the permits. Subsequently by order dated 30-4-73 the tribunal set aside the grant made in favour of both the appellants. That order or the Tribunal was set aside by this court by order dated 23-6-1975 made in w. P. Nos. 1703 and 3692 ot 1973, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal. Subsequently by order dated 30-4-73 the tribunal set aside the grant made in favour of both the appellants. That order or the Tribunal was set aside by this court by order dated 23-6-1975 made in w. P. Nos. 1703 and 3692 ot 1973, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal. During the pendency of the matter before this Court, the Scheme under Section 68c was notified on 29-8-1973. In view of the order of this Court setting the order of the Tribunal, the permit granted by the R. T. A. in favour of the appellants stood restored and as a result it is not disputed that the position as on the date of the publication of the Scheme was the permit granted to the appellants were in force, though their operation was stayed. The Tribunal once again allowed the appeal by its order dated 17-12-1975 and set aside the grant. Against the ssid order of the Tribunal, the writ petitions, out of which these appeals arise, were presented before this court. The writ petitions were dismissed by order dated 14-11-1980. Against the said order, these appeals are presented. Thus, it may be seen right from the dated of grant and issue of the permits in favour of the appellants, their operation had been stayed by the order of the tribunal and ultimately the permits were set aside. There is no dispute that the period for which the permit was granted in favour of the appellants was 3 years. The period of 3 years expired on 11-12-1975, i. e. , after the date of publication of the Scheme on 29-8-1973. ( 15 ) THE contention of the appellants is that as the permits were in force on the date when the draft Scheme was published, they were saved by the proviso to Section 68f (1 D ). ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents do not dispute that on the date when the Scheme was published, three years period for which the permits were granted had not expired and, therefore, the permits were in force. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents do not dispute that on the date when the Scheme was published, three years period for which the permits were granted had not expired and, therefore, the permits were in force. However, their objection is even if we were to set aside the order of the Tribunal as the period of three years from the date of grant was over long back and the appellants have not made any application for renewal as required under Section 58 (2) of the Act ; though, not making such an application was as a consequence of setting aside of the grant itself; and as no application for renewal could be made at this distance of time in view of the maximum period fixed under Section 58 (2) of the Act, an order setting aside the order of the Tribunal would be purposeless. ( 17 ) BUT the reply of Sri Viswanath for the objection was that the appellants were not at all required to make renewal applications, but they were entitled to operate for a period of three years on the basis of the permit granted by the R. T. A. after the permits granted by the R. T. A. are confirmed and that the question of renewal arises only after they operate the Stage Carriage for three years under the permit. He submitted that the result which flows from the interim order of the Tribunal cannot be such as would deprive the benefit of the grant made by the R. T. A. in their favour even if ultimately the Court were to uphold the grant made in their favour, just because the upholding of the grant was after three years. In view of this rival submission as above the question set out earlier arises for consideration. ( 18 ) NOW we shall proceed to find out the answer to the question. Relevant portion of Section 58 of the Act reads :"58 (1) (A) A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. Relevant portion of Section 58 of the Act reads :"58 (1) (A) A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. (b) A private carrier's permit or a public carrier's permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for a period of five years. (2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit : provided that the application for the renewal of a permit shall be made, (a) in the case of stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, not less than (one hundred and twenty days) before the date of its expiry ; and (b) in any other case, not less than (sixty days) before the date of its expiry : provided further that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits. "under sub-section (1) the period of operation of a stage carriage permit granted under the Act is required to be not less than 3 years and not more than 5 years. Therefore, it is open for the Regional transport Authority to grant a stage carriage permit for a minimum period of three years or for a period more than three years but not exceeding 5 years. Section 64 of the Act provides for an appeal against tha order of the State or Regional transport Authority granting a permit to any person at the instance of an objector. There is no dispute that the appellate Tribunal before which an appeal is preferred under Section 63 of the Act has the power to grant an interim order staying the operation of the grant of permit made by the State or regional Transport Authority. There is no dispute that the appellate Tribunal before which an appeal is preferred under Section 63 of the Act has the power to grant an interim order staying the operation of the grant of permit made by the State or regional Transport Authority. Therefore it is clear that if a person prefers an appeal against the grant of a stage carriage permit, say for a period of 3 years by a State or Regional Transport authority, to the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal were to grant an interim order staying the operation of the permit, the grantee would be prevented from operating the stage carriage on the basis of the grant. If in such a case, if finally the appeal were to be dismissed after about 3 years or the tribunal were to allow the appeal and set aside the grant and the order of the Tribunal were to be set aside by the High court after 3 years, the question would be whether the grantee loses the right under the grant notwithstanding the fact that the grant is upheld either by the tribunal or the High Court as the case may be. if the contention urged for the respondents were to be accepted, it would lead to astounding results in that notwithstanding that the grant is upheld by the Tribunal or the High Court as the case may be, as by that time the period of three years would have expired the grantee would lose the right and the orders of the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be, upholding the grant would become futile. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that in such a cass the only course open for the grantee was to apply for renewal. Even assuming that in such a case the party could and has to apply for renewal, it might so happen that even the period within which an application for renewal has to be filed in view of Section 58 (2} of the Act might have expired. Even assuming that in such a case the party could and has to apply for renewal, it might so happen that even the period within which an application for renewal has to be filed in view of Section 58 (2} of the Act might have expired. It is also pertinent to note that even if the order upholding the grant, after staying it, is made after about 2 years and there is still time for the grantee to make an application for renewal, the question still would be, whether in such a case notwithstanding the upholding of the grant of the permit for a period of 3 years, the grantee would have the right to operate the stage carriage only for the balance of about six months only and had to apply for renewal and his application for renewal has to be considered as an application for the first grant as required under Section 58 (2) of the Act and as a result he has to compete with other applicants and would secure perference for renewal, if only the other applicants are not more merited and are found to be equal in merit to the grantee. ( 19 ) IN our opinion, when a stage carriage permit is granted for a period of 3 years by a State or a Regional Transport Authority under Section 58 of the act, the party acquires the right to operate the stage carriage for a period of 3 years. If the grantee on account of his own inability, whatever be the reason, is unable to operate the stage carriage for the whole or any part of the period for which the permit was granted, then it would be a case of his having the right but not exercising it, and therefore he cannot say that he would operate for three years whenever he pleases. But in a case where the party is in a position to exercise his right and operate the stage carriage for a period of 3 years and he is ready and willing to do so, but he is prevented from exercising his right by the operation of an interim order granted by the Tribunal or the Court, as the case may be, the reasonable view to take is the right to operate the stage carriage for a period of 3 years stands suspended during the period which the grant is stayed and suspension stands revoked on the date on which the grant is upheld. In other words, if the stage carriage permit was granted say on 1-1-1972 for a period of 3 years in favour of a person and he was prevented from operating the stage carriage on account of interim orders granted by the Tribunal or by the court and finally the grant is upheld on 1-1-1976, the period of 3 years must commence from the date on which the permit is issued on and after 1-1-1976. Any other view would result in the deprivation of the right flowing from the grant of a permit for the period for which it was granted even if the grant is upheld by the Tribunal or the Court, if by the date on which the grant is upheld the period for which the permit was granted had expired and in the interregnum the operation of the grant was stayed. ( 20 ) IT is also not correct to say that in such a situation, the party must apply for the renewal. The question of applying for renewal aris. es only when the party has operated the permit for the period for which it was granted. Therefore, in a case in which a party is prevented from operating a stage carriage permit pursuant to a grant by the interim order of the Tribunal of Court, it would be unreasonable to require him to apply for renewal when the grant itself was stayed by the Tribunal or the Court as the case may be and any such insistence would mean the deprivation of the right flowing from the original grant for operating the stage carriage for the period for which it was granted and limiting the grant only for enabling him to apply for renewal. ( 21 ) IN our view the permit granted by the S. T. A. or R. T. A. , as the case may be, remains dormant during the period when its operation is stayed by the Tribunal or the Courts, and becomes operative for the period for which it was iranted if and when the grant is restored, excluding the period if any during which the operator had operated the permit before its operation was stayed by the court or Tribunal. In such a case, after the grant is restored the officer concerned has to make necessary alteration entries regarding the dates between which the permit would be operative so as to allow the grantee to operate for the full period for which the permit was granted. ( 22 ) WE receive support for the above view in Rule 119 of the M V. Rules. It reads :"119 Permits-Entry of Registration mark compulsory- (1) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has been entered therein. Provided further, if in the meanwhile an order staying operation of the grant of permit has been issued by any competent authority, the person in whose favour the permit is granted may be called upon to produce the said certificate within a period of one month from the date, or such other period as may be specified by the Transport authority, not exceeding 3 months in the aggregate from the date of order vacating stay order. "sub-rule (1) makes the entry of the registration mark of the vehicle in the permit mandatory. Sub-rule (2) prescribes the maximum lime which could be given tor production of registration certificate. The second proviso is very significant for the question arising in this case. It provides that where the permit is stayed by any competent authority, the grantee should be given time not exceeding three months for the production of the registration certificate, from the date of vacation of the stay order. This rule indicate if a permit granted for 3 years is stayed for even more than 3 years, the permit could be issued thereafter within three months from the date of vacating of the stay order. This rule fully supports the view which we have taken on the interpretation of Section 58 of the Act. This rule indicate if a permit granted for 3 years is stayed for even more than 3 years, the permit could be issued thereafter within three months from the date of vacating of the stay order. This rule fully supports the view which we have taken on the interpretation of Section 58 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question set out at paragraph-13 in the affirmative ( 23 ) IN view of our answer as above, the objection raised on behalf of the respondents that because the appellants have not made an application for renewal of their permits within the time stipulated under Section 58 (2) of the act, no relief can be granted, has to be rejected, for, the question of the appellants applying for renewal does not arise at all until after the expiry of the period of grant on and after the date on which the grant made by the R. T. A. stands restored. ( 24 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants also relied on the decision of the supreme Court in Yogeshwar Jaiswal v State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR. 1985 SC 516), and submitted that the draft scheme published on 28-9-1973 had to be treated as not in existence as it was not finalised even after 13 years. It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the said question in this case. ( 25 ) NOW coming to the merits of the case it may be seen that the R. T. A. , shimoga, had considered the evidence on record regarding the need and after recording a finding that the need was proved granted the permits. The Tribunal set aside the grant on the ground that there was no need. Counsel for the appellants submitted that the finding was perverse. We proceed to consider the case of each of the appellants in this behalf separately. ( 26 ) RE: Appellant in 352 of 1981 : in the case of this appellant in holding that the evidence did not establish the need, the Tribunal said thus:"on. Counsel for the appellants submitted that the finding was perverse. We proceed to consider the case of each of the appellants in this behalf separately. ( 26 ) RE: Appellant in 352 of 1981 : in the case of this appellant in holding that the evidence did not establish the need, the Tribunal said thus:"on. the first question the learned counsel for Sri Basavappa, one of the grantees, contended that there was need to introduce the express service having regard to the representations made to the R. T. A. Shimoga and that he drew my attention to various representations which have been made to the R. T. A. in support of the applications of his client. It may be mentioned that in his case the R. T. A. ; chitradurga refused the concurrence whereas in the case of Syed Madar the rta, Chitradurga seems to have given concurrence. In the case of Basavappa there are no doubt some representations. In the case of the other grantee there are no representations and except the report of the Inspector of Motor vehicles Inspectors, the report of the police and the concurrence of the RTA, chitradurga, there is no other favourable circumstances. "syed Madar referred to in this paragraph is the father of the appellant, who had made the application. It may be seen in so far this appellant is concerned, instead of considering whether the finding of the R. T. A. regarding need on the basis of the material on record, was well-founded, the Tribunal said except the report of the Police and of the M. V. Inspectors and the concurrence of the r. T. A. , Chitradurga, there was no other material. It is nothing but coming to a conclusion by saying no evidence other than the evidence available on record was available, instead of coming to a conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record. Later part of the Tribunal's order itself shows there was also other evidence in support of the need. That part of the order reads:-"the TDB, Channagiri has merely recommended the grant of permit to two services under its resolution dated 21-1-1971 one from Shimoga to Chitradurga and the other from Davangere to Bhadravathi. There is another recommendation from the President, town Municipal Council recommending the grant of an Express Service from Shimoga to Chitradurga during the early morning. That part of the order reads:-"the TDB, Channagiri has merely recommended the grant of permit to two services under its resolution dated 21-1-1971 one from Shimoga to Chitradurga and the other from Davangere to Bhadravathi. There is another recommendation from the President, town Municipal Council recommending the grant of an Express Service from Shimoga to Chitradurga during the early morning. A resolution is also passed by the Channagiri Town municipal Council recommending for an express service to enable the people to travel from Shimoga to Chitradurga. But, it is not stated why such a service is required. "thus, it may be seen that the Tribunal said that there were representations regarding the need for express services from two local authorities, namely. Taluk Development Board, channagiri, Town Municipal Council, channagiri, but proceeded to brush aside the same by saying that they had not stated as to why such a service was required. When the local authorities said that there was need for express service, it means that it is required for the travelling passengers. Again at paragraph-7, the Tribunal said thus :"in Syed Madar's case, there is a representation of a cycle shop owner and some other persons of Shimoga and one need not give such consideration to such representations. In this case also the route survey is conducted only upto Shimoga District border. Thus it would seem that whereas the municipalities and other requested the service to start in the morning from chitradurga, what is given is a service starting from Shimoga in the morning "here again the Tribunal referred to a few other representations, though it said earlier there was no other material but said that they need not be considered, without saying as to why they should not have been considered. The Tribunal again misread the evidence, namely, the representation of the Municipalities stating that the representation was for an express service starting in the morning from Chitradurga but the permit was granted for an express service starting from Shimoga in the morning. As seen from the earlier part of the order of the tribunal, the Tribunal has specifically referred to the representation of the town Municipal Council end said that it was for an express service from Shimoga to Chitradurga during the early morning. As seen from the earlier part of the order of the tribunal, the Tribunal has specifically referred to the representation of the town Municipal Council end said that it was for an express service from Shimoga to Chitradurga during the early morning. Further, as far as the route survey is concerned, the Tribunal observed that it was only upto Chitradurga border without noticing that out of 82 miles from Shimoga to Chitradurga, 53 miles were in Shimoga District and only 29. miles lay in Chitradurga District and, therefore, the report expressing need for an express service starting from Shimoga to Chitradurga could not be said to be not relevant. In this behalf, the Tribunal also over-looked the fact that the r. T. A. , Chitredurga, had given concurrence for opening this route. Thus, it may be seen that the order of the Tribunal is full of inconsistencies even as regards the nature of evidence on record. Ultimately, the Tribunal concladed that as there were three express services already, the need was not established. Learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the three existing express services were at 8-15 A. M. , 10-45 a. M. and 1-15 P. M. starting from Shimoga and the need put forward was for an express service starting early in the morning from Shimoga, i. e. , at 6-30 a. M. and reaching Chitradurga by 10-00 a. M. There can be no doubt, any express service starting from Shimoga at 8-15 A. M. or thereafter could not fullfil the need of passengers desirous of reaching Chitradurga by 10-00 A. M. One other reason given by the Tribunal for reversing the order of the R. T. A. reads :"syed Madar is operating a shuttle service from Shimoga at 6-30 A. M. He proceeds to Chitradurga. He wanted to run an express service to start at the identical hour of 6-30 A. M. in addition to his shuttle service he is already operating. In short, he wants to monopolise the route. "this observation runs counter to the order made by this Court on his earlier writ petition. He wanted to run an express service to start at the identical hour of 6-30 A. M. in addition to his shuttle service he is already operating. In short, he wants to monopolise the route. "this observation runs counter to the order made by this Court on his earlier writ petition. This Court found fault with the earlier order of the Tribunal, on the ground that the Tribunal failed to consider that the need for an express service was different from a shuttle and the Tribunal was directed to reconsider the matter on the basis of the need for an express service. Therefore, the observation that as the appellant was running a shuttle service ; which takes much longer time for reaching Chitradurga ; there was no need for an express service is inconsistent with the direction issued in the earlier writ petition. Further the criticism that by granting a permit for an express service, the appellant secures monopoly is also patently untenable when even after the grant he would be having only two permits. ( 27 ) IN the circumstances, we are of the view, that the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal cannot but be characterised as perverse and has to be set aside. ( 28 ) RE : Appellant in W. A. 474 of 1981: The only difference between this case and the case of the other appellant regarding the evidence is in the case of appellant in W. A. No. 352 of 1981 the r. T. A. , Chitradurga had given its concurrence" whereas in the case of appellant in W. A. No. 474 of 1981 the R. T. A. , chitradurga had not given its concurrence. Therefore, whatever we have said in the case of appellant in W. A. No. 352 of 1981 applies to this case also. But in this case the Tribunal has also proceeded to consider the case of this appellant even on the basis that the need for an express service starting from shimoga at 10-30 A. M. existed, and held that need was fulfilled by the grant of a permit by the R. T. A. , Shimoga subsequently on the route Kumsi to chitradurga via Shimoga. Relevant portion of the order reads :"then we come to the question whether there is need for introducing an additional express service. Relevant portion of the order reads :"then we come to the question whether there is need for introducing an additional express service. It may be mentioned that after the grant made in favour of Basavappa was set aside by the Tribunal in the first instance, he filled an application to the R. T. A. Shimoga, for the grant of another express service to start from kumsi, a Small place in Shimoga district and to reach Chitradurga. This grant was made by the R. T. A. Shimoga and the grant was also confirmed by this Tribunal on appeal. It is admitted that Basavappa is operating the service as an express, practically from shimoga to Chitradurga though he starts from Kumsi a little earlier. From the timings assigned to this service, we find that he arrives Shimoga from kumsi at 10-30 A. M. and leaves Shimoga at 10-35 A. M. and he arrived at Chitradurga at 3-30 P. M. So the need for an additional express service, if there was any need, had been substantially met by the grant of a permit to Basavappa to operate between kumsi and Chitradurga via Shimoga, as an express service. " ( 29 ) THE above facts are not in dispute. As pointed out by the Tribunal, this appellant has secured virtually a permit for an express service from Shimoga to Chitradurga, through a permit from Kumsi to Chitradurga via Shimoga, kumsi being a small place at a little distance from Shimoga. But for this subsequent grant, the grant made by the r. T. A. had to be sustained. ( 30 ) AS the decision of the Tribunal regarding this appellant is based on the above subsequent event also which fulfils the very need sought to be achieved by the grant which is the subject-matter of these proceedings, we find no ground to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. ( 31 ) IN the result, we make the following:" (1) W. A. No. 352 of 1981: (1) The appeal is allowed ; (2) In reversal of the order made by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7818 of 1976, the writ petition is allowed; (3) The order of the Kamataka State transport Appellate Tribunal, in so far it relates the setting aside of the permit granted to the appellant, is set aside. (4) The R. T. A. /r. T. O. , Shimoga, shall make the necessary endorsement/ alteration on the permit as indicated in paragraph-21 of this order. (2) W. A. No. 474 of 1981 : (1) The appeal is dismissed ; (2) No costs. " --- *** --- .