Judgment N.P. SINGH, J. This appeal has been filed for setting aside the judgment of a learned Judge of this Court in a writ application filed on behalf of the petitioners-respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondents’) for quashing the notifications under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), acquiring the lands belonging to the said respondents for the appellant. The application aforesaid was allowed by the learned Judge and the two notifications under challenge were quashed. 2. The notifications under section 4 of the Act, was issued on 28.1.1980 by the Additional Collector, Ranchi, saying that 3.47 acres of land mentioned in the notification was to be acquired for extension of Krishi Vigyan Kendra of the appellant at the cost of the appellant. On 29.4.1980, objection under section 5A of the Act, was filed. On 8.6.1981, the Additional Collector allowed the said objection and dropped the proceeding. The appellant filed a petition before the State Government for setting aside of the order of the Additional Collector dropping the proceeding for acquisition. The State Government, by its order dat9d 31.3.1983, set aside the aforesaid order of the Additional Collector and directed that the declaration under section 6 of the Act, be published after getting an agreement executed between the appellant and the State Government in accordance with section 41 of the Act. A declaration under section 6 of the Act, was issued the same day, i.e. on 31.3.1983. That declaration under section 6 of the Act, was challenged by the respondents in the writ application aforesaid. The learned Judge has quashed the notification under section 6 of the Act, on the ground that the order passed by the Additional Collector allowing the objection of the respondents had been set aside by the State Government without hearing the respondents. It has also been held that the acquisition was not for any public purpose. 3. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondents about the maintainability of this appeal. It was submitted that when ever a land is acquired for any -company including any registered society, such company or the society shall neither be a person interested in the land or the compensation to be paid, nor such company or society can be held to be a person aggrieved if the proceeding for acquisition is dropped. It was submitted that when ever a land is acquired for any -company including any registered society, such company or the society shall neither be a person interested in the land or the compensation to be paid, nor such company or society can be held to be a person aggrieved if the proceeding for acquisition is dropped. In other words; whenever steps for acquisition of any land is taken under the provisions of the Act, the dispute as to whether such land be acquired and as to what amount should be paid as compensation, is between the person or persons claiming interest in the land and the State Government. According to respondents it makes hardly any difference whether the land is being acquired by the State Government for its own use or for a company after an agreement has been entered into between the State Government and such company. In support of the aforesaid contention reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation V. Chandulal Shamal das Patell. In that case the notification issued under the Act, for acquiring some lands for a Municipal Corporation had been quashed by the High Court. An appeal had been filed on behalf of the Municipal Corporation before the Supreme Court which was dismissed as not maintainable observing as follows: “We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent." 4. It may be pointed out that in the case of Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. V. F.V. Coutinho the Supreme Court considered that very question, in detail, and after referring to judgments of different High Courts and an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunderlal V. Paramsukhdas it was observed as follows :- "Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of 'person interested" must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. Now can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital. For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him....................We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person fur whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefore because both these factors Concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by S. 18(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench." Unfortunately the attention of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court who decided the aforesaid case of Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. V. F. V. Coutinho (Supra) was not drawn to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation V, Chandulal Shamaldar Patel (Supra). 5. On behalf Of the respondents it was urged that although the later judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. V. F. V. Continho (Supra) is more well discussed and reasoned one, still it is not open to this Court to ignore the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court. According to the well settled principles; if the later judgment of the Supreme: Court has not noticed an earlier judgment which is contrary to the view taken in the tater judgment, then High Courts nave to follow the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court. As such a very embarrasing situation has arisen before us. According to the well settled principles; if the later judgment of the Supreme: Court has not noticed an earlier judgment which is contrary to the view taken in the tater judgment, then High Courts nave to follow the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court. As such a very embarrasing situation has arisen before us. But it can be pointed out that in the case of Municipal Corporation V. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (Supra) the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to an earlier three Judges judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunderlal V. Paramsukhdas (Supra) 1968 Supreme Court 366. In the case of Sunderlal V. Paramsukhdas (Supra), after referring to the definition of person interested under section 3(b) of the Act, it was observed as follows :- “It will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition. It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas is a "person interested “within Section 3(b) of the Act, because he claims an interest in compensation.................." "It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the reference made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections. Within section 21 He was accordingly entitled to be made a party." It may be mentioned that aforesaid Paramsukhdas who was held to be a person interested, had neither any interest in the land nor had he made any claim before the Collector for compensation when the dispute was referred to the Civil Court. Mr. Paramsukhdas wanted to be added as a party as he claimed part of the compensation which was payable to the person interested in the land on the basis of a decree in his favour against the person so interested in land. Mr. Paramsukhdas wanted to be added as a party as he claimed part of the compensation which was payable to the person interested in the land on the basis of a decree in his favour against the person so interested in land. In my opinion, in the aforesaid case (Paramsukhdas), the Supreme Court had considered the scope of person interested and had come to the conclusion that the definition being an inclusive one should be given a liberal interpretation so as to include even a person who has no interest in land which is being acquired, but becomes a person interested by claiming an interest in compensation to be awarded. In the case of Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. V. F. V. Coutinho (Supra), the same view was reiterated, pointing out that can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested. Unfortunately the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunderlal V. Paramsukhdas (Supra), on which great reliance was placed in the case of Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. V. F. V. Coutinho (Supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges deciding the case of Municipal Corporation V. Chandulal Shomaldas Patel (Supra). In the aforesaid background, I am of the view that it is open to this Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunderlal V. Paramsukhdas (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 366) and Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. V. F. V. Coutinho (AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1118). The result will be that it has to be held that the appeal filed on behalf of the appellant is maintainable and it cannot be dismissed on that ground. 6. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the learned Judge should not have quashed the declaration under section 6 of the Act, on the ground that State Government sat aside the order of the Additional Collector without hearing the petitioners when there was no such requirement under section 5-A of the Act. 6. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the learned Judge should not have quashed the declaration under section 6 of the Act, on the ground that State Government sat aside the order of the Additional Collector without hearing the petitioners when there was no such requirement under section 5-A of the Act. In order to appreciate this contention it is advisable to refer to certain provisions of the Act, and the amendments which have been introduced by Land Acquisition (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bihar Amendment Act') Section 4 vests power in the appropriate Government to issue a preliminary notification saying that a particular land is needed for a public purpose. By the Bihar Amendment Act, a different mode of issuance of notification has been prescribed which is not of much relevance for the present case. Section 5-A of the Act, contains provisions regarding filing of objection by the persons interested in the land in question and consideration of the objection by the collector and appropriate Government. Sub-section (2) of section 5-A is as follows:- "(2) Every objection under subsection (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4, Sub-section (1), Or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final." The aforesaid sub-section (2) of section 5-A has been substituted by Bihar Amendment Act, by following subsection (2): "(2)(i) Every objection under sub-section (1) be made in writing to the Collector who shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and ma king such further enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, decide the objection: Provided that the appropriate Government may, either of its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the land call for the record of the proceedings held by the Collector and pass such order as it may think fit. (ii) The order of the appropriate Government and subject to such order the decision of the Collector, under clause (i) shall be final." 7. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that Section 5-A of the Act, requires the Collector to give an opportunity to the objector of being heard in person or by a pleader before the decision is taken on the objection but it does not conceive hearing the objector at two stages, one at the stage of the enquiry by the Collector and other at the stage when final decision is taken by the State Government. It was pointed out that admittedly the respondents were heard by the Additional Collector as such there was no necessity of hearing them again by the State Government It was urged that the Bihar Amendment Act, has not made any substantial difference so far the question of hearing the objectors are concerned. 8. From a bare reference to substituted sub-section (2) of section 5-A by the Bihar Amendment Act, which is in force in the State of Bihar, it shall appear that the Collector has been vested not only with the power of hearing the objectors but also with the power of deciding the objections' In other words, whereas under the Bihar Act, Collector has been vested with the power to decide the objections finally, subject to any order being passed by the State Government no such power has been vested under the Central Act. There the Collector after hearing the objectors and after making enquiries has no submit a report to the appropriate Government and decision on the objection has to submit a report to the appropriate Government and decision on the objection has to be taken by the appropriate Government. The proviso to section 5-A (2) (i) of the Bihar Amendment Act, empowers the appropriate Government as follows:- "Either of its own motion or on the application of any person interested in the land, call for the record of the proceedings held by the Collector and pass such order as it may think fit." On a plain reading the proviso aforesaid vests a supervisory power in the appropriate Government; under exercise of that power the appropriate Government may call for the record of any proceeding held by the Collector and can pass any order as the appropriate Government may think fit including setting aside the order in question. In view of the proviso aforesaid neither it has been urged nor could have been urged On behalf of the respondents that State Government could not have set aside the order dated 8-6-1981 passed by the Additional Collector dropping the proceeding, But the question which remains to be answered is as to whether any decision of the Additional Collector could have been set aside by the State Government without affording an opportunity to the respondents in whose favour the objection under section 5-A had been decided by the Additional Collector. Once it is held that the Collector has been empowered under the Bihar Amendment to decide the objection, any order passed by the Collector shall be deemed to be a final, subject to any order which may be passed by the appropriate Government under exercise of the power under proviso to section 5-A (2)(i). But the finality of the decision of the Collector shall not a wait or be kept under abeyance till it is approved or set aside by the appropriate Government. 9. Now it has to be examined as to whether in such a situation it is obligatory on the part of the appropriate Government before setting aside the order under section 5-A (2)(i) passed in favour of the objector, to hear the objector. 9. Now it has to be examined as to whether in such a situation it is obligatory on the part of the appropriate Government before setting aside the order under section 5-A (2)(i) passed in favour of the objector, to hear the objector. It is well known that even if the statute concerned does not say in so many words that a party likely to be affected by the exercise of the power under a particular provision should be heard, that requirement has to be read because it shall be deemed to be an implicit obligation. This is all the more necessary when the exercise of the power is a quasi judicial in nature. Supreme Court in the case of Gopalkrishna V. State of M.P. while saying that rule 54 did not in express terms lays down that the authority shall give to the employees concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order; held that the very nature of the function implies the court to Act, judicially." It was observed" in such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action, proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice." In the well known case of Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India it was observed as follows: "Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness is order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied ......" It was pointed out that although the Passport Act, 1977 did not provide that before impounding a passport the person concerned ought to be heard, it was held that as the power conferred on passport authority was quasi judicial in nature the rules of natural justice would, in the circumstances, be applicable in the exercise or the power of impounding a passport. In that connection it was pointed out that even if that power was held to be administrative in character in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Krai Pak V. Union of India the same result must follow. In the case of I.T. Commissioner, Calcutta V. B. N. Bhattacharjee, it was observed «law leans in favour of natural justice where statutory interdict does not forbid it." 10. In the case of Bishwanath Pd. V. The Municipal Board, Chapra through the Special Officer, Chapra a Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the scope of section 198 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, which empowers the authorities of the Municipality to demolish the unauthorised construction. In that context it was observed" although the sections in question do not say in so many words, yet in my opinion, the requirement to show cause is implicit in those sections specially under section 198. The Magistrate has to issue notice to the person against whom he proposes to pass an order under that section and in case any show cause is filed in pursuance of the said notice it is incumbent on the Magistrate concerned to hear the parties in question. The same view was reiterated in the case of Liknath V. Municipal Commissioners. In my opinion, once the power of the Collector while considering the objection filed by the person interested is held to be quasi judicial in nature and the power of the State Government under the proviso aforesaid is he]d to be supervisory/revisional in nature, it is too late to urge that while setting aside a final order passed by the Collector allowing the objection of the person interested, the State Government is not required to give an opportunity to the persons, in whose favour the order which is sought to be set aside had been passed, of being held before such order is set aside. The position under the Bihar Amendment Act, is different from one I under section 5-A(2) of the Central Act, where Collector has no power to decide the objection but has to refer the objection to the appropriate Government after hearing the parties concerned and after making enquiry in respect of the objection so filed. The position under the Bihar Amendment Act, is different from one I under section 5-A(2) of the Central Act, where Collector has no power to decide the objection but has to refer the objection to the appropriate Government after hearing the parties concerned and after making enquiry in respect of the objection so filed. In my view, when the proviso vests powers in the appropriate Government to call for the records of any proceeding on its own motion or on the application of any person interested it is a power in the nature of supervisory or revisional jurisdiction which has to be exercised in accordance with well settled norms in respect of exercise of quasi judicial power. The person in whose favour decision has been taken by the Collector, has to be given an opportunity to show cause why the order in question be not set aside by the appropriate Government, There is no dispute that the order passed by the Collector accepting the objection of the petitioners has been set aside on a petition filed by the appellant without affording any opportunity to the respondents to support that order. As such the learned Judge rightly quashed the order dated 31.3.1983 passed by the State Government and quashed the notification under section 6 based on such order. 11. The declaration of acquisition under section 6 of the Act, has been challenged even on the ground that it was against the requirement of sections 39 and 41 of the Act. Section 41 provides that if the appropriate Government is satisfied in respect of the proposed acquisition for any company "it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government, providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government" about the payment to the appropriate Government of the cost of acquisition, the transfer, on such payment, of the land to the company, the terms on which the land shall be held by the company etc. Section 39 of the Act, is as follows: "39. Previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement necessary. Section 39 of the Act, is as follows: "39. Previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement necessary. The provisions of Sections 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned." In view of section 39, the provisions of sections 6 to 37 is not to be put in force, in order to acquire land for any Company, unless the Company has executed the agreement in accordance with section 41 of the Act. In view of sections 39 and 41 before a declaration of acquisition is made under section 6 an agreement has to be executed between the Company and the appropriate Government in accordance with section 41 of the Act. I am unable to appreciate as to how the decision of the Collector allowing the objection of the petitioners was set aside by the State Government on 31.3.1983 and the Commissioner at Ranchi was directed from Patna to get the agreement executed and thereafter to make declaration under section 6 of the Act. It is being claimed by the appellant that agreement was executed on 31.3.1983 itself and thereafter the notification of declaration of acquisition under section 6 of the Act, has also been made on 31.3.1983 at Ranchi. Normally all this is not possible on the same day. On behalf of the respondents it was pointed out that in the copy of the agreement alleged to have been executed between the State Government and the appellant, a copy of which has been annexed on behalf of the appellant, there is no signature of any authority on behalf of the State and as such it cannot be held to be an agreement within the meaning of section 41 of the Act. I am inclined to accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that an agreement in accordance with law had not been executed before the declaration under section 6 of the Act, was issued. 12. On behalf of the appellant it was then submitted that the learned Judge while allowing the writ application, should have only directed the State Government, to give an opportunity to the respondents of being heard and should not have quashed even the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. 12. On behalf of the appellant it was then submitted that the learned Judge while allowing the writ application, should have only directed the State Government, to give an opportunity to the respondents of being heard and should not have quashed even the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. There is substance in this contention. The learned Judge has quashed even the notifications under section 4 of the Act, because, according to him, the acquisition itself was not for a public purpose, The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, however, could not urge before us, in view of the several judgments of the Supreme Court, that acquisition for Company could not be held to be for a public purpose. But a new stand has been taken on behalf of the respondents in this appeal. It was submitted that as the period of three years has admittedly expired from the day the notification under section 4(1) was issued or served on the persons interested in view of the first proviso to section 6(1) of the Act, which was introduced in the year 1967, now no declaration under section 6 of the Act, even after hearing the respondents can be made by the State Government. 13. 13. Section 6(1) of the Act, at present is as follows: "6(1) Subject of Part VII to the provisions of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5-A, subsection (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its order and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been mad", (whether required) under section 5-A, sub-section (2): Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967(1 of 1967) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority." The first proviso mentioned above fixing a period of three years for issuance of declaration under Section 6 was introduced in the Central Act, by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967. But before that Section 6 (1) of the Central Act, had been substituted by the Bihar Amendment Act, of 1960 as follows: "(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act, where the appropriate Government IS satisfied after considering the Collector's report, if any under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 5-A or the Collector is satisfied after hearing the objection, if any, under Section 5-A particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for Company a declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government or the Collector, as the case may be, to that effect in writing: Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by the Company wholly or partly out of the Consolidated Fund of the State or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. (ii) in subsection (3), after the words "appropriate Government", the words "or in the Collector, as the case may be", shall be substituted". 14. The proviso which was introduced in the year 1967 says in clear and unambiguous terms that no declaration under section 6 in respect of any particular land, covered by a notification under section 4(1) of the Act, published after the commencement of the aforesaid 1967 Amendment Act, shall be r made after expiry of three years from the date of such publication. On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that this proviso will be operative even in the State of Bihar because it has been introduced in the Central Act, after the Bihar Amendment Act, of 1960. Reference in, this connection was made to the proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution which empowers the Parliament to add or to amend any law made by the Legislature of the State. It was submitted that the period of Limitation of three years prescribed by the Parliament in the aforesaid proviso; which was introduced in 1967, in respect of notification under section 4, for all practical purposes, is a substantive provision and as such it shall be deemed that the said provision has been added to section 6 as substituted by the Bihar Amendment Act, 1960, in exercise of the powers under proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution. 15. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant could not urge that after coming into force of the Bihar Amendment Act, 1960, substituting sub-section (1) of section 6, Parliament could not have made a law adding Or amending such Bihar Amendment Act. But, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Parliament had to say specifically that the amendment introduced by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, shall be deemed to have been added to the amendment introduced by Bihar Amendment Act, 1960. But, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Parliament had to say specifically that the amendment introduced by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, shall be deemed to have been added to the amendment introduced by Bihar Amendment Act, 1960. Article 254- (2) of the Constitution is as follows :- "254(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament Or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State; Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State." In the case of T. Barai V. Henry Ah Hoe while discussing the scope of Article 254 of the Constitution Supreme Court observed as follows: "Article 254 of the Constitution makes provision firstly, as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Central and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List, and secondly, for resolving such conflict. Article 254(1) enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter. Clause (1) lays down that if a State law relating to a concurrent subject is 'repugnent' to a Union law relating to that subject then, whether the Union law is prior or later in time, the Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. To the general rule laid down in Clause (1). Clause (2) engrafts an exception, viz., that if the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his consideration, it will prevail not-withstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union, both laws dealing with a concurrent subject. In such a case, the Central Act, will give way to the State Act, only to the extent of inconsistency between the two and no more. In such a case, the Central Act, will give way to the State Act, only to the extent of inconsistency between the two and no more. In short, the result of obtaining the assent of the President to a State Act, which is inconsistent with a previous Union law relating to a concurrent subject would be that the State Act, will prevail in that State and override the provisions of the Central Act, in their applicability to that State only. The predominance of the State law may however be taken away if Parliament legislates under the proviso to Clause (2). The proviso to Article 251 (2) empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State' law even though it has become valid by virtue of the may repeal or amend the repugnant State law; either directly, or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the State law with respect to the 'same matter'. Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does not expressly repeal a State law, even then the State law will become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made." Reference in this connection may also be made to the case of Zavcrbhai Amaidas V. State of Bombay (AIR 1954 Supreme Court 7521 where the scope of Article 254 (2) was considered. Under proviso to Article 254 (2) Parliament has power to add or amend any Act, made by the Legislature of the State. As such no sooner the amendment was introduced in the year 1967, by adding a proviso in the Central Act, it shall be deemed that the said proviso has been added in section 6 as amended by Bihar Amendment Act, 1960 As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of T. Barai V. Henry Ah Hoe (Supra), even where the subsequent law made by the Parliament does not expressly repeal a State law the subsequent law made by Parliament shall prevail. As such limitation of three years introduced in 1967 in the Central Act, shall be deemed to have been also introduced in section 6 (1) as substituted by Bihar Amendment Act, 1960. Although this question was riot raised before the learned Judge but as it is a pure question of law and the respondents are entitled to support the judgment of the learned Judge, on reasons other than mentioned in the judgment. Although this question was riot raised before the learned Judge but as it is a pure question of law and the respondents are entitled to support the judgment of the learned Judge, on reasons other than mentioned in the judgment. I had to take note of this submission as well. The notification under section 4 (1) was issued on 28.1.1980, objection under section 5-A of the Act, as filed on 29.4.1980. As such when the writ application was heard and allowed in September, 1985 the period of three years and already expired. In my view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, after quashing the notification under section 6 of the Act, the learned Judge has rightly quashed even notification under section 4 (1) of the Act, because now the State Government even after hearing the respondents cannot direct issuance of notification of declaration under section 6 of the Act. 16. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to Casts. Appeal dismissed.