JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) PARTIES have made a very long journey to come to this Court which commenced on 6-6-1971. In between there was another bout of litigation which had brought them to this Court. Then, on 20-9-1976, an order was passed in Civil revision No. 443 of 1976 wherein the question determinable by this Court concerned fixation and payment of provisional rent in terms of Section 13 (2) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 for short the act. ( 2. ) THIS appeal is by the plaintiff/landlord, who sued in terms of Section 12 (l) (a)of the Act for eviction of the tenant (defendant-respondent) from the suit house on the ground of default in payment of rent due payable by the tenant for the premises occupied by him. Because there was a dispute between the parties as to the quantum of the rent payable by the tenant, it had to be determined under Section 13 (2) of the act and proceedings in the course of the suit commenced for that purpose terminating eventually, as earlier alluded, in this Courts order passed on 20-9-1976. It is the finding of the lower appellate Court in the impugned judgment that because of the proceedings undertaken under Section 13 (2) of the Act during the pendency of the suit, compliance with the provisions of Section 3 (-l) could not be ensured though the defendant-respondent started making regularly deposits of rent on and after 16-12-1976, namely, within three months, as directed by this Court, by the order aforesaid rendered on 20-9-1976. However, what is contended by Shri N. K. Jain, counsel, appearing for the landlord/appellant, by filing LA. No. I/86 in the course of hearing of this appeal, is that the Court below misconstrued the provision of Section 13 (1) of the act and confirmed erroneously the decree passed by the trial Court dismissing his suit, without ascertaining the fact as to whether during the pendency of the appeal before it the tenant had continued to make deposit of rent regularly in terms of section 13 (1) of the Act. It may be noted in this connection that after provisional rent under Section 13 (2) was fixed at Rs. 45/- per month by this Court, finally the trial Court determined defendants liability to pay monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 50/ -. ( 3. It may be noted in this connection that after provisional rent under Section 13 (2) was fixed at Rs. 45/- per month by this Court, finally the trial Court determined defendants liability to pay monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 50/ -. ( 3. ) ACCORDINGLY, the short question on which the decision of this appeal hangs is construction mainly, in my opinion, of sub-section (5) of Section 13, which I extract along with sub-section (i) :- " (1) On a suit or any other proceedings being instituted by a landlord on any of the grounds referred to in Section 12 or in any appeal or any other proceedings by a tenant against any decree or order for his eviction, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of writ of summons or notice of appeal or of any other proceeding, or within one month of institution of appeal or any other proceeding by the tenant, as the case may be, or within such further time as the court may on an application made to it allow in this behalf, deposit in the court or pay to the landlord, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made, and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate till the decision of the suit, appeal or proceedings, as the case may be. " " (5) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) no decree or order shall be made by the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord. " ( 4. " ( 4. ) ALTHOUGH Shri N. K. Jain has strenuously argued that because Section 13 (5)conferred a "benefit" on the tenant, it was tenants burden to satisfy the Court that he had made regular deposits of rent, as contemplated under Sub-section (1) of Section 13, I propose to take a different view of the matter for several reasons: However, first I may examine the scope and ambit of sub-section (5) which, in my opinion, lends a different complexion to the lis. It encompasses, according to me, jurisdictional competence of Court rather to finally determine landlords entitlement contemplated under section 12 (l) (a) of the Act. What is to be noted is the significance of the use of the term "decree" along with the term "order" in sub-section (5) while in sub-section (1)also, the terms used are "suit" and "proceeding" indeed in relation to section 12. The question is, why ? What the legislature intended ? Could it be that the final jurisdiction in the matter of passing an order for tenants eviction was invested in the Executing court ? Indeed, merely on passing of a decree against the tenant, "recovery of possession of the accommodation" did not take place only when the decree for possession is executed by the landlord by instituting a "proceeding" in the Executing court that occasion will arise for the Court to order finally restoration to the landlord of possession of the accommodation by the tenant. ( 5. ) WHAT indeed is the combined effect of sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 13 ? when the landlord has failed to obtain, a decree in the suit to recover possession of accommodation from tenant and has preferred "appeal", he has to make out his "ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant". This follows from the language of both sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 13 because he has to establish his claim and get a decree from the appellate Court in execution whereof only it will be possible for him to recover possession from the tenant. I do not read anything in Section 13 (5) to rest any burden on the tenant, by which he is required, while resisting a prayer for a decree for possession by the landlord, to set up his defence in anticipation of landlords plea. I do not read anything in Section 13 (5) to rest any burden on the tenant, by which he is required, while resisting a prayer for a decree for possession by the landlord, to set up his defence in anticipation of landlords plea. Indeed, even when plea of non-compliance by the tenant of the statutory mandate of section 13 (1) is raised by the landlord in the appellate Court, it will be still open to the tenant, even at that stage, to submit that the appellate Court may pass an order under section 13 (1) and only on his default in compliance with that order, a decree to disposses him can be passed. Because, sub-section (1) itself contemplates application being made by the tenant in that regard and the right to do so cannot be limited only to the stage of pendency of the suit. ( 6. ) THE contention pressed by Shri Jain has not appealed me for more than one reason. Firstly, because I do not read any compulsion in the language either of sub-section (1) or subsection (5) of Section 13 of the Act which lends assurance or support to counsels contention. Secondly, I have no doubt that Section 12 (l) (a) of the Act has to be read along with sub-sections (1) and (2) and (5) of Section 13 to effectuate the legislative intent and purpose underlying the enactment. It is true that the marginal note of Section 13 speaks of a benefit of protection against eviction. But the settled law is that it can be read merely as an external aid to interpretation of any statutory provision. On the other hand, although the marginal note appended to Section 12 "restriction of eviction of tenants", not only section 12 but also section 13 and indeed all other provisions of the Chapter III, upto Section 23, have the same object, namely "control of eviction of tenants", which is the caption given to Chapter HI. So much for today. I am happy that in this case atleast no boggling authorities have clouded my vision as none is cited and I have to proceed on my own in divining the legislative intent. ( 7. So much for today. I am happy that in this case atleast no boggling authorities have clouded my vision as none is cited and I have to proceed on my own in divining the legislative intent. ( 7. ) FOR all the foregoing reasons I have no hesitation at all to hold that there is no ground for me to entertain the interlocutory application filed today or even to interfere otherwise with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court below. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. ( 8. ) SHRI N. K. Jain however, makes a very fair and reasonable prayer to which I refuse to hear Shri Lahotis objection. Counsel contends that let it be made clear that the liability of the tenant (respondent-defendant) to continue to make regular deposits of rent under the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and as envisaged by the relevant statutory provision, remain unaltered and is not wiped out by this order. This prayer is accepted and I confirm that this order does not affect in any manner the right of the plaintiff-appellant to recover rent due payable by the tenant, whether out of deposits made by him or by taking recourse to other proceedings. Appeal dismissed.