K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Keonjhar, upholding the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate First Class, Anandapur, convicting the petitioner under section 408, Indian Penal Code ('i. P. C. ' for short) and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months more. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case lies within short compass and is that the petitioner at the relevant time was serving as an Assistant Accountant in the Baula Mines Office of the Ferror Alloys Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the FACOR ). His duty consisted of receiving and keeping cash and weekly submission of accounts of the receipt, expenditure and the cash in hand to the head office of the FACOR at Bhadrak. On 4. 3. 1978 he submitted the weekly accounts (Ext. 3) for the last time showing therein that the closing balance of cash in hand with him was Rs. 11. 834. 27. Thereafter, he did not attend the office nor made over charge of cash and accounts. P. W. 3 was the Agent and Superintendent of Mines of the FACOR posted at Bhadrak who had appointed the petitioner on the recommendation of a local businessman (P. W. 4 ). On receiving report that the petitioner was not attending office and had not made over charge of cash and accounts, P. W. 3 informed P. W. 4 in order to starch for the petitioner. Accordingly, P. W. 4 searched out the petitioner and brought him before P. W. 3. In the presence of both P. Ws. 3 and 4, the petitioner is said to have made an extra judicial confession to the effect that he had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 13,000/-belonging to the FACOR and wrote down in his own hand Ext. 5 on 16. 3. 1978 in evidence of the extra judicial confession. Although he had promised to refund the amount, he did not do so and so F. I. R. (Ext. 9) was lodged by P. W. 3 on 17. 3. 1978. In course of investigation it came to light that the petitioner had received a sum of Rs. 3,891/- from P. W. 9 and a further sum of Rs. Although he had promised to refund the amount, he did not do so and so F. I. R. (Ext. 9) was lodged by P. W. 3 on 17. 3. 1978. In course of investigation it came to light that the petitioner had received a sum of Rs. 3,891/- from P. W. 9 and a further sum of Rs. 7,830/- from P. W. 12 and had not accounted for the same. After close of investigation it became apparent that the petitioner had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 28,629. 01 and accordingly charge-sheet was submitted against him for having committed an offence under section 408 I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE petitioner had pleaded that he did not misappropriated the cash. He did not make any extra judicial confession of having misappropriated cash, but was coerced to write down Ext. 5 as if it was an extra judicial confession. ( 4 ) THE learned Judicial Magistrate accepted the prosecution case and convicted and sentenced the petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge on appeal maintained the order of conviction and sentence. ( 5 ) MR. B. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, illustrated several suspicious circumstances from the evidence adduced by the prosecution and contended that the learned courts below without considering them and on shallow consideration of the prosecution evidence found the petitioner guilty. According to him, had an in-depth study of the prosecution evidence been made, the suspicious circumstances could come to light so as to cause grave doubt into the prosecution case. The suspicious circumstances, according to him, were as follows: 1. Although, according to the charge sheet, a sum of Rs. 28,62901 was shown to have been misappropriated by the petitioner, the prosecution led evidence to the effect that only a sum of Rs. 23,555/- was misappropriated. 2. In the forwarding report the investigating officer stated that a sum of Rs. 13,000/- was seized from the petitioner, whereas, the evidence in court disclosed that actually a sum of Rs. 3,500/- was seized. if, as a matter of fact, a sum of Rs. 13. 000/- was seized from the petitioner, there could be no misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 11,834. 27 which was shown as the cash balance on the crucial date, namely, 4. 3. 1978 as per Ext. 3. 3. 3,500/- was seized. if, as a matter of fact, a sum of Rs. 13. 000/- was seized from the petitioner, there could be no misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 11,834. 27 which was shown as the cash balance on the crucial date, namely, 4. 3. 1978 as per Ext. 3. 3. P. W. 3 was the employer of the petitioner and P. W. 4 was a Contractor under the FACOR according to his own admission. Both of them were interested in the FACOR in some way or other. Coercion by them to write out Ext. 5 could not, therefore, be ruled out, particularly when there is no independent corroboration that the alleged extra judicial confession evidenced by Ext. 5 was voluntary. 4. P. W. 8, an Accountant of the FACOR at Bhadrak office gave a clean chit to the petitioner saying that he did not notice any misappropriation of money by the petitioner though he had verified the accounts. The evidence of P. W. 8 was not discussed by the learned courts below. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, urged that the prosecution proved its case of misappropriation by the petitioner to the hilt and so in revision interference with the orders passed by the learned courts below is unwarranted. ( 6 ) IN the charge-sheet it has been stated that the petitioner had committed criminal breach of trust to the tune of Rs. 28,629. 01. The charge sheet was submitted as a result of the materials available to the investigating officer from the records and accounts maintained by the FACOR. It can be safely assumed that the investigating officer got evidence to the effect that the petitioner had committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the aforesaid amount. But the evidence laid before the trial court was otherwise. According to the evidence, the petitioner showed a sum of Rs. 11,834. 27 in the weekly accounts return (Ext. 3) submitted on 4. 3. 1978. Further, he had received a sum of Rs. 3,891 I- from P. W. 9 and Rs. 7,830/- from P. W. 12. The total amount comes to Rs. 23,555. 27 which, according to the evidence, was said to have been misappropriated by the petitioner. It has not been explained nor is it understood how there was a difference of the amount said to have been misappropriated. 3,891 I- from P. W. 9 and Rs. 7,830/- from P. W. 12. The total amount comes to Rs. 23,555. 27 which, according to the evidence, was said to have been misappropriated by the petitioner. It has not been explained nor is it understood how there was a difference of the amount said to have been misappropriated. It seems that either the informant nor the investigating officer was sure of the amount alleged to have been misappropriated by the petitioner. This obvious fact is sufficient to create a suspicion into the allegations made by the prosecution, as well as the nature of investigation. ( 7 ) IN a cognizable criminal case, a forwarding report to the criminal court is one of the earliest documents sent by the investigating officer. In this case, in the forwarding report, the investigating officer (P. W. 13) stated in clear terms that be had seized a sum of Rs. 13,000/- from the petitioner on 2 1. 3. 1978. But, as a matter of fact, evidence was adduced by the prosecution by examining two seizure witnesses, P. Ws. 5 and 11, to show that a sum of Rs. 3,500/- was seized from the petitioner. The investigating officer (P. W. 13) explained that by mistake he mentioned in the forwarding report that a sum of Rs. 13,000/- was seized, although, as a matter of fact, a sum of Rs. 3,500/- was seized. Both the learned courts below have accepted the explanation of the investigating officer. It is significant to point out that the seizure list by which the sum of Rs 3,500/- was alleged to have been seized by the investigating officer was not legally marked as an exhibit in proof of the seizure. The seizure witnesses, P. Ws. 5 and 11, stated that a sum of Rs. 3,500/- was seized and they proved their signatures (Exts. 10 and 10/1) appearing in the seizure list. These facts will indicate two things. First, a sum of Rs. 13,000/- might have been seized from the possession of the petitioner and it was shown in the seizure list that a sum of Rs. 3,500/- was seized and, second, even if the explanation of the investigating officer (P. W. 131 is accepted as correct, he was grossly careless in making the investigation and furnishing a wrong statement to the court. 13,000/- might have been seized from the possession of the petitioner and it was shown in the seizure list that a sum of Rs. 3,500/- was seized and, second, even if the explanation of the investigating officer (P. W. 131 is accepted as correct, he was grossly careless in making the investigation and furnishing a wrong statement to the court. In either case, it is clear that the investigation was not free from suspicious circumstances. ( 8 ) MR. B. Nayak vehemently urged that the retracted extra judicial confession being a weak type of evidence, there being no corroboration of its voluntary nature from independent sources, and as P. W. 3 before whom the extra judicial confession was said to have been made was a person in authority, the evidence of extra judicial confession should be wholly rejected. According to the evidence of P. W. 3, who was the Agent and Superintendent of Mines of the FACOR with headquarters at Bhadrak, the petitioner had been appointed as an Assistant Accountant by him on the recommendation of P. W. 4, a local businessman who according to his own admission was a Contractor under the FACOR because, he supplies cement. The evidence of both P. Ws. 3 and 4 goes to show that in their presence the petitioner had confessed that he had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 13,000/- and in evidence of the extra judicial confession he wrote Ext. 5 addressing it to P. W. 3 to the following effect: To The Agent, M/s. Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited, Bhadrak. Shri, I confess that I have withdrawn a sum of Rs. 13,000/- (Rupees thirteen thousand only) from the funds lying with me towards the blasting account of the Company. I have utilized the above amount in my personal expenditure and requirements. I am ready to repay the above amount, whenever it is demanded by the Authority concerned. I hope a sympathetic consideration may kindly be made in this respect. Thanking you. Yours Sincerely, A. N. Rana Dt. 16. 3. 1978 Bh ad ra k. It is significant to note that although according to the prosecution case the petitioner had committed criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 28,629. 01, the petitioner is alleged to have confessed that he misappropriated only a sum of Rs. 13,000/ -. Further, according to the weekly accounts return (Ext. 16. 3. 1978 Bh ad ra k. It is significant to note that although according to the prosecution case the petitioner had committed criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 28,629. 01, the petitioner is alleged to have confessed that he misappropriated only a sum of Rs. 13,000/ -. Further, according to the weekly accounts return (Ext. 3), the petitioner did not account for Rs. 11,834. 27, yet he confessed to have misappropriated a sum of Rs. 13,000/ -. Why and how the above discrepancy occurred has not been explained by the prosecution. Undoubtedly P. W. 3, the immediate superior officer of the petitioner and who was responsible for his appointment, was vitally interested in the prosecution case because, he himself was under employment of the FACOR. It was his duty to safeguard the pecuniary interest of the company he represented. Although, there is no documentary evidence that P. W. 4 was responsible for appointment of the petitioner and on his recommendation P. W. 3 gave the appointment, yet P. W. 4 was no less interested in the FACOR because, according to his own admission he was a Contractor under the company. Thus, there is no corroboration from independent sources that the alleged extra judicial confession was made and Ext. 5 was written by the petitioner voluntarily. The F. I. R. (Ext. 9) was lodged on 17. 3. 1978 and the alleged extra judicial confession was said to have been made on 16. 3. 1978. The possibility cannot be ruled out that all the while the petitioner was under pressure and a police report against him was hanging like the sword of Damocles over his head. This being the position, it was not unlikely that under pressure and in order that a criminal proceeding against him could be averted, he wrote out Ext. 5. The most important question in this case is whether P. W. 3 was a person in authority within the meaning of section 24 of the Evidence Act. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to Mst. Viran Wali v. State,1 in which Fazi Ali, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench held as follows: The question as to who is person in authority does not seem to be free from difficulty. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to Mst. Viran Wali v. State,1 in which Fazi Ali, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench held as follows: The question as to who is person in authority does not seem to be free from difficulty. There is no doubt the view of the Patna High Court that a person in authority is one who is in charge of prosecuting, conducting, or defending cases. There is on the other hand a number of authorities which seem to have taken a more liberal view of the matter. In Bhagabaticharan v. Emperor,2 which is a Full Bench decision, it bas been laid down, that even a superior officer of an accused is a person in authority. To the same effect is a later decision of the same court reported in Gunga Prarad v. Emperor. 3 To the same effect is also the decision reported in Loung Rashid v. Emperor. 4 In Emperor v. Attursing,5 manager of the office where the accused was employed was held to be person in authority. Similar seems to be the view of the Lahore High Court in the case reported as Mahomed v. Emperor. 6 In E. D. Smith v. Emperor,7 it was held that the words person in authorityt are wider in the meaning than the actual prosecutor. I, therefore, propose to construe the words person in authority in the light of the decisions mentioned above. An identical view was taken by this Court in a case reported in Abhiram Jagadev v. State. 8 In that case it was held that an extra judicial confessional statement made before a superior officer who is a person in authority is inadmissible in evidence. So, on a liberal interpretation, P. W. 3 being the superior officer of the petitioner was in a position to weild authority and influence him and so he was a person in authority within the meaning of section 24 of the Evidence Act. As already referred to above, it was not unlikely that pressure or inducement was brought upon the petitioner by P. W. 3 on 16. 3. 1978 to write out Ext. 5 and then submit the F. I. R. (Ext. 9) on the next day. As already referred to above, it was not unlikely that pressure or inducement was brought upon the petitioner by P. W. 3 on 16. 3. 1978 to write out Ext. 5 and then submit the F. I. R. (Ext. 9) on the next day. Last of all, it would be useful to refer to State of U. P. v. M. K. Anthony,9 in which it was observed that the courts have considered the evidence of extra judicial confession a weak piece of evidence unless the evidence thereof comes from the mouth of witness! witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. As already discussed above with reference to the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4, their statements with regard to extra judicial confession cannot be said to be unbiased, free from interestedness and absolutely above board. For the aforesaid reasons, I consider it unsafe to rely upon the retracted extra judicial confession to support the petitioners conviction. ( 9 ) FROM the statement of the petitioner under section 313 Cr. P. C. it appears that although he admitted that he had a balance cash of Rs. 11,834. 27 on 4. 3. 1978 and had also received Rs. 3,891/- from P. W. 9 and Rs. 7,830/- from P. W. 12, yet he did not commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the aforesaid amounts. According to the principle laid down in Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and Another v. State of Bombay,1 to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure, in breach of an obligation, to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other- circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure, in breach of an obligation, to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other- circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or over which he had dominion, even when a duty to count is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made. Ordinarily, in a straight case, in view of the admission of the petitioner referred to above and the settled principle, it would have been easy for a court of law to reach the conclusion that the petitioner had committed criminal breach of trust, but for the suspicious circumstances referred to above and the further fact as deposed to by P. W. 8 that there was no misappropriation at all. In this connection, I would profitably quote the evidence of P. W. 8 who was the Accountant of the FACOR at Bhadrak office to which the petitioner was responsible. He was supposed to know about the state of affairs relating to the cash transactions. He stated in his cross- examination thus: Final accounts documents are maintained in my head office at Tumsar. The cash extracts are submitted weekly. The accounts extracts after 4. 3. 1978 is also available in my Bhadrak office. I have been examined by the police. All transactions in cash including weekly payments to the labourers and debit vouchers after expenditure are mentioned in the accounts extracts. Before being examined by the police I verified the accounts of Baula office. I have not noticed any misappropriation of money by the accused though I verified the accounts. I have made the cash verification personally during the tenureship of the accused as Accounts Assistant in Boula Office. After the institution of this case the accused was discharged. These cash books which I have produced today have not been seen by the police. I have not noticed any misappropriation of money by the accused though I verified the accounts. I have made the cash verification personally during the tenureship of the accused as Accounts Assistant in Boula Office. After the institution of this case the accused was discharged. These cash books which I have produced today have not been seen by the police. (emphasis supplied) Even though the 5uspicious circumstances earlier referred to, for some reason or other can be discarded in view of the specific admission of the petitioner in his statement under section 313 Or. P. C. , yet it is very difficult for the prosecution to get over the categorical statement of P. W. 8, the Accountant of the FACOR of Bhadrak office to the effect that there was no misappropriation of any amount, much Jess the amount of Rs. 28,629. 01 as mentioned in the charge-sheet or the sum of Rs. 27,527. 01 which finds mention in the charge. The evidence of P. W. 8 offers sufficient explanation for existence of the cash which was not misappropriated by the petitioner. I do not find any ground whatsoever to disbelieve the aforesaid evidence of P. W. 8 nor was any explanation offered by the prosecution for discarding the same. Once the evidence of P. W. 8 is accepted, there is absolutely no case of criminal breach of trust against the petitioner. ( 10 ) FROM the foregoing discussion of the prosecution evidence, the suspicious circumstances, and the evidence of P. W. 8 to the effect that there was no misappropriation of any amount by the petitioner, it is not possible to hold that a case under section 408 I. P. C. was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The learned courts below did not make a deep study of the case, overlooked the suspicious circumstances and did not make any reference to the evidence of P. W. 6 which supported the petitioner. Therefore, they arrived at an erroneous conclusion which though concurrent cannot be accepted in revision. ( 11 ) IN the result, the criminal revision is allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner under section 408 I. P. C. is set aside. He is acquitted and is set at liberty. Fine if realized may be refunded. The bail bond is discharged. .