Kautik s/o Motiram Dandge v. State of Maharashtra & others
1986-07-30
M.S.RATNAPARKHI, S.M.DAUD
body1986
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---A writ of certiorari or in the nature of certiorari has been sought for by the petitioner in this petition. 2. It is no longer in dispute that the petitioner entered in the Police Department as a Police Constable long back in 1969. He was promoted as Head Constable some time in 1979. In pursuance of the advertisement issued by Maharashtra Public Service Commission, he applied for the post of Police Sub-Inspector. It is not much disputed that some posts were reserved for the scheduled tribes. The petitioner claims himself as belonging to 'Malhar Koli" caste and as such , belonging to the Scheduled Tribe. The petitioner was selected for the post against the vacancy reserved for scheduled tribe. He was asked by the Public Service Commission by its dated 24-2-1983 to join the Police Training College at Nasik and accordingly, he reported to the Principle on 1st March, 1983. 3. While he was under training at the Police Training College, Nasik he received a communication from the Principal, directing him to appear before the Scrutiny Committee at Pune on 2-4-1983. Accordingly, he appeared before the Scrutiny Committee and produced all the documents including the caste certificate issued by the Executive Magistrate and school leaving certificate. He also filed in the questionnaire which he was asked to fill in by the Committee. There was a viva voce interview. The petitioner joined his training. But to his surprise he found a communication dated 20-6-1983 addressed by the Principal of the Police Training College, Nasik, discharging him from the training college on the ground that the Director of Social Welfare was not satisfied with the caste certificate issued in his favour. It is his case that in pursuance of this letter he was discharged from the training College. 4. It is this letter, which has resulted in his discharge from the Training College that the petitioner is challenging in this petition. It has been his contention that he belongs to Malhar Koli community which is a schedule tribe within the meaning of law prevailing. In support of his claim he has also obtained the caste certificate from the competent authority. It is his contention that the Scrutiny Committee was wrong in coming to the conclusion that he does not belong to the said caste.
In support of his claim he has also obtained the caste certificate from the competent authority. It is his contention that the Scrutiny Committee was wrong in coming to the conclusion that he does not belong to the said caste. On the other hand, it is his contention that the Committee had no powers or jurisdiction to give such a declaration resulting virtually in cancellation of the caste certificate issued in his favour. He, therefore, seeks a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing this direction. 5. The respondent raised two points in their defence. Firstly, they contended that the caste certificate issued by the Taluka Executive Magistrate was subjected to the scrutiny by the Caste Scrutiny Committee under the law prevailing then and hence, the decision of the Committee is final and as such, cannot be agitated now, Secondly, it was contended that there has been inordinate delay without any explanation which disentitles the petitioner from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. The controversy in this litigation thus covers a very narrow compass. The learned Assistant Government Pleader conceded before us that the petitioner has produced a caste certificate before the Maharashtra Public Service Commission and that certificate was issued by the competent authority, namely the Taluka Executive Magistrate. It is also not much disputed by the contesting parties that the certificate was a subject matter of scrutiny at the hands of "Scrutiny Committee" of which the Director of Tribal Welfare and Research and the Joint Director of Social Welfare were the members. However it has been contended that the role which this Committee was expected to play was very much limited, inasmuch as, its role was only investigatory and advisory and it had no powers to cancel the certificate or to negative the claim of the claimant. The learned advocate for the petitioner took us extensively through the Government Resolution dated 29th October, 1980. More important is Appendix (A) attached to this Resolution. Clause (9) of this Appendix authorise the Committee to reject the claim of caste on due investigation. But a duty has been cast on this Committee to inform its decision of the person who is aggrieved so that the aggrieved person gets an opportunity to file appeal against the rejection of his claim before the Commissioner within ten days.
Clause (9) of this Appendix authorise the Committee to reject the claim of caste on due investigation. But a duty has been cast on this Committee to inform its decision of the person who is aggrieved so that the aggrieved person gets an opportunity to file appeal against the rejection of his claim before the Commissioner within ten days. This provision is salutary inasmuch as, a substantive right of appeal has been provided to the aggrieved person. It can be reasonably said in these circumstances that it is within these limitations that the Committee has to work. 7. There is nothing on record to show that the Scrutiny Committee has informed the petitioner its decision which it had been taken on the subject. On the other hand, to his surprise he found a communication from the Principal of the Police Training College at Nasik and that too long after the interview which ultimately resulted in his discharge from the Training programme. This virtually means that the principal had usurped the powers which never existed in him in discharging the petitioner from the Institution. The proper procedure as envisaged is otherwise. When this Scrutiny Committee comes to the conclusion that the person does not belong to a particular caste which he claims to, it has to send its report to the District Magistrate who in turn is empowered to take further action in the matter. The position of the law as it is revealed is quite simple. It was only the District Magistrate who could take the ultimate action which in this case has been taken by the Principal of the College. This amounts to nothing but usurption of powers which did not exist in the authority. Similar point came up for decision before the Division Bench of this Court in (Writ Petition No. 1387 of 1984)1. The Division Bench of this Court in para 4 observed: "Unfortunately, the finding given was not sent to the District Magistrate who alone under the Circular referred to above had the authority to take the action in regard to the cancellation of the certificate. The procedure prescribed by the Government itself has not been followed." 8. Mr. A.M. Dabir, learned Assistant Government Pleader representing the Respondents, had to concede that this anomalous position has crept in because of the letter addressed by the Principal of Training College.
The procedure prescribed by the Government itself has not been followed." 8. Mr. A.M. Dabir, learned Assistant Government Pleader representing the Respondents, had to concede that this anomalous position has crept in because of the letter addressed by the Principal of Training College. In these circumstances there is no alternative open except to quash the letter as the authority issuing the same has no powers to issue the letter. 9. Another point raised in this petition was about the delay. It is true that the petitioner was discharged from the training course on 20th June, 1983, whereas, the present petition has been filed on 10th August, 1984. More than a year has lapsed before presenting this petition before this Court. The petitioner has given the explanation in regard to delay in para- 10 of the petition and the explanation so tendered appears to be quite reasonable. This petition ha been admitted long back and we are at a stage of examining and scrutinising the merits of the case and particularly when substantive rights are being put in jeopardy, the technicalities should not be allowed to deprive the citizen of his due rights. We do not think that the delay in filing this petition can be an obstacle in the way of the present petitioner. 10. In result, the letter dated 20th June, 1983 addressed by the Principal of Police Training College, Nasik, to the present petitioner is hereby quashed. Respondent No. 1 is directed to take further steps in the matter according to law, disregarding the impugned letter dated 20th June, 1983. No further directions are necessary. Rule is made absolute in above terms. The petition is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----